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**SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS  
and UNITED STATES POLICY**



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# **SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS and United States Policy**

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## DEFINING OUR TASK

Apartheid is more than a set of laws. It describes a condition of suffering. It is a political system which assigns each man a quality of life governed by his skin color. Poverty, suffering, obedience are those rights assigned to the majority of men, so that wealth, ease and the power to command can be enjoyed by a minority.

Today, the dynamics of apartheid are given life by the Afrikaner nationalist movement. This movement was born in the early nineteenth century, vanquished on the field of battle by Britain in 1899-1901, eclipsed by the English-speaking population between the world wars, and born anew in 1948.

African nationalism, on the other hand, is a relatively new force, whose potential in South Africa still lies nine-tenths hidden or unrealized. Yet it cannot but grow, fed by mounting frustrations of a disenfranchised people as well as external forces throughout Africa and the world.

The thesis of the following paper is that apartheid is an unjust and cruel system, that the system can only be maintained by taking formidable "security" measures, and that an open clash (or a series of them) between African and Afrikaner nationalism is inevitable.

Our method of presentation will be, first to sketch in the most recent examples of government measures to assure continuation of its racial policies; secondly, we will examine the composition and direction of those internal groups opposing the Government; and thirdly, we will try to assess external opposition to South African policies, with emphasis on United Nations involvement. Finally, we will give particular attention to United States-South African relations. This last point will inevitably bring up the question of sanctions against South Africa.

In the end, then, the purpose of this paper is to communicate the severe plight of non-white South Africans and to recommend certain international actions to help them. We earnestly hope that organized elements on the American scene will carefully consider

our proposals for sanctions, and will then set themselves to implementing these, either alone or in cooperation with the American Committee on Africa.

Apartheid cannot be destroyed from the inside alone. "Only the intervention of the outside world can save us from starvation, chaos and death," wrote novelist Alan Paton, for he has himself seen the growth and strength of organized racism in South Africa.

## Section I

# Apartheid And Its Opponents

## A. AFRIKANER NATIONALISM IN POWER

### 1. The Nationalists Grow in Strength

Apartheid is not new, and neither is the concept of bantustans (geographical segregation along ethnic and sub-ethnic lines). For many years it was known more simply as the "color bar," and bantustans were known as "native reserves." The color bar was implemented by a multitude of parliamentary acts and social conventions which, either implicitly or explicitly, reserved citizenship rights and privileges to whites only. The word "apartheid" was not coined until 1947 and used extensively until the 1948 elections. Dr. Daniel F. Malan, who then led the Nationalist Party, had surmised (correctly) that the more extreme was the call to racism, the more success would be gained at the polls.

The Nationalists had hardly been swept into office, with 79 seats out of 153, but with a minority of the popular vote—400,000 out of more than 1 million cast, before they started building the wall of apartheid. In 1949, Africans were forbidden to enter most urban centers to find work. "The Bantu in the urban areas should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the Whites," had read one of the planks in the 1948 Nationalist platform.

The first of a series of moves to assure Nationalist continuation in power was taken in 1949: White South West Africans, most of whom were Nationalist Party supporters, were given the right to elect six members to the South African Assembly and two senators. A third senator was nominated by the Governor.

In 1950, the Mixed Marriage and the Immorality Amendment acts were passed. The Population Registration Act (to classify the entire population by racial origin) was also passed that same year

but not implemented until later. Also in 1950 came the Suppression of Communism Act under whose broad canopy so many repressive measures not remotely connected to communism have been taken.

In the 1953 elections, the Nationalists increased their seats in the Union parliament to 94 out of 159. Barely a year later, Malan was dead and Strijdom had taken his place. Before dying in 1958, Strijdom managed further to entrench his party by removing the Cape Coloreds from the common voters' roll, where they voted against the Nationalists, and placing them on a segregated roll of their own, where they could be quarantined. The Strijdom period also saw the passing of the Bantu Education Act (which placed control of all African education firmly under the grip of the Government) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act (which crushed the non-violent resistance campaign of 1952-53).

In the 1958 election, the Nationalists increased their majority to 103 out of 163. In that same year, Strijdom died and was replaced by H. F. Verwoerd.

The increasing success of the apartheid forces at the polls since 1948 was due as much to Afrikaner solidarity, discipline and police state methods as to the indecisiveness and splits among the opposition. The United Party, once victoriously led by Jan Smuts, drew only semantic differences between their platform and that of the Nationalists. Rather than seek allies among those who suffered under the system, they preferred to appeal to that same sector of the electorate voting for the Nationalists. Non-parliamentary groups such as the African National Congress met with such persecution, unrelieved by the smallest victory, that decisive mass action has become almost impossible to organize.

Thus fed mostly by defeats, the opposition to apartheid has been split into factions, not one of which alone can turn back the tide of apartheid. And this is why Albert Lutuli and other African leaders have urged the outside world to come to their help. Without international pressures, the South African regime could stand for many years without being toppled internally.

## **2. The State Arms Itself**

**MEN . . . .** One of the methods of measuring the fear at the heart of the South African Government is to examine the growing militarization of the country. Through two world

wars, both of which were partly fought on African soil, her citizens were left entirely free of military obligations. The Nationalist Party of 1939, then part of the ruling coalition, even went so far as to oppose South African entry into World War II. And so military service remained a voluntary function.

In 1952, not long after intensification of racism had become the primary purpose of the Government, the "ballot" system of military induction was adopted. Most white youths turning 18 were obliged to serve 5 months in the Active Citizen Force. In addition, "rifle commandos," calling to mind the basic military unit used by the Afrikaners in their war with the British, were revived. In 1959, some 175 commandos totalling 80,000 men existed. The main function of this "elite" group ("Their standard of marksmanship is one of the highest in the world," states the South African Yearbook) is "internal security duties." Not even schoolboys, providing they are white, are exempt from military training. All boys between the ages of 12 and 20 are enrolled in school Cadet Corps. In 1959, 85,000 cadets and officers were thus organized in 500 detachments.

MOTIVE . . . . The purpose of this militarization was well expressed by Prime Minister Strijdom in 1957: "It is the duty of the state to guard over the nation in this connection (the future of the White race) and to act as it would in case of war. . . ."

Since then, the quickening pace of rearmament in South Africa attests to the fact that the Nationalist Party has not forgotten its duty. The emergence of independent African states coincided with increased preparations for "defense." The then Minister of Defense, Mr. F. C. Erasmus, speaking in the House in August, 1960, after the events of Sharpeville and the outbreak of violence in the Congo, said that the government had no intention of changing its policy. "So it must be expected that violence will come again. The Government must prepare for this."

The Government of South Africa has wasted little time in preparing for further violence. The two years since 1960 have seen massive efforts to build a Defense Force behind which the White population can continue to run the country in spite of mounting criticism at home and abroad. The Prime Minister was reported to have said in the House in March, 1961, that "if it should boil

down to a choice between international popularity and the maintenance of White civilization, then there was only one choice. We must fight with the utmost power for the continuance of the White nation in South Africa."

The effort to achieve this "utmost power" has had two aspects. First, of course, was the military build-up itself, carried on in an increasingly hostile world, a world in which South Africa has never been sure that it would be able to purchase modern arms from those countries who had them in the amounts necessary. The second aspect of the South African defense effort has been that of convincing the nations of the "West," particularly the United States, that no country is a surer ally against Communism than a strong, White South Africa; that it is of vital interest to the West to maintain this friendly ally which controls the only passage to the East should the Suez Canal be closed.

**MONEY . . . .** Defense spending in the Union (now Republic) of South Africa has risen from R44 (\$61.6) millions in 1960 to R120 (\$168) millions in the 1962-63 budget, a figure higher than at any time during the Second World War. Defense forces which numbered 20,000 two years ago are due to rise to 60,000 in the near future. The period of training has been increased from 3 to 9 months. In June, 1962, Mr. J. J. Fouche, the Minister of Defense, announced that South Africa could mobilize 250,000 (White) men. The South African Police Force, whose share of the budget has risen to R40 (\$56) millions, has been completely reorganized and integrated with Defense Forces. In a recent joint announcement, Mr. Fouche joined Mr. F. C. Erasmus, Minister of Justice, to state that this was done "to insure a single fast-striking force to crush any uprising regarded as a threat to the security of the State."

**SECURING ARMS** One of the major problems facing the Government has been the equipment of these forces with the most modern weapons. The military chiefs have spent a good deal of time in Europe making the necessary enquiries into the possibility of buying, or obtaining licenses to manufacture, arms. They did not come away empty-handed.

From Britain they obtained the training there of parachute troops, the first unit of which returned and was stationed at

Bloemfontein in April, 1961; two British destroyers are to be re-equipped for modern warfare; purchases have been made of tear gas and of bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Also from Britain will come a low-level strike jet plane—the Blackburn Buccaneer Mk. II (the craft would be especially handy in scattering small concentrations of people). From Belgium they obtained modern automatic rifles to replace the obsolete .303 rifles then in use. From France four turbine-powered Alouette II helicopters arrived in December, 1960, and South African Air Force pilots were trained there to fly them. Commenting on this purchase, the *Digest of South African Affairs* said, on December 15, 1960, that “they have been bought as a result of a decision to expand the SAAF’s helicopter squadron . . . with the emphasis on internal defense. Helicopters have proved useful for ‘spotting’ in civil disturbances.” From France also, the Government purchased an undisclosed number of Mirage jet fighters capable of flying at twice the speed of sound. The plane is equipped with sidewinders—an infra-red homing missile.

The principal operational squadrons of the South African Air Force are equipped as follows:

- Squadrons 1 & 2—Mark VI Sabre jets (interceptor fighters of Canadian origin);
- Squadrons 235 & 237—Vampires FB. 5 (single-seat fighter bomber jet of British origin);
- Active Citizen Force—equipped with Vampires, both fighting planes and trainers;
- No. 2 Maritime Group includes some Shackleton MR 3 (a British Maritime Reconnaissance Bomber) and PV-1 Venturas (an American general purpose aircraft).

Besides these purchases abroad, the Government has made every effort to establish a munitions industry at home. In the last year, production has risen from R4 (\$5.6) millions to R14 (\$19.6) millions. Small arms and ammunition are now being produced in quantity in South Africa. Licenses obtained in France will shortly permit the building at home of “Panhard” armored cars and military rockets. With help from the United States a nuclear reactor has been built and the building of an atomic bomb is within the power of the Government. African Explosives, a subsidiary of the

British Imperial Chemical Industries, is setting up three ammunition factories in South Africa.

This military build-up was disquieting not only, naturally, to the newly independent African states, but also to many people in the Commonwealth and in the United States which was attempting, particularly after 1960, to woo the neutral nations whose opposition to colonialism was extreme. What were the South Africans preparing for? Coming as they did on the heels of the Sharpeville and Transkei Emergencies, it seemed quite obvious that these moves were made to strengthen the forces dealing with internal disorders.

AGAINST WHOM? On October 5, 1959, in Capetown, Mr. F. C. Erasmus, who was then in the Defense Ministry, said: "You must not think that we are arming against an external enemy. We are not. We are arming in order to shoot down the black masses." The reorganization of the Defense Forces for this sort of duty has already been noted. On March 2, 1961, the Minister of Defense was quoted in the *Cape Times* as having said "that in the same way as world powers were continually preparing for war, so South Africa intended to be ready for internal trouble." As late as April, 1962, he was quoted in the newspaper *Contact* as follows: "The maintenance of peace and order internally is the main requirement of any operation against aggression."

