

## FIVE AMERICANS FLY INTO SOUTH WEST AFRICA

On December 6, 1967, five Americans, accompanied by several press correspondents, flew into the territory of South West Africa in two chartered airplanes. Minutes before they intended to land at Windhoek, the capital of the country, a South African authority radioed the planes, and instructed the passengers to record the following message:

*You will not be allowed to land at Strijdom Airport or any other airport in South West Africa unless all documents of crew and passengers meet all local, legal requirements. We know the reason for your mission and should you land you shall have to bear the consequences.*

The passengers did not have the "legal" documents, and the pilots could not be convinced to land. Instead they reversed their course and flew east over the dry South West African veld into Botswana.

What was this unwelcome mission? The Americans represented the Ad Hoc Committee for the Development of an Independent South West Africa. Their immediate goal was to enter the territory in order to explore and discuss possible projects by which private U.S. groups could aid the development of the country in its progression towards independence. The group included Samuel F. Ashelman, Jr., Economic Consultant with the International Co-operative Development Association; Flemmie P. Kittrell, Chairman of the Department of Home Economics at Howard University; Lyle Tatum, Executive Director of Farmers and World Affairs, Inc.; John L. S. Holloman, M.D., the immediate past president of the National Medical Association; and coordinator of the project, George M. Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa.

The project had been planned for many months beforehand as one whereby American citizens would show their solidarity with the United Nations resolutions terminating South Africa's mandate over South West Africa and establishing a United Nations Council for South West Africa as administrator of the territory until independence. These resolutions had been totally ignored by South Africa who maintained apartheid control over S.W.A., and the issue itself appeared stalemated at the international diplomatic level. Concurring with the U.N. resolutions, the Ad Hoc Committee then determined to

fly into South West Africa without conferring with the de facto South African authorities and without visas from the South African Government. The purpose of the project was therefore to dramatize South Africa's resistance to and defiance of the international community, through an act confronting the authorities in South West Africa, and secondly to enter the country in order to investigate possible development projects; a plan in accord with the assumption that the territory would be independent in the near future in accordance with the U.N. resolutions.

It was fully understood by the members of the American team that the South African authorities would probably not allow this type of mission. Therefore the radio message from Strijdom Airport was no surprise. The group chartered airplanes in Zambia early the morning of December 6 from a private company, and flew via



At the refueling stop in Maun, Botswana, following the confrontation with South Africa in South West Africa.

Left to right; Samuel Ashelman, Lyle Tatum, John Holloman, George Houser, Flemmie Kittrell. (Photo courtesy of: John Musukuma, Zambia Mail).

Botswana into South West Africa before being turned back. The threats of the South African authorities against both the pilots and passengers were gauged at intimidating the pilots, who admitted that they feared being imprisoned or having their planes impounded or both. Several major problems ensued because the small planes were nearly out of gasoline, but even under these emergency conditions the South Africans would not grant the

planes permission to land. The pilots then had to grope their way over unfamiliar territory to Botswana where they finally landed for refueling before the flight back to Zambia. Thus the expected confrontation with South Africa occurred — high in the sky enabling South Africa to avoid a face-to-face meeting with the Americans.

The project received extensive press coverage in Africa, and was particularly highlighted in the South African and South West African press. Prime Minister B. J. Vorster went so far as to say:

*"The whole move was merely an attempt to revive the South West Africa debate in the United Nations, -which, I believe, has been postponed for the purpose till next week. Nobody will be allowed in South Africa or South West Africa without the proper documents . . ."*

The Ad Hoc Committee has submitted a full report to the U.N. Council for South West Africa, which will be of value for the Council's future work. The project did occur at the time that the U.N. General Assembly was meeting to discuss the South West Africa issue, and it generated considerable discussion among U.N. delegates.

In summary, the fly-in project to South West Africa made these points clear:

1. South Africa has now indicated by action, and not merely by words, that it will not accept U.N. authority over South West Africa.

2. The South African de facto authorities will not allow non-governmental representatives to aid in the development of the Territory, unless of course the projects fit into South Africa's apartheid plans.
3. South Africa is willing to tamper with peoples' lives, witness the refusal to allow the planes to refuel.
4. South Africa was deeply disturbed by this effort (a South African paper reported that 30 policemen and the Commissioner of Police waited at the airport for five hours in anticipation of the mission).

It is therefore important that groups of all types, national and international, continue to challenge South Africa's control of S.W.A. As the *Times of Zambia* wrote in an editorial on December 8, "... these citizens of the United States also demonstrated to their government the difference between paying lip-service to the ideals of African nationalism and actually doing something about it." Or in the words of the Committee, "We look upon this project as just a beginning... We never had the naive impression that this project was basically going to change the situation in South West Africa. We feel that the project was eminently worthwhile in making clear to the South African authorities that their present de facto control over South West Africa must be challenged by more than words and that they could expect further protests as they attempt to maintain their control by force over a subject people."

