

## A REPORT ON A TRIP TO AFRICA MAY 11 - JUNE 10, 1967

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### Purpose Of The Trip

This was my first trip to Africa since Zambian independence in October, 1964 and marked my eleventh one since 1954. Most of my time was spent in three places - Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Kinshasa and their environs. Briefer periods of time were spent in Nairobi, Lagos and Accra. In spite of the fact that most of my waking hours have to do with African affairs and that in the ordinary course of daily events I am in conversation with many African leaders and others who frequently are specialists in African affairs, nothing takes the place of spending a period of time on the continent in direct contact with the situation there.

The primary purposes of this trip were threefold:

1. To contact all of the liberation movements in southern Africa, to talk with their leaders, visit their headquarters. This was a major objective of the trip.
2. Generally get the feel of the atmosphere in Africa at the present time.
3. To look into possible projects both for the Africa Defense and Aid Fund of the American Committee on Africa, and possible projects for the African Aid and Legal Defense Fund.

Among the many individuals with whom I talked at some length on this trip, I would particularly mention the following:

President Julius Nyerere and Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa of the Republic of Tanzania; President Kenneth Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia; Tom Myboya, Minister of Planning and Economic Development in Kenya; Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, President of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo); Kanyana Chiume, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for Malawi; Yatuta Chisiza, former Minister of Defense in Malawi; Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the African National Congress of South Africa (A.N.C.); Z.B. Molete and A.B. Ngcobo of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (P.A.C.); Dr. Agostinho Neto, President of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); James Chikerema and George Sifundika, of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU); Herbert Chitepo, of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); Emil Appolus and Solomon Mafimi of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO); Holden Roberto, President of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE); Mr. Bobo, in charge of foreign affairs for the Revolutionary Committee for Mozambique (COREMO); Smart Chata, First Vice-President of National Union for the Total Independence of

Angola (UNITA); Rev. David Grenfell, former British Baptist Missionary in Angola who was deported by the Portuguese and is now working among Angolan refugees in the Congo; Godfrey Amachree, a lawyer in Lagos and formerly with the U.N. Secretariat; K.A. Gbedemah, former Minister of Finance in the government formed by the Convention Peoples Party in Ghana; a number of American officials connected with our embassies in Africa.

#### General Observations on the Liberation Movements

1. The main centers for the liberation movements are in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, and virtually all of the movements have offices in these two cities. The main exception would be the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) with its headquarters in Kinshasa, although I understand it will be opening up an office in Lusaka sometime soon. The MPLA has its principal office in Brazzaville, although it has offices also in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. At the moment the South West African National Union (SWANU) does not seem to have an office in either Dar es Salaam or Lusaka. Many of these organizations also have offices in Cairo where SWANU is represented, but I did not visit Cairo on this trip.

It is quite obvious, of course, why Dar and Lusaka are the centers for the liberation movements. Both countries are sympathetic to and supportive of the movements struggling for freedom in south Africa. Zambia is more restricted in its support than is Tanzania primarily, I suppose, because Zambia is in such a delicate position, surrounded as it is by Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, not to mention touching on the Caprivi Strip ruled by South Africa. Zambia maintains a little tighter control on the liberation movements than does Tanzania. Zambia, for example, does not permit any military training camps in its territory, whereas, it is pretty common knowledge that there are such camps in Tanzania. Furthermore, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) has its base of operation in Tanzania. The offices of the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam are scattered around in the central area of the city in various small offices maintained with government support. In Lusaka, the government supports what is called a Liberation Centre where virtually all of the movements have their offices. One exception is a relatively new Angolan organization, UNITA, which has not been recognized yet by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, and maintains a separate office. Also, ZAPU has a larger office at another place near the center of the city in addition to the small office at the Centre.

2. In my discussions both with leaders of the liberation movements and government figures, I felt there was a new mood and outlook towards the struggle ahead for liberation in southern Africa. There was a new realism, which perhaps would be descriptive of the mood. In contrast to the mood of two or three years ago when liberation leaders would frequently claim they intended to mount an attack which would win victory in the foreseeable future, now the leaders were talking about a long and difficult process.