The movement of modern "commando" units into areas of trouble such, for example, as the Transkei in late 1960 made it obvious to the world why South Africa was rearming. Indeed South African leaders were quite frank, as has been noted. But world opinion has, more recently, become so hostile both in the United Nations and elsewhere, that the Government has shifted the emphasis from the "internal" enemy to "external" enemies in Africa, and to "Communism." They have attempted to appeal to the emotions of those western nations whose policies are firmly grounded on "anti-communism." On his return from a disastrous session of the UN, Foreign Minister Eric Louw said to his countrymen: "I want to warn my fellow South Africans that they must have no illusions about the dangers of this cold war, which is being waged by Black Africa, some of Asia and Communist countries. The powers against South Africa are getting bigger and stronger," he concluded, and South Africa "had to make sure it

had the necessary weapons to meet the threat at home." He also said that apparently the stories of shooting the black masses were believed and that it was therefore understandable that there was talk of military threats against the Republic. He warned that although these threats could be mere bluster, the Government had to take notice of them.

South African leaders do not tire of pointing out the obvious advantages of South Africa as an ally in the cold war. In order for this to be effective it has been necessary to build up the threat of external attack, to identify that attack with "Communism" and show that internal opposition is "Communist" led or inspired. Speaking at the Cape Congress of the National Party in September, 1961, Dr. T. E. Donges, Minister of Finance, was reported in the *Digest of South African Affairs* as saying "that the preservation of South Africa was the symbol of the West's own preservation in its struggle against Communism." In April, 1962, Mr. J. J. Fouche, speaking in the Senate, said that South Africa was threatened with real danger from some African countries which, having communist military advisors and trainers, and equipped with communist weapons, were threatening and considering joint action against South Africa.

No one has been more receptive to the idea that South Africa is a natural ally for the United States than Mr. Philip Crowe, Ambassador in Pretoria from 1959 to 1961. He was quoted in *U. S. News and World Report* as feeling that South Africa's contribution to the "free world" is not only her military strength but her willingness to serve as a base for the West in a limited war in which the Suez Canal would most certainly be closed. He describes South Africa as "one of the few strongly anti-communist nations on that continent," and states that the "majority of the forty-odd nations between Cairo and Capetown are either neutral or subject to communist influence."

It appears evident that, since no independent African state, or combination thereof, is presently, or will be in the foreseeable future, in a position to launch an attack on South Africa, the Government in Pretoria is preparing largely for the kind of internal troubles that have been continuous since 1960. However, for reasons of "popularity" it would prefer to play to the tendency of the Western Allies to take as a partner any country, no matter what its internal policy, so long as it is anti-communist. It has not

been blind to the benefits that Spain and Portugal have reaped. But it must maintain internal order so that the illusion of a strong, prosperous state will continue to attract the confidence of Western business and financial circles, upon which further growth and power for the White population depends. It is absolutely essential that there be no more Sharpevilles. It would appear from the evidence that the military build-up that has been going on for two years has, as its goal, a "Defence Force" that will place the whole country under absolute military control.

### 3. The Sabotage Act

The growth of a strong military infrastructure does not normally alarm most people. It is too easily discounted as being the Government's duty and responsibility. But civilian, para-military measures cannot be so easily shrugged-off. They affect all men in all walks of life. That is why the "Sabotage" Act has attracted so much attention, both in South Africa and throughout the world.

Despite weeks of protests by Churchmen, students and white liberals of all walks of life, this measure, officially known as the General Law Amendment Act, was passed in the House of Assembly on June 12, 1962, and after approval by the Senate, became law on June 27. As is implied by its title, it is a series of amendments to laws that have long been on the books to establish and maintain White supremacy in South Africa. These include the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Public Safety Act of 1953, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 and the Unlawful Organization Act of 1960.

**WHAT IS SABOTAGE?** The law gets its popular title from the preamble which defines the act as one "to define and prohibit sabotage and to provide for other incidental matters." In actual fact, this popular title is a misnomer, since only one of the twenty-one provisions deals with sabotage which it defines in very broad terms, as injuring, damaging, destroying, rendering useless, obstructing, tampering with, contaminating or endangering: public health or safety, law and order, water supplies, the supply or distribution of light, power, fuel, foodstuffs, sanitation facilities, medical or fire service, communications, transportation, or any property.

To establish his innocence, the accused must prove that "ob-

jectively regarded" the alleged offense was not calculated, and that he did not intend to (among others):

- a) cause or promote general dislocation, disturbance or disorder;
- b) further or encourage any political aim, including bringing about social or economic change;
- c) embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State.

The punishment for conviction is a minimum of 5 years imprisonment which may not be suspended; the maximum penalty is death, even for a juvenile.

**PROVISIONS** The other "incidental matters" dealt with in the Act go so far in the suppression of civil liberties that one cannot see how any protest, other than underground and violent, will be possible from now on. The terms of the Act deal principally with banning, newspapers, detention and court procedures.

**Banning:** The provisions of previous bills, particularly the Suppression of Communism Act, is extended now to television, newspapers, sports, and political activities. The Minister of Justice has the power to prohibit a person from performing any act whatsoever. This state, popularly referred to as "civil death," would make it impossible for a person so banned to see either his lawyer or his minister, priest or rabbi.

**Newspapers:** No newspaper shall be registered under the appropriate Act unless an amount of up to about \$30,000 is deposited with the Minister of the Interior, which amount will be forfeit if the newspaper is banned on the grounds that it furthers the aims of communism as defined under the Suppression of Communism Act. This applies only to new publications.

**Detention:** The power to detain a person for twelve days without trial is extended through 1963. This law was first promulgated to deal with the situation after Sharpeville, and during the Transkei Emergency. The Public Safety Act, which empowers the Government to declare a state of emergency and to rule by decree, is amended to extend these powers outside of areas in which an official "Emergency" has been declared.

**Court Procedure:** Three fundamental principles are annulled by the act. Under its provisions, trials will be held without jury, before a judge of the Supreme Court. Unless the Attorney-General specifies otherwise, there will be no pre-trial examination. Anyone

who is acquitted can be retried under the same law. The burden of proof of innocence is on the accused. There is no appeal.

VOICES AGAINST During debate on the Bill in the House, numerous protests were made by civil libertarian groups, by ministers, and by members of the Liberal Party. The Black Sash Women, attempting to carry out a protest vigil, were attacked and beaten by hooligan elements while the police took little action. An attempt by the Liberal Party to hold a protest meeting was broken up.

In London, Mr. Robert Resha, a spokesman for the banned African National Congress, said: "If the Whites in South Africa who have the vote, as well as the democracy-loving world, allow this bill to become law, a situation worse than what has been experienced in Algeria will develop in South Africa."

In Durban, Archbishop Denis Hurley said: "I have supported the call for opposition to the (Sabotage) Bill because I look on it as giving additional impetus to the coming head-on collision between White intransigence and African Nationalism. At present, the internal security of the country is such that the Sabotage Bill does not seem necessary. But if a rapid change takes place on our borders with Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique—and if South Africa continues in its present strain—it is difficult to see how a repetition of Algeria can be averted."

The International Commission of Jurists issued from its headquarters in Geneva a summary of the significance of the bill in terms of the rule of law and of civil liberties. Their conclusions included the following:

"In a country which does not claim to be in a state of war, the Government of the Republic of South Africa has secured the passing in the House of Assembly of a bill, known as the Sabotage Bill, which reduces the liberty of the citizen to a degree not surpassed by the most extreme dictatorships of the Left or the Right. This measure is a culmination of a determined and ruthless attempt to enforce the doctrine of apartheid, and is not worthy of a civilized jurisprudence." The report goes on to point out that "the onus of proof is shifted to the accused. He is guilty of a new crime of sabotage, for example, unless he can prove that his act was not calculated. . . ."

The practical effect of the Act would make possible a death sen-

tence for the following acts: painting of anti-government slogans; ordinary burglary; striking for higher wages or improved working conditions; protesting apartheid in any way. The Jurists' report also points out that without any trial persons may be prevented from attending meetings or publishing articles, or from leaving their homes, merely upon being designated as "Communists" by the Minister of Justice. Concentration camps for these persons may be set up.

The Commission concludes its report stating that "if the Bill becomes law, South Africa will have taken a major, if not final, step towards the elimination of all rights of the individual and the rule of law. The world legal community is profoundly and deeply disturbed over the Sabotage Bill and other legal steps being taken by the South African Government which may lead inevitably to the annihilation of human rights in South Africa."

Advocating passage of the bill in the House, Mr. Balthazar J. Vorster, Minister of Justice, said of the provisions of the bill: "There is nothing inherently undemocratic in them; in fact, the bill is to protect democracy."

What is the significance of the passage of this bill? The *Rand Daily Mail* stated editorially on May 14, 1962, that "Mr. Vorster's General Law Amendment Bill displays some of the symptoms of panic, and even hysteria, but that does not make it any the less dangerous. It is the legislation of a government with its back to the wall and in an ugly mood." A few days later, the newspaper commented: "For a long time the Nationalist Government has been seeking to enshrine the principles that opposition to its race policies is a form of treason against the established order."

Mr. Peter Hjul, Cape Chairman of the Liberal Party, was quoted in the *Cape Times* on May 14 as predicting that "the Sabotage Bill . . . will drive opposition underground and subject South Africa to the sterile tyranny of a police state, which is the nearest thing yet to the laws of Nazi Germany."

The *Johannesburg Star*, on the same date, put its finger on what is certainly the most significant fact of the passage of this bill:

"The Government is saying, in effect, that the State is in mortal peril and that the civilized principles of justice must therefore be abrogated. The familiar pattern of liberty being destroyed in defense of liberty is thus being repeated. There can be no doubt that

the agitation for outside interference will be immeasurably strengthened by this admission and this Sabotage Bill.”

#### 4. Toward Thought Control

To define “subversive” activities as do the Suppression of Communism and the Sabotage acts is all very well, but a government cannot be reasonably expected to exercise effective control over the population without the unanimous, active cooperation of the press and other media of communication. And such unanimity does not exist in South Africa.

The Afrikaans press is, naturally, firmly committed to apartheid. In fact, daily papers such as *Die Burger* (Cape Town) and *Die Vaderland* (Johannesburg) are quite influential in creating Government apartheid policies. But the English-language press is much less reliable.

Those important dailies which consistently support the United Party (*Cape Argus*, *Johannesburg Star*, etc.) cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, ever be labelled “subversive.” But there does exist an important section of the press which not only openly disagrees with the Government, but proposes radical action as an alternative. This section includes everything from the anti-color bar, Progressive Party, *Evening Post* (Port Elizabeth), through the two important fortnightlies, *Contact* and *New Age*, which support full equality. It is this last part of the press spectrum that the Government is most anxious to control.

**CENSORSHIP IN THE PAST** Government censorship, however, is no innovation in South Africa. Under the Native Administration Act of 1927, the Minister of Native Affairs could prohibit the showing of “objectionable” films in “any scheduled Native area,” and could charge with committing a crime editors or publishers responsible for the utterance or “any other act or thing whatever with intent to promote feelings of hostility between Natives and Europeans. . . .”

Alex Hepple (in “Censorship and Press Control in South Africa”) shows that some 21 laws controlling publications existed in 1960. The major ones were the Customs Act of 1955 (controlling imported publications); the Entertainments Act of 1931 (prohibiting, among other things, films showing a boxing match between a white and a black man); and the Suppression of Com-

munism Act of 1950 ("the definition of 'communism' is so wide," says Hepple, "that it can be taken to embrace the politics of all groups which actively oppose racial discrimination and white domination").

In 1955, an International Press Institute Survey ("Government Pressures on the Press," IPI, Zurich), had this to say about the situation in South Africa:

"It is perfectly understandable that a state should be anxious to improve its safeguards against revolutionary violence. . . . But even though the intention of these laws is justified, their terms and especially their application often overstep the original conception. As a result they come to represent a latent threat not only to extremist papers but to the press as a whole. This situation is particularly well illustrated in the Union of South Africa—the Government there has, during the past few years, promulgated several laws which are a sword of Damocles for the entire press."

