


January/February 1981

SOUTHERN AFRICA

\$1.25

Volume XIV Number 1

Report from
MOZAMBIQUE



SOUTH AFRICA
Total Strategy for Total War

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
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"Nothing Can Stop Us"

—SWAPO Woman Speaks

As South Africa looked yearningly to the incoming Reagan administration to ease the mounting military and diplomatic pressures for UN-supervised elections in Namibia, Ellen Musialela toured the United States in November telling the other side of the story. At the end of her tour, the representative of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) sat down with Southern Africa and repeated the message she had carried all across the country—that the people of Namibia are determined to win their freedom, and that South Africa's resistance to elections reflects not strength but weakness.

The apartheid regime is fighting "a losing war," she told us. "It's not weapons which fight but the determination of the people"—a determination exemplified by what she told of herself, of the dedication and commitment that have been her life since she first joined SWAPO in 1964 at the age of 14.

by Gloria Jacobs

Ellen Musialela was only eighteen years old when the South African police came looking for her. She had just returned from a clandestine trip to Botswana where she and a male colleague had raised money to buy transport equipment for SWAPO and worked briefly organizing Namibians living on that side of the border. When she arrived back at her parents' home in the Caprivi Strip, Musialela discovered she'd been branded a criminal by the government—"They were looking for me, dead or alive."

That night, without time to rest from her Botswana trip, Musialela began the journey that exiled her from her country, a journey that would lead her to SWAPO training schools in Africa.

"When I arrived home that day [in 1968] my parents said I should leave the country immediately." Musialela and her companion set off right away, on foot, hiking to a new life.

Gloria Jacobs is a long time southern Africa liberation supporter and an editor at Seven Days.



Representative Ellen Musialela spent three months touring the US.

"We walked the entire night without sleeping to get as close to the border as possible. Late the next day, we came to a river where women and children were fishing. We were so thirsty we decided we had to approach the river, but as we did so, a car with about fifteen police pulled up.

"There was one Black policeman and he said to us in our language, so the whites could not understand, 'We are looking for you. Run away. Cross the border and I will not tell the others that you are the ones we want.'

"Without taking any water, we got up and kept on following the river, trying to reach the Zambian border before the police realized who we were. We were only 100 yards from Zambia when we looked back and saw the police car coming at us, very fast. We were so tired, but we ran the last yards to the border station, where the guards tried to stop us from entering. 'We are freedom fighters,' we said. 'You must let us in.'"

Musialela and her partner entered Zambia with the South Africans only a few feet behind them. "Those are not freedom fighters. They are thieves," the South

Africans told the Zambians, who refused to hand us over because they said they were forbidden to by international law. The South Africans then threatened to open fire on the border hut. They fought and argued for two hours and finally turned away in disgust. We went to Lusaka then and joined other comrades from SWAPO."

A Nation in Struggle

In the last few years, squeezed between SWAPO's growing military strength and mounting international pressure, the South Africans have become more desperate and vicious in their attempts to cow the people. Whole villages and their outlying fields have been burnt to the ground; South African troops freely cross into Angola where they bomb SWAPO refugee camps filled with civilians. And says Musialela, the police have been digging holes in the ground to put their prisoners in because the jails are so completely filled.

"Recently whole schools of students have crossed the border just to get away from the terror," says Musialela. When she joined SWAPO, students were not involved in quite the same numbers.

"A member of SWAPO came to our school to speak. He arose my consciousness." But, she admits, her consciousness was already on the rise, her eyes already open to the injustice of South Africa's illegal occupation of her country.

"I could see quite easily that white children had better schools than we did. They rode buses to school while we walked. They had books, more teachers." She needed 25¢ to buy a party card, so Musialela went to her parents, who tried to dissuade her from joining. "They feared I would expose myself to the enemy." Finally they gave in and let her have the money. Musialela later learned that both her parents were SWAPO members.

She spent the next four years organizing students in her own school and traveling to other areas during her vacations.

After the police drove her out of the country, SWAPO leaders offered to send her on to higher education. No, she said, she wanted to be trained for combat. Musialela spent the next six years in military

Continued on page 36

South Africa Sinks Namibia Plan

by Joan Draper

The United Nation's latest effort to bring independence to Namibia has failed, due once again to South Africa's intransigence. In early January the UN's Geneva-based conference on Namibia brought together for the first time representatives of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the front-line states, South Africa and their allies from the "internal parties" in Namibia, Nigeria, and the five Western nations who have been involved in these negotiations for the last four years. The collapse of the talks brings the issue of sanctions against South Africa to the fore. It is likely that a call for sanctions will be brought before the UN in early 1981.

South Africa long ago agreed to the UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in the territory, creation of a 30 mile de-militarized zone along the Namibia-Angola border, and UN supervised elections, but has haggled and delayed for nearly three years on putting it into effect. That record, which was continued in Geneva, suggests that South Africa has no intention of taking part in a process leading to a SWAPO government on its border.

Pretoria said that its delegation came to Geneva as an "observer" and that it was up to SWAPO and the "Namibian government" to negotiate implementation of the UN plan. But Brian Urquhart, the UN assistant secretary-general, made it clear the South African government attended the conference as an "interlocutor" or partner of the internal parties.

After meeting UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in Geneva, SWAPO's President Sam Nujoma offered South Africa two crucial concessions to follow a cease-fire agreement: SWAPO would give "assurance" [of cooperation] to Namibia's internal groupings and the 100,000 whites; and, agree to relinquish its special UN recognition "as sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people."

South Africa, on the other hand, told the Secretary General that the UN, SWAPO's major supporter, was too prejudiced to run elections for Namibia's first independent government. Pretoria's own impartiality is flawed by its monthly contributions in excess of \$650,000 to the internal party known as the Turnhalle Alliance, a level of support

which is far in excess of the UN's support for SWAPO according to the British *Guardian*.

Western and United Nations diplomats, as well as Nujoma, generally found a paradox in the demand for stronger assurances of impartiality, since under the settlement plan the election would actually be carried out by the present administration in the territory, which is largely South African. UN supervisors would be there essentially to certify its fairness, and to keep peace.

"The UN plan," Brian Urquhart later advised the delegations, "has gone as far as it can in the abstract. The only thing left to decide is to go ahead with it." No one was surprised, however, when South Africa announced it considered the time "premature" to put into effect the UN plan. Shortly afterwards, the Geneva conference broke down.

There is no doubt that a call for sanctions against South Africa will come before the UN Security Council this year. Only the efforts of the five Western members of the Security Council to inject life in the UN Namibia settlement have prevented a call for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa from reaching the floor for a vote so far.

Many diplomats believe the South

African refusal to implement the UN plan is based on expectations of policy changes toward southern Africa by the conservative Reagan administration, including a US veto of any Security call for sanctions. South Africa's continuing inability to go beyond token negotiations over Namibian independence, however, is reportedly weakening the resolve of some members of the Western five negotiating team. Reagan administration policy, however, remains strongly against sanctions.

South African officials were the only ones to leave the Geneva talks smiling and afterwards, Pik Botha, the South African foreign minister, announced in Pretoria that he was proud of their performance. Among the other parties to the talks there was almost universal anger, frustration, and bitterness at the fruitless week of diplomatic maneuvering. SWAPO immediately called for a stepped up guerrilla struggle. The front-line states, which had played a considerable role in backing the UN plan and bringing SWAPO to the conference table, showed their disillusionment when they pledged full support to the guerrillas. The deep dismay of the UN officials was marked by their pointed refusal to suggest new initiatives during a press conference after the talks. □



SWAPO President Sam Nujoma with SWAPO delegation at the Geneva talks.

Joan Draper is a journalist with the Inter Press Service—Third World News Agency and reports on the United Nations.

Mozambique: With the

Maputo—It is the second year of insufficient rains. Even the fertile Limpopo Valley, in Gaza province, is showing signs of the drought. Once a broad, flowing river, the Limpopo has shrunk away from its banks, baring large stretches of sand, dry earth, stagnant pools, and occasional marsh.

Residents of the area's communal villages are better equipped than most of the peasants to weather the drought because of some collective farming and the consumer cooperatives which supplement the rice they produce. But even here people are beginning to worry and hunger is becoming a reality (for more information on the drought see *Southern Africa*, November/December 1980).

Among those anxiously awaiting the November rains are the people of "3 de Fevereiro"—the Third of February—one of the first and largest communal villages in the area.

Divided into five bairros (neighborhoods), the village, like many such villages—provides free schools, literacy classes, electric water pumps, and a health post. The village has its own government through the local People's Assembly, a local People's Tribunal, as well as such structures as a party cell, the Organization of Women (OMM), and the Organization of Youth (OJM). It is also one of the few to boast electricity and a telephone.

Communal villages, like this one are also envisioned as building a new social order that will embody the country's socialist principles—stressing equality between people, curtailing oppressive practices (e.g. polygamy), and providing a basis for collective production. One of the most challenging problems they confront is the realization of the commitment to equality between the sexes, and changing the division of labor accordingly. The few days I spent in the village with the OMM secretary and women she works with, made clear that progress, while it occurs, is slow and difficult.

A Woman's Work?

The women of 3 de Fevereiro rise early. By 4:30 a.m. they are already around the fire preparing a breakfast of ground corn porridge. By shortly after five, when the sun is rising well above the horizon, the children are dressed and the women have set off for the 45 minute brisk walk to the valley, many with babies secured on their backs by a wide length of cloth.

The village is named in memory of the day in 1969 when Eduardo Mondlane, president and founder of FRELIMO, was assassinated. On that date seven years later future villagers and volunteers first came together to clear the dense bush and undergrowth, to cut down trees, to rid the area of its snakes and wild animals, and make way for the open land that now sup-

ports a thriving, if poor, community.

In principle—but not yet totally in practice—every family is entitled to an individual machamba in the fertile valley, to grow rice and vegetables, as well as one in the village itself. There rows of manioc, peanuts and corn are grown in sandy, unyielding earth.

Each bairro is responsible for providing a day's labor for collective work, in the OMM cooperative machamba, in restoring the large banana groves previously owned by a Portuguese settler, or in breaking ground for the planned agricultural cooperative. For this work, both men and women set off with hoes and machetes and generally share the task equally. Although the women I spoke with insisted that there is no division of labor based on sex, the claim did not hold true under observation.

The individual machambas stretched out across the open land on the edge of the bairros, by a narrow path, a particular tree, or a stake. From early hours until the sun becomes unbearable, a solitary female figure could be seen bending over, legs straight, to hoe the earth, to plant, to weed, to harvest. Here and there a baby tied to its mother's back would swing rhythmically with the movements of her work. A three-year old boy, surrounded by corn plants reaching above his head, watched his mother with a bored expression. An older woman, her face wizened and creviced by years of work under the sun, worked almost as quickly as the younger women. I saw no

men.

In fact, men were absent from any task integral to village life: the long lines for the water pump were made up almost solely of women, the male sex represented for the most part by young boys—except the two men in charge. The lines waiting to buy rice one day, sugar the next, from the consumer cooperative were filled mainly with patient though weary women. And women faced alone the basic and time-consuming domestic chores which waited when agricultural work was over.

The reason is not only women's versus men's work, although this is the determining factor. The fact is that the majority of the population of the province are women. Gaza, and the neighboring provinces of Maputo and Inhambane supply the South African mines with their economically active Mozambican men. Others seek work in Maputo, or find limited jobs in the nearby towns and few industries, and the rest work in the village. Jobs in the mines are most coveted for the pay is better. The few brick houses that stand out among the mud and reed huts were built by miners. And women spoke with respect of the goods the men brought home with them on their yearly or half-yearly leaves—the primus stoves, the thick South African blankets, the clothes, and other consumer items. Many men proudly sported the orange or blue hard-hats they had brought home from their stint in the mines.

But women's roles are not static. Chang-

Pounding maize (left), women often still shoulder most of the household chores. Hands that for many years have wielded only hoes (center) are now being taught to hold pencils.



Women of "3 de Fevereiro"

ing most perceptibly is the range of tasks that women are taking on. Both party and government are making conscious moves, supported by the work of OMM, to encourage women to realize they can do any work men can do.

In 3 de Fevereiro, for instance, women help build their families' houses. Besides changing work roles, this entrenches a wife's claim to her share of the house should the marriage dissolve. Previously, the house was considered the man's property, and the woman had to leave. Women now help rethatch roofs and, alongside men, engage in the heavy work of clearing land for housing and cultivation.

But most important, and most noticeable, is the prominent role that women play in village political life. The higher percentage of women in 3 de Fevereiro is reflected in the composition of the local People's Assembly: Twelve out of a total of twenty members are women (although the president and vice-president are men). Of the 54 party members in the village, 32 are women, and half the members of the People's Tribunal are women.