The leaders of FRELIMO, for example, although carrying on military action inside Mozambique, talked in terms of what might happen within the next 10 years. No target date for the achievement of their goal of independence was suggested. The leaders of the A.N.C., although determined and working very hard to achieve their goal, do not see the end in sight. The leaders of the Rhodesian movements, both ZAPU and ZANU, said in effect "the testing time has come for us. It will be a long hard struggle, we hope that we are up to it."

This mood could not be interpreted as one of discouragement because the determination to carry on the struggle is definitely there. But the objective facts of the situation have made it useless for these movements and their leaders not to recognize the tremendous odds against them. The South African regime has increased its strength both economically, militarily and politically. Sanctions against Rhodesia are not making a tremendous impact and do not threaten to break down the Ian Smith regime. The U.N. does not have the power, especially without any determination from Western Countries, to implement resolutions on South West Africa. The Organization of African Unity is a very weak vessel. The various African independent states have so many overwhelming problems of their own, they can give little except fringe support to the various liberation movements. This realization is now causing virtually everyone of the African leaders to say "We can no longer look for any significant support from outside ourselves. We must do the job ourselves." There will be less talk in the future about an African liberation army coming from the independent states. There will be less reliance on what the U.N. might do to support movements for independence. The liberation committee of O.A.U. has a certain degree of influence among the liberation movements, but I have the impression that this is decreasing rather than increasing. The major reason for this is that most of the movements receive a very small portion of their needed funds from the O.A.U. Many of the African independent states are not contributing as they are supposed to to the liberation fund. And yet when the liberation movements approach any particular government for direct assistance, the reply frequently comes back that government will contribute only through the O.A.U. Some funds do, of course, come from the Liberation Committee. One organization told me, for example, that they received about 20% of their budget. The various movements do attempt to receive recognition by the O.A.U. only because they get a minimum financial assistance this way, and it also helps to establish them in an official sense. Neither UNITA nor COREMO have been officially recognized by the O.A.U., as yet.

All of the persons with whom I talked, not surprisingly of course, were convinced of the ultimate victory of their cause. Now the basic question is what the nature of the struggle will be, how ideological and how bitter. Kenneth Kaunda perhaps expresses the feelings of most when he says that the struggle will be violent, it will take on the tone of racialism and of ideology. He also expresses the feelings of most when he says that the Western countries are losing out by maintaining their neutrality in the struggle. With increased support from Eastern countries coming to the liberation movements, the struggle will increasingly take on an ideological

cast and therefore as the racial struggle intensifies, it is very likely to take on a cold war aspect with East and West again dividing against one another with the West tending to back the white minority regimes.

Both Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda have made the observation that the beginning of the break in colonialism and white minority domination in southern African would most likely come in Portuguese territories. And guerilla fighting is incontestably taking place in northern Mozambique led by the FRELIMO forces, and there is a probability that COREMO is involved in some fighting in a front adjacent to the Zambian border. All three Angolan organizations - GRAE, MPLA, and UNITA - make claims of increased fighting in various parts of Angola. GRAE has a significant degree of control in the northern portion of Angola and is reaching further south. Holden Roberto claims that they have control of about 250 thousand square kilometers or about one-fifth of the territory of Angola. And they are opening up a new front in the eastern and southern portion of Angola. The MPLA speaks about three fronts - one in Cabinda, one in the north and one in the east. When I visited the GRAE headquarters in Kinshasa I was shown two Portuguese prisoners of war who were captured in February and March of this year, one of them as far south as Ambriz. They had been kept at the military base at Kinkuzu, but were brought to Kinshasa when the Committee Of 24 of the U.N. arrived on the scene.

When I raised the question with Oliver Tambo as to whether he felt liberation might come to Portuguese territories first, he commented that the Portuguese and South African struggles would help one another. As things progressed in South Africa, this would be a help to those who are struggling in the Portuguese territories, and vice versa.