The Government not only seeks to control the periodical press but also all other means of communication. Broadcasting, of course, is a Governmental monopoly—or, to put it more accurately, the radio network is administered by a public commission whose members are appointed by the Government. The policy of the network is characterized by extreme timidity in the face of all controversy. The Board of Governors of the corporation stated, in their 1961 Annual Report, that it is their duty "to promote the survival and heritage of the white people of South Africa. . . ." Shortwave sets, capable of picking up signals from abroad, are in fairly common use in South Africa. The Government has thus decided to halt sale of shortwave receivers in order to force listeners to stick with the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

In the past, only books imported into South Africa could be banned. Some 4,000 books have fallen into this category. They include works of fiction by people such as Nadine Gordimer, Peter Abrahams, Richard Wright, Nicholas Monserrat, D. H. Lawrence, Emile Zola, Françoise Sagan, Ernest Hemingway, Tennessee Williams, Robert Graves, and John Steinbeck. Even Robert Ruark's "Uhuru" has been banned. A large percentage of the books banned, however, are, according to Alex Hepple, serious political and sociological works. John Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* is thus excluded under a banning order. A Unesco pub-

lication by Arnold Rose titled "The Roots of Prejudice" is likewise forbidden reading for South Africans.

Censorship in South Africa is a direct product of apartheid. Its roots are primarily psychological. It is thus impossible to deal with censorship as if it were an isolated phenomenon. It cannot be separated from the diseased body-politic.

In 14 years of clear political domination, the Nationalists have not been able to bring about the social peace they so deeply desire. With the aid of various special interest groups (the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, the Broederbond, etc.), they have attempted to evolve an integrated philosophy of racism. But the patchwork cannot stand critical examination, let alone practical implementation. Hence the Government's conviction that criticism is tantamount to treason.

"The time has come for us to grasp the English press by the throat before it destroys us . . . a number of English-language newspapers support the black man in South Africa because of their profits . . ." said Mr. Blaar Coetzee, a Nationalist MP this year. This statement and dozens of others like it document the underlying fears of South Africa's racist regime.

Censorship of material emanating from outside South Africa is not enough. Communications *within* the Republic must also be controlled.

**NEW CENSORSHIP PLANS** Little wonder, then, that the Government has for years been attempting to introduce an integrated, comprehensive set of censorship laws. In 1961, the protest raised in the face of such a draft law was so loud that the Government withdrew its proposed legislation if the press agreed to "discipline itself." The Newspaper Press Union, to which all major English-language papers belong, drew up and decided to abide by a code to further "the general good of South Africa." This code is currently implemented by a Board of Reference which can "reprimand" a paper or a journalist and which can demand a correction notice to be published.

The Government was still not satisfied. In 1962, therefore, a Publications and Entertainment Bill was introduced to deal with all "publications, cinematographic films, entertainments and certain objects . . ." not governed by the newspaper union code.

The Bill proposed that a "Publications Control Board" be set up by the Government. This Board could declare any publications or objects undesirable. "Undesirable" is partly defined as "harmful to the relations between any of the inhabitants of the Republic . . . prejudicial to the safety of the state, the general welfare or the peace and good order." Among the objects to be controlled are, besides periodicals and newspapers (whose control also falls under the General Law Amendment Bill), drawings, tape recordings, or "any typescript which in any manner has been duplicated or made available to the public or any section of the public."

The bill was not pushed through for two reasons: The parliamentary agenda was particularly heavy and the bill might be expected to cause considerable rumpus; and the Sabotage Act, already passed, assured more than enough control over those papers causing the Government the most anxiety (*Contact* and *New Age*). Necessary or not, the bill will probably assume the form of an act in some future session of the South African Assembly.

### **5. The Fantasy of "Bantu Self-Government" (The Transkei)**

The various parliamentary measures we have described have one thing in common: they are repressive and they are defensive. Their object is, in other words, to block certain quite natural channels of revolt. In the creation of a "Bantu homeland," however, the Government has, for the first time, taken a step of quite a different character.

**THE TRANSKEI** The Transkei is an area of approximately 15,000 square miles, located along the Indian Ocean Coast, northeast of the Great Kei river. It extends about 150 miles along the coast and 100 miles inland, to border, for a part of its boundary, the High Commission Territory of Basutoland. This area was designated as one of the Bantustans (Bantu homelands) envisaged by the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, which eliminated the Africans' representatives (White) in the Government in return for "home rule."

One of the eight projected "Bantustans," the Transkei is the "homeland" or "native reserve" of some million and a half Xosa-speaking peoples. Since the Nationalist theory rests on "apartheid," it is believed, as Alan Paton puts it, that "when people are properly separated, friction will cease. . . . Each group will develop its

separate institutions. There will be peace and cooperation, whereas now there is only fear and discord." He concludes his description of what the Government is trying to accomplish by saying: "Let us recognize . . . that it is a fantasy."

Since this "fantasy" is the motivating force behind the Nationalist Government, let us look, for a moment, at what is planned for these "Native Reserves," which have been, and still are, the source of cheap labor for the mines, assured by the acute land hunger and abject poverty of the people.

**PRECURSOR TO THE "HOMELAND"** With the withdrawal of representation in 1959, the Bantu Self-Government Act set up a Territorial Authority for the Transkei; previously the reserves had been organized, in ascending order of administrative size and importance, into tribal, district and regional authorities only. These formed (and still do for areas outside the Transkei) small, non-contiguous pockets of land known as the "Native Reserves." The creation of a Territorial Authority foresaw "self-government" for the people living therein.

Under the Native Trust and Land Act, the maximum land available for these Bantustans is roughly 13 per cent of the total in South Africa; and it is some of the poorest land in the country. The Whites have reserved 87 per cent of the land for themselves, although they represent but a quarter of the population. The Tomlinson Report, a Government study of the situation of the reserves, stated bluntly that vast sums of the taxpayers' money would have to be spent to make these areas viable. In addition, the report foresaw the necessity of allocating much more land to provide room for the population growth which will double the African population by the turn of the century.

Mr. M. D. C. de Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, has defended his scheme for "separate development" in optimistic language, saying that development would be "realistic and natural," that some large plans were now being worked out by his staff. But the facts are that first, the resources of the land are limited, and second, as we shall note later, the "border industries" will be dependent on African manpower living within the Territorial Authorities.

The political administration of the homelands has been, of course, in the hands of the Nationalist Government administra-

tors who have recruited the chiefs in each area through whom they rule indirectly. In this way they attempt to give the impression that the Africans are ruling themselves in the "time-honored" tribal way.

**METHOD IN THE MADNESS** There is little doubt that the pressure of world opinion had no small part in pushing the Government along the road to proclaiming eventual "self-government" for the homelands. Previously, the policy of "baaskap" had envisaged White rule throughout South Africa, not its division into a series of independent states. Mr. Eric Louw must have shocked many ardent Nationalists, when, at the UN in 1959, he stated that it was the policy of the Government to create "separate Bantu Communities which can eventually attain full self-government." It was a bold stroke, for at one time the White Government, by providing the opportunity for all Africans to vote in their "Bantustans," could deny this privilege in the White areas. In addition, its domination could be maintained in the developed areas at the nominal cost of ceding the poverty-stricken reserves. Mr. de Wet Nel was quoted in the *Digest of South African Affairs* as having said, in April, 1961, that he fully endorsed the view of members of the Territorial Authority that the granting of "self-government would quiet world criticism of South Africa."

However, while the Government was proclaiming the eventual self-government of the Bantustans, it was necessary to ensure that real authority remained in White hands. The machinery for the administration of the "Reserves" established in 1951 could easily be continued and incorporated into the new Territory.

The constitutions and powers of the Bantu Authorities are all under the direction and veto of the Minister of Bantu Administration and the Commissioner of the Territory. The Tribal Authorities are headed by a chief who may be deposed by the Commissioner. The chief presides over a council, any member of whom may be dismissed by the Commissioner. The Tribal Authorities assist the chief in the maintenance of law and order, and they collect taxes. The District Authorities, each one of which includes an average of five Tribal Authorities, are composed of all the chiefs, and four representatives of the Tribal Authorities, within the District. An average of three Districts makes up a Region, of

which there are nine. The Regional authority is composed similarly to the District, except that office is held for five years. The District Council is responsible for schools, hospitals, and agriculture. Meetings are not public. Minutes of the meetings are sent automatically to specified officials of the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development. At the apex of the system is the Territorial Authority, which is made up of chiefs and other appointed and elected members meeting in a Council, or "Bunga." The Territorial Authority may make representations to the Government with regard to local problems, may appoint chiefs and impose taxes. All acts are subject to Government approval and amendment. The first area organized into a territory was the Transkei. The first session of the "Bunga" was opened in May, 1957. In May, 1959, the Chairmanship of the Authority was taken over by an African, Chief Botha Sigcau.

**TROUBLE IN PONDOLAND** All, however, was not going well within the Transkei. In 1958 large sections of the Ba Pedi tribe, in Sekhukuniland, had resisted the imposition of the system. The Acting Chief, Moroamoche, and leading councillors were banished, 338 Africans arrested and the whole area was patrolled by police in 1959. In East Pondoland, the Government relied on its chosen Chief Botha to introduce the Bantu Authorities system in 1957. This Chief had been appointed by the Government in 1939 instead of his half-brother Nelson, believed by the Pondo people to be the rightful heir. Efforts of various kinds were employed to persuade the Pondos to accept the system, with little success. In 1958 all the Pondoland Districts were invited to send representatives to a meeting with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. de Wet Nel. At this meeting, according to the Hill Committee, established by the people of Pondoland later in order to voice their grievances to the UN, Chief Botha told them that they were to receive self-government.

In the succeeding months the people had ample opportunity to see the corruption of the regime. Since the Chief made all appointments, the loyalty of the councillors was to him, not to the people. He was advised on one occasion by the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei to "use moderate violence just like a good policeman."

Briefly, the Pondo people resisted. The South African Institute of Race Relations stated later that "it is to be regretted that the Government has continued to insist on upholding the appointment of chiefs and headmen arbitrarily chosen by themselves rather than elected by the people themselves in democratic fashion." This was the mainspring of the revolt, for the Pondo people were long used to having representative chiefs. The frustration of one attempt after another to gain expression of their dissatisfactions led finally, in March 1960, to a popular movement which appointed the Hill Committee to lead them. There were mass meetings and requests that the Government come and hear their grievances. There was violence, including the burning of some huts of the Chief's supporters. The Government did come, but its reply took the form of a heavily armed police attack on a mass meeting at Ngquza Hill in June: 11 Pondos were killed. At a subsequent inquest, the magistrate found that the firing of Sten guns was "unjustified and excessive, even reckless."

A Commission was appointed to investigate, but, though it recognized certain injustices, its report was rejected by the Hill Committee, by now the only real authority among the Pondos, as granting little or nothing in concessions to their grievances. In October, the Pondos decided to refuse to pay taxes, and declared a boycott of White traders in the area.

In December of 1960 the Government acted with speed and ferocity. The whole of the Transkei was declared an emergency area and sealed off under law R400 which empowered the Government to rule by decree. The police and the regular Army took over and the Navy was set to guarding the coast "against Russian submarines." Since that time it has been difficult to know the extent of the unrest, for newsmen are not permitted to enter. But innumerable stories have leaked out concerning wholesale arrests and banishment of Pondo leaders. One, Mr. Anderson Ganyile, managed to escape to Basutoland with some of his colleagues, but the South African police crossed into that Territory and kidnapped him.

The revolt of the Pondos is significant in that it shows the manner in which the imposition of Bantu Authorities has been received in the most advanced area set aside for "self-government." In spite of constant references to autonomy, there is no question

who the rulers are. The emergency is still in effect nearly two years later.

**THE NEW APPROACH** On January 23, 1962, the Government announced the first step toward "self-rule" for the Transkei. A Constitution was announced which had ostensibly been drawn up by a 27-man Recess Committee of the Territorial Authority which deliberated in secret with White officials "advising" the discussions.