## INDEPENDENCE FOR SWAZILAND, SEPTEMBER 6, 1968

BY Lucie A. G. Colvin

As he opened Swaziland's first parliament in July this year, the King of Swaziland, Sobhuza II announced that his government would ask Britain for independence in September 1968.<sup>1</sup> The overwhelming majority of the faces in the crowd broke into smiles, and there was a loud chorus of applause. Only after the celebrations were over did anyone voice reservations about this choice of an early date for independence. Then the controversy revealed each group's hopes and fears for Swaziland.

This tiny country, enclosed on three sides by the Republic of South Africa and on the fourth by Portuguese Mozambique, was ruled by proclamation of the British High Commissioner to the Union of South Africa from 1906 until 1961. Only after South Africa had declared herself a Republic in 1961 was it even suggested that Swaziland might consider asking for some form of representative government. Only then, after 85% of the black African states outside southern Africa were already independent, did the British excelerate secondary education

in Swaziland so that there might be some secondary school graduates to run the country in ten years.

Since 1961 Swaziland has had two radically different constitutions. In the first constitutional talks the white settlers agreed with the tribal hierarchy to push for a strong monarchy under Sobhuza II in return for white reservation of half of the seats in the Legislative Council. They convinced the King's men that it was irrelevant that there were only 8,000 whites compared to 362,463 Swazis. The new African nationalist parties wanted a weak monarchy and universal non-racial adult suffrage, but they were not represented in the talks. The Colonial Office in London forced a compromise in which the parties might have had a chance for some of the seats, but the King outwitted them by forming a party of his own.

With the full support of tribal leaders, the Imbokodvo, as the King's party is called, has swept the polls at both subsequent elections. Impressed by its unquestionable strength, it has abandoned its "partnership" with the white settlers and reached a rapprochement with most of the nationalist leaders. It has arranged the electoral

<sup>1</sup>At recent constitutional talks in London it was announced that on September 6, Swaziland will gain independence, becoming the 28th member of the Commonwealth.

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
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districts so that the only significant opposition party remaining, Dr. Zwane's Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, will have difficulty ever putting a man in Parliament.

The question now is what this emerging one-party state headed by its leader-King will do with independence. Dr. Zwane fears that it will become a South African Bantustan, and that the Imbokodvo will tolerate no internal opposition. More moderate Africans in government are afraid that Swaziland will be forced to depend on South Africans for the skilled man-power she lacks, and will have to tolerate their prejudices. The conservative whites, when they were still "partners" with the Imbokodvo, promised to lead Swaziland quickly to independence "before Communistic influences were entrenched."<sup>2</sup> Now they are less confident. Most whites trust the present King to protect their privileges, but thereafter fear that Trade Unionism, governmental inefficiency, "Communist infiltration," and possibly nationalization of land or mines may come. And the British, who have been severely criticized for ignoring the High Commission Territories during the colonial era, fear that whatever happens it will be blamed on them.

The most pressing problem for Swaziland's new government is how to develop the country's economy without compromising its sovereignty. Swaziland is both presently and potentially the most prosperous of the former High Commission Territories. It has large areas of fertile land, good water resources, a comfortable climate and rich deposits of minerals including iron, asbestos and coal. It supports one of the largest man-made forestry schemes in the southern hemisphere, a thriving sugar cane industry and numerous citrus and pineapple plantations. A hydroelectric plant has been built, and several irrigation schemes are in operation.

Yet Swaziland cannot feed itself without importing staples, and African wages in the country's few industries fall far below those denounced as exploitative in South Africa. White South Africans, backed by South African and British capital, have been responsible for most of the economic development to date. They have brought with them their conviction that African needs as well as African capabilities are inferior to those of Europeans, and they pay them accordingly. Although trade unions are theoretically legal, employers are not required to recognize them as bargaining agents so they have had little impact.

Mineral resources are exported without refining, and Swaziland's share of the profit does not begin to compensate for the fact that they are wasting assets. Irrigation and electricity serve almost exclusively Europeans.

Some other industries have begun processing their produce partly in Swaziland. Timber is exported as baled

pulp, mainly to South Africa and Japan. The Swazi nation has a small share in Usutu Pulp, one of the large forestry companies, but the vast majority of the profits still go to South Africa and Britain. Two sugar refineries serve mainly European commercial plantations, but a little corner of the land and of the sugar quota has been reserved for some 135 Swazi farmers by the Commonwealth Development Corporation. There is a similar small settlement scheme for Swazi pineapple growers in the fertile Malkerns Valley. Their pineapple, along with that of the huge European plantations surrounding them is processed by the nation's only cannery.