3. It is rather obvious from what I have reported so far that there is increased emphasis upon the necessity of violence in the liberation movements. Not one of the movements' leadership is talking in terms of non-violence anymore. They are completely committed to training any young men they can for guerilla warfare. It is not wise at this particular moment in history, especially with the background of CIA exposures for an American to begin probing too deeply into where the military training camps are, how many men there are in training, what the methods of infiltration are into the dominated territories. I just did not try to raise these specific questions with the liberation leaders, in spite of the fact that I think my credentials are above suspicion with many of those whom I have known for so many years. Nevertheless, one glean enough from what one is told to know that there are military training camps in various African independent states and there are volunteers from the subjugated territories frequently getting training in the established armies of some of the independent states. There is also not much doubt that in the case of some of the liberation movements they have men in training in some eastern European countries, also in Asia. In Asia the training would not take place just in China, for example, but also in India. At this moment, liberation movements see no hope except by long term

preparation in guerilla fighting.

4. I came to the conclusion on this trip that any possible unity among competing groups working for the liberation of particular territories was further removed than ever. Various attempts have been made over a good many years now by African governmental leaders to try to bring unity about. Notably, Nkrumah made several attempts in this direction when he was President of Ghana. The O.A.U. has passed strong resolutions recommending this course and its Liberation Committee has called conferences to attempt to achieve some unity among contending groups. This has not had any success. There is no realistic talk any more about ZANU and ZAFU in Rhodesia getting together. They both have their central offices in Zambia. The Zambian government generally favors ZAFU over ZANU, but there is no real discrimination against ZANU. In fact, quite recently, ZANU has been permitted to make use of Zambian radio facilities for broadcasts into Rhodesia as ZAFU has been privileged to do for some time. (The Rhodesian government is jamming such broadcasts) A number of governmental leaders have become disgusted by the fact, especially in the Rhodesian case, that the organizations cannot get together. Nevertheless, they accept what is a fact, and say that they would support any group doing anything.

The relationship between the GRAE and the MPLA is worse than ever. There have been, comparatively recently, violent conflicts between the groups and some deaths have followed. It is rumored that the GRAE has some MPLA partisans under arrest at their military base in the Congo. An effort was being made to get UNITA to join GRAE, but the two groups could not agree on the method of unity. The GRAE wanted Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, to come to Kinshasa. Also GRAE wanted the members of UNITA to join their movement as individuals. UNITA, on the other hand, wanted to become the GRAE representatives in Zambia and wanted to join the government in exile en bloc. Although, these two movements have more in common with one another than either has with the MPLA, it is not very likely they will join forces soon.

Likewise, the ANC and the PAC, (also the Unity Movement of South Africa), are severely divided. Whatever the situation may be within any one of the countries, the movements in exile are further divided than they have ever been.

5. There tend to be informal alliances among various liberation movements from the different countries. By and large, they divide into two groups. One group includes FRELIMO, MPLA, ANC, SWAPO, and ZAFU. This group would also include the PAIGC from Portuguese Guinea. I have not dealt with this very significant organization because I was not able to stop in Conakry, Guinea on this trip where PAIGC has its headquarters. The other grouping includes PAC, COREMO, SWANU, GRAE, and ZANU.