The Legislative Body will consist of:

- 4 Paramount Chiefs (Government-appointed)
- 60 Recognized Chiefs (Government-appointed)
- 45 Representatives elected by the people

All land will be controlled by the chiefs.

All laws passed by the Transkeian Government shall be submitted to the President of South Africa for his assent, through the offices of the Commissioner General of the Transkei and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.

Legislative authority will not extend to the following:

- a) Defense and External Affairs
- b) Internal Security
- c) Posts and Telegraph
- d) Transport
- e) Immigration
- f) Currency, Public loans, Customs and Excise.

The Constitution was submitted to tribal meetings throughout the Territory. In West Pondoland, and in Tembuland, according to the newspaper *Contact*, it was unmistakably rejected by the people. This was also confirmed by the *Daily Dispatch* on June 5th. However, on May 1, at Umtata, capital of the Transkei, the annual session of the Bunga convened to "debate" the Constitution. An attempt by some chiefs, opposed to the Constitution, to adjourn so that the Recess Committee could hear reports from the tribal meetings was overruled.

The meeting itself was significant, in that White visitors were seated in front, the Chiefs in the back. After the session, only Whites were invited to the Mayor's reception. In the capital of this "independent" territory even Chief Kaiser Matanzima, the

probable future Prime Minister, and present Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority, was not invited.

All that remains now is for the South African Government to pass, as it will in 1963, a Bill enabling the formation of this state. Mr. de Wet Nel has announced already the formation, in his Ministry, of a department for "diplomatic relations" with the "self-governing" territories.

In spite of the effort of South African Government officials to make it appear that self-government is really being accorded Africans within South Africa, an analysis of the facts shows that this is not, nor can it realistically be, the case.

Speaking in the Senate on May 1, 1961, Prime Minister Verwoerd said: "Now a Senator wants to know whether the series of self-governing areas would be sovereign. The answer is obvious. It stands to reason that White South Africa must remain their guardian. We are spending all the money on those developments. How could small scattered states arise? The areas will be economically dependent on the Union. It stands to reason that when we talk about the Natives' rights of self-government in those areas, we cannot mean that we intend by that to cut large slices out of South Africa and turn them into independent states."

The Verwoerd Government has drawn up a 5-year plan to spend R114 (\$159.6) millions in the development of all rural African areas. Most of this will be spent on housing, so arranged as to make labor easily available to industries which will locate on the borders of these Bantustans. It is vital to the economy of White South Africa that these sources of cheap labor continue to exist. Thus, they have restricted investment in the Territories, thereby making it difficult for any real development of these areas to take place, forcing the majority of the population to seek work elsewhere. By locating factories on the edge of the Bantustan, the Whites will have all of the advantages of apartheid and of cheap labor which will return home every night across the border.

This "new" approach is utterly rejected by all liberal White opinion in South Africa for the fraud that it is. On May 3rd Contact said editorially: "The real rulers of the Transkei are the police and will remain the police even if self-government is given. And the police are the servants of the Nationalist Party Cabinet at Pretoria. Under 'self-government' this will remain so, for it is quite clear that the police and security forces . . . are not to be

transferred to the Umtata Government. Self-government of this kind is no government; it is colonial tyranny."

A report of the South African Institute of Race Relations sums up the dangers inherent in the continuation of the policies set in motion by the Nationalist Government. As reported in the *Race Relations News* in March, 1962, the "Council was particularly distressed by the powers of arbitrary detention now exercised under the latest amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 and under the emergency regulations in force in the Transkei. Council recorded its profound disagreement with the use of legislation as a means of silencing political opponents. It regarded with dismay this manifestation of inflexible resolve to divide and fragment the Republic of South Africa." Taking up the question of the border industries, the Council voiced its fear that these "would result in the maintenance of color bars and restrictions on the mobility of labor which would retard economic progress."

It is not realistic to believe that real "self-government" is the aim of the Nationalist Government in the Bantustans. Dr. Verwoerd would be committing political suicide were he to allow these areas to become independent politically or to spend the kind of money necessary to make them viable economically. As it stands they cannot support, even at a low level of subsistence, more than one-half of the present population.

In the development of the "border industries" one can clearly see the true design unfold. If the Nationalist Government can, through the intermediary of docile Chiefs in police-ruled territories, set up manpower reserves where other forms of employment are not available to the majority of the population, then they will have achieved the goal which they announced years ago and from which they have never taken their eyes. Let no one be fooled by talk of "self-government." There is none, there can be none, for true self-government for the Africans is diametrically opposed to the wishes and the interests of White South Africa.

## B. INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

### 1. African Organizations

**SABOTAGE** In October and December, 1961, a number of explosions were set off by unknown persons in the main cities of South Africa. The Government was at first slow to acknowledge that these might have been acts of sabotage. After the thick steel legs of a pylon carrying power lines had been cut in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, however, the police were forced to admit that the damage was deliberate. Soon after this, representatives of an organization calling itself the National Liberation Committee told journalists in London that they were taking responsibility for these acts. They claimed that men were being trained as saboteurs outside South Africa and were to be smuggled into South Africa along with dynamite and other supplies necessary to their profession. The Committee also claimed to have \$14,000 at its disposal to carry out the assignments.

Then in December of that year, between Saturday night December 16, and Thursday night December 21, some 19 charges were set off in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. One unexploded charge was found in Durban.

The Government reacted most violently to these threats. The new Minister of Justice, Mr. John Vorster, hurried back from his vacation to announce that new legislation would be introduced in parliament to deal with potential and actual saboteurs. Five months later the General Law Amendment Bill was unveiled by Mr. Vorster.

Thus the two extremes of Afrikaner and African nationalism have finally shown themselves to be in agreement on at least one point—the use of violence.

It wasn't always like this. On the contrary, African nationalism has shown remarkable restraint in the face of continual provocation. The modern uses of non-violent resistance were first elaborated in South Africa by the emigrant Indian community just after the Anglo-Boer war. The apparent success of such tactics in India after World War II naturally influenced South African anti-apartheid leaders. The defiance campaign of 1952 was waged by

the African National Congress and the Indian Congress in conformity with non-violent principles.

These days, however, African nationalists are no longer thinking just in terms of these tactics.

"It will not be enough for the African people to protest as we have hitherto," wrote Oliver Tambo recently; "The Government, in its desperate attempt to provoke a civil war, has outlawed all methods of peaceful protest against its draconian measures. It is now abundantly clear that civilized methods of struggle have not and never will appeal to the fascist South African Government . . . for every blow delivered by the Nationalist Party, we should reply with two or even more."

What has happened to cause this shift in tactics? What effect is it likely to have on the destiny of South Africa?

Before these two questions can be answered we must first take a brief look at the history and composition of the anti-apartheid movement in the Republic.

**AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS** Oldest and best established organization representing the African population is the African National Congress. Founded in 1912 as the Native National Congress with the declared purpose of extending democratic rights to Africans, it stood from the beginning for the abolition of pass laws.

Pass laws have been the one great symbol of inequality in South Africa, and to this day, no mass campaign is organized without reference to the abolition of this form of control.

The 1913 Land Act, which deprived Africans of the right to own land outside the Reserves, spurred the organization into its first major anti-government campaign. A deputation was sent to Britain, protest meetings were held throughout the land, in joint cooperation with the two Indian Congresses (Natal and Transvaal) and the African People's Organization (a Cape "colored" group).

One of the earliest ANC militant acts was the threat to call a general strike in 1918. At stake was the firing of some Johannesburg municipal workers and the demand for a general 1 shilling a day wage rise. In thus concentrating on industrial action, the ANC was following the lead of Western radical organizations. The

government answered this threat to their authority as their counterparts did elsewhere. They called in troops and arrested strike leaders.

Yet the ANC never patterned itself on any overseas organization—its methods and outlook remained determinedly African. In 1935, for example, when the White coalition government removed Cape Africans from the common voters roll and set up a Native Representative Council instead, the ANC took the position that its members should be allowed to serve on this Council if they so wished. It is easy, in retrospect, to quarrel with this decision (because the Council was the first of many steps to remove Africans from having any say at all in their own affairs), but one must note the flexibility and pragmatism of the ANC.

Most responsible for bringing the plight of non-Europeans to the attention of the outside world was the joint ANC-Indian Congresses-sponsored Defiance Campaign of 1952. In 8 months of campaign, some 8,000 persons defying unjust laws were arrested. Among the objects of defiance were curfews, passes, and segregated facilities. The campaign ended in 1953 after the Government passed the Criminal Laws Amendment Act whose severe penalties (up to 5 years in prison) rendered further open protest an act of considerable bravery.

A Congress of the People held at Kliptown, Transvaal, in 1955 was partly organized by the ANC. Out of this Congress came the Freedom Charter, whose egalitarian demands featured prominently as evidence of “treason” in the 1956-61 trials.

Albert Lutuli, the chief of a small Zulu tribe, served on the National Executive Committee of the ANC from 1946 to 1952. In 1952, shortly after being deposed as chief by the Government, he was elected President of the ANC. He has remained in this position even though the ANC has been banned since 1960.

The ANC had been banned for one year in 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre. After the October, 1960 referendum, it became certain that South Africa would soon be a republic—and thus permanently removed from whatever “softening” influence Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth might have had on the Government. The ANC then undertook its last great campaign—the May, 1961 Stay-at-Home demonstrations.

Before calling for demonstrations, however, the ANC summoned its members and supporters from all over South Africa to

take part in a conference held in Pietermaritzburg, Natal. The Conference called for the government to hold a national convention of elected representatives of all adult men and women, irrespective of their race, creed, or color, to be held not later than May 31 (when South Africa was due to become a republic). It was agreed that, if the Government ignored the call for such a convention, the people would be called on to join in mass demonstrations by staying at home on the eve of the declaration of the Republic.

Government reaction to this was (a) to amend three existing parliamentary acts (to allow detention of 12 days without charges, trial without jury for certain crimes, and to prohibit public meetings by simple police order); (b) to extend the period of military training for White youths and to establish a citizen reserve police force (5,000 members initially); and (c) to stage police raids in an attempt to flush out leaders of the demonstration and to immobilize the thousands of volatile unemployed Africans swarming in urban ghettos.

In spite of these measures, the demonstrations took place as planned, with at least limited success. The percentage of people staying at home ranged from 20 (for those employed in commerce in the Johannesburg area) to 50 (for those operating shops in the Durban area).

The ANC is now banned again—this time probably permanently, and most of its leaders have been jailed or are in exile. Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, both important internal leaders, were arrested in August, 1962. Albert Lutuli is restricted to his home village, his every move and every phone call monitored by the police. Oliver Tambo remains the most prominent leader to operate freely only because he is outside South Africa.

**PAN-AFRICANISM** This brief profile of the ANC cannot alone explain the cause behind the change in dynamic of South African resistance. The role of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) must be briefly outlined first.

“We want the independence of South Africa under African rule,” said Lawrence Mgweba, a PAC leader to a newspaperman in Dar-es-Salaam; “. . . the word ‘African’ includes everyone of every color or race who has made South Africa his or her home—brown, black and white.” He then qualified this definition of

“African” by pointing out that South African nationalists cannot be “multi-racialists,” because these are “fighting for better conditions and more wages,” and this is not the central issue. Hence, he reasoned, “we are not looking for a good White government. We are looking for a government of Africans by the African people. And all those who support a Black government in Africa, irrespective of their color or creed, and who support the democratic rule of the African majority, are Africans as far as we are concerned.”

The PAC, looking across South Africa’s borders to the rest of Africa, sees all-African governments even where other ethnic groups have settled. Hence, it reasons, this must also come to pass in South Africa. The organization thus brings to life the greatest fear of all White South Africans—that theirs will no longer be a “white civilization” if an inch is given to the Africans.