Women take this work seriously and are losing their hesitancy about exercising their authority over men. I saw these interactions often, as on a visit to the OMM machamba.

Eager to show me the work of this cooperative, the OMM secretary, Leah Manhique woke me so early one morning that the sun had barely risen. We reached the fields before five, a good 45 minutes

Leah Manhique at right (in picture on right), OMM Secretary for 3 de Fevereiro. Challenging old roles.

before the first worker. Soon about 20 women were turning up the earth with their hoes, preparing to plant corn. But only when the male "responsible" for the storeroom appeared an hour later were they able to get the seeds. He was greeted by an irate Leah Manhique.

"You are lying," she accused him, "when you stand up in meetings and tell us that the reason why the work in the machamba is going slowly is because the women don't come to work. It is you who doesn't come to work. The women have been here for a long time."

He took the offensive. "But there is corn ready for harvesting. The women should be there, not planting new corn and allowing the old to die."

The secretary stood her ground. "But then it is *your* responsibility to call a meeting the night before to organize the work for the following day." Defeated, the responsible left in a huff.

In the banana groves, the day's male volunteers were clearing grass and weeds from the clogged irrigation canals, releasing the foul-smelling stagnant water. I was assured that this work was usually shared by men and women, but since the corn had to be sowed the work had been divided. Divided, I noted, along sexual lines. Clearing the stagnant water was men's work, and women now helped with that. Sowing seeds was generally women's work, and remained so—at least in the OMM machamba.

What *had* changed were the once tight

lines between those who had the right to make decisions, and those who carried them out.

More Than Technology Is Needed

Also helping to change women's roles are technological improvements, which help alleviate some of their time-consuming tasks. The need to travel long distances to pump water by hand is something of the past: each bairro has its own electric pump and generator.

But technology is only fine as long as it does not break down. At the time of my visit three or four pumps had been out of order for two to three months, and the lack of trained personnel meant that it might be more months before a repair technician could get to the village. So once more women were spending time collecting water, this time waiting in line.

Much more is needed. Watching women work from the first sign of light to late in the evening was to begin to appreciate how oppressive their work load is, and to have renewed awe for their stamina. And to the child care, food preparation, including hours of pounding and grinding, work in the machambas, washing clothes, and endless other domestic tasks now is added the call to build a new life. Women working with men in new forms of production, taking literacy classes, engaging in decision-making as leaders. Where do they find enough hours in the day?

Men That Help Are the Exceptions

And what of the men? Women in the People's Assembly told me that when women had to be away from home for political work, their husbands helped prepare food. But any visions of men pounding, collecting firewood, and then cooking were soon dispelled. "Many men have brought primus stoves from South Africa," I was told. "They are able to cook simple food." Thus they help out, but only once the husking of rice or the grinding of corn has been done.

This is a step, enabling women to travel and attend to political tasks, but absent is the conscious mobilization of *men* for these tasks. Women are exhorted to take on men's work. The reverse is not true. Those men that help are the exceptions.

While these contradictions persist, talking with the women of 3 de Fevereiro leaves one little doubt of the fundamental changes when compared with their lives under Portuguese colonialism.

"How could we dream," one woman said to me, her face showing the passion she felt, "that what is happening to us today could have ever been possible?" S.U. □

Stephanie Urdang is a member of the Southern Africa Collective and is currently based in Mozambique.



Stephanie Urdang



Stephanie Urdang

Zimbabwe: Nkomo Down, Tekere Out

by Steve Vegh

In a move intended to balance opposing forces in his administration, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe abruptly dropped two prominent government ministers in a cabinet shake-up on January 10. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the country's minority PF-ZAPU party was dismissed as home affairs minister. In return, Edgar Tekere, one of Nkomo's leading critics, was removed as minister of manpower development. Nkomo initially refused to accept a lesser post as minister of public service. Two weeks later, however, he agreed to accept a new position as minister without portfolio, thus ensuring the survival of the coalition government.

Mugabe downplayed the potentially dangerous implications of Nkomo's dismissal by praising Nkomo, explaining that "Because public expressions of the police

Steve Vegh is a long time solidarity worker who has recently moved to New York.

became criticisms of comrade Nkomo," the rival leader was relieved of the Home Affairs post which included responsibility for the police. "I give him credit for all he has done in very difficult circumstances," continued the Prime minister. Nkomo angrily denounced the move, claiming that it violated an agreement to share the security portfolio between the two parties.

Under the current arrangement, Nkomo will assist the prime minister in defense and public service administration and retain a voice in the cabinet committee responsible for public security. Nkomo's new post also directs him towards "tasks which require special handling in the national interest" according to Mugabe. The reshuffle allocates three additional government posts to PF-ZAPU, bringing six cabinet seats and three deputy ministries under their control.

No discussions about the cabinet changes were held with Nkomo prior to his dismissal. Mugabe did confer with his own ZANU party leaders, including Tekere, before announcing the controversial

minister's step-down from the government. "I felt that he needs a rest so he can recover from the pressures and strains he has had," said the Prime Minister, referring to Tekere's trial in December on charges of murdering a white farmer, Gerald Adams.

Tekere, who will continue to serve as secretary-general of the ZANU-PF Party, was found not guilty by two Black assessors who overruled a guilty verdict delivered by the third judge in the case, a South African-born white. Tekere's successful defense was based on a vestige of the Smith regime, the 1975 Indemnity and Compensation Act intended to absolve brutal Rhodesian officials and soldiers engaged in "suppression of terrorism." Tekere argued he was doing the same when he led a military-style assault on Adams' farm following a shooting incident the previous night. Adams died during the attack. Reactions to the trial's conclusion were undramatic, generally following racial lines.

Nkomo's removal as home affairs minister was only the latest in a series of disappointments recently suffered by the minority party. Nine senior party officials were arrested and detained without charges by the government on November 21, several weeks after violence between soldiers of ZAPU and ZANU erupted in Bulawayo, leaving 55 dead. "After the Bulawayo incident, it was obvious that some people did not take heed of my warning [against 'dissidents' and anti-ZANU-PF elements] so we have detained some of them," Mugabe stated.

In the November 24 local elections, Zimbabwe's first since independence, ZANU-PF won a "sweeping victory, according to Galilee Jami, member of the Zimbabwe UN delegation. "Only in the Western provinces did PF-ZAPU have any great support," he said. Elections were postponed in Salisbury and Bulawayo until the end of January because of armed clashes in mid-November between Mugabe and Nkomo supporters. Where voting did take place, however, PF-ZANU leaders accused ZANU-PF of committing "criminal deception and fraud aimed at falsifying the results of the elections." A formal note from PF-ZAPU to the Ministry of Local Government requesting nullification of the elections, and a judicial commission of inquiry is currently under consideration.

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Joshua Nkomo, left, with white commander during Zimbabwe's transition to independence. Independence eliminated some problems, but many still remain.

Struggling for Independence

In April 1980, nine countries in southern Africa met to establish a regional grouping known as the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), aimed at accelerating the member countries economic and social development and at reducing their tremendous economic dependence on South Africa. At the end of November the group held its second conference, in Maputo, to discuss plans for the development of the region, with priority given to transport and communication. Stephanie Urdang reports from Maputo.


Maputo—Colonial development of the southern Africa region had South Africa acting as a magnet—drawing all lines of transport towards it. Most landlocked countries had access to the sea only through South Africa. There was some development of Mozambican ports, but at a secondary level, and primarily to service South African needs or those of its economic satellite, Southern Rhodesia. The map of Mozambique's rail lines provides a vivid picture of this heritage. Not one of the lines runs vertically from North to South through this long narrow country. Instead, the two most important lines run horizontally across the narrow width of the country to South Africa and to Zimbabwe.

Potentially the ports of Maputo and Beira could play a valuable role in servicing Zambia, Zimbabwe, the north of Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi.

But both ports and connecting railways are hopelessly inadequate to serve the developing economies of these independent countries.

The lines of communication fare little better. A telephone call to Salisbury, from Luanda, a distance of just 1,800 kilometres, has to be routed through Europe.

At the first-ever conference on economic independence, held in April 1980, transportation and communications development were delineated as regional priorities by the nine 'SADCC' countries—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (see *Southern Africa*, June 1980). Of the estimated \$1,912 million budget that has been drawn up to undertake planned development projects over the coming decade, almost half the money has been assigned to the development of railways and



Reducing dependence, especially in relation to South Africa, is essential. Samora Machel opening the conference.

ports. Much of this money is to be spent on upgrading the port of Beira, in Mozambique, so that its present capacity—which allows it to take ships of 25,000 tons—will be almost doubled.

The second SADCC conference, held on November 27 and 28 was faced with the task of finding the funding to begin work on regional development projects aimed at promoting self-reliance, turning dreams into reality. It followed three days of high-level inter-governmental meetings held in closed sessions. Representatives of development agencies, OPEC, and delegations from thirty governments of the industrialized countries—both socialist and capitalist—came to the conference, many to pledge support for the goals of the region.

Opening the conference, Mozambican President Samora Machel set the tone for the days to come:

"The struggle we are waging to reduce our dependence, in particular in relation to South Africa, is an integral and essential part of the struggle for our people's right to the development that will enable them to benefit from the fruits of their labor."

The two major aims of the conference, according to Botswana's Minister of Finance Peter Musi, were to secure financial pledges from government and funding agencies for regional projects and explaining to the international community the conference's plans for development.

Representatives from the nine countries came away from the conference feeling it had been a considerable success. Close to a third of the budget—\$650 million—was pledged by participants over the next five years, allowing work on these priorities to begin early next year.

Only \$50 million of this (donated by the Scandinavian countries), however, represents actual "new" money. The balance came from commitments already made but reaffirmed at the conference. Nevertheless, the sum as a whole and the support expressed by the countries participating in the conference gave fuel to feelings of optimism for the eventual outcome of the regional plan.

The largest contribution came from the African Development Bank which pledged 10 percent of its budget over the next five years, a sum of \$400 million.

The European Economic Community, after much discussion within its ranks, pledged \$100 million, with the proviso that it be used by the seven countries that have signed the Lome convention, thus excluding Angola and Mozambique. These funds represent the EEC's normal grant to the region and are not necessarily earmarked for transport and communications, although it is likely that the funds will be spent this way.

Although the European socialist countries sent delegations to the conference, they made no offers of/or commitments to funding.

The United States sent a delegation and—pending Congressional approval—expects to "be able to provide up to \$25 million for new regional activities, principally in transport, during the current fiscal year which ends September 30, 1981." In addition, the delegation indicated the US would consider the possibility of contributing a similar amount in the next fiscal year. The change of administration, however, places a large question mark alongside such pledges.

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Overview

In recent years the conflict in southern Africa has been a focus of world attention and concern. The struggle matches a well-armed, Western supported, white minority against the overwhelming Black majority of the region's inhabitants. And slowly, after a decade of guerrilla warfare, the people are winning, ending Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, and defeating the white settlers in Zimbabwe.

The success of African arms, and the emergence of genuinely revolutionary popular governments in the former colonies is the single greatest historical force behind the current unprecedented militarization now underway in white South Africa.

The military build-up, which affects virtually every aspect of white society, is also the product of dynamic internal forces—both Black and white. And, by virtue of South Africa's status as one of the most industrialized countries in Africa, the global interests of the imperial West have also played an important role in this build-up.

These forces have combined to form the context in which a growing challenge to capitalism and white supremacy has emerged. A challenge mounted by African liberation forces that has resulted in the mobilization of an entire society in defense of white privilege. South Africa's Prime Minister P.W. Botha has termed this mobilization the total strategy.

Only a decade ago, the white politicians in Salisbury, Luanda, and Pretoria considered their positions impregnable, a view widely shared in Washington and London.

NSSM 39, a secret document on southern Africa policy prepared for then presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, was based on the assumption that "The whites are here to stay." Option Two of the study—the so-called tar-baby option—advocated the expansion of economic, technical, and military links with the colonial and white settler regimes in southern Africa, while maintaining an ostensibly anti-racist stance in public.

US trade and investments in southern Africa soared. Between 1968 and 1974 direct US investment in South Africa alone doubled to over \$1.4 billion, mostly in the strategic manufacturing and high technology—even nuclear—sectors. US and other Western arms continued to arrive on South African and Portuguese docks, despite a voluntary arms embargo. The racist regimes in southern Africa were held to be the reliable custodians of Western industrial interests in the region, providing the security and the cheap Black labor required for corporate profit.

Only five years later, however, the assumptions spelled out in NSSM 39 had begun to founder on the rocks of history.

When the peoples of Mozambique and Angola seized state power from the Portuguese, they dealt a huge blow to the colonial system of exploitation that drained Africa's wealth into Western corporate coffers. Decades of blind support for the racist system in southern Africa had left South Africa and its Western allies with few friends and fewer options in the mineral rich and strategically located region.