Although it is not of primary importance, it is interesting to speculate as to the reasons for these informal working alliances. There seems to be no hard and fast lines for the particular alliances, but there are two explanations that apply to a considerable degree. The first is that the second group of organizations have among them a number that have split off from the parent bodies. This would apply to ZANU in relation to ZAPU, for example; for the PAC in relation to the ANC; for COREMO in relation to FRELIMO. It does not apply as far as the GRAE is concerned, nor SWANU. The second explanation has to do with the source of at least some financial assistance. Many of the movements in the first grouping receive considerable assistance from the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries. By and large, they do not receive significant support from the Chinese. The second grouping would tend to receive more support from the Chinese or at least would not be receiving support from Eastern European countries. It is doubtful that if one looks for a strict ideological split, one would find it. There is a certain tendency in the literature published by these movements to say that which would not be unpleasing to the countries which give significant support. Consequently, one finds that PAC literature tends to call the ANC revisionist which certainly would be rather pleasing to the Chinese. But African leaders and organizations are not primarily thinking along ideological lines and if one attempted to conclude that there was significant Communist influence in guiding the policies of these organizations one would be coming to a generally incorrect deduction. I was told by leaders in COREMO that although they had been to China and had gotten some assistance there, their relations were not very good at the present time. Roberto has apparently been invited to visit China, and perhaps he would like to go, but as long as he must depend upon maintaining a very solid relationship with the Congo government, he must be exceedingly careful about visiting China. It is curious that some of the movements which are purported to have been looked upon a little more favorably in Washington are also some of the same groups that have the reputation of being Chinese oriented. It is interesting to note that East/West differences don't have a particularly practical effect upon the politics of the liberation movements. The Chinese/Soviet split has a practical effect. The Western countries are just not a significant influence in the politics of liberation movements at this point in history.

#### Defense And Aid Projects

I am more than ever convinced, as a result of this trip, that it is essential for the American Committee on Africa to maintain a position of neutrality between the various liberation movements. This is not easy to do. There is a natural tendency on the part of any one of us to have closer ties, or perhaps, more confidence, in some of the leaders than in others. A position of neutrality does not mean that we necessarily equally divide whatever funds we have among the various groups. But it does mean that if we receive a request from any one of the groups, and the particular project for which they are making a request seems to make sense, we should give it every sympathetic consideration. We are not in a position to supply any kind of military equipment, and we are not likely to receive any such requests seriously. The various movements are receiving their military support, not from non-governmental sources, but, directly from governments. We should continue to give major attention to legal defense, both in South Africa and in Rhodesia. In South Africa I think

most of this assistance should go through the International Defense and Aid Fund with which we are affiliated because they have maintained the best contacts on the inside. We also should continue to do what we can to aid the families of those who are in prison and also to help with correspondence courses for political prisoners.

Some of the movements, particularly in Rhodesia and South Africa, are establishing funds of their own which are kept quite separate from their organizational funds. This money is used for particular hardship cases with which they have to deal. I think that we ought to begin to give some funds through these specially set up committees as long as we are assured that funds would be used for purposes they are given.

I think also we should not hesitate to give money directly to the political organizations for certain projects. For example, I think we could very well support publications some of the organizations are issuing. Furthermore, I think that, as we have done to a limited extent in the past, if we can help the political organizations with land rovers or jeeps for their general use, we should not hesitate.

Particularly in the case of Angola and Mozambique, it seems to me we should try to help projects aimed at dealing with the people within the liberated areas of the countries fighting for freedom. For example, in the case of both Mozambique and Angola, there are schools being established inside. The teachers need some minimum pay and need equipment. We should try to respond to this. Also, some limited work of this kind can be done with medical supplies. We, of course, have had some experience with this in Angola.

I am not here listing specific projects to which we should recommend support at this moment. Nevertheless, I can back up most of the generalizations I have made with specific requests or a recommendation.

#### Miscellaneous Comments

1. Kamuzu Banda. All the liberation leaders, and such governmental figures as I talked with, felt that Banda was betraying their cause. They might have been able to understand the necessity for Banda to maintain some trade with South Africa and Rhodesia. But they do not understand why he has to make a crusade out of it, thus helping South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal in their world wide public relations efforts. I don't care to put on paper some of the rather strong descriptive denunciations of Banda I heard.
2. Ambassador William Attwood's book, The Reds and The Blacks. When I went through Kenya, this book, written by our former Ambassador to that country, had not yet been banned. I had a copy of it in my briefcase and had been reading it on the plane. The book was finally banned and it was causing

quite a stir in Kenya. Attwood had said in his book that he was attempting to speak ill of no one. And yet in repeating private conversations that he had with such people as Kenyatta and Diallo Telli, he put in print remarks which certainly can damage the relations of these two men with one another. To say the very least, it was most unwise for a former Ambassador to have written this kind of book, at least so soon after leaving his post. How he could have thought it would not have damaged relationships, I cannot understand.