This polarization did not start until the general decolonization of Africa had become a reality. In 1957, future PAC President, Robert Sobukwe, was an ANC member and editor of *The Africanist*, a magazine calling for specifically African action. In April, 1959, the group around the magazine officially left the ANC and formed the PAC. Then, in early March, 1960, Sobukwe announced that a mass campaign against pass laws would be launched on the 21st of that month. Africans were to burn their passes and to court arrest. The slogan was: “no bail, no defense, no fine.” In Johannesburg, only a small group gathered on the day of protest. But in neighboring Sharpeville, some 3,000-5,000 persons good-humouredly marched to the Location police station. When the day had ended, more than 70 lay dead and 200 wounded.

Barely a week later, in Cape Town, 23-year-old Philip Kgosane led 30,000 Africans in a march on the city to demand a discussion with Government officials concerning certain grievances (pass laws and a minimum wage law). The Minister of Justice, playing for time, agreed to the interview. When the crowd dispersed, Kgosane was arrested. No interview ever took place.

Sobukwe is currently in jail, serving a 3-year term. Kgosane escaped, while out on bail, and is in exile. The PAC has been banned since 1960.

It is not likely that further mass action will be organized by PAC. The Nationalists are not intimidated by protesting crowds and the dangers run by demonstrators are becoming greater. Thus

PAC's next strategic step is likely to be one of small scale harassment—sabotaging military equipment, distributing underground newspapers, etc. . . . In other words, opposition to apartheid is about to become largely the work of professional revolutionaries rather than that of well-meaning amateurs or part-time agitators.

The gulf between black and white in South Africa is so deep, and the sentiments expressed by PAC followers so prevalent throughout Africa, that we do not believe it is possible to shrug off this movement as an expression of extremism. On the contrary, we believe that events, particularly the inability of many white South Africans to accept Africans even as potential equals, will generate a solution held to be inevitable by PAC supporters. The turn of events in Algeria (we refer especially to the last-ditch stand of the terrorist *Organisation Armee Secrete* and the mass exodus of Europeans to France) may be duplicated in South Africa. As of this writing, Algeria has technically a non-racial policy, but decisions are made by the Moslem majority. This is what the PAC advocates. And it is becoming more difficult for the ANC to say otherwise.

FOR THE FUTURE The ANC and the Pac were briefly joined in a united front. The front failed for two reasons. The first is that repeated frustration causes friction leading to personality jealousies and organizational quarrels. The second is that one of the two groups must become dominant . . . so a united front was hardly a long-term proposition. What is more probable, however, is that, in their struggle for power among the African masses, both groups will undoubtedly come to resemble each other more and more.

At the moment, ANC's position of racial cooperation is held in place through the influence of its tactical allies: the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, and the Congress of Democrats (a White group). These groups together form the "Congress Alliance."

For the time being, the prevalent philosophy of action against apartheid is likely to remain that expressed in the leading paragraph of the Freedom Charter:

"We the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can

justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people. . . .”

How long this moderate aim will continue to remain officially dominant is a major responsibility of the White electorate. If the present trends continue, we do not think that the Africans' determination to assume a monopoly of political power can long be avoided.

We must not mistake this long-range prediction as a description of opposition activity today, however. Both the ANC and PAC are, after all, banned. Leaders such as Albert Lutuli are forced to obey orders not to engage in political activity. Police informants are to be found in all those groups still active. No major demonstrations have taken place since May, 1961. All is quiet for the moment. But how else can the bottled-up frustrations of 10 million people emerge except under explosive conditions?

## 2. Other Forces

“We don't have any real liberals in our country,” said a leading nationalist from Southern Rhodesia recently; “It's not like in South Africa where a few whites are really suffering to help the Africans.”

In the United States, opposition to apartheid is usually associated with White liberals such as Alan Paton and Patrick Duncan.

Liberals may have a certain amount of influence, but it is felt primarily in the White community, and the White community has returned larger and tougher Nationalist Governments in each election since 1948. Malan—Strijdom—Verwoerd . . . each Prime Minister since Smuts has taken a progressively more intransigent line on White supremacy and apartheid. At the same time, White liberals have cooperated more and more with Africans, Indians, and “Coloreds.”

**UNITED AND PROGRESSIVE PARTIES** The largest, but weakest, organized group technically opposed to apartheid is the South African United Party, the official parliamentary opposition. Currently led by Sir de Villiers Graaf, the UP, however, seldom if ever takes a principled stand against apartheid. Attempts to manoeuvre back into parliamentary power have led the party to accept some form of White domination,

social segregation and "economic integration" without ever involving the word "apartheid." Its strongest stand against the Nationalist Government has been on those issues threatening the existence of the English-speaking White community.

The United Party was generally thought to contain a fairly wide scope of political opinion concerning White domination until the 1961 elections. Many English-speaking South Africans were assumed to be more liberal than their parliamentary representatives. Then, in 1959, when the UP decided to oppose further Government purchase of lands for Africans (needed to give some semblance of reality to the Bantustan plan), 12 UP members of Parliament resigned from the party and formed the Progressive Party. They had the support of Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the two most powerful South African mining companies, Anglo-American (gold) and De Beers (diamonds) and Donald Molteno (a former Native Representative). The Progressive Party soon outlined its platform: They were in favor of a rigid constitution incorporating a Bill of Rights and for the representation of all races in Parliament on the basis of a qualified franchise. The last provision served to cut off any support from non-Whites. In spite of the sympathetic hearing they received in the urban English-speaking press, the Progressives were virtually erased as an effective parliamentary group in the 1961 elections. Only one—Mrs. Helen Suzeman—was elected. One is puzzled by the political weakness of a man as influential as Mr. Oppenheimer. The business community has clearly not followed him. "At this stage, there is unlikely to be any surrender of White political control," reads a 1960 Johannesburg Stock Exchange report for overseas investors; "Changes there will be, but there will be no selling of the white man's heritage and birthright for a pottage of good will." This curious labelling of fundamental human rights as "goodwill" seems to reflect the predominant outlook among businessmen. The future of the Progressive Party is certainly not assured.

**LIBERALS AND OTHERS** Smaller, more militant, and perhaps with better prospects, is the South African Liberal Party. The Liberals have no parliamentary representation but their forthright position on the race question lays a foundation for a possibly brighter future. The Liberal Party stands for a universal franchise, a common roll, the redistribution of land, com-

pulsory universal education, as well as a Bill of Rights entrenched in the Constitution and abolition of the economic color bar. This uncompromising stand has allowed them to look for and receive support from non-Whites, who are now a majority in the Party. The publication *Contact* serves as an unofficial voice for the Liberals.

The Liberal Party was launched in 1953 by Margaret Ballinger, an ex-Native Representative. Alan Paton and Patrick Duncan (son of a former Governor-General of South Africa) were important, early members. The Party has fought a number of elections but never managed to elect a candidate.

*Contact*, the fortnightly liberal paper now edited by Patrick Duncan, was started in 1958. Both the paper and the organization specifically oppose all totalitarianism (including fascism and communism). This might be the reason for the Party's refusal to enter into the Congress Alliance, which does not exclude Communists or Soviet sympathizers. Liberals, however, do cooperate with the Alliance and its members on specific projects. Many party leaders, such as Peter Brown and Patrick Duncan, have been jailed for their work.

The Government makes little distinction between Liberals and, say, ANC supporters. All are generally lumped together under the Suppression of Communism Act as likely to further the Communist cause.

The Communist Party itself has of course been banned since 1950. Since 1960, however, a publication titled *The African Communist* has been published in London. The publication enjoys a very small circulation and, under present circumstances, does not represent more than a futile, romantic gesture to keep alive the word "communist."

Soviet sympathizers, most of whom are white, have drifted into the South African Congress of Democrats (COD), "a loose association of like-minded people," in the words of COD President Piet Beyleveld. The group was started in 1953, after the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign. Most white persons connected with the weekly *New Age* are members of COD. The organization's main purpose is to campaign for equality of all races. It has now joined the ANC and PAC in being banned.

A group which opposes apartheid and whose influence is hard to judge is the South African Institute of Race Relations. The

Institute's research and publication program has undoubtedly stung the Government throughout the years—enough, at any rate, for the latter to establish its own South African Bureau of Racial Affairs to produce an allegedly scholarly foundation for apartheid. The Institute publishes a monthly, *Race Relations News* (now an 8-page, tabloid-style paper), the *Race Relations Journal* (quarterly), an annual *Survey*, and a series of pamphlets, usually well-documented and edited. The Institute is the most reliable primary and secondary source of statistical information for all questions involving race relations. It does not, however, enter into any political action.

The last group opposing apartheid which we shall mention is the Black Sash movement. Exclusively made up of white women, the Black Sash demonstrates (usually in silent vigils, each member wearing a black sash) wherever some major violation of human rights is taking place. The movement also undertakes social and defense work to aid victims of apartheid.

## C. UNITED NATIONS OPPOSITION

It should be fairly apparent that the forces of apartheid are, for the moment, unchallengeable internally. A Nationalist-dominated parliament all but rubber stamps bill after bill entrenching inequality. The opposition which, for the most part, is non-parliamentary, is splintered, impoverished and on the defensive. The great mass of people are concerned primarily with economic survival rather than political action demanding considerable self-sacrifice. Opposition leaders are jailed, exiled, or banned. The rewards of cooperating with apartheid are enough to discourage other potential leaders from joining the rebels.

We cannot conclude this brief analysis of the South African equation without examining the activities of opponents of apartheid at the United Nations.

**RESOLUTIONS ROLL ON** Since the First Session of the United Nations in 1946, South Africa has been the target of resolutions almost annually. Resolution 103 (Session

I), stated that racial segregation is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination; Resolution 217 (III) takes note of the "Group Areas Act"; Resolution 511 (VI) established a "Committee on the Racial Situation in South Africa" which carried on an investigation from without (the members were not allowed to enter South Africa) during the course of three years. Each year the Committee reported to the General Assembly on the various ways in which South Africa was violating the Charter of the United Nations by various laws. After its third report, the Committee was discontinued. South Africa absented itself from these discussions, claiming that under Article 2 (7) the United Nations had no authority to investigate what it considered a purely domestic matter.

Subsequent resolutions were pretty much alike; they deplored the situation in South Africa and called upon that country to live up to the Charter, which it had signed; and the United Nations offered its services for negotiating a solution to the "problem."

Coupled with this resolution was a yearly request introduced by India and Pakistan calling on South Africa to negotiate the ill-treatment of its citizens of Indian origin. South Africa never replied, negotiated, or showed in any way that it was aware of these resolutions, except by its absence from the debates. Since the resolutions were really quite harmless, this attitude is hardly surprising.

**ENTER AFRICA** Thus the stage was set for the mass entry of African states into the United Nations, beginning with Ghana in 1957. It was natural that these countries were bitter about the treatment of their brothers, and they have been, particularly since 1960, increasingly determined to push toward more meaningful action, along with some Asian countries and supported by the Communist bloc. They feel that the reality of the situation in South Africa points to an eventual showdown, probably violent, unless sufficient economic pressure is brought to topple the Nationalists. They are sure that the Afrikaners mean every word they say about apartheid and the establishment of a white-dominated state. They consider that any approach by outside countries based on the hope that the South African Government will "mend its ways" is naive and self-defeating.

During the last two years, in the 15th and 16th Sessions of the United Nations, the Afro-Asian bloc has introduced resolutions

calling for the "consideration" of drastic sanctions. They have been passed in the Special Political Committee, but have not obtained the two-thirds majority necessary for passage in the Plenary Session, and have been withdrawn. In the 15th Assembly, the Resolution which was passed by a vote of 95 for, none opposed and 1 abstention, called on all states to "consider taking such separate and collective action as is open to them constitutionally."

In the 16th Assembly, a resolution introduced by the Afro-Asian bloc called for the Security Council to consider continued membership of South Africa in the United Nations, and recommended comprehensive sanctions. This was passed in the Special Political Committee, but, as before, did not receive the required two-thirds majority in the Plenary Session. Amendments calling for the denial of arms and oil to South Africa met the same fate. In its final form, stripped of all sections dealing with sanctions, the resolution, which merely repeated the request of the previous Session, passed by a vote of 97 in favor, 2 opposed and 1 abstention.