Encouraged by the US and Britain, Western industrial interests and elements within the South African capitalist leadership—men like Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo-American Corporation and P.W. Botha in the ruling Nationalist Party—hastily developed a new two-pronged strategy to defend white interests.

Externally, the political component of this new strategy, vigorously pursued by the Carter administration and then United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young, called for a negotiated end to the liberation wars raging in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Carter and Young believed that such "peaceful solutions" would

undercut radicals within the nationalist movements, leading to the installation of pro-Western African moderates content to leave the exploitative colonial economy in place. The new regimes would then either become charter members of an economic and political "Constellation of States" dominated by South Africa, or at least remain dependent on Western aid and investment.

The second prong of this neo-colonial strategy, that of "persuading" the African camp to accept it, was left in the willing hands of the white settler army. The size and power of the South African military increased dramatically as South Africa stepped up its aggression against the liberation movements and their "front line" backers. Newly independent front line states—because of their support for liberation—were forced to fight not only underdevelopment, but the armies of white southern Africa.

The strengthening of the military within South Africa was given further impetus by the growing internal unrest catalyzed by the 1976 Soweto Rebellion, and marked by steadily growing guerrilla war within the *laager*.

The deteriorating security situation further exacerbated chronic economic problems, and sharpened vision within white society. Inside the ruling Nationalist Party, a new alliance of military and business interests began to emerge. By 1978, these interests had coalesced around P.W. Botha, and other proponents of the "total strategy."

Total strategy is principally a militarist doctrine, subordinating all other activities to the survival of the state. But in South Africa, it also serves to institutionalize the use of the state on behalf of capitalist interests. Billions of tax dollars have been poured into the private sector, making the military a prime engine of economic growth, technological advancement, and capitalist accumulation. Even the highly publicized reforms adopted recently have a military application within the framework of the total strategy.

But military service has also placed demands on the white male population that are seriously aggravating the economy's long-term shortage of skilled labor. The modest privileges given to urban Blacks are designed to ease this shortage by creating a more highly skilled permanent Black labor force which also acts as a buffer between the whites and the impoverished Black masses trapped in the migrant labor system or rural bantustans.

The total strategy, regardless of whatever other components are introduced, is still firmly rooted in military strength. The recent shutdown of the Black press, forced removals of striking workers to bantustans, and raids in neighboring countries are convincing proof of the foundation which underlies South Africa's new strategy. And it is with this basis in mind that we have prepared this supplement. The enclosed articles present a picture of the militarized state in South Africa and the degree to which this state is integrated with and supported by the Western world. We have also provided a view of the forces that are trying to—and eventually will—overcome this situation.

Southern Africa is at a critical juncture, the center of the struggle is turning towards an ever more militarized apartheid. At the same time, the Western world remains clearly identified with Pretoria.

Liberation for South Africa and Namibia, as in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe before them, will come from the people of these countries. But the people of the US, and the Western world in general, by understanding the militarization of southern Africa, can work to support the forces for liberation. Through this supplement we hope to provide a resource that can be used in this struggle. □

The Roots of Total Strategy



"The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action . . . The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and coordinated action in all fields—military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc."

P. W. Botha
Defense White Paper, 1977

Industrial commandos guarding Sasol oil-from-coal synfuels plant.

"Bullets kill bodies, not beliefs. I would like to remind you that the Portuguese did not lose the military battle in Angola and Mozambique, but they lost the faith and trust of the inhabitants of those countries. The insurgent forces have no hope of success without the aid of the local population."

General Magnus Malan

For generations of Afrikaners, the descendants of 17th century Dutch immigrants to South Africa, the laager was the symbol of survival. From inside that closed circle of wagons, "the volk", or chosen people, as they called themselves, sought to fend off their enemies, both Briton and Black.

Afrikaner generals talk today of a much broader perspective. The "total strategy," and the social order they seek to defend, embraces much more than the Afrikaner volk. Economic changes combined with military and political pragmatism have given the army the central role in attempting to unify divergent forces for the preservation of South Africa's threatened social order.

As a group Afrikaners remain dedicated

to the survival of white supremacy, as are the other white groups in South Africa. But today this is coupled with the desire to preserve a complex capitalist society in which many Afrikaners have assumed positions of power and predominance.

When the National Party took power in 1948 it did so on the basis of a class alliance made up of Afrikaner farmers, white workers and a petty bourgeoisie which was still seeking to transform itself into a fully fledged capitalist class. Economic control and ownership of the major sectors of the economy, of mining, commerce, and industry, was firmly in the hands of the English South Africans and foreign, mainly British investors. Afrikaner political rhetoric frequently took on a populist hue, very hostile both to the British "capitalists"

as well as to the "threatening Black hordes."

In the last thirty years there has been a profound change in that rhetoric, reflecting both fundamental changes in the nature of the South African economy and in the distribution of economic power between English and Afrikaner.

The economy, once heavily based on mining has become increasingly diversified and industrialized. Industries have grown larger, requiring more capital, so that there are now a few giant firms controlling the economy, instead of many small workshops. Labor demand has changed too—there is still a demand for cheap, unskilled, migratory Black labor for the mines, but there is also a growing need for a more stable industrial workforce with greater

skills.

As the economy has grown, so has the size and power of an Afrikaner capital owning class. Once captured, state power was deliberately used to nurture Afrikaner capitalism at many levels, industrial, banking and commercial. Afrikaner capitalism now thrives in both state-owned and private form. At the same time the Nationalist Party used its political domination of government to seize final control of the mechanisms of the state. All top civil service jobs, from the treasury to the army, have been filled by loyal Afrikaners.

Such developments have led to the emergence of new interests and alliances. There has been considerable unification of English, Afrikaner and foreign business interests over the past three decades. The National Party is itself being re-constituted to more closely represent major business interests, rather than those of its old base, the white workers and small farmers.

This rapidly changing political economy of white power in South Africa thus created the conditions needed for the fusion of state and capital that is embodied in the notion of a total strategy. But the new doctrine did not develop solely from the shifts in the white economy. These shifts are only part of the context, helping to determine the nature of the reaction, but not explaining why the reaction was necessary.

The South African state in the seventies was confronting not only profound structural changes economically, but also a heightened threat to its very existence, presented in the form of a three pronged attack. After 1974, independence in Angola and Mozambique, and the intensifying war in Zimbabwe and Namibia threatened South African stability by providing an increasingly supportive environment for liberation forces externally. Inside the country growing popular militancy, as demonstrated by the 1973 Durban strikes and the 1976 Soweto uprising were all warning markers of a growing confrontation.

International pressures, including threats of an oil embargo also increased in the seventies, adding weight to the argument that South Africa was facing an all-out attack on all levels. Against such an assault, Pretoria could have only one hope, a "total strategy" for defense of the Republic.

Total Strategy

Every activity of the state must be seen and understood as a function of total war, argued former Minister of Defense P.W. Botha in his 1977 Defense White Paper. One implication of this was a push for increased streamlining and centralization of control inside the state apparatus, creating an efficient and responsive bureaucracy, willing and able to implement new policies as they emerged.

Another was the very explicit incorporation of the major capitalist leadership—English and Afrikaner—into strategic planning for the survival of the state. This thrust seems to have been spear-headed by the military planners—with some opposition from the old-line politicians such as former Prime Minister Vorster, and considerable resistance from elements in the Party representing the old "populist" constituencies, particularly the white workers.

Close links had, in fact, already been established between the military and sections of industry in the fifteen year old drive to achieve military self-sufficiency in the face of a potential international arms embargo. Since 1964 Armscor (the state-run Armaments Development and Production Corporation) has been building a domestic military-industrial complex. Today the giant armaments industry employs nearly 90,000 people, more than 5 percent of the industrial workforce. Over 800 local contractors and subcontractors are involved in what has become a billion dollar industry capable of supplying the Defense force with everything from armored cars and aircraft to radio equipment, gun sights and bullets.

In the late 1970's government planners set about formalizing links with the business world, incorporating top company directors into state planning agencies like the Defense Advisory Board, the new President's Council, and the previously civil-service controlled Public Service Commission.

The early attempts to build weapons self-sufficiency has been greatly expanded with important implications for the South African economy. Vast amounts of state capital

are being invested in a deliberate effort to build strategic sectors of the economy—hence billions of dollars have flowed into developing the synthetic-fuels oil-from-coal SASOL process. A less dramatic, but important manifestation of this policy of building industrial self-reliance can be seen in the push to establish a fully domestic diesel-engine plant, the Atlantis project.


Thus the state has continued to play a very active role in initiating economic planning and investment. But it has also showed signs, recently, of a willingness to hand some decision making back to private enterprise—a shift that reflects the growing cohesion of business and government.

As the popular threat to the survival of the South African system grows, businessmen are also being directly incorporated into the state security structure. New legislation (The National Supplies Procurement Act), stipulates that any business, including foreign owned companies, can be required to make or provide military supplies to the government upon request. The National Key Points Act (see side-bar) has formalized a para-military alliance between the plant-owner, police, and military forces against any possible Black challenge.

Dealing with Blacks

One striking element in the "total strategy" thinking is the attempt to deal with the Black population in ways that initially avoid open, brute repression. There are no suggestions that full economic and political power should be shared with Blacks, but there is an attempt to extend

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Armscor employs more than five percent of the industrial workforce



certain privileges to limited sections of that population. By giving some Blacks "a stake in the system", government strategists hope to create an elite which will serve to head off confrontation.

The "system" government strategists are referring to is not Bantustan retribalization—but the "free enterprise" white controlled economy. Thus there is talk of building a Black capitalist class, although the restrictions hedging this move ensure that members of this class would achieve very minimal economic independence.

At the same time there have been major moves in the direction of stabilizing the urban work force, and allowing it some greater permanence and privilege. "Reforms" such as those arising out of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commission recommendations meet two needs—the economic need for more semi-skilled labor and the political need for a Black buffer between the repressive state and the majority Black millions who still suffer the full measure of injustice imposed by South Africa's apartheid laws.

Constellation of States

Nor have the new policy planners confined their vision within South Africa's borders. To the north they see markets—and also potential refuges for guerrillas. They have set out to use their economic leverage, backed by military threats, to prevent any alliance between the liberation movements and independent neighboring states. Thus an economically advanced South Africa offers technical aid, transport, emergency food supplies, and loans to the adjacent states in exchange for subservience within a regional economic framework or "constellation" dominated by South Africa.

For those countries unwilling to accept the South African carrot, there is always the stick. On January 30, 1981, South African troops struck deep into neighboring Mozambique, destroying several buildings occupied by the exiled African National Congress near the capital of Maputo. Mozambique nevertheless remains dependent on South African trade and technical assistance in crucial economic sectors.

There have also been recent moves among the "southern nine" independent African states to create their own regional economic co-operation and planning body. But the old trade and transport links established in the colonial period have mostly remained in place. And as a glance at a railroad map of southern Africa demonstrates, they greatly favor South Africa's continuing dominance of regional trade and development.

Thus what is unfolding in South Africa is a growing confrontation which still takes

US Companies Enlist

The main target of apartheid will not come from a "Black" army marching on Pretoria, but from a small Black capitalist class. This class will be produced by the new moves toward the implementation of the "free enterprise" system. In the early 1970s, the government of the Bantustan of Ciskei, with the aid of the military, had already begun the process of creating a Black capitalist class. In June 1981, the Minister of Defense, P. W. Botha, announced that 100,000 Black personnel had already been recruited and that a further 50 percent of those are already giving the fullest cooperation.

It is possible these preparations date before October 1976, the ANC's victory in the general election, several SASOL (South African Shale Oil) companies, and a government-backed bank, the Industrial Development Corporation, which was designed to further strengthen the Black economy as form of insurance to take economic sanctions.

The National Key Point Act gives the Minister of Defense power to declare any place a national key point. When it appears to the Minister that any place has a place of special importance and is in danger of being lost, he may declare it a national key point. The Minister may also declare any place a national key point if he considers it necessary for the safety of the Republic.

Places of special importance as key points are directly responsible to the Defense Minister for all required security precautions. Failure to comply will be punished by a 120-100 (120-400) fine or imprisonment for the first offence. The government provides the necessary security. It may then call the attention of the public. The Defense Force may also "proceed" in such areas. This includes all companies, including multi-national corporations, all white military forces, and stock weapons and communications equipment. It also includes all companies, including multi-national corporations, all white military forces, and stock weapons and communications equipment. It also includes all companies, including multi-national corporations, all white military forces, and stock weapons and communications equipment.

These moves are part of the strategy to create a Black capitalist class.

their home offices about the government's security programs. But at most times, the workers are more interested in their own jobs. In the automotive, oil and chemical industries, some US-owned plants in Africa can be regarded as having a high degree of US involvement, and in some a military alliance with the South African police force and army.