3. The CIA controversy. I could write quite a bit on this, but on the whole, I was struck by the fact that as little attention was paid to it as seems to have been the case. I brought the question up with many people with whom I talked. Generally speaking, the response was that no one had been particularly surprised by the disclosures. They had rather assumed that CIA was active. Therefore, there had been no particular outcry against something that had been expected all along. Nevertheless, there was a little more bandying around of CIA charges than has been true on other trips I have taken in Africa. Nyerere told me that he had been somewhat amused by the response he got when he mentioned rather casually in a press conference that there were probably some CIA agents working through the Peace Corps. He said, (and I paraphrase him) "Perhaps I should not have said this. Nevertheless, it probably is true." He went on to say that as far as he was concerned the Peace Corps would be able to remain in Tanzania.
4. The Zambian/Tanzania Railroad. Both Nyerere and Kaunda said they felt it was a necessity to have this railroad. Apparently, a feasibility study which has been made by the U.S. came to the conclusion that it didn't make economic sense. Nevertheless, the two leaders of these countries are convinced that they must have it. They say that they would like to get it with Western capital but the Chinese are prepared to contribute and they would rather take help from the Chinese than not get the railroad at all. Nyerere and Kaunda have a close personal relationship with one another and meet not infrequently to discuss, and hopefully agree upon, such important projects as this railroad.
5. Comments on Kaunda and Zambia. I discussed with Kaunda his discussion with David Rockefeller on the question of private investment in South Africa. Kaunda was quite disturbed that he had been quoted as he has by Rockefeller as presumably favoring such private American investments. Kaunda's comment was that there might be some justification for this investment if it meant increased pay, breaking down of job reservation, etc. But he also commented that he did not think that this was possible. Therefore, the weight of what Kaunda had to say was opposed to the strategy of increased private investment in South Africa.

Kaunda commented that in some ways the problem with Rhodesia had been a blessing to Zambia. It has led Zambia, for example, to explore for coal

deposits and they have found a very rich bed. Within a year, he says, they will no longer be dependent even on Wankie coal from Rhodesia.

There are approximately 20,000 refugees in Zambia. Perhaps the largest number are Angolans and there may be as many as 10 thousand of them. There are also large numbers of Rhodesians, Mozambicans, and South and South West Africans. The refugees are maintained in camps near the borders. And a considerable amount of support comes through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

I was greatly struck again by the earnestness and simplicity of Kaunda. He and his family are now living in the State House which was built for the British governor in 1935. The Kaundas have nine (9) children. They live in only three (3) rooms of the State House. Kaunda doesn't want to become too accustomed to a palatial existence. I don't know how well his wife responds to this, but it is rather common knowledge that this is the living arrangement they have in the palatial set-up there.

One has the impression in Zambia that there is still considerable European influence. Nevertheless this is noticeably changing. Up to the time of independence, and for some time thereafter, there were still a large number of whites in Zambia who absolutely resisted the idea of living in a country controlled by an African government. From my general impression as well as my discussions with a good many people, I feel that this attitude is at least shifting from one of resistance to one of reluctant acceptance. The real diehard racialists have left either for Rhodesia or South Africa.

6. Nigeria. I spent only three (3) days in Lagos. Obviously, the situation there is very complicated and it is impossible to attempt to deal with it in this report. Suffice it to say that it seems almost inevitable that civil war will break out between the Federal Government and the Eastern Region. I talked with no one in Lagos who thought that this could be avoided. This may be just a prelude, not only to the breaking up of the federation of Nigeria, but a precursor to the beginnings of vast changes likely to take place in the map of Africa. If this can perhaps be looked upon in historical perspective, we recognize that the map of Africa was drawn by the colonial powers and it is rather inevitable that the colonial lines will be subjected to some strains and stresses as the African people exert themselves. Nevertheless, one would hope that the federation of Nigeria might be maintained and that enough agreement on the Constitution could be achieved so that the independent tendencies amongst the various peoples of Nigeria could be given full expression.
7. Ghana. I spent only three (3) days in Accra, and therefore, again, have only superficial impressions. It seems most unlikely that Nkrumah will be able to make a comeback. People generally recognize the contribution

that he made, not only to the Pan-African idea in Africa, but of course, to the independence of Ghana. But no leadership has arisen to take Nkrumah's place. The country is in a rather sad and dejected spirit at this moment in history. They have lost that verve and sense of direction which they had during the rising days of the CPP. They feel like a people who have lost face. It will take some time for a recovery and for a new sense of direction to be found.