The key to the defeat was the opposition of the United States to all paragraphs dealing with sanctions, and the abstention of a substantial number of South American states which do not vote for anything the United States does not want. The Afro-Asian bloc lacked 15 votes. There seems little likelihood of achieving a two-thirds majority unless the United States is willing to allow some kind of "voluntary" resolution which it will not feel honor-bound to follow. One may take encouragement, perhaps, from the fact that the United States has shifted its policy before, having voted, in 1958, for the anti-apartheid resolution for the first time. It may make further shifts toward the African position again.

The significance of the UN debate is the unifying effect that it has on the have-not peoples of the world, whatever their language or culture. Many of the members of the Afro-Asian bloc have put their words into action by declaring unilateral embargoes and boycotts. At various meetings of African independent states and of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, South Africa has been the target of denunciation and recommended boycotts. At their 1962 meeting in Lagos, the Monrovia powers declared that an immediate boycott should be imposed on all colonial powers who do not accept the right of the indigenous majorities to self-determination and independence. These efforts

are costing South Africa around \$40 million a year in lost markets, though she has been able to make them up by increased trade with nations of Western Europe, particularly Great Britain.

In addition, the Afro-Asian states are making it very plain that the Western nations are guided, not by principle but by their economic interests; that they will not, up to now at least, go beyond pious words of "regret" concerning the situation in South Africa.

**EFFECT OF THE DEBATES** The debates have had two noticeable results inside South Africa. They have tremendously encouraged the African population in their own efforts to achieve freedom. They see the large majority of the world's population supporting them in their struggle, as best they can.

On the other hand, the Nationalist Government, which returned to the debates after three years of boycotting them, began, in 1959, to wage a counterattack, which, despite the setback of the Security Council Resolution "deploring" the massacre at Sharpeville, has undoubtedly had some success, at least in the business circles of Western nations and among the more ardent cold war partisans.

In the General Assembly in October, 1959, Mr. Eric Louw, describing the Bantu Self-Government Act, said that it "provides the means for the different Bantu territories to progress along the road towards self-government, and eventually to form part of a South African Commonwealth, together with the Union of South Africa. . . ." His assertion, which he has repeated over and over again since then, that the Bantustans will be eventually independent, is an attempt to remove the objections of those who criticize apartheid, or who fear, for economic reasons, serious clashes which could ruin South Africa's reputation as a stable state. Whether, in the face of the kind of mounting tensions that brought the "Sabotage Act" in June, 1962, South Africa can keep up the bluff is questionable.

Our brief survey of the political forces at work in South Africa has sustained, we hope, the thesis that a showdown—perhaps violent, probably drawn out, and certainly racial—is inevitable.

But one should not make the mistake of thinking that the regime is on the point of tottering. On the contrary: the psychotic rigidity of the Government, the increasing efficiency of the police, the gradual flight of White liberals and moderates overseas, the occasional benefits paternalistically bestowed on the non-White population . . . all these help to extend the life of the regime.

But even more critical to sustain the apartheid government is the attitude taken by Britain and the United States.

What is the relationship of South Africa to the United States? Do we have an official policy? Is this policy guided by purely tactical considerations or do we take human rights seriously? What could we do to help South Africa free herself?

The answer to these and other questions will be dealt with in the next section of this survey.

## Section II

### South Africa And The United States

#### A. AT THE UNITED NATIONS— HESITATING ALLEGIANCE

South Africa has been a major subject of debate at the UN for 17 years. During the period, the United States has gradually shifted its position to show more concern for the plight of apartheid's victims.

At first (1945-1957), the United States consistently abstained from voting on resolutions which called for South Africa to reconsider its apartheid policies and to observe the Charter of the United Nations. The abstention was justified on the grounds that the world organization was not competent to deal with the internal affairs of a member state. This was exactly the position of the South African delegation. The United States opposed the operation of the "Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa" during the years 1952-56. Mr. Charles A. Sprague, speaking in 1952 for the American delegation, saw no purpose in the Commission, claiming its recommendations would be unenforceable, and that the information it sought was already well-known. Instead, he wanted the UN to "hold aloft the standard of human brotherhood." He continued: "Let us not impute evil purpose or lack of intelligence to the people of South Africa. . . . We would leave enforcement to the lively conscience of the citizens of each country and to the power of the public opinion of the world."

In the XIth Session, Mr. Philip Bonsal spoke in the same vein. He noted that there was "debate" within South Africa which gave hope for the future. He went on to say that he hoped the subject would not be brought up again before the General Assembly, because South Africa felt itself "deeply aggrieved" and had withdrawn from full participation in the work of the Assembly. He preferred, he said, to examine human rights "in their broad application," a plea to shift the focus of the United Nations from South Africa to the situation in Communist countries.

Mr. Herman B. Wells, American delegate in the XIIth Session, only reiterated the by now standard American argument for not dealing in any way with the affront to Africans' rights in South Africa. This position, of course, reflected the general attitude of the Eisenhower Administration in foreign affairs.

**SECOND PHASE** In 1958, during the XIIIth Session, the position of the United States was revised to the extent that for the first time it voted with the majority to express "regret and concern" that South Africa continued to flout the United Nations Charter. However, the United States had refused to allow the word "condemn," to be added to the resolution and Mr. George Harrison suggested that "an informed and sympathetic public opinion can serve to help a member overcome a problem."

The situation changed little for the American delegation during the next session, although in the UN itself, under the pressure of the swelling number of African states, insistence on stronger measures was building rapidly. It appeared that no sooner had the United States moved to the point where it could, in good conscience, vote for a mildly condemnatory resolution, than the majority of world opinion took another long stride ahead, leaving the US again in the minority, along with the "colonialist" nations.

**THIRD PHASE** In the XVth General Assembly, Mr. Francis Plimpton spoke at length about his country's concern for the Africans and his belief "that the surge toward racial equality is the wave of the future; that the Government of the Union of South Africa should swim buoyantly with that wave lest it be engulfed by it." Then he turned to the question of sanctions, consideration of which had been proposed by the Afro-Asian bloc. He said that he sympathized with the desire for harsher measures, but he feared for the "welfare of apartheid's unfortunate victims themselves." He wondered whether such measures "might . . . result in increased oppression and exploitation of the very ones we are trying to help."

The United States voted against the resolution on sanctions which, though it passed in the Special Political Committee by a vote of 47 in favor, 29 opposed, and 18 abstentions, did not achieve the necessary two-thirds majority in the Plenary Session.

In the XVIth Session the story was much the same: a series of

proposals calling for sanctions of various kinds, and one calling on the Security Council to consider what measures might be taken against South Africa. The position of the United States was unchanged. Mr. Plimpton again used strong words to show United States disapproval of South Africa. He even went so far as to say, categorically, that "the history of South Africa's legislative record of the past decade is clear and irrefutable evidence of the failure of the South African Government to carry out its obligations under the UN Charter." However, when it came to action, the United States opposed it on the same grounds as before: the possible suffering of Africans. He also expressed doubt that the US could, under its laws, put the proposed measures into effect.

Mr. Plimpton did, however, give tacit approval for such action as some countries might wish to take, saying, "Let those members who, after serious reflection, are convinced that the actions called for in paragraph 6 would be effective and appropriate, move in that direction. . . ."

America's reluctance to become involved in any sanctions against South Africa was again evident in the XVIIth Session (1962). This time the reason given was that sanctions would be "applied only partially, feebly, and ineffectually." And unimplemented sanctions, argued the Ambassador, would lead to "bitterness among members," and might also "seriously weaken the authority of the United Nations."

Mr. Plimpton's speech was otherwise a "model" (in UN terms) condemnation of apartheid. But in a period when examples of the use of economic and diplomatic sanctions by the US are multiplying, the condemnation unaccompanied by action could not be taken seriously. Perhaps the reason to explain why such action is not forthcoming can be found in the two following chapters.

## B. MILITARY ENTANGLEMENT

Speaking in the House in May, 1962, in reply to those who suggested that the United States might aid militarily certain African states if they were to make an attack on South Africa or South West Africa, the Prime Minister, Mr. Verwoerd, said:

“How on earth can people say such things? Nobody considers that France or Britain will give such support. Why then the insult to the United States that it would indeed be receptive to such intentions? It must be borne in mind that, in spite of the fact that there are differences regarding our colour policy . . . there are also vast planes of friendship and cooperation. Not only is there economic cooperation, but this is also apparent in the sphere of research and indeed that research which at the moment holds the attention of the world . . . namely in connection with satellites and related space projects. I do not allow myself to be told that the strategists of the United States will adopt the attitude that South Africa can nevertheless be thrown to the wolves or be swallowed up in the fluctuating ideological streams which, inspired partly by communism, flow across Africa, rather than accept her as being, by nature, a safe and sure and permanent friend.”

Leaving aside the three-quarter billion dollar American investment in South Africa which helps to give the Government the economic strength permitting the spectacular rise in arms spending in the last two years, what is the direct involvement of the United States in South African military affairs?

**COMMUNISM THE ISSUE?** The United States, up to now, has refused to sell arms directly to South Africa. It has, nevertheless, made it perfectly clear that it regards South Africa as an important link in the chain of anti-communism around the world. The United States Navy uses, periodically, the two excellent harbors that South Africa possesses, Cape Town and Durban.

Speaking before the National Press Club in October, 1960, Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of External Affairs, said: “May I point out that South Africa’s strategic position at the southern end of Africa is of the greatest importance to the Western countries as a bastion against Communist penetration.”

The Minister of Finance, Dr. T. E. Donges, spoke in the same vein at the Cape Congress of the National Party in September, 1961. He said that “sooner or later the Western way of thinking must master the cunning communist technique and realize that the preservation of South Africa was the symbol of the West’s own preservation in its struggle against Communism.”

In an age when Americans are inclined to have paranoid fears, this line of argument has hit the mark. Mr. Philip Crowe, former Ambassador to South Africa, affirmed that "the new Republic is willing to stand up and be counted. . . . South Africa's contribution to the free world is not only her military strength but her willingness to serve as a base for the West. . . ."

The United States Navy, besides making "good will" stops in South Africa, has participated in training exercises with South African Defense Forces. In October 1959, ships of the navies of the United States, Britain, France, Portugal and South Africa took part in "Operation Cape," an anti-submarine training exercise held off the southern coast of South Africa. In the early summer of 1961, American Naval units and United States Marines carried out practice landings on the coast with the cooperation of South African forces. Shortly before, Rear Admiral H. H. Bierman, USN, said to a group of South African war veterans that their navy of 29 ships was a contribution to the Western Alliance and that a country like the United States realized that a stable country such as South Africa was a "very useful ally."

A second area of increasing involvement between the two countries is in the establishment of a deep-space tracking station near Krugersdorp. It was set up by American military technicians and is used to track the fall of ICBM missiles fired from Cape Canaveral. It is also used to track and communicate with satellites. For these missions the *Digest of South African Affairs* proudly stated, on August 5, 1960, that "the American military technicians had conferred with the South African Government, had used South African bases and had had the full cooperation of South African Military and Air Forces."

The Government of South Africa realizes that the United States is caught in a not-unfamiliar problem of needing allies in the cold war against Communism and its desire to commit itself, in words at least, to freedom and independence for Africans. Since South Africa has been successful in purchasing arms elsewhere, and in building at home the beginnings of an arms industry, it will turn all of its efforts towards convincing the United States that it is threatened, both externally and internally, by communist subversion and even direct attack. To further this end, it will make every effort to establish informal or formal military cooperation with United States forces, thereby creating a *de facto* alliance which

will be cemented by continued "training exercises," cooperation in the missile and satellite areas, and in the building of nuclear reactors. If this alliance can be created, they can afford to regard the words used at the UN in support of their enemies as so much propaganda, and ignore them. For what counts in the final analysis to the Government of South Africa is that the United States regard the maintenance of the "status quo" desirable.