Though some US corporations reportedly unwilling to follow the measures, most companies are likely to go along with what is required of them. Some have already been doing so for years.

In May 1977, General Molloy, USAF, already drawn up a contingency plan which involved close collaboration with the government and with other agencies in the industrial area.

The GM plan was based on using white employees to defend the plant against Black protesters. It also stipulated that 100 percent of white employees in the plant would not be party to creating of strike during civil wars, and that the plant group would be African and Chinese. The plan also called for a company employee to be outside South Africa in 1981 (Southern Africa, June/July 1978).

The plan was explicit about the distinction between plant defense and South Africa's Civilian Peace Commission, which is for employees with military training or commitments to join local resistance units. "Plant personnel," the scheme also noted, "could be engaged in a variety of functions, i.e. part normal work and part guard duty in such situations."

These plans were drawn up by the white nationalist Black resistance organization, the Swatara uprising, and at the same time, a GM board of directors member, Ross G. Sullivan, was drawing up his "code of conduct" for US firms that would be doing business in South Africa. But while Sullivan was giving his impression that firms were being "bribed" with money away from the government with the white minority regime, the Black resistance in the opposite direction

the primary shape of white versus Black. But there are complex forces at work making for new alliances on each side of the line; the all-embracing nature of the Black challenge is recognized by the total strategy response, which seeks to mobilize and militarize an entire society in its own defense. But the recognition that what is ultimately at stake is the preservation of a capitalist run society (albeit at this stage a

white-run capitalist economy) has added new dimensions to the strategies which capital owners in South Africa are willing to consider.

The days ahead are likely to see complex moves and counter-moves as the differing elements inside the white society work out their relations of power to one another, and seek above all to preserve their domination over a rising Black population. J.D.

Mobilizing for Total War

by Richard Leonard

"Switch on the radio and you are likely to hear some crooner urging you to buy Defence Bonds. During the pop program 'Forces Favorites' you are treated to interviews with high-ranking officers in Pretoria and on the border."

The newspapers—both Afrikaans and English—are falling over themselves to obtain and publish press releases about our military preparedness . . ."

Writing in the *Cape Times*, in 1978, this university lecturer went on to describe the "mind boggling and terrifying intensity" of the South African government's war propaganda effort.

While South Africa's intensive militarization is linked to the "total strategy" promoted by P.W. Botha since he became prime minister in 1978, it really got under way in 1975/76 during the period of South Africa's invasion of Angola and the related escalation of the war against SWAPO in Namibia.

South Africa also expanded its military intervention in Zimbabwe in support of the "internal settlement" with Bishop Muzorewa, and Mozambique and Zambia suffered heavily from strikes and raids carried out by the South African/Rhodesian forces. Now South Africa has openly extended the Namibia war into southern Angola and is backing attacks and subversion against Mozambique by the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) set up by former colonialists and dissidents. But, already engaged in war beyond its own borders, the South African military machine has also had to face a growing guerrilla challenge and popular resistance within South Africa.

A Military State

There are concrete indicators of South Africa's growing militarization. Total defense expenditures rose from R707 million (\$933 million) for 1974/75 to R 2.189 billion (\$2.9 billion) for 1979/80. The government's arms manufacturing and procurement agency, Armscor, has become "an octopus organization," in the words of *To The Point* magazine; by December 1980, Armscor alone had 25,000 employees and a budget of more than \$2 billion.

Richard Leonard is the author of the forthcoming book, *South Africa at War* (Lawrence Hill and Co, Westport, Connecticut), from which this article has been adapted.

The Defense Force almost doubled in size between 1974 and 1979, from a total strength of 269,000 to 494,000 as estimated in the *Apartheid War Machine*. The standing operational force (total troops under arms at one time) is now put at 180,000. The total troop strength, which includes all available reserves, represents about half the white male population between the ages of 18 and 45, but does not include older men who have completed their compulsory national service and active reserve period (now ten years). Unless they volunteer for additional reserve duty with the Citizen Force or Commandos, older men are posted to the inactive general reserves—to be called up only during a total national mobilization. The government is now seeking to activate this older group for Civil Defense units that are required under the terms of the 1977 Civil Defense Act.

In 1977, the period of compulsory national military service for white males was extended from one to two years—with an additional required eight years of active reserve duty with the Citizen Force or Commandos. The minimum annual period of active duty with these reserve forces also increased from nineteen to thirty days.

In 1975, the military began calling up personnel on active reserve to serve three month tours of duty in order to meet operational requirements in the Angolan war. And despite the longer period of national service requirements, reserve call-ups have

continued to range from three to six months—placing a strain on the white workforce.

Women Now Join

White women are being encouraged to join the Permanent Force and the Commando reserves, and in 1978 national military service was extended on a voluntary basis to white women. Women are now being moved into many Defense Force positions formerly reserved for men, though not combat roles.

Another government priority is preparing school age children for military service through a secondary school "cadet" program. The government's 1977 Defense White Paper announced the goal of doubling the number of cadets to 300,000.

In 1978 plans for extending the Cadet program to students of mixed race were announced. Although this plan drew strong opposition from teachers and the "Colored" Labor Party, it appears that the government is intending to go ahead. Also, girls are now joining boys in the Cadets. One press report described "adventure camps" for white girls and boys, age eleven to fifteen, set up privately by a university lecturer in the Transvaal. The camps included political indoctrination, shooting instruction, and "terrorist hunts" as part of the program.

The most significant new element in South Africa's military mobilization has

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More Black recruits have been introduced in order to relieve strains on the white workforce.

been the recruitment of Blacks into combat roles in the military forces. The "Colored" Corps was first given weapons training and made a part of the Permanent Force in 1972. Other Black units now include the Indian Corps (a naval unit), the 21st Battalion (an African infantry unit in the Permanent Force), and the "Colored" Service Battalion (a reserve unit).

In addition, South Africa has set up military forces in the "independent" bantustans—the barren reserves to which many Blacks are relegated. These forces, under the command of South African officers, number about 1,000 each in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, and fewer in Venda. In May 1980, the government announced that four new ethnically-based battalions (about 600 each) were being set up including Swazis, Vendas, Shangaans, and Zulus.

The battalions are to be stationed in the northern and eastern border areas near Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, areas the government sees as zones of guerrilla infiltration. With the "ethnic" battalions, the number of Black troops trained in South Africa in recent years is estimated to be 10,000 (the figure for Namibia is estimated at 5,000). Black troops serve as volunteers in racially segregated units under white command, mainly as Permanent Force (i.e. professional) soldiers.

Black recruits in the Defense Force are paid about \$2,700 per year and receive other benefits; while this is somewhat less than their white counterparts earn, such wages are a significant inducement for Blacks facing unemployment rates over twenty percent and low wages. The South African forces continue to face troop shortages, however, and the government is considering the introduction of compulsory national military service for people of mixed race and Indians by as soon as 1982.

Yet Black dissatisfaction is evident and in 1980 the highest ranking Black in the Defense Force, an Indian naval officer, resigned, saying he could no longer lie about continuing discrimination. Part of his job had been to go out and drum up Black recruits.

Border Security

Despite the pace of militarization, guerrilla incidents in South Africa have continued to mount, with more than 55 incidents publicly reported between late 1976 and mid-1980. Soon after becoming prime minister, P.W. Botha toured the northern borders and appointed a commission to report on the rural security situation. The investigation showed there were large tracts of land unoccupied by whites. Of the 3,118 outlying farms surveyed, 44 percent had no white occupants. One district in the north-west Transvaal had 400 large cattle farms,

but only 118 were owned by real farmers (instead of businesses or game farms), and only twenty percent were occupied by whites.

Prime Minister Botha declared that "a terrorist can walk from the Limpopo River right through to Pieterburg without having to set foot on a farm occupied by whites." Members of parliament, the press, and government leaders called urgently for measures to aid farm security.

In response, the government announced plans to promote the white repopulation of the border areas by offering interest-free and low-interest loans to young men with military experience to take up farming in key areas. The scheme was scheduled to cost some \$100 million over a six year

period according to Defense Force guidelines.

"Hearts and Minds"

The Defense Force has also undertaken "Civil Action" programs to win over or intimidate the population in areas such as Zululand and Bophuthatswana. That such efforts are necessary is a measure of the military's insecurity about the support of people who are supposed to be enjoying the fruits of thirty years of apartheid rule. This attitude was reflected in the remarks of Brigadier C.J. Lloyd, in August 1979, when he said, if the "local population of border and rural areas did not show loyalty, goodwill, and cooperation" with the Civil Action programs, "we will have to move them out of the critical areas and resettle them."

SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMED FORCES

The South African Defense Force includes the Army (by far the largest branch with more than eighty percent of its troop strength), the Air Force, and the Navy.

	Number*	
	1974	1979
The Permanent Force is the full-time, professional core of the Defense Force and includes some white women and several Black units.	21,500	40,000
National Servicemen are white males between age 18 and 25 serving their compulsory two-year period of initial military duty.	26,000	60,000
The Citizen Force includes mainly men who have completed their National Service who must serve eight years of active reserve; many are now called up for three or six months active duty. It also includes older men serving as volunteers.	120,000	230,000
The Commandos provide security for urban and rural areas and also designated key national points; they include volunteers and men serving their eight year active reserve period. Local groups include white women volunteers and are now allowed to recruit Black volunteers.	90,000	150,000
Civilian employees.	12,500	14,000
TOTAL	270,000	494,000

*This estimate, with documentation, is provided in *The Apartheid War Machine* (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1980), page 41.

period. As part of this program Deputy Defense Minister Coetsee recommended that farmers be linked into the radio network operated by the Defense Force and that farmers set up fortified strong points to form a "ring of steel" around the Republic. He also indicated that the Defense Force already maintained a permanent military presence in "priority regions" through a major base at Phalaborwa and training bases at Madimbu, Wembe, Messina, Batavia, Amsterdam, and Impala. In June 1979, additional legislation was passed to give farmers credits for keeping their property occupied and managed ac-

In April 1980, it was reported that the Army had been made directly responsible for security in northern Zululand, near the border with Mozambique.

In urban areas the government has created Industrial Commando units to guard what are designated as "key" industrial sites (see related article), and the South African Police have also been expanded.

The South African Police is a national police force now numbering some 40,000; about half of its members are Black, most of whom are concentrated in the lower

The Shooting War

ranks. In addition, there are police reserve units estimated to number almost another 40,000. Police units responsible for political repression and counter-insurgency work, include the Security Police, paramilitary border patrol units, a special Task Force and Counter Insurgency Unit, and specially trained riot squads.

Julie Frederikse of *Africa News* has reported on the police and army roadblocks which have become routine around Soweto, angering Black residents. Describing a recent visit, she says, "The men in camouflage with automatic rifles don't care where you say you're going or why; they're looking for weapons, explosives and communist literature, and they'll search every inch of your car and your body to find anything that fits one of those categories."

Weaknesses in the War Machine

Although South Africa's military forces are rapidly increasing in size and strength, the intensive militarization has also exposed weaknesses in the apartheid war machine.

Above all there is the problem of white manpower. The Permanent Force (the military's career force) has had difficulties retaining skilled members in a number of fields. Scores of resisters have sought asylum in Britain, the US, Holland, Canada, Botswana, and other countries. Beyond those who have chosen to leave the country, the London-based South African war resisters organization COSAWR, has estimated that thousands of young men are on the run from the military in South Africa. At least 2343 men were convicted of failure to report for military duty between 1975 and 1979.

Another sign of difficulties is that the Defense Force has launched an extensive investigation to try to stop bribery of clerks by parents of conscripts who want their children assigned to non-combatant units. In spite of all of South Africa's preparations, in September 1980, Prime Minister Botha noted that there were Defense Force units under strength and said a special committee was reviewing the entire system of military service in an effort to bring in larger numbers of people. The country also faces increasing shortages of skilled workers, a situation which—as military recruitment increases—will undoubtedly be further strained.

South Africa is a country at war, both outside and inside its borders. Prime Minister Botha and his generals insist that their battle within the country is "80 percent political and 20 percent military," but there is no doubt that whatever political strategies they choose in their efforts to maintain white domination will be enforced with all the military power that can be mustered. □

While South Africa's war in Namibia is often described as a "low-intensity conflict," South Africa has steadily increased its troop strength, now estimated at 70,000, and has expanded the war in southern Angola. An estimate of the South African forces operating in Namibia include, Permanent Force: 12,000; SWA Territorial Force: 8,000; National Servicemen: 20,000; Citizen's Force and Commando Reserves: 30,000.

The "South West Africa Territorial Force," formed in 1980, includes both battalions formed on a tribal basis and also ethnically integrated units. Although this new force is ostensibly separate, with its own administrative structure, it remains dependent on South Africa. Conscription for this force is to be introduced for all Namibian men over sixteen years of age in an attempt to "reduce strains on South African manpower reserves. There have been reports, however, that as a result of conscription plans, more young men are leaving the country to join SWAPO.

