

Rhodesia for your information

July 1966

The following Fact Sheet on the Rhodesian crisis growing out of the attempt of Ian Smith's government to maintain its unilaterally declared independence from Britain attempts to summarize the most important current points in the situation. The Africans (94 percent of the people in Rhodesia) are apprehensive about the private talks now taking place between the British and the Rhodesian white minority.

The US position should be clear. Under no circumstances must a white minority government be recognized. Since Rhodesia became a self-governing colony in 1923 the record of the Europeans has been singularly unambiguous. The results are summarized in this Sheet in regard to land ownership, education, and the franchise. Wilson's six principles must be followed, and African political leadership given a full role in the discussions leading to any agreements as to the future of Rhodesia. Sanctions can and should be stepped up in at least two ways: further aid to Zambia, and cessation of oil shipments through Bechuanaland from South Africa to Rhodesia.

Further and more detailed documentation of facts in the Rhodesian crisis are available from the American Committee on Africa, and will be sent on request.

1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RHODESIAN CRISIS FOR THE US

The most narrowly conceived interests of the US are at stake in the Rhodesian question. The passive acceptance of a white-dominated independent Rhodesia will have an impact on:

- (a) The stability of the pound sterling and of the Atlantic alliance. Rhodesia and Zambia are closely bound economically. The stability of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's government hinges on ending the rebellion and moving toward majority rule in Rhodesia. Zambia is the world's second-largest copper producer. More than 40 percent of the mineral, of which there is a critical world shortage, is sold to the UK. Copper prices have already tripled this year. Interruptions in Zambian production would have serious debilitating effects on the already shaky British economy -- in fact, might imperil the value of the sterling, which in turn holds grave danger for the future of the Atlantic alliance.
- (b) US-South African relations. South Africa is the principal mainstay of white Rhodesia, supplying her with foreign exchange, consumer goods, and oil. US foreign policy spokesmen have managed to present an image of distaste for South African apartheid up until now. But South Africa is an albatross around the US neck; acceptance of Verwoerd's role in backing Smith will be tantamount to permanent identification of the US with southern African racism.
- (c) US-Third World relations. Whether or not world opinion is accepted as a dynamic variable influencing US foreign policy, US credibility as a positive international social power is at stake in the Rhodesian equation. With this credibility dissipated, the US will have no alternative but to buy allies in the Third World at prices heretofore unimagined.

2. PRESENT US AND UK POSITIONS ON RHODESIA

* The principal characteristics of the UK position on Rhodesia are:

- (a) For some years the British Government has warned the Rhodesian Government of the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence ("... an act of defiance and rebellion . . . treasonable . . ." -- UK statement, Oct. 25, 1964). In discussions and negotiations the UK has stressed that it alone had the legal and constitutional power to grant independence and that in reaching a decision it would be guided by the following six principles:
 - ^ There would have to be unimpeded progress to majority rule.
 - ^ There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution.
 - ^ There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
 - ^ There would have to be progress toward ending racial discrimination.
 - ^ The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
 - ^ There should be, regardless of race, no oppression by either majority or minority.
- (b) The UK has consistently maintained that Rhodesia is a British responsibility, even though it took the initiative to raise the issue at the UN Security Council.
- (c) The UK has consistently refused to use force to bring about a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Lagos, Jan. 12, 1966, the UK reiterated its position, but accepted that the use of force could not be precluded if the restoration of "law and order" was at stake. The Commonwealth PMs noted the UK statement that a period of direct rule would be needed, leading to a constitutional conference representing all sections of the Rhodesian people for the purpose of recommending a constitution leading to majority rule acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
- (d) The UK has entered into "informal" talks with the Salisbury government, "directed only to see whether a basis for negotiation exists." Though the contents of the talks have been kept secret, it seems fair to assume that the principle of minority rule (with safeguards) has been accepted by the UK.

* The principal characteristic of the US position on Rhodesia has been to support the UK. On Nov. 22, 1965, Ambassador Goldberg summed up the US position as being (i) support of self-determination by and for all the people; (ii) achieving this by peaceful negotiations; (iii) support of the UK as sovereign authority.

President Johnson reiterated this position when speaking to OAU Ambassadors on May 26, 1966.

3. RHODESIAN DOMESTIC ISSUES

The internal Rhodesian conflict revolves around three central issues: schools, land, and the vote. It is important to remember that, until 1962, when the present Rhodesian Front party ousted the Welensky-Whitehead government, there was a slight tendency for whites to accommodate to African desire for power. Since then, however, the drift has been reversed.

- (a) Franchise: Under the 1961 Constitution voters are registered on either "A" or "B" rolls, depending on monetary and schooling levels. "A" roll voters elect 50 legislators in an assembly of 65; "B" roll elect 15. Voting qualifications restrict Africans to "B" rolls; few have even bothered to exercise this right. Technically Africans should qualify for "A" rolls as their income and education rises. Since coming to power Smith has said that he did not expect to see African nationalist rule in his lifetime (he is 46). African income and secondary education have fallen off in recent years.
- (b) Education: The Rhodesian Government spends twelve times as much on schooling for each white child as it does on each African child. Under Premier Garfield Todd the scope of African education was greatly enlarged, particularly for the first five years of school. But under the present Rhodesian Front Government, further expansion has been ended "for financial reasons." The main financial reason has been increased expenditure on police, prisons, and the military. Expenditure for African education has been pegged at 2 percent of the GNP. As population has grown faster than economy (in real terms, annual income per head has declined from \$205 in 1962 to \$185 last year), this amounts to a decrease in amount per child.