The Swaziland government is treading gently in its attempt to increase Swazi participation in the economy. The European capital holders are quick to threaten to leave whenever their privileged position is challenged. There is no doubt that their skills and their capital are needed. But few Swazis entertain the illusion that token sharing on the pineapple and sugar settlement-scheme pattern will ever produce a prosperous peasantry. The companies sponsored by the Commonwealth Development Corporation and some private industries now are attempting to train and place Africans in higher positions. They even seem to have established a consensus among most white businessmen that "localization of personnel" is the trend of the future. This is one of the most hopeful signs in the social-economy of Swaziland.

Large amounts of outside capital will still be needed to continue Swaziland's development, and the logical source is South Africa. The Commonwealth Development Corp., the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank and other agencies will be asked, but their contribution is not likely to equal South Africa's. Few private English and American investors who are not deeply involved in South Africa even know of Swaziland's existence. And South Africa is ready and willing to help. She is openly cultivating the most cooperative parties in the black-ruled states in her neighborhood in an effort to create a protective cordon around her own apartheid society.

For the present and the foreseeable future the Imbokodvo will be the "cooperative" party in Swaziland. Prince Makhosini Dhlamini, head of the Imbokodvo and Prime Minister of Swaziland, announced that he would follow a policy modeled on that of Chief Jonathan Leabua of Lesotho and Seretse Khama of Botswana, two of South Africa's first friends. Specifically, Prince Makhosini said that Swaziland would rely increasingly on South African technical aid, and that the basis of his foreign policy would be "non-interference." These two policies are linked by South African demand.

The question many educated Swazis ask is how far that demand will go. Swaziland will probably never have an independent foreign policy. South Africa controls her currency, her telephone and telegraph service, her cus-

<sup>2</sup>United Swaziland Association platform, in "The Times of Swaziland," April 10, 1964.

toms and most of her borders. In retaliation for any uncooperative act South Africa could paralyze Swaziland without violating any international convention. In 1962 Verwoerd appeared to give up South Africa's long standing expectation of annexing Swaziland, but in 1963 he proposed that South Africa should become her guardian and "prepare her for independence" like the Transkei. If South Africa were to feel particularly threatened by events in Swaziland, it might well try to establish what

it regards as its historic claim to a "protectorate" over Swaziland.

On the other hand, the Imbokodvo has repeatedly stressed its intention to pursue an independent domestic policy. Swazis want nothing to do with apartheid, and insist that they are moving towards non-racialism rather than multi-racialism. Somewhere in the not-too-distant future lies the test of whether an apartheid society can allow a non-racial society in its midst to succeed.

## U. S. GOVERNMENT AND SOUTH AFRICA

### U.S. BUYS MILITARY PARTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

During the first three-quarters of 1967 and culminating in a last minute uproar over the Foreign Aid bill, Congress was exceedingly occupied with the subject of American arms sales abroad. This discussion on the manner in which the U.S. supplies other nations with armaments and military equipment unfortunately overshadowed an equally interesting facet of our military-industrial trading complex: how and from whom does the United States buy its military equipment?

On July 7, 1967 the *Sunday Times* of Johannesburg ran a story headlined, "U.S. Army places big electronic order with South Africa". The article explained that R900,000 (\$1,260,000.) worth of specialized military equipment, made to detailed specifications, was to be sold to the U.S. Army by a South African company, Plessey South African Ltd., in conjunction with a S.A. Government Agency, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).<sup>\*</sup> The equipment measures distances through the use of microwaves, and is modeled after a device called the Tellurometer. According to the news article, 200 such instruments were being exported to a Plessey subsidiary in New York in a "knocked down" condition to be reassembled in the U.S. for the Army's consumption.

Upon inquiry, the Departments of Defense and State denied any specific knowledge of the Army's South African purchase. The Plessey Company of New York (with its international operations plant on Long Island) did not acknowledge any new import of South African equipment, but admitted that it manufactures Tellurometers in the U.S., as well as in South Africa. Finally months later, a communiqué from the Army explained that the Army had not actually purchased the South African "end product" described in the *Sunday Times*, but had bought only certain component parts manufactured in South Africa. The letter from the Army states: "end products of electronic distance measuring equipment being supplied to the Army by United States'

<sup>\*</sup>CSIR is NASA's partner at the U.S. tracking stations located in South Africa.

firms contain 19.5% South African component parts, which is well within the Buy American Act classification of a United States product." (The Buy American Act requires the purchase of U.S. end products; an end product manufactured in the U.S. is one having the cost of its components which are mined, produced or manufactured in the U.S. exceed 50% of the cost of all its components).