In negotiations with the UN, South Africa has stated that it has forty military bases on the northern border with Angola and Zambia. In Ovamboland, where the war is most intense, nearly every village is reported to be controlled by South African forces. In addition to at least four major air bases in the "operational area" and a main staging area at Grootfontein, South Africa has established a large new military command headquarters in Windhoek, the capital, and another strong point at Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deepwater port.

While the little coverage given to Namibia in the US media tends to focus on South Africa's diplomatic maneuvering over a UN settlement, even less attention is given to

the war and the effects of the South African occupation on the Namibian people. Paul Wee, general secretary of the US based Lutheran World Ministries, visited Namibia in 1979 and found "overwhelming and pervasive evidence" that the Defense Forces and units of the South African-sponsored Home Guards were responsible for "constant, daily violence" and "brutality among all segments of the population" in Ovamboland.

Namibia is also used as the staging area for attacks into southern Angola. During 1980, according to Angola's deputy minister of defense, Colonel David Moises, there were 81 air attacks and 33 assaults by airborne troops into Angola. The South Africans consistently maintain they invade Angola only to attack SWAPO targets. Yet almost 700 people—mostly women and children—died in May 1978 when South African troops attacked a refugee camp at Cassinga, Angola. In January 1981, the British *Guardian* released a report from a former mercenary who claimed that in addition to regular raids, South Africa uses covert units, posing as anti-Angolan government guerrillas, to deliberately murder civilians and destroy Angolan economic installations. The mercenary, Trevor Edwards, served with the South African forces in Namibia until December 1980.

The war in Namibia has been a key cause of militarization within South Africa, including the arms build-up, the lengthened period of military service, regular call-ups of men on reserve, and the recruitment of Blacks and women. It has also generated various forms of opposition to military service, including conscientious objection, draft resistance, and desertions. □



In Namibia the military is in evidence everywhere.

Laying the Basis For Intervention

by Sean Gervasi

In January 1981 a new administration took office in Washington. In many respects it will be a continuation of the Nixon administration, drawing on the same base of power, and relying upon many of the same men and women. Its ideology is, if anything, more conservative. There is every reason to expect another imperial presidency.

The situation, however, is even more dangerous than these observations would suggest. For the Reagan administration comes to power at a time when the United States feels itself threatened from every quarter. And the deep-seated fears of a growing threat to the very survival of capitalism will play a major role in shaping foreign policy.

Those concerned about Africa and about the ongoing liberation struggle in southern Africa have begun seeking clues as to the new administration's probable policy for the region. No one can predict what specific decisions will be taken. But it is possible to define broadly a likely course of action. From that one can deduce certain more or less inevitable consequences.

Interests and Intervention

The basic question is whether the Reagan administration will actually carry the US closer to some kind of military intervention in southern Africa against the cause of genuine African nationalism. This is generally held to be unthinkable, even by some of Reagan's more prominent advisors on Africa. Yet, I believe, the new administration will indeed carry us much closer to military intervention in the late stages of the South African revolution.

Those responsible for African policy in the new administration see US (and also its allies') three areas of vital US interests in Africa:

Economic—Western corporations and financial institutions have \$4 billion in direct investments in South Africa. Radical change could mean nationalization without full or even any compensation for loss of these investments. The suspension of mineral supplies from southern Africa, or significant rises in the cost of minerals, would also mean serious disruption—some would say devastation—throughout in-

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dustry in most Western countries.

Political—Several Western countries have such close political, cultural, and religious ties with South Africa that upheaval would have serious domestic political repercussions in the West. In addition, the present balance between progressive and neo-colonial regimes in sub-Saharan Africa is underpinned by South Africa's economic and military power. Upheaval in South Africa could mean the rapid spread of revolution and the collapse of the neo-colonial system on the entire continent.

Military—South Africa's military power is seen as important to the maintenance of stability on the continent, and to the policing and control of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Western use of military bases, for instance at Simonstown, may well be important for control of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and for the projection of power into "trouble spots" on the continent and into the Middle East. South Africa is also regarded as crucial for the protection of the sea lanes which carry Western trade, and especially Western oil imports, around the Cape of Good Hope.


Given these interests, the point is not whether Reagan's advisors *want* eventually to intervene in southern Africa. Few of them would say that they do. But they *cannot avoid*, given their view of the world, taking actions which will draw America into the conflict on the wrong side.

Why come to such a conclusion? The answer lies not in the personalities of the new foreign policy makers, but in the nature of certain institutional forces in our society and in the historical situation which defines Western relations with the present Republic of South Africa.

Disintegrating Capitalist Order

There is now a consensus among Western strategic analysts that the West is entering an extremely dangerous period. Although there are differences over the causes of this situation all are agreed that economic and political trends pose a major threat to Western interests around the world. Most are also agreed that, whatever the particular causes, it is the Third World which is the source of the threat.

The crisis is actually a dual one, in which



The US Rapid Deployment Force on trial exercises in Egypt. Intervention in the making?

All That Glitters . . .

economic and political problems interact. The Western world faces growing economic difficulties, with many countries finding it impossible to maintain adequate rates of economic growth. Capitalism as a system requires growth. Without economic expansion corporations cannot generate profits. The labor force—which is itself constantly expanding—cannot be fully employed, and capitalist society becomes trapped in a downward spiral which ends in depression.

Today it is clear that crisis is deepening. The recession of 1974-1975 blended into the recession of 1980-81. Unemployment and high inflation are widespread. Competition among the major capitalist powers for markets is intensifying. Further, the Western countries now face the prospect of growing internal division and unrest. The economic crisis has attained proportions which threaten new political difficulties.

In the early 1970s a new external development began to intensify the problems of the capitalist countries. The Third World began making new demands. Political decolonization was followed by demands for economic change. The increasing assertions of economic sovereignty by Third World countries posed a new and real danger for the West, threatening the structure of the world economy on which the prosperity and privileged position of the West rested.

Economic growth in the West has, in fact, been increasingly fueled by imports of energy and raw material supplies from abroad. By the mid-1960s almost every Western country had become critically dependent on the Third World for supplies of several commodities, and particularly for supplies of petroleum and scarce minerals (see box on strategic minerals).

North-South Conflict

It is against this background that Western analysts have viewed the growing pressure for change in the Third World. Such pressure for change and the growing "instability" in areas once securely within the Western sphere forced policy makers to confront a fundamental contradiction in the capitalist system, that between sovereignty in the peripheral countries and economic requirements in the industrial centers of the North Atlantic basin. If "sovereignty" should deny or significantly raise the cost of access to the supplies of energy and raw materials which are increasingly vital to the West, then the Third World could bring about the gradual economic strangulation of the West.

As the 1970s ended, it was becoming clear that Third World demands presented the West with an external political crisis of major proportions. OPEC was merely the beginning. And while the crisis remains unresolved, it is clear that the drift is in-

creasingly in the direction of intervention. One need only cite the interventions in Angola, Chad, and Zaire, as well as covert actions in Zimbabwe, Namibia, El Salvador and Jamaica to see the pattern.

The description of the dual crisis con-

US policy makers are increasingly using the issue of control over reserves of key mineral resources as a determinant for American actions in southern Africa. Those who have been most vocal about the United States' minerals policy have framed the debate in anti-communist and militarist rhetoric.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig recently argued that a future southern Africa "aligned with Moscow . . . could bring the severest consequences to the existing economic and security framework of the free world," because of critical resources. Haig argued that "the era of the 'resource war' has arrived," and NATO must "broaden its horizons" to encompass areas of "Third World resource conflict."

Representative James Santini of Nevada has also argued in Congress that a "Soviet dominated mineral market" would be "worse than OPEC" in its potential effects on "the economy and defense security of the entire Western world." In order to deal with this grave situation, Santini advocates closer ties with South Africa.

This sort of "minerals scare" could become the rallying cry for those who seek a greater US opposition to the growing liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia. Given these reserves, it is important to understand the extent and implications of US mineral imports from southern Africa.

According to US Bureau of Mines estimates, the United States imports a significant percentage of its consumption of four key minerals from South Africa: ferrochromium (34 percent), vanadium (20 percent), platinum group metals (37 percent), and ferromanganese (29 percent). These minerals are critical to basic production processes in the steel, aerospace, chemical, automotive, and armaments industries.

Does this import dependency mean that US industry would collapse if mineral supplies from South Africa were cut off? Contrary to the views of Representative Santini and Secretary of State Haig, researcher James Raiford has argued in a study done for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that even in the unlikely event of a total cut-off of mineral exports from South Africa, Western countries could make adjustments in consumption and marketing patterns over the short to medium term.

If the key question is access to minerals, there is no reason to assume that the triumph of the national liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa would bring a cut-off of mineral exports to the West. Newly independent countries, desperate for foreign exchange, have little choice about where to sell mineral resources.

What may change are the near monopoly domination of prices and markets now enjoyed by the big mining firms. Giant multinational corporations like the South African based Anglo-American Corporation, and US companies such as Union Carbide, Allegheny-Ludlum, and Englehard Minerals and Chemicals will no longer profit from the exploitation of cheap Black labor supplied by the apartheid regime. And it is likely that labor practices, profits, and foreign ownership would be tightly controlled by a revolutionary government.

The real issue behind the "current minerals scare" is not continuing Western access to South African minerals, but continuing Western control of those resources. Secretary Haig's pursuit of the "resource war" will most probably keep the US on the wrong side of the freedom war in southern Africa. D.B. □

SOUTH AFRICA; 1978 production and reserves of five critical minerals as a proportion of global production and reserves

(in percent)

mineral	reserves	production
Chromium	68	34
Manganese	37	23
Vanadium	19	39
Platinum group metals	73	46
Gold	48	58

Data source: US Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1979.

Table is from the Congressional Research Study, *Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the US and OECD Countries*. Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, September 1980. page xvi.

fronting the Western countries set out above is not particularly controversial. Yet conservatives, particularly those who have been working at think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the

Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, would accept only part of that description as valid.

Reagan's foreign policy advisers would readily agree that the West confronts a major challenge in the Third World, a challenge which "must be met".

But they do not see the growing turmoil in Third World countries as evidence of a rebellion against exploitation and oppression. They do not believe that there is any justifiable basis for the demands for a new international economic order. In their view, the United States is the dominant world power by right. They do not question its position or speculate upon the need for the US to adjust to the demands for change around the world.

Reagan and his advisers see a simple world. Increasingly, they speak not of the turmoil in the Third World and its causes, but of "Soviet expansionism." The war in Namibia, and the coming upheaval in South Africa, are seen not as the outcome of conflict generated locally by the conditions in which people are forced to live but as the result of outside interference. Thus the simple-minded interpretations of the Cold War are now being transferred to perceptions of events in the Third World.

A Giant Chessboard

The conservative Republican's view of Africa is essentially a geo-political one. It does not look at Africa per se, seeking to understand the history and problems of the continent, and of its peoples. Rather it views Africa as a giant chessboard on which the West and the Soviet Union are vying for influence and power. If the West has lost influence and power in Africa during the last decade, that loss is not the result of revolutions and change which grew out of the situations in southern Africa and the Horn. Reaganite conservatives see it as part of an "orchestrated Soviet policy of worldwide imperial expansion." And the pace of Soviet intervention in Africa, in their view, is accelerating everywhere.

In these circumstances, the United States and the West, according to conservative analysts, must set themselves the following objectives in Africa:

- The United States and other Western countries should seek to consolidate and extend their influence on the continent in order to protect their vital economic interests (particularly the supply of many minerals).
- The United States and other Western countries should seek to extend and consolidate a significant military presence on the continent.
- Since Africa is a single geo-strategic entity, links between moderate Arab and Afri-

can governments should be encouraged.

- South Africa is the single most important country for the West in Africa, and in consequence, revolution in South Africa should be pre-empted by the acceleration of economic growth and the amelioration of apartheid.

- Any intervention by socialist bloc countries in the internal affairs of Africa should be resisted vigorously.

- Socialist revolutions on the African continent, whatever their causes and origins, should be prevented, or, where that is not possible, contained and undermined.

This listing summarizes the many articles and books written over the last few years by people who will now be making policy on Africa. Whatever the details, the dominant thrust of the policy which is likely to emerge from the Reagan administration will be based on an effort to achieve these objectives. This will mean a significant departure from the confused but relatively restrained policy of the Carter administration.

Intervention Capability

For most of the last decade, it seemed unimaginable that the United States would intervene in Africa on the side of South Africa. Some argued that the main restraint on such action was political—that the people of the United States would not tolerate intervention. This objection misses the main point. The United States has intervened only marginally to assist South Africa commit itself aggressively in the struggle to protect its imperial interests. The state is once again sufficiently coherent, and has sufficient public support, to contemplate intervention.