8. The U.N. Committee of twenty-four (24) and the U.S. Position. While I was in Kinshasa the U.N. Committee of twenty-four (24), dealing with the problems of decolonization, arrived on the scene for hearings. In Kinshasa they were holding hearings primarily on the Angolan situation. I attended one day of this. Those who were testifying, in addition to describing the abuses and injustices of the Portuguese regime and the nature of the struggle they were carrying on, took occasion from time to time to point out that the United States and other Western countries were giving support to Portugal through NATO and in other ways. I spoke to members of the United States delegation. They were in a rather sad position and could really do nothing to hide it. They raised no questions at all of the petitioners, and probably will not, during the remainder of the tour of the Committee of twenty-four (24) in other cities. They are in the embarrassing position of having ties with Portugal and it would only be embarrassing to this relationship to ask questions of the petitioners. And yet the delegation felt very uncomfortable, as they should, when charges were made about their support to the Portuguese. All in all, it was rather sad for this American to see the United States delegation with so little to say and so little to contribute in the face of one of the great problems of the era in which we live.

#### Comments on What Our Strategy Should Be.

Referring primarily to the South African issue, because this will be the most difficult conflict to resolve in southern Africa, I make the following assumptions:

1. Apartheid will not be relaxed. The Police state will continue to expand to become more absolute in South Africa.
2. Although there will be some African States which will maintain trade ties openly with South Africa, on the whole there will be continued strained relations and enmity between the bulk of independent Africa and the Republic of South Africa.
3. Internal resistance to the regime will become better organized. Over a period of time, the liberation movements will grow in effectiveness.
4. A long and violent struggle will take place. There will not be one cataclysmic confrontation, but a series of outbreaks of struggles and riots  
*a series of outbreaks of struggles and riots*

over a period of time.

In the light of this, our strategy must be based on a recognition that <sup>there</sup> will not be, in the immediate future, one overriding crisis which will demand urgent action on the part of all the governments of the world, but a simmering situation which will be characterized by continued racism and abusiveness of the vast majority of people in South Africa.

It would be impossible under these circumstances for us, at this juncture in history, to talk realistically about an overall program of economic sanctions being adopted, either unilaterally or through the U.N. The tendency in the United States will be to recognize South Africa as an increasingly stable and as a sound area for investment. South Africa propaganda will make inroads into the opinions of Americans and increasingly South Africa will be looked upon as a benign, if somewhat mistaken, government, but committed to the West. In the light of this, American economic commitment is likely to become much greater over a period of time in South Africa. If one is working on the assumption that the struggle will grow in intensity, this increased investment and involvement will be a disastrous development. The kind of prophecy which Kenneth Kaunda makes for the struggle (both racial and ideological in character) in South Africa could indeed become a fact as we ourselves have been pointing out for some period of time.

I believe that the general policy which ACOA has been following for the last couple of years or so is a sound one. We cannot look forward to spectacular victories. We cannot realistically call for an overall program of economic sanctions with any hope of success. But we can try to move in the direction of economic disengagement unilaterally. We can urge an American policy against new investments. We can call for an end of the sugar quota and pulling our tracking stations out of South Africa. We must be satisfied to work on small but specific projects, where there is a chance for some degree of success.

I have tested this general line of strategy with many of our friends from the Nationalist movements in South Africa. They agree in the soundness of this approach. They have been impressed by the relative success of our bank campaign, and the victory that was won in the case of the aircraft carrier. This makes all the more important, not only the continuation, but the expansion of our work on the Washington scene.

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