In spite of this official explanation, it is clear that the U.S. is purchasing South African technical devices for military uses. Although the U.S. Government stands proudly on the fact that it has ended direct arms shipments to South Africa in accord with the United Nations' Security Council resolution of 1963, it appears to ignore the significance of U.S. dependence on South Africa for certain military goods. The Army has thus provided incentives and profits to South African firms and agencies who are no doubt integral to the development of South Africa's own defense system, and has thereby acted contrary to the United Nations resolution prohibiting foreign assistance to South Africa's military expansion.

Protest letters against American purchases of South African military equipment should be addressed to the Department of Defense, the State Department and your Congressmen.

### 1968 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REGULATIONS: HOW THEY AFFECT U.S. INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

"We neither encourage nor discourage investment in South Africa." This has been the stated official U.S. Government policy towards growing American investment in the Republic of South Africa. This laissez-faire policy has naturally been gratefully accepted by American businessmen as a means of avoiding direct responsibility for the aid which they provide to the apartheid economy of South Africa. But no longer will they have this crutch!

As of January 1, 1968, President Johnson announced new mandatory restrictions on U.S. direct investments abroad as part of a broad program intended to reduce

the U.S. balance of payments deficit. In addition new voluntary guidelines were established to restrain foreign lending by American financial institutions. As Americans alarmed with the growing American economic involvement in South Africa, it is important to understand the implications of these regulations on American investment and loan patterns, and in particular to note some of the discrepancies in the regulations as they affect South Africa.

The financing from the U.S. of projects and loans in and for the Republic of South Africa is currently affected by the following restrictions:

*1. Mandatory Restrictions by the Department of Commerce on Direct Investments.*

Under regulations issued by the Secretary of Commerce as of January 1, 1968, any U.S. corporate or individual investor owning an interest of 10% or more in any enterprise in South Africa or Continental Western Europe is: (1) prohibited from making any transfer of capital from the U.S. to or for such enterprise and (2) required to repatriate to the U.S. all earnings of such enterprise in excess of 35% of the investor's average investment (including both capital transfers and reinvested earnings) for the years 1965 and 1966.

It should be noted that for the purpose of imposing these restrictions, the Republic of South Africa is grouped as a developed country with those of Continental Western Europe.

A new Office of Foreign Direct Investments has been established in the Department of Commerce to administer these regulations. This office is empowered to grant specific exemptions from the application of the regulations in appropriate cases. It is understood that exemptions to date have been limited to situations where the U.S. investor became committed to make transfers prior to January 2, 1968, the effective date of the regulations.

*2. "Voluntary" Guidelines by The Federal Reserve Board for Banks and Nonbank Financial Institutions on Loans.*

Under revised guidelines issued by the Federal Reserve Board and effective January 1, 1968, banks are "requested" to fix a ceiling on their total credits in all foreign countries for 1968 at 103% of such credits outstanding at the end of 1964, a reduction of 6% from the former ceiling. Furthermore the banks are asked *not* to renew "term loans" (those with a maturity of one year or more) at maturity or to relend the repayments of such loans; and to reduce short-term loans by 40% during 1968. These latter more severe guidelines are applicable only to loans directed towards the developed countries of Continental Western Europe and do not refer to credits in South Africa!

*3. Interest Equalization Tax.*

Under Secs. 4911 et seq. of the U.S. Internal Revenue

Code, an excise tax is imposed on the acquisition by a U.S. individual, corporation or bank of debt obligations of foreign borrowers (including governments) in the developed countries which have maturity dates of one year or longer. Executive Order No. 11198 of Feb. 10, 1965 made the tax specifically applicable to loans by U.S. commercial banks to borrowers in the developed countries having maturity of one year or more. For the purpose of this interest equalization tax, the Republic of South Africa is grouped as a developed country with the countries of Western Europe. However, a loan by a U.S. commercial bank to the Republic of South Africa would be exempt from this tax, if the loan matures in less than one year's time. Therefore it is interesting to note the reduction in 1967 of the \$40 Million consortium loan by 10 U.S. banks to South Africa from a term loan of 2 year maturity to that of one year, thereby avoiding the costly interest equalization tax.

*4. Eurodollar Market.*

None of the above restrictions on transferring capital or granting loans from the U.S. to foreigners effects any borrower's right to obtain dollar credits in the Eurodollar market. Eurodollars are domestic dollars that have gone abroad and are owned and being held abroad by foreigners (i.e. dollars owned by foreign governments, companies and individuals and deposited in foreign banks or foreign branches of American banks.)