## C. ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

American economic involvement in South Africa has increased substantially in recent years. Trade between the two countries amounted to an average of more than \$400 million in 1961, with the United States enjoying a very favorable balance. American capital investment has reached the \$700 million mark.

South Africa is, of course, the "industrial giant" of Africa. Her total export trade is almost \$2 billion a year, and—more important—she provides excellent markets for overseas manufacturers, investors, and traders.

**EXPORTS** In 1961, South African exports to the US totalled \$205,462,000 (12 percent of her exports). No gold transfers are included in this. The major item exported was nevertheless a mineral—uranium oxide (\$86.8 million). The movement of this mineral bears special mention, for it shows how the United States Government has become involved so as to tie its hands politically. South Africa exports uranium on contract to the Combined Development Agency, the joint buying agency of the United States and the United Kingdom. The value of these exports in 1959 was four times higher than the next most valuable commodity exported to the United States. The ten-year contract for uranium should expire in 1965, but a "stretch-out" period has been agreed upon whereby the CDA will buy an average of 3,730 tons of uranium ores until 1967, instead of the contracted 4,272 tons; in

the last three years (until 1970) a total of 5,953 tons will be bought.

The next most important South African export to the US was wool (\$24.1 million in 1961); then came diamonds (\$20.7 million), copper (\$12.7 million), and lobster tails (\$11.6 million).

Some comments on these commodities: The diamond movement is only that coming directly from South Africa. Indirect exports, through third countries, are far more important. Most South African wool enters the US in "scoured" form—so that its origin cannot be identified when it becomes a finished product. Boston, incidentally, is the most frequent port of entry for South African wool. Lobster tails, on the other hand, are easy to identify. Indeed, restaurants and groceries are usually proud to label the country of origin.

Since the disappearance of Cuba from US sugar markets, South Africa has been eagerly attempting to fill up part of the quotas left open. Molasses and sugar movements to the US started in 1961. At least one soft drink manufacturer—Pepsi Cola—has purchased South African sugars.

**IMPORTS** South African imports from the US amounted, in 1961, to \$227,800,000, or about 16 percent of South Africa's total imports. The balance of trade was thus clearly in US favor. In fact, if it were not for the uranium export, South Africa might be in serious trouble vis-a-vis the US. The most important movements consisted of machinery (\$73.3 million), chemicals (\$26.5 million), automobiles (\$22.3 million), cotton (\$16.2 million), synthetic fibers (\$15.8 million), and paper (\$10.2 million). South Africa's reliance on US products, second only to those from Britain (which supplies almost half of her imports) is a more than adequate demonstration of the economic ties binding the two countries.

**INVESTMENTS** More important than the movement of commodities between the US and South Africa in defining their economic relationship, however, is the movement of US capital to South Africa. This has increased from \$140 million in 1950 to approximately \$700 million today—60 percent of all American capital invested in the African continent. Except for a slowdown brought on by the unrest evidenced by the shooting and

killing at Sharpeville, American corporations and individuals have greatly increased their stake in the South African economy in the last three years.

This capital is distributed over the entire South African private sector. Following the normal repartition of capital in South Africa, most US funds are centered on the gold and diamond mining industries—the heart of South African economic life. Because the price of gold has been the same for many years, while mining expenses have increased, the industry must continually increase its output and seek to reduce costs of production. Thus the hundreds of thousands of Africans employed in the mines cannot ever expect to enjoy much higher wages unless the system is radically changed. Most US investors consider this a rather remote possibility, and so continue to place their capital share in the industry. There is no question, however, that the major capital transactions take place in South Africa itself and in Britain rather than in the US. Controlling interests in the giant Anglo-American Corporation, for example, are South African, despite the name of the company.

The pattern of South African industrialization is a vicious one, for its major benefits apply almost uniquely to the whites. It is they who generate the economic activity found so profitable by overseas investors. The vast majority of non-whites are fenced into urban and rural ghettos, safely segregated not only physically but also economically. Their participation in the money economy is marginal—a fact assured by all South African Governments, of whatever party, as well as by the overseas investors who close their eyes to the whole thing.

Mr. Marcus Banghart, Vice-President of the US-owned Newmont Mining Company, recently returned to the US to say that South Africa “offers better promise for stability than untried social and political reforms in other areas.” He went on to point out that an American company can average 27 percent in annual profits, a situation that he described as “tantalizing.” And if businessmen did not believe him, they had no less a person than the President of the New York Stock Exchange, Mr. Keith Funston, telling them much the same thing in the summer of 1962: “The whole Western world and all the free nations, of which South Africa and the United States are two outstanding leaders, will have to work together more in the years to come. . . .”

With this sort of reassurance, then, it is little wonder that virtually all major US corporations have opened plants in the Republic. General Motors has several assembly plants—for both cars and refrigerators. Ford, Chrysler, Studebaker are also there. Then there are the auto parts manufacturers such as Champion Spark Plugs, a company making shock absorbers, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, and other rubber companies. Electrical companies such as General Electric, Westinghouse, and Western Electric have set outlets, as have drug and cosmetic companies such as Procter and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, Abbott Laboratories, Johnson and Johnson, and Vick Products . . . oil companies such as Standard Vacuum, Caltex, and Atlantic Refining . . . farm equipment companies such as International Harvester, J. I. Case, and Allis Chalmers . . . and miscellaneous firms ranging from American Cyanamid to Singer Sewing Machines. Even New York's First National City Bank has opened offices in South Africa.

We point to the depth and spread of American economic penetration into South Africa to remind Americans that they are, directly and in large measure, active participants in the continuation of apartheid. We are fully aware of the excitement that can sweep a businessman at the thoughts of profits five or six times as large as normal ones, and so we do not look to him with any hope for self-regulation, much less a major change in policy. Thus it is, as in many other fields, to the Federal Government and international agencies that we must look for some way to stem or cut apartheid's economic lifeline.

**OFFICIAL HELP** In the years stretching from 1947 to 1962, South Africa obtained from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development more than \$220 million in loans. This represents more than a quarter of all loans made to Africa in that period. The Bank's rationale, of course, is that South Africa is a good credit risk; the very same rationale given to explain the Export-Import Bank's \$9 million in credits given in 1960-1961, and the International Monetary Fund's authorization to exchange South African pounds into more than \$37 million in 1960.

In terms of our Federal Credit Insurance Program, South Africa is a "well-rated risk." Could there be any greater encouragement to investors . . . and apartheid? If, as is often claimed, assistance from

US and international agencies is weighed and handed out partially on a moral basis, are we then not to conclude that South Africa has been given a clean bill of health? And furthermore, if such aid is given on the evidence that it will ultimately be repaid, are the same agencies not contributing to the maintenance of the system? Surely there is no need to wait for an official embargo or quarantine for the United States to cease insuring shipments to and investments in South Africa. Surely this country has no obligation to loan South Africa money to expand her electricity system, her harbors and railroads, much less to help install nuclear reactors (which will, in the near future, make the creation of atomic bombs possible).

There are many stages between open support and open hostility. It is time the United States started on this long journey.

## D. SANCTIONS AND BOYCOTT

**SANCTIONS BY WHOM?** In the XVth and XVIth Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, members of the Afro-Asian bloc proposed the consideration of sanctions against South Africa because of its racial policies. In 1961 the resolution included paragraphs calling on Member States to consider breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa, closing their ports to South African ships, prohibiting their own ships from entering South African ports, boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods to South Africa. It passed in the Special Political Committee by a vote of 55 to 26, with 20 abstentions. In the Plenary Session, however, it did not obtain a two-thirds majority and was withdrawn. Attempts to reinstate separate paragraphs wherein lay the heart of the resolution were unsuccessful. What finally received overwhelming support (97-2, with 1 abstention) was a resolution urging Member States "to take such separate and collective action as was open to them."

It was in 1962 that the sanctions proposals first received the General Assembly's two-thirds majority. The resolution requested members to break diplomatic relations with South Africa, to close their ports to South African flag ships, and to boycott South

African goods. It also requested the Security Council to "take appropriate action"—more specifically, to expel the Republic from the UN "if necessary." Sixty-seven nations were in favor of the resolution; 17 were opposed; and 23 abstained. Among those opposed were the US, Britain and Japan.

It is evident that the countries which have the power to hurt South Africa have been unwilling to use it, while those who wish to do so lack the economic power. Eric Louw pointed out, after the 1962 vote, that the 17 nations not supporting sanctions absorb 79.8 percent of South African exports and send her 63.7 percent of her imports.

And he was right. Some seven-tenths of South African exports go to 10 countries, of which by far the most important are Britain, which buys nearly one-third of all exports, the United States, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France and West Germany. Britain, the United States and West Germany have very favorable trade balances with South Africa, and it is obvious that the latter would, if subjected to a boycott, retaliate first against those countries from whom it imports the most.

The Government of South Africa is fond of pointing out that some of its exports are vital to the West. It supplies 55 percent of its diamonds, 16 per cent of its chrome, 14 per cent of its wool and 12 percent of its asbestos, not to mention gold, which is absolutely essential and cannot be boycotted anyway. Many of these items, as well as others in lesser amounts, cannot be immediately obtained elsewhere. Any attempt to impose sanctions would have to be accompanied by intense efforts to increase production in other countries.

Without joint international agreements which would spread out the losses and burdens to all countries, there would be a serious dislocation of world prices in which many innocent nations would suffer. Without very binding and equitable arrangements, South Africa would suffer no loss in many areas, since countries other than the major buyers might have to buy in South Africa some of the rejected commodities, forced there by large British and American purchases in the markets in which those others normally buy.

**A WEAK POINT** South Africa is more vulnerable on two other fronts. While capital investment is not now

controllable by the governments of the nations wishing to apply sanctions, it is, of course, indirectly affected by the climate for profit which investors see in South Africa. There is no doubt that the climate would not appear promising were other steps taken to cut off imports and exports. The drying up of capital could be the *coup de grace* to the South African economy very shortly after sanctions or embargoes were applied.

South Africa is completely dependent on imports of oil and industrial machinery and metal parts. The problems in effecting sanctions on these items are, first, the glut of oil on the world market. It is probable that, under the circumstances, it would be difficult to get suppliers of oil to refuse to sell. Likewise, it would be almost impossible to get Britain to give up the sale of goods which are absolutely vital to her economic livelihood. Again, it would be necessary for Member States of the United Nations to enter into agreements to supply alternate markets for British exports. Without such arrangements, talk of sanctions as a reality is idle.

The action of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN during the last three Sessions of the General Assembly is largely a result of the tremendous numerical increase in independent African states as well as a growing anger at the treatment of Africans in South Africa. They are simply unwilling to accept any longer the mildly worded resolutions which, in the past, "regretted" South African policies. An indication of their indignation and their short temper was the vote to censure Mr. Louw after his speech in the XVth Session.

Unlike some representatives who, each year, wring their hands in sympathy for the Africans but block any attempt to bring action, the smaller states, particularly the African nations, have instituted boycotts and sanctions individually and collectively since the Nationalist rise to power after the war. India and Pakistan have severed trade relations with South Africa because of the treatment of their ethnic brothers in that country. In December, 1958, the All African Peoples Conference, meeting in Accra, demanded a boycott of South Africa. In July, 1959, the Jamaican Government announced a ban on the importation of all South African goods. In the same year they were followed by the Ghana Trade Union Federation, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, and the Tanganyika Federation of Labor.

In December 1959, the International Congress of Free Trade Unions voted to support a boycott in principle. The year 1960 saw no letup in the movement: in January the Malayan Trades Union Congress launched a boycott of all South African goods. The President of the Trades Union Federations in Scandinavia voiced their support. Movements launched by individuals sprang up around the world. In Britain several members of Parliament and a whole array of national figures were associated with it.