The United States is an imperial power, and has characteristically intervened in the internal affairs of states all over the world. But the defeat of US arms in Vietnam, the constitutional crisis which followed Watergate, and the political crisis which followed the exposure of illegal activities by the intelligence agencies badly disrupted the normal workings of the state during the 1970's. These exigencies led to disruption within the US armed forces, to the gradual isolation of the US from its allies, and to the collapse of the political consensus needed to support foreign policy. The ruling elite in this country could not mobilize the elements required for a successful intervention anywhere.

Angola proves the point. Geo-political logic carried the US into a large-scale covert action against the MPLA in the mid-seventies. And the US co-operated closely with South Africa. But that intervention was ended not because the public objected to a tacit alliance with South Africa. It ended because the political conditions did not

exist which would permit intervention to continue.

Much of this has been changed under the Carter administration. The pseudo-concern for human rights which was the basis of Carter's foreign policy was widely accepted as congenial. The perception of foreign policy was altered. And an aggressive foreign policy was legitimized once again by public relations.

Propaganda has succeeded again in creating the general impression that the United States, through no fault of its own is under attack in much of the Third World. The connection has been made between domestic prosperity and the depredation of OPEC and any potential imitators. Many Americans have been convinced that the United States is a victim. The consensus for an aggressive foreign policy has been reconstituted. The military, with greater difficulty, is rebuilding itself.

As the new President takes office in January the United States finds itself able for the first time in perhaps a decade, to engage aggressively in the struggle to protect its imperial interests. The state is once again sufficiently coherent, and has sufficient public support, to contemplate intervention.

Conclusions

These, then, are the changes which will weigh heavily in the minds of Reagan's advisers as they come to grips with the immediate problems of southern Africa. They wish to see a "stable" Africa and southern Africa, from their point of view, dangerously unstable. They regard South Africa as the most important country of the continent, stressing the importance of its vast deposits of minerals and the waterways which connect the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. For all these reasons they are likely to establish closer relations with the apartheid regime. Refusing to accept with their Afrikaner friends, the inevitability of radical change in South Africa, they will lay the basis for possible intervention in the future by trying to pretend that they can help the apartheid regime to reform itself.

Thus the new administration's policy is likely to include all or most of the following initiatives:

- Put some pressure on South Africa to accelerate the reform of apartheid.
- Draw closer to South Africa politically, diplomatically, and economically.
- Resume significant covert arms shipments to South Africa, possibly indirectly (this would include the provision of military equipment).
- Seek, with the United Kingdom, bases and rights at Simonstown.
- Press forward with plans for an expanded

Continued on page 2

ESTIMATED SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE ARMS INVENTORY*

Type	Role	No.	Manufacturer	Remarks
Landward Air Defense/Attack				
Mirage (various models)	ground attack fighters (60+), interceptors (41+), trainers (19), reconnaissance (10+), and ground attack fighter bombers (38)	168+	Fr./SA	Initial planes imported from France; now produced under license in South Africa, with current priority toward building the ground attack fighter force to over 100 planes, each equipped with advanced fire control and laser range finder systems; SA also manufacturing more interceptor types armed with Magic air to air missiles.
Impala	trainer (216) and ground attack (122+)	338+	Italy/SA	Each version originally imported from Italy, later produced in SA; Italian producer is Amermacchi, which is 25 percent owned by Lockheed (US).
Maritime Command				
P. 166 S Albatross	coastal patrol, light transport	18	Italy	9 delivered 1969, 9 in 73/74; Piaggio is the Italian producer, engine is Avco-Lycoming (US).
Transport				
Lockheed C-130B Hercules	heavy transport	7	US	delivered from US, 1963.
Lockheed L-100	heavy transport	15	US	Civilian equivalent of C-130B, delivered from US for "civilian purposes."
Transall C-160	heavy transport	9	Fr./FRG	from France, 1969/70.
HS 125	light transport	4	UK	from UK early 1970s.
Merlin LVA	light transport	7	US	from US, 1970s, made by Swearingen.
Light Aircraft Command				
Cessna	light transport and reconnaissance	28	US	16 CE-185s del. 60s; 12 185 "Skywagon" del. '70s; sale of 70-80 US light aircraft (incl. Cessnas) to "civilians" approved '78.
Bosbok and Kudu	Forward air control; tactical reconnaissance light transport casualty evacuation	80+	Italy/SA	40 Bosbok del. from Italy and produced in SA, '74/75; more than 40 Kudu designed and made in SA, based on Bosbok. Both designs are based on the Lockheed AL-60 and use Avco-Lycoming engines.
Helicopters				
Alouette II and III	light air support	110+	Fr.	7 IIs and 70 IIIs delivered '60s; later orders unconfirmed.
SA-330 Puma	air support, light transport	40+	Fr.	20 del. 70/71; later orders unconfirmed.
SA-321L Super Frelon	med. transport	15+	Fr.	16 del. 70/71; later orders unconfirmed.
Westland Wasp	maritime support	12	UK	from UK, 66-74.
205 Iroquois	anti-tank warfare, tactical support, rescue, transport	25	Italy/US	Design by Bell (US), produced under license in Italy by Augusta.

Also in use: 12 CL-13 B Sabre fighter (Canada), 9 BAC Canberra strike-reconnaissance (UK), 7 Buccaneer maritime strike-reconnaissance (UK), 7 HS Shackleton maritime patrol (UK), Douglas C-47 (30) and DC-4 (5) transports (US), 74 Rockwell Harvard T-6 trainers (US).

There have been allegations that the SAAF also has the following:


40 Lockheed F-140G Starfighter, 50 F-51D Cavalier, 12 Lockheed P-2 Neptune, and Pucara FMA 1A.58.

*These tables are based on tables in *The Apartheid War Machine*, see footnote on following page for full citation.

SA ARMY — MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN SERVICE *

Type	Manufacturer	No.	Remarks
ARMOUR			
<i>Tanks</i>			
Centurion Mk10	UK	150	Delivered from UK, Jordan and India (via Spain).
Merkava	Israel	30+	Believed to be on order.
AMX-13	Fr./SA	80(approx.)	Sales unconfirmed.
<hr/>			
<i>Armoured Cars</i>			
Panhard			
AML-245/60 and 80	Fr./SA	1200+	Manufactured under licence in SA.
Ferret	UK	100	460 delivered 1963—9; almost obsolete.
<hr/>			
<i>Armoured Personnel Carriers</i>			
Saracen	UK	250	700 delivered 1956—66; almost obsolete.
Commando V150	US/Portugal	100	320 believed ordered.
M-113A1	US/Italy	150+	400 ordered via Israel.
Ratel	SA	600+	In service since 1977; still in production.
<hr/>			
ARTILLERY			
<i>Field</i>			
90mm FG	SA	150+	Still in production
5.5 inch (140mm)	UK	?	World War II issue; being replaced by 155mm.
M109 s.p.g. (155mm)	US	20+	Delivered 1976.
G5 155mm	SA/Canada	100+	Being manufactured in SA with Canadian technology.
<hr/>			
<i>Anti-Tank</i>			
106mm Recoilless Rifle	US	?	Delivered via Israel 1977.
ENTAC ATGW	France	120	138 delivered 1955-6.
Milan AT Missile	Fr./FRG	?	To replace ENTAC.
<hr/>			
<i>Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAAF)</i>			
Cactus/Crotale	Fr./SA	30+	Initially manufactured in France; now in production in SA.
Tigercat	UK	54	Delivered via Jordan 1974.

*These tables are based on tables IV and VI of chapter 4 of the International Defence and Aid Fund's fact paper, *The Apartheid War Machine*. Readers interested in the full tables and the sources used should consult the fact paper (see resource list for details on ordering it). Additional information on Italian—produced weapons in South Africa's arsenal came from IDOC Documentation Service, Bulletin no. 10-11, Oct.-Nov. 1979. Additional information on US light aircraft sales to South Africa came from a Reuters news release, March 22, 1978.



Western Gunrunners

South Africa's "new" G-5 howitzer. Provided courtesy of Western technology and assistance.

In 1963, the United Nations responded to the Sharpeville massacre by passing a "voluntary" arms embargo against South Africa. Since then there has been at least a formal commitment by most of the world's governments to enforce this decision. The embargo was made mandatory in 1977 following the Soweto rebellion and the subsequent imprisonment and banning of individuals and organizations associated with the philosophy of Black Consciousness. Whether international sanctions have been mandatory or voluntary, however, there has been one consistent feature: large scale violations of the embargo by Western nations.

The failure to effectively isolate South Africa is evident in the substantial arsenal the white government has built up since the 1960s (see table). With the aid of arms purchases and technology transfers from France, West Germany, Britain, the United States, Israel, Italy, and other Western countries, South Africa has developed the most sophisticated military machine on

the African continent. From fighter aircraft and tanks, to the potential to wage nuclear war, South Africa today poses a threat to world peace. The Republic poses a threat to the independent states in southern Africa that it could not have posed twenty years ago.

As the liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa escalate, it will be more important than ever to stop the flow of arms to the racist white minority. An examination of some of the major cases of foreign collaboration in South Africa's military build-up is a necessary starting point for building such a strategy.

Space Research Scandal

The largest recent shipments of arms to South Africa have come from the Space Research Corporation, a US-Canadian chartered company which specializes in the design of extended range howitzers and artillery shells. Between 1976 and 1978, Space Research shipped more than 53,000 artillery shells, along with the technology needed for

the production of advanced 155mm howitzers, to South Africa.

The clandestine shipments were originally exposed by the dockworkers union in the Caribbean island of Antigua, a transshipment point in the devious arms deal. Public denunciations of the shipments by Zimbabwean liberation movement leader Joshua Nkomo led to further investigation by reporters for the British and Canadian broadcasting systems and the Vermont-based *Burlington Free Press*. Finally, in March of 1980, Space Research President Gerald Bull pleaded guilty to the charges that his firm had violated the arms embargo against South Africa.

Two key features of the Space Research case are the elaborate international network used to get the arms and technology to South Africa, and the apparent complicity of high level government officials, particularly in the United States. Besides the role of Space Research in the US and Canada, companies and individuals from the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Antigua and (of course) South Africa were all involved in the secret plan.

The vast majority of the artillery shells which ended up in South Africa were initially produced in a US government-owned arsenal in Scranton, Pennsylvania under a special (and possibly illegal) arrangement worked out with the Pentagon by a member of the Space Research board of directors. Approval for the use of the arsenal took only four days—an unheard-of speed considering such approval often takes many months. The US State Department cleared the shells for export without license, even though and earlier shipment of the same material from SRC had required a license. John Stockwell, a former CIA case officer in Angola, and Jack Frost, an international arms dealer who has done work for the CIA, told television reporters that a CIA agent named John Clancy helped set up the deal between Space Research and the South African military.

Despite the admission of guilt by its chief officer, the Space Research case is far from over. South Africa received shells, guns, technology, training by company technicians and, eventually, Pretoria even bought partial ownership in the firm. To date no concrete steps have been taken by any of the governments involved to insure that a similar deal is not repeated.

Apatomic Bomb

A more subtle and even more dangerous form of collaboration with South Africa has come through the role of foreign governments and corporations in providing the technology and scientific training that has been used in South Africa's nuclear weapons production program. (See box on

Foreign Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa.)

Two major revelations about South Africa's nuclear weapons program have emerged in recent years: the discovery of preparations for a nuclear bomb test in the Kalahari Desert in August of 1977, and a nuclear explosion which was detected in the South Atlantic in September of 1979.

The preparations in the Kalahari Desert were halted by South Africa only after they had been spotted independently by both Soviet and US surveillance satellites, and after the French, British, and US governments publicly warned South Africa not to proceed further with the planned test.

The occurrence of a nuclear blast in the South Atlantic has been disputed by a White House "panel of experts" commissioned by the Carter Administration. After nine months the panel concluded that the US Vela surveillance satellite was probably hit with a meteorite which caused it to erroneously register readings like those that would have been caused by a nuclear explosion. The panel's findings were flatly contradicted by a 300 page Naval Research Report that concluded that the Vela satellite had detected a nuclear blast. Scientists at the US nuclear weapons laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico also rejected the presidential panel's report (for details see *Southern Africa*, September-October 1980).

Whether or not the September 22, 1979 blast was a South African nuclear test, it is clear from the statements of South African military and government officials over the years that it has the *capability* to produce nuclear weapons and the will to use them if white domination is threatened. The most recent statement of this sort was made in mid-1980 when South African Deputy Defense Minister Hendrik Coetsee told *Newsweek*: "If nuclear weapons are a last resort to defend oneself, it would be very stupid not to use them." Coming from an official of a regime which defines bombing refugee camps and shooting unarmed student demonstrators as part of its legitimate "defense" functions, this is an ominous statement.