It appears that as a result of restrictions on domestic capital transfers that there will be a burst of U.S. corporate interest in using Eurodollars through the sale of Eurobonds in an attempt to circumvent these regulations.

**Discrepancies and Action Proposal:**

The Republic of South Africa is grouped with the developed countries of Western Europe for the purposes of the new restrictions on Direct Investments and of the Interest Equalization Tax. But it is not categorized with these countries for the Voluntary Guidelines of the Federal Reserve Board in respect to loans. The rationality of such a difference in treatments should be questioned, and an appeal made to all segments of the Administration to correct this inconsistency by grouping South Africa with Western Europe for the purposes of loan guidelines as well.

Therefore we urge you to write:

1. William H. Shaw, Office of Foreign Direct Investments, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.
2. The Honorable Joseph Palmer, Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
3. Director, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York, N. Y.
4. Vice President of the United States, 500 N Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20024.

# AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID

## METHODISTS WITHDRAW \$10 MILLION FROM FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

During 1967 the campaign for the withdrawal of funds from American banks loaning to the Government of South Africa remained an issue of primary concern to organizations which had not yet decided how to act on this question. The most significant result of this continuing concern, however, was the announcement in September by the Methodist Board of Missions that it would withdraw a \$10 Million investment portfolio from First National City Bank of New York if that bank renewed its share of the \$40 Million consortium loan to South Africa. In early February, after discovering that the bank had in fact renewed its part of this credit loan, the Methodist Board proceeded to implement its earlier decision by transferring the \$10 M. to a non-consortium bank. Other church groups, such as the New York Presbytery, the Church of the Brethren, and the Division of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches have made general decisions encouraging withdrawal.

## THE TRIAL OF SOUTH WEST AFRICANS IN PRETORIA

On December 11 more than 200 American lawyers petitioned the South African Government to stop the unlawful prosecution of 35 South West Africans under the Terrorism Act. In January, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, adopted a similar resolution. Both groups' statements point out that the Terrorism Act, passed in June, 1967 by South Africa's all-white Parliament, is a violation of civilized principles of law. It is ex-post facto legislation retroactive to 1962; defines "terrorism" in such a way as to make it possible for a man to receive the death penalty for simply embarrassing the administration of the affairs of the State, and then forces the accused to prove their innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond these legal abnormalities, South Africa is acting in defiance of the United Nations by trying South West Africans. In October, 1966 the United Nations passed a resolution terminating South Africa's mandate over South West Africa, and placed the administration of the Territory in the hands of a U.N. Council for South West Africa.

In addition to private organizations' protests against the trial, Governments, both at the United Nations and no doubt through private channels, have expressed displeasure at South Africa's conduct. Vice-President Humphrey during his recent visit to Africa, called the trial a "farce", and Ambassador Goldberg said: "We have a right and a responsibility to call upon the South African Government to halt those prosecutions, to release and repatriate those South West Africans and to cease the illegal application of that Act in the Territory. This we do with all the vigor at our command." More recently the Ambassador suggested recourse to the International Court of Justice in order to "divest the South African Government of the cloak of legality which it has put on to cover up its invalid actions."

On January 26, six months after the trial commenced, the judge pronounced 30 of the South West Africans guilty of Terrorism as defined under the Act. On February 9 the men were sentenced: 19 to life imprisonment, 9 received 20 years, 2 received five year sentences, and 3 other men, charged under the Suppression of Communism Act, received 5 year suspended sentences. Of the original 37 men on trial two were acquitted, one died during the trial and one man was too ill for sentencing. The men did not receive the death penalty, provided under the Terrorism Act, as was anticipated. The judge was quick to add, however, that the death penalty would not be ruled out in future cases (of which there are several). The sentences were perhaps the result of external pressure on the South African Government, but the decision not to apply the death penalty in this instance also fits neatly into the new, more "liberal" image South Africa is trying to perpetuate. It must be remembered, however, that in the words of the *New York Times* of January 29, the conviction is still "a travesty of justice and an offense against civilized behavior. . . . It is regrettable that Justice Ludorf did not throw the case out of court altogether and order the repatriation of the accused. . . ."

It was recently announced that 8 more South West Africans, and no doubt many others, will be tried under the Terrorism Act. The first trial of 37 men caught the conscience of the world— let us not forget that it was just the beginning.

### **FLASH:**

In the next issue: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE OLYMPICS  
The boycott of the 1968 Mexico City Games and American action.

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