Since the massacre at Sharpeville the call for sanctions and boycotts has proliferated around the world. At the present time some 13 countries boycott South African goods. The total loss to South Africa from January 1960 to September 1961, if Dr. N. Diederichs, Minister of Economic Affairs, is to be believed, amounted to about R10 (\$14) millions. To this may be added the combined efforts of individuals.

The South African Government has been concerned not so much that the boycott movements in the "have-not" nations would be effective, since they have been referred to as "flea-bites" by officials; but they have been concerned lest these isolated efforts spread to Britain or America. Mr. Maxwell Legh, writing in *New Commonwealth* in November 1959, said: "Measured in commercial terms, the decision of Jamaica to stop all imports from South Africa—worth about £600,000 (\$1,680,000)—is insignificant in its effect on the total export trade of the Union which runs into the hundreds of millions. On the other hand, the indirect effects of the island's move have been cause for considerable alarm, for it sparked off threats of boycotts by several other states, the cumulative effect of which, if they were carried out, could be seriously damaging to the Union's economy."

**CONFIDENCE IN THE REPUBLIC** We have seen that this, in fact, up to the present, has not taken place to the feared degree. However, the boycott movement cannot be considered entirely apart from the general withdrawal of confidence in the economy of the country after Sharpeville, when the stock market fell drastically and the drain of gold reserves reached crisis proportions, resulting in emergency restrictions on the repatriation of capital. These measures have sufficed to right the ship for the present, but the Republic treads a very narrow road with an abyss on either side. Even serious talk of

effective sanctions and boycotts would probably trigger an impromptu embargo on capital, an event that the economy cannot withstand.

In order to restore confidence, the Government has bent every effort in two propaganda directions: first, to convince the West that South Africa is really battling communism and is arming to stand beside the Western democracies; second, to torpedo the charge that they are exploiting the Africans by pretending to grant "self-government" to the Bantustans. Up to now they appear to be quite convincing to the business community, which is playing an important role in development and rearmament.

In a paper entitled "United States, South Africa and Sanctions" Professor Thomas Birkenhead writes that "the US would not be happy to institute a program of sanctions against a country with whom she enjoys such a favorable trading position. . . . Also South Africa . . . would obviously strike first at those nations which are not only major exporters to South Africa, but also account for South Africa's negative trade position." This argument is even more strikingly applicable to Britain, as we have seen.

In regard to the possibility of non-governmental action, Professor Birkenhead concludes that the large proportion of US imports are raw materials which do not lend themselves to consumer boycotts. Only great pressure on manufacturers and on unions involved in handling and working the goods involved could bring any results.

**THE US AND SANCTIONS** In the United Nations, the US has been four-square against sanctions. In a speech on November 10, 1961, Mr. Francis Plimpton stated that "in all honesty my delegation could not assure this committee that the United States Government could, under its laws, put these particular measures into effect." He went on to ask: "Would they bring the Government of South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies or would they tend only to harden and unify all White South Africa in support of the present Government and its policies, while at the same time imposing severe hardships upon the non-White population . . . ?" Let us see whether these arguments hold water.

First, the most superficial analysis of the policies of the Nationalists over the last decade, culminating with the passage in June

1962, of the Sabotage Act, will show that the Government has pursued its long-announced goal as ruthlessly and as methodically as did Hitler after the appearance of "Mein Kampf." In the 1961 elections, the Nationalist Government received strong endorsement for its policies, from which they have deviated only in minor particulars. It would seem naive to believe that anything but stringent measures will effect a change.

The argument that sanctions should not be voted because they would hurt non-Whites is a decision that America has no legal or moral right to make, when it runs counter to the repeated requests for such action by African leaders both within South Africa and in exile. They know that the choice is between sanctions and boycotts on the one hand, and eventual violence on the other. Chief Albert Lutuli, President of the banned African National Congress, has written: "We are ourselves conducting a campaign of boycotting Nationalist products in South Africa. . . . We are very heartened by the decision of . . . other parts of the world to boycott South African goods." Nelson Mandela, Honorary Secretary of the All African National Action Council, wrote in July 1961: "We shall ask our millions of friends outside South Africa to intensify the boycott and isolation of the Government of this country diplomatically, economically, and in every way." In the April 14th, 1962, edition of *South Africa Freedom News*, published by the African National Congress in exile, leaders said: "In a final attempt to save the situation, and in the interest of international peace, the African National Congress has decided to make an urgent appeal for economic and other sanctions against South Africa."

PRECEDENTS As far as Mr. Plimpton's suggestion that there are legal barriers to the implementation of sanctions, he must be forgetting action taken against Communist China and Cuba. In foreign policy the President is traditionally quite free, and could declare an embargo on exports and imports, though political factors, of course, have a limiting effect. If he could convince the business and military establishments that a "threat" to the United States exists, there is little question that he could act.

In the summer of 1962, the United States has accepted, under the auspices of the United Nations, the principle of sanctions as a last resort to deal with the intransigence of Katanga. This develop-

ment, in a plan submitted to the Acting Secretary General, means that the application of sanctions really depends on how the United States views a particular international situation. In addition, the Mutual Assistance Control Act of 1951 gives the President the power to apply an embargo on the shipment of "transportation materials of strategic value" as well as on armaments of all kinds, provided that a country so isolated is a threat to United States security. An embargo on oil would qualify under this act.

If, then, the United States may, legally, participate in the imposition of sanctions on South Africa, on what does the adoption of such a policy depend? The answer lies in the recognition of the inherent threat to the long-term interests of the United States that a continuation of South African policies entails. Unless the United States is willing to go to war against Africans fighting for their independence from subjection to a White minority, it must recognize that in the end the cause of freedom will prevail. And if it does so in bloodshed and violence, what rewards will the United States reap?

America's hope is to act now, while there is still a strong possibility that a substantial proportion of White South Africans are willing to come to terms with the future. The chance that they will get rid of the Nationalists when they see economic ruin staring at them is not in the least impossible. The urban industrial society of South Africa is not likely to commit suicide for the principle of apartheid. If Japanese businessmen can be declared "White" in order to accommodate deals, then there is still enough flexibility in "apartheid" to meet economic realities. The longer we wait, the more hardened positions will become, and the preaching of the Nationalists that "all Whites must stand and die together" will have its effect.

## Section III

### *Things To Come And How They Affect Us*

We believe the study undertaken in this paper has established the thesis outlined in the opening paragraph—that a peaceful resolution of the conflict in South Africa seems impossible. The struggle for a complete change in the social, political and economic relationships (based at present on an extreme racist doctrine) has started. This is a dynamic, not a static struggle. It will go on until the present structure has been destroyed and hopefully a new, non-racial structure established. A combination of forces will produce this change—internal opposition primarily by African nationalists, support by a minority of European South Africans, international pressure by African states and through the United Nations. There can be no assurance that a democratic, non-racial structure will emerge from this struggle. The reaction to long years of white domination and exploitation may lead to excesses. But there is obviously no chance of anything democratic eventuating from the continued oppression of the Africans by the apologists of apartheid.

The fundamental question is not whether change is inevitably taking place, but how it will take place and how long a process it will be. United States policy toward South Africa must be worked out on the assumption that the forces for change will be victorious in the not too distant future and that the process of change will not be smooth, but complicated with many signs of disorderliness.

CAUSES FOR ACTION Three considerations must be borne in mind that should give some guidance in relation to United States policy. *First*, whatever other observers may say, we do not think a violent clash likely now or in the near future. We imagine over a somewhat lengthy period of time a deterioration in law and order, increasing totalitarian efforts by the government to maintain itself, sporadic violent attacks in local-

ized areas by Africans, a combination of planned and spontaneous uprisings, riots, action and counteraction, a mixture of violence and non-violence. The government, in its fear and its increasing insecurity, will be led to take a harsher course. The opposition will become better organized and more audacious with bases of operation both within and outside South Africa. But it will probably not be by one bold frontal attack that the apartheidists will be overthrown, but by a gradual deterioration within the ranks of the White minority which will weaken the government and force ultimate change to take place. If this is true, then there is time to put programs into operation which will at least minimize the violence and the disorder. All efforts should be made to weaken the apartheid government so that it cannot stand long against the forces of change.

Second, sanctions are important, not only because they put pressure on the South African, but because they further tend to undermine the hard-core White support for the government. The crisis psychology which can be expected to increase in the next period of time will have the effect both of unifying the frantic supporters of apartheid and creating splits among other elements in the White population. The split of the Progressive Party from the United Party is a case in point. The tendency on the part of White liberals, especially among professors, to leave South Africa for Britain, the United States, Canada, etc., because they see no role for themselves in the struggle, is another case in point. The frenzied effort of the government to set up recruiting stations in various parts of the world to encourage white settlers to move to South Africa is the negative side of the same trend.

It is not expected that economic sanctions could alone force the South African Government drastically to change its policy. But sanctions can hurt South Africa economically and can serve dramatically to show that international opinion is committed to a new order in South Africa. Sanctions can help to produce further deterioration among those who either presently support the government or feel they are at least forced not to be numbered among the active opposition. Sanctions could be one of the factors leading to a breakdown of White unity, the creation of new political alignments, and therefore the ultimate breakup of the present powerful government. The United States could lead the way in making sanctions effective.

*Third*, the security of the United States will become inevitably involved by the South African conflict when it occurs, and therefore action should be taken before it is too late. Just as the massacre at Sharpeville brought the South African issue to the United Nations Security Council, so will other future events involving riots, police killings, calling up of troops to quell demonstrations and disturbances leading to inevitable shootings bring the issue forcefully to the United Nations. Or, the issue could become of first international importance through the United Nations involvement in the mandated territory of South West Africa. Just as the future of the United Nations is at stake in the Congo problem, it could even more be bound with South Africa and UN commitments to South West Africa. Or, threats of invasion of South Africa by a coalition of African states could lead to a major international issue. Or, the imminent fall of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese control with the South African Government participating in strengthening Portugal's defenses in order to protect its own borders would make the South African conflict of the greatest international importance. Or, the establishment of South African rebel bases in territories adjacent to South Africa (such as Bechuanaland or even Angola and Mozambique after the Portuguese rule has been overthrown) much as Angolan rebels have a base in the Congo, would make the South African issue of first importance.

Without doubt, through one or a combination of such developments South Africa will be as important as international issue as Berlin or Korea. The South African Government, with its military buildup, will defend itself vigorously. The African-Asian states will support the African nationalists to the hilt. The Communist world will give complete support to the rebels and will make capital of any Western hesitancy to oppose South African power.

Must South Africa become the most dramatic, the most compromising, and the most tragic cold war issue? This is the key question the United States must answer. Can the present South African Government, playing upon the anti-Communist paranoiac tendencies in American life, possibly convince the US leaders that South Africa is even minimally important in the international anti-Communist front? If there is any chance of this, then South Africa will become the cold war issue which will cause the United States to lose all support from African-Asian countries. Therefore,

it is of ultimate importance for the United States to commit itself now to the position that the present South African Government must be weakened and displaced as soon as possible by hopefully democratic elements in South Africa. If there is equivocation on adopting this policy now, it will be much more difficult to make a clear-cut decision at a later stage when the struggle has reached major international proportions and the tendencies for cold war divisions become much greater.

The South African issue is symbolic of the last and the greatest struggle for freedom and equality in Africa. If the United States can take the leadership in ending the reign of apartheid, it will be the greatest possible step toward establishing the United States as the champion of equality and freedom. To fail on this issue would be disastrous.

## SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

From all the foregoing, specific policies which we urge on our Government are:

1. Adoption of economic sanctions against South Africa as a policy because the continuance of apartheid in South Africa will be a threat to the security of the United States.
2. No military aid whatsoever to the South African Government.
3. Discouragement of private American loans and investments in South Africa.
4. No more joint military maneuvers with South African forces, or use of South African shores or the seas off South African coasts.
5. The recall of our Ambassador, when the South African Government is involved in police or military action against Africans.

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