Unless an African is remarkably well-paid, he must have a secondary school certificate to become an "A" roll voter. The present Government has just halved the number of children who can enter secondary school. To enter university a person must have completed six years of secondary school. In 1961, 34 Africans completed this course; in 1964, 35.

- (c) Land: The Land Apportionment Act divides Rhodesia into areas on a racial basis. At present, the divisions are:

National Land (parks and forest)	10 million acres
Native Purchase area (especially poor land)	4 million acres
Unreserved land (under voluntary desegregation)	6 million acres
Tribal Trust Land (for Africans)	40 million acres
European area	36 million acres

Unreserved land dates back to the Welensky-Whitehead government, which started to "desegregate" certain areas. The Smith regime has halted this policy. Most unreserved land therefore remains white. It should be noted that sixteen times as many people live on Tribal Trust Land as in European areas. Between 1936 and 1959, 113,000 Africans were evicted from European areas to preserve the racial boundaries.

The 1962 elections, which brought the Rhodesian Front to power, was fought around repeal of the Land Apportionment Act. The Front's Grey Eminence and paymaster, "Boss" Lilford, left Whitehead's party because he opposed land reforms. More than 100,000 African families subsist in the reserves without land; under another act, all families moving to urban areas lose their claims to tribal land. Africans have no freehold right in urban areas.

4. SANCTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT

In imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia, Britain clearly intended to: Bring Smith to negotiating table without disrupting economies of nearby independent African states as well as the Rhodesian productive potential; Prohibit formal recognition of the Smith regime; Avoid major dislocation of British industry, which depends on Rhodesian chrome, tobacco, and other essentials; and perhaps Induce the Rhodesian white "man in the street" to break with the Smith farmer-artisan group and rejoin the older conservative élite of yesteryear.

British sanctions on finance, currency, and trade have included: Prevention of Rhodesian access to London capital market; Exclusion of Rhodesia from sterling area; Elimination of Commonwealth preference; Prohibition of stock and bond dividends payments from Britain; Prohibition of the regime from "incurring any legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Rhodesia," thus stopping external loans; Banning imports and exports from and to Rhodesia.

These sanctions have cut both ways, and the visible and invisible cost to Britain may total \$560 million.

. . . on oil: Britain has prohibited oil shipments to Rhodesia (and has convinced all but oil-producing countries to follow suit) and has ended the use of the oil pipeline that carried oil imports from Mozambique to Rhodesia. An informal naval blockade of the Mozambique coast has been maintained by the Royal Navy. Major oil companies operating in South Africa have agreed not to increase their shipments of oil to South Africa by more than 6 percent of the 1965 amounts. However, Rhodesian needs do not exceed 2 percent of South African annual purchases. By rationing and by leakages from South Africa and Mozambique, Smith has managed to prevent any major crisis in Rhodesian power needs.

. . . on tobacco: Britain normally buys 46 percent of Rhodesian tobacco exports, West Germany 12 percent. Both have turned to the US and Zambia. The Smith regime has legislated price support and has sought to smuggle tobacco into the South African market. Best estimates are that not more than 50 percent of crop was sold.

. . . on minerals: Embargo on Rhodesian pig-iron has been quite successful; Rhodesian chrome and asbestos, however, have continued to leak into the US, the UK, and other industrial nations.

The Rhodesian has been hurt by sanctions: Government receipts are down, expenditures up, consumer spending is down, unemployment is up, auto industry is in crisis, sugar production has been closed down, cotton industry is on a three-day week schedule. Yet many of the effects of sanctions are mitigated by outside financial interests, especially South African. France's Peugeot is negotiating to establish an auto assembly plant in Salisbury; Italy invited Rhodesians to exhibit at the Milan trade fair. American petroleum, mineral, and electrical firms continue to allow goods to be imported to Rhodesia and to operate affiliates and mines inside the country. Rather than splitting the white community, sanctions seem to have united it behind Smith.

Still, the full force of mandatory sanctions under UN supervision has not been tried; Rhodesia would be most vulnerable to such pressures. Smith acknowledged this when he noted: "I do not want to be too optimistic. One realizes that in this game you can come down unexpectedly." Furthermore, behind the calm of the present talks lie both Britain's December commitment to protect British-Zambian interests at Kariba Dam and Lord Caradon's allusion to the use of force when he suggested that if talks fail, ". . . then a new situation will arise and we shall need to consider the whole problem further." The "whole problem" unavoidably includes all of the white territories of southern Africa, and reconsideration of our policy there involves missile tracking stations, gold and diamond supplies, military bases in the Azores, and the millions of dollars invested in the territories.