Technology Transfers

In addition to the Western role in South Africa's artillery development and nuclear weapons capability, US and European companies provide computers for the police and military, light aircraft for use in counter-insurgency operations, and a variety of military aircraft and vehicles. This is done either through direct sales to the Republic or by licensing agreements which allow South Africa to produce Western-designed equipment in its own armaments factories (see table for details).

In the face of this steady flow of equip-

Apartheid's Atomic Allies

Every step of South Africa's nuclear program has benefited from Western technology, training, or financing.

From the late 1940s when the US and Britain formed the Combined Development Agency to locate and exploit uranium reserves in South Africa to the current work of a French consortium to build South Africa's first two functioning nuclear power reactors at Koeberg, the pattern of Western collaboration has been a constant.

Western governments and, on occasion, South African officials as well have taken great pains to stress that the nuclear know-how shared with South Africa has purely "peaceful" applications. In his pamphlet on *South Africa's Nuclear Capability* Dan Smith puts these protestations of innocence in their proper perspective by pointing out that "nuclear collaboration with South Africa is a kind of jig-saw, in which each piece has had its particular part to play."

Particularly important pieces of the puzzle include a 1957 agreement between the US and South Africa through which the US firm Allis Chalmers built Safari I, South Africa's first nuclear research reactor, in 1961. Other consequences of this agreement, which has been extended through the year 2007, have been the supply of enriched uranium for Safari I for the years 1965-1976, and the training of over 150 South African nuclear scientists and engineers in the US.

Although the Carter Administration withheld shipments of enriched uranium to South Africa in an effort to get the regime to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty—which would subject its nuclear

facilities to international inspection—other forms of US collaboration have continued. Westinghouse owns a share of the French consortium headed by Framatome which is currently building the two nuclear power reactors at Koeberg using a Westinghouse design.

In December 1979 Black employees at the US Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratories in Illinois discovered another link. Two white South Africans were enrolled in a six week nuclear technology training program there. Telegrams of protest by Black employees of Argonne to President Carter brought no public response.

Another key element in South Africa's nuclear program is its pilot uranium enrichment facility at Valindaba, designed and financed by the West German company STEAG. Although STEAG pulled out of the project in March of 1976, it did so only after providing South Africa with its own enrichment plant free of international safeguards.

The expansion of the Valindaba enrichment plant scheduled for completion during 1981, combined with the completion of the Koeberg reactors in 1982 and 1983 will create a quantum leap in South Africa's nuclear weapons production capabilities. The know-how, sophisticated equipment and trained personnel for these plants come, in large part, courtesy of Western nations. Thus despite the growth of South Africa's nuclear program, since the 1960's there is still an opportunity to arrest its development.

ment from the West to the South African military, and given South Africa's growing self-sufficiency in armaments production, is there still a way to significantly undermine South Africa's ability to wage war on the people of southern Africa?

There is evidence that despite the great strides which have been made since the 1960s, the apartheid war machine remains vulnerable in a number of key areas. Dick Leonard points out in his forthcoming book, *South Africa at War*, that South Africa is *not* self-sufficient in such key areas as the production of aircraft engines for its Mirage fighters or in the production of diesel engines for the more than 2400 armored personnel carriers it has in its arsenal. A diesel engine plant to be built for South Africa by Daimler-Benz of West Germany, and Perkins of Britain will partially fill this gap. But even then the plant will depend on the importation of certain foreign components.

These weak links in the military's self-sufficiency drive are only part of a broader problem facing the apartheid regime. Huge "strategic investment" programs in areas such as synthetic fuels, uranium enrichment, and railway and harbor construction are placing a heavy burden on the economy. The continuing guerrilla war in Namibia and an escalating revolutionary struggle within its own borders, are already straining the military and manpower reserves of the white minority. The need for foreign credit technology and personnel (e.g., engineers for the Sasol program) will intensify with the growth of the liberation struggle. ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo notes in a recent interview: "It will be necessary for the anti-apartheid movement to support any and all measures which undermine the racist regime's ability to wage war on the struggling masses. Building popular support for a total embargo on the racist regime is an urgent task. "

B.H.C.

Three Hundred Years of Resistance

White South Africa has always been a major military power on the African continent. Tank for tank or plane for plane, the white regime is already far stronger than the combined armies of all its potential African adversaries put together. And it always has been. Why then, are South Africa's ruling whites still feverishly arming themselves? What mighty enemy are they planning to fight?

The answer lies in the long history of Black resistance to white minority rule. A decade ago South Africa stood protected by a powerful ring of white-ruled states to the north: Rhodesia, South Africa's own colony of Namibia, and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.


Today South Africa is the last white minority power on the African continent. One by one, the colonial buffers have fallen to national liberation movements fiercely opposed to the apartheid system. Encouraged by the people's victories in neighboring states, the Black majority in South Africa is stepping up its own resistance to the white regime, both on a mass political level and through an accelerating guerrilla war. It is against these enemies, that is, the majority Black population to whom they have denied citizenship, that South Africa's whites are so desperately preparing for war.

300 Years of Resistance

In 1652 the first Dutch settlers arrived in South Africa where they received a cordial reception from the Khoikoi people living along the coast. Only eight years later, European land greed provoked the first of a long series of land wars between the encroaching Europeans and the indigenous African tribes. The struggle for land dominated the first 250 years of Black/white relations in South Africa.

Outgunned and divided among themselves, the Africans were eventually defeated by the British—seeking to extend their African empire—and the descendants of the Dutch farmers, now called Boers or Afrikaners. Still, it was not until 1906 that tribal military resistance was finally crushed by the defeat of the "Bambata Rebellion."

Six years later, African resistance entered a new phase with the founding of the South African Native National Council in 1912, later renamed the African National Congress (ANC). The national character of the new organization was an important step forward for Black resistance to white domination, since it tried to bridge the tribal and regional divisions that had



Mike Shuster/LNS

Angolan guerrilla fighter in 1978. A radical change in the balance of power had occurred with the defeat of Portuguese colonialism

proved so disastrous in the past.

Political Radicalization

Over the next three decades, the rapid industrialization and urbanization of South Africa dramatically altered the lives of millions of Black people, and slowly began to change the nature of African resistance. Across the entire spectrum of African life, from peasants struggling to retain their land to the newly urbanized Black work force in the mines and factories, a gradual political radicalization was taking place.

New, more militant organizations emerged to challenge the moderate stance of the ANC, as Africans adapted their resistance to the changing economic and political conditions. This politicization was greatly accelerated by Black participation in the Second World War, which brought many South Africans into their first contact with the outside world.

Armed with this new militancy, the Black opposition launched a decade of mass non-violent resistance against the apartheid policies of the white Nationalist govern-

ment. Commencing with the "Defiance Campaign" in 1952, thousands of Blacks deliberately filled the jails in protest against such grievances as the extension of the hated "pass laws" to women, and the forced eviction of Blacks from newly designated "whites-only" areas. The intent of the mass campaigns was described by ANC president Albert Lutuli. "Ultimately we hope that we will have brought pressure on the [white] electorate so that the . . . electorate comes to see the justice of our claims and demands."

It was a forlorn hope. The white government met the campaigns with force, arresting campaign leaders and disrupting peaceful protests with police violence. Rural resistance met the same fate. A revolt in the Pondoland area of the Transkei, against government appointed chiefs and unpopular land and cattle policies, was bloodily crushed by the white government. A state of emergency declared in 1960 to deal with that revolt is still in effect today.

Sharpeville—The End of Non-Violence

In 1960 the newly formed Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) initiated a nationwide anti-pass law campaign. In response to their call, several thousand Africans gathered in a little town called Sharpeville, planning to present themselves peacefully at the police station for arrest. The police opened fire on the protesters, killing 67 and wounding 200. Most were shot in the back as they fled the police. With them died any hope for peaceful change in South Africa. The government declared a state of emergency and arrested thousands of activists. Both the ANC and the PAC were declared illegal organizations and banned.

The Sharpeville massacre forced the Black leadership into a painful reappraisal of the situation. As imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela noted in 1964:

"The hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation and fewer and fewer rights. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961 it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence had achieved nothing and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy."

Unable to operate legally in South Africa, both the ANC and the PAC established armed underground wings and

TOTAL STRATEGY FOR TOTAL WAR

sent some members out of the country to form movements-in-exile. As a result of these preparations South Africa experienced a brief wave of sabotage and armed attacks in the early 1960s, conducted mainly by brave but isolated individuals and small cells of party militants. But bravery proved no substitute for organization, experience, or friendly borders. By 1964, most of the armed wings of the underground resistance had been crushed. A decade would pass before the regime would face another mass upsurge of protest and armed resistance.

The Buffer Collapses

If white minority rule in South Africa appeared secure and stable during the 1960's and early 70's, it was nearing collapse in the Portuguese colonies. In Mozambique, strategically located along both South African and white Rhodesian borders, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) had successfully wrested northern Mozambique from Portuguese control after a decade of guerrilla war, and was advancing south. In Guinea-Bissau, the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was inflicting heavy losses on the demoralized Portuguese, and in Angola the Portuguese were also under mounting pressure from three contending nationalist parties.

Despite generous economic and military aid from the United States and NATO, the colonial wars had so weakened the dictatorial Caetano regime in Lisbon that it was suddenly overthrown in a military coup in 1974. The liberation movements had won, permanently altering the balance of power in southern Africa in favor of the Africans.

Angola's independence now provided vital rear bases and infiltration routes over the long Namibian border for SWAPO guerrillas fighting South Africa's occupying army in that vast territory. Mozambique's independence opened up the entire eastern half of Rhodesia to ZANU guerrillas fighting the Smith regime in the breakaway British colony.

The pace of the independence struggle in Namibia and Zimbabwe quickened as the guerrillas opened up new fronts for political and military action.

The decision of the three principal "front-line states"—Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia—to serve as the "firm rear base" for the independence movements in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa was borne at a terrible cost. In 1976 the South Africans launched a massive invasion of Angola to overthrow the newly independent government. They retreated only after the ruling MPLA called in Cuban troops for support.

The Mozambicans suffered a different, but equally brutal, baptism. Only months

after ending their long war against the Portuguese in 1975, FRELIMO found itself at war with Zimbabwe's white rulers. The Rhodesians, by then completely dependent on South African economic and military aid, and bolstered by 6,000 South African troops, unmercifully pounded Mozambique's railways, roads, dams and communications centers. By the war's end, Mozambican losses stood at over 1300 killed, most of whom were civilians, \$145 million in war damage, and over \$500 million in revenues lost due to the trade cut-off.

Zambia's transport system was so badly damaged by Rhodesian attack that only emergency grain shipments over the last remaining rail line—the line through Rhodesia—averted famine. South African and Rhodesian aggression had brought devastation to the entire region. As the Angolan Ambassador to the United Nations, Elisio de Figueiredo, noted: "I cannot adequately convey the full dimensions of the national tragedy we face, as the racist minority regime in Pretoria uses our territory as its battlefield and our people as its sport."

Yet ultimately, South Africa lost the war for its peripheries. South Africa's military power had delayed the transition to Black majority rule in Zimbabwe, but it was unable to prevent it. In Namibia, SWAPO continued to intensify the liberation struggle. Meanwhile, within the *laager* itself, a fresh challenge had emerged.

The Soweto Rebellion

In 1968, a group of African university students, led by a young medical student named Steve Biko, broke away from the white-dominated national students union to form the all-Black South African Students Organization. Emphasizing the need for Black self-reliance, "psychological liberation," and complete non-cooperation with the white government, SASO became the focus of a new ideology of resistance—Black Consciousness. The Black Consciousness Movement as it came to be known, quickly swept the African high schools and colleges. By the early 1970's, it had become the most important internal force in Black politics, and expanded its activities into the wider community.

In 1972 and '73 a massive wave of strikes by African workers swept South Africa, the first significant labor action since 1960. The strikes, inspired by desperately low wages and other workplace grievances, was undoubtedly influenced by the Black power orientation of Black consciousness. In turn the strikes contributed greatly to the increasing militancy and popularity of Black Consciousness. In 1974, Black consciousness adherents organized a demonstration in support of Mozambican independence, their first direct confrontation with the

regime.

Two years later, a demonstration against South Africa's inferior "Bantu education" system for Blacks erupted into a pitched battle between students and police in Soweto township near Johannesburg. Hundreds died as Black children matched bottles and stones against the automatic rifles of the regime. Outraged at the slaughter of their children, urban workers threw off the fatalism of the sixties and joined the war on the streets, destroying government buildings and organizing devastatingly effective strikes.

The unrest rapidly spread across the country, encompassing the entire range of Black grievances against white domination. Despite the thousands of arrests and a death toll estimated at one thousand, Black opposition continued to grow. In October 1977, the government banned nineteen separate Black Consciousness organizations in an effort to crush the mass opposition. They failed. Since then new organizations and leaders have emerged to continue the struggle among students, workers, and shanty-town dwellers.

Strategy For Liberation

Perhaps the most dramatic response to mounting white violence and militarism has been the upsurge of guerrilla warfare inside South Africa, sponsored principally by the military wing of the ANC. The downfall of white minority rule in Mozambique and Zimbabwe has, for the first time, given the South African liberation movements easy access to South Africa's borders.

As the heart of the ANC's military strategy is the concept of guerrilla war, "par excellence the weapon of the materially weak." These tactics proved successful during the long liberation wars in the Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe, and place a high priority on mobilizing the support of the masses of the people.

But success in one country is not necessarily a blueprint for success in another, particularly in countries as fundamentally different as industrial South Africa and colonial Mozambique or Zimbabwe.

The populations of the surrounding African states are overwhelmingly rural peasants, eking out a living on their tiny plots of land. And it was among the peasantry that other national liberation movements in southern Africa concentrated their political and military efforts. In contrast, less than half of the Black population of South Africa still live in the countryside. Most live in the urban Black townships, and form the largest and most sophisticated urban working class in Africa. It is among these people, the students, workers, and the tiny middle class, that political consciousness and activism is most developed. In contrast to other countries, South



Popular demonstration in support of imprisoned guerrillas. Pretoria, June 1977.

Africa's urban inhabitants seem destined to play a leading role in South Africa's political future. But their relationship to a rural based guerrilla insurgency is much less clear.

The ability of the independent African states on the borders to support guerrilla warfare in South Africa actively is another important consideration. Bases in neighboring states were vital to the success of guerrillas in Zimbabwe, and have greatly aided SWAPO in Namibia. But Zimbabwe and Mozambique—the most likely staging areas for South African guerrillas—are still staggering under the impact of the war in Zimbabwe and have been careful not to give South Africa a pretext for military intervention.

South Africa already sponsors anti-government guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique, and has recruited many disgruntled officers and soldiers of the old Rhodesian army for possible use in Zimbabwe. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha, the engineer of the Angolan invasion in 1975, warned neighboring countries not to harbor anti-apartheid guerrillas, saying "We will hit you so hard that you will never forget it." Parts of South Africa's northern border are already under military control, and twice in 1980, the white regime moved troops to the Mozambican border.

South Africa will also use its considerable economic clout in the region against un-

cooperative neighbors. Much of southern Africa remains dependent on the transport network, and on the industrial and agricultural output of the apartheid economy for survival. While the independent countries of southern Africa have launched an ambitious regional development strategy to lessen economic dependence on the white south, significant progress is years away. Until then, South Africa will try to use the carrot of economic assistance backed by the stick of its military arsenal to prevent the front-line states from open support of any insurgency.

Yet ironically, some of South Africa's greatest strengths are among its most damaging weaknesses. The industrial economy, for instance, is extremely vulnerable to guerrilla attack due to its size and complexity. It also forces the admittedly superior white military to spread thin in an effort to guard economically key installations. Outnumbered five to one by the Black majority, the whites will be hard pressed to deploy enough troops internally and still watch the borders. With 60,000 troops pinned down in Namibia by SWAPO, South Africa is already experiencing a severe shortage of skilled—i.e. white—labor.

Furthermore, as more and more white workers are absorbed into the military, the white economy becomes more dependent


on the Black workforce, which is both more skilled and more militant than ever before. Black workers already have the capacity to paralyze the economy, and in recent years they have demonstrated their willingness to use this power for political ends. Since the Durban strikes in 1973, African workers have brought whole industries to a standstill over issues ranging from pay increases to the firing of a local political activist. The existence of a mass opposition among workers in the cities, acting in conjunction with guerrillas in the countryside, poses the greatest threat to continued white rule.

Towards Unity

Coordinated action by urban workers and rural guerrillas, however, still appears to be little more than coincidence. Serious and long-standing differences divide the African camp. But common cause against a common enemy is a powerful incentive to compromise.

Twenty years of exile have left the external elements in the best position, geographically, materially, and politically, to initiate armed resistance to the apartheid regime. But the necessity of operating underground has reduced their mass base. Black Consciousness, on the other hand has convincingly proven itself able to mobilize mass popular opposition, and organize itself in ways that allow the movement to

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A Voice for the ANC Leader Interviewed

ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo.

Alfred Nzo was a delegate to the 1956 African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) conference that ratified the Freedom Charter and has been secretary-general of the ANC for over ten years. In mid-November 1980, Southern Africa spoke with Nzo about the ANC's view of the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. The secretary-general first talked about the transition from above ground overt actions in the fifties to the underground tactics of organizing that following the banning of the ANC in 1960. We then asked him about the ANC's strategy today.

How do you see the ANC bringing together the groups that are legal and above ground at this point, and the groups in opposition that are underground in South Africa? Do you see these forming a broad mass front against the South African regime?

We can illustrate that by what is actually happening on the battle field today. Civic organizations, say in the Black ghettos, fight against increased rents as they have been doing in Johannesburg and elsewhere. The military wing, to support that struggle, destroys the rent offices of the regime. In African townships workers decide to go on strike on a particular day. The military wing destroys the communication lines of the regime, the railroads and so on. You see, that sort of combination of the political action on a mass level by the people, with the clandestine, goes on all the time in the revolutionary movement. These forms of struggle are complementary, because when

people see the activity of the underground supporting their mass struggles it gives them courage and confidence to carry on. And from that mass struggle it is possible to get reinforcements into the military wing.

The aim, eventually, is to draw an armed people into struggle. An armed people, developing around the core that has been set-up—the people's army, Umkonto We Siwze—that is our aim. But in order to get the people to reach that situation you must get a people that is politically conscious now to accept the inevitability of this Form of struggle and that is what is happening in South Africa today. It is impossible to avoid the political mobilization of the people, which in our view must form the firm and reliable base for the escalation of the military.

That poses an interesting question. A number of front-line state leaders have indicated that because of South Africa's military strength and economic considerations, the ANC will not be allowed to operate from military bases in their countries in the way that FRELIMO operated from Tanzania or ZANU did from Mozambique. How do you see the development of the military struggle under those apparent circumstances?

Our ability to evolve, simultaneously, the masses of the people in the urban areas and the rural areas will determine the pace of our struggle. Even during the days of our legality it was easier to arouse the consciousness of the people in the urban areas. It was easier to organize them, so the tendency was therefore for the movement

to be strongest in the urban areas. But we are saying we must involve everybody—including the rural areas.

We have got to look at the type of actions—military actions—our peoples' army has carried out inside the country. You will observe that those actions have been launched from bases that are deep inside the country. We are aware that the regime would do anything possible to destroy the neighboring countries and we want to protect them. We are evolving a strategy and tactics whereby our military struggle must find root, and develop internally inside the country. Of course it is not a very easy thing to do because in the process our people get arrested.

We are gaining sufficient experience, however, to be able to develop this form of struggle. Sasol gets blown up, Sasol is hundreds of miles from the border and the enemy does everything to find who is responsible and does not find out. Our people destroy police stations and the enemy cordons off huge areas to find who is responsible without success. So that we say our people are gaining the necessary experience to be able to create the type of base right inside the country which is going to be necessary.

It seems that the ANC is successfully developing a strategy of urban armed struggle which differs from previous southern Africa struggles which were based in the rural areas, mobilizing peasants to encircle the cities over a period of time. Will the primary thrust for revolution in South Africa rest with workers in the cities rather, or to a greater extent, than it will be with the peasants in the bantustans?

No. The ANC must fight to develop the sort of organization forms that are going to involve the entire oppressed population. During the days of legality, the ANC was not only concentrated in the cities, we were also able to arouse the peasant masses.

How do you see the development of the Black middle class and what does this development say for the kind of strategy that you can use in South Africa?

The development of the Black middle class should be seen, in terms of the enemy's strategy, as a development which seeks to create from within the Black oppressed population a definite class base for its reform program. They are talking of reforms, reforming the apartheid system. In order for them to succeed they must have a certain group within the oppressed population that is going to be able to support this type of thing.

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The Military: A Reader's Guide

by Trevor Abrahams

A more precise understanding of the development and capacity of the repressive apparatus at the disposal of the South African regime is urgently needed. Of equal importance—as most of the authors of the limited material available on this topic have emphasized—is an understanding of the growing global influence of the South African military. This now includes not only growing involvement in regional conflicts in southern Africa but also the establishment of new linkages with countries like Argentina, Taiwan and Israel, and the exchange of advanced technological and nuclear weaponry among several of the most repressive regimes around the world.

The International Defence and Aid Fund's booklet, the *Apartheid War Machine* is one of the most comprehensive and accessible analyses of this topic. It places the development of the South African Defense Force (SADF) in the context of the transition from an almost total reliance on the South African Police (SAP) for state security in the early sixties, to the current situation where the major portion of the responsibility for state security rests with the SADF. Under the current Botha regime, this pamphlet notes "The SADF is no longer seen as a necessary tool of government but is instead an increasing force within government itself." The pamphlet clearly demonstrates the links between portions of the private sector and the SADF which have emerged with the development of an indigenous armaments industry already engaged in the export of arms.

While describing the formidable increases in the SADF's budget, manpower, and acquisition of military hardware, the authors also emphasize the expanding para-military role being assigned to the police-force.

Overall the *Apartheid War Machine* provides the best available account of the South African military structure and its operation in southern Africa.

A useful complement to this resource is provided by the four part series in *Sechaba* (April, May, June and July 1980), the journal of the African National Congress. While the *Sechaba* articles draw heavily on the IDAF work, they provide a more extensive historical account of the relationship between the struggles of the nationalist movement and the development of the SADF.

Trevor Abrahams, a long-time southern Africa liberation supporter, is a graduate student at the State University of New York at Binghamton.

Dick Leonard's forthcoming book, *South Africa at War*, should also provide a useful addition to currently available material. This book includes much new material on South Africa's military forces and features extensive primary-source material on armed conflicts inside the Republic.

A good basic account of South Africa's military involvement in Namibia is not generally available. The International Defense and Aid Fund plans to publish a book on this topic in the near future, and that work—as yet untitled—should help fill this gap.

Perhaps the best, albeit short, account that is currently available is a recent paper prepared by the Committee on South African War Resistance for SWAPO, entitled "Some Aspects of the South African Military Occupation of Namibia." This work provides a brief overview of the emergence of SWAPO's military resistance presents a breakdown of the occupying forces in Namibia and a listing of SADF weaponry in service in Namibia (including references to foreign countries which supply arms and licence arms manufacture in South Africa itself.)

South Africa's desire to develop nuclear research and weapons technology, and the West's desire for access to the rich uranium resources in South Africa and Namibia has historically provided a basis for mutual cooperation in the nuclear field.

The Nuclear Axis, based primarily on confidential files obtained from the South African embassy in West Germany, provides an extensively documented account of

West German co-operation with the South African nuclear development program. Not only are high ranking German and NATO military personnel involved in the transfer of technology and equipment to South Africa, but German generals and other Western and Israeli agencies are deeply implicated in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapons program.

The extent of Western involvement in South Africa's nuclear program is also emphasized in a very detailed report issued in 1979 by the South African Atomic Energy Board. The study, titled *Chain Reaction—Twenty Years of Nuclear Research in South Africa*, by A.R. Newby-Fraser, is a valuable source of information on the development of the South African nuclear program.

Dan Smith's excellent pamphlet *South Africa's Nuclear Capability* provides the most concise and accessible description of the development of the South African nuclear program. The history of South Africa's nuclear weapons program, the extent of Western collaboration, and the far reaching implications of South Africa's nuclear capabilities are examined. This pamphlet also provides information for those wishing to decipher the complex jargon of the nuclear industry: from enrichment to fusion.

Sean Gervasi's *The United States and the Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Evidence, Denial and Refutation*, although now dated, clearly demonstrates the unenthusiastic manner in which the US government has enforced the 1963 voluntary UN arms embargo against South Africa. This

Continued on page 29

TRILATERALISM The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management edited by Holly Sklar



TRILATERALISM demystifies the Trilateral Commission and its members from David Rockefeller to Brzezinski to Kissinger to Andrew Young. Twenty-seven different articles trace the rise of the Commission and examine trilateral policies and programs as well as the 1976 and 1980 elections, labor, the economy, militarism, human rights, democracy, and trilateral policy toward Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and much more. Carolyn Brown discusses trilateral policies in Southern Africa and Prexy Nesbitt details policies in Zimbabwe.

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Resources

The South African Military

The Apartheid War Machine: The Strength and Deployment of the South African Armed Forces. Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 8. London: International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF—North American Office, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138), 1980. 75pp. \$1.25 plus 75¢ p&h.

Richard LEONARD, *South Africa at War.* New Haven, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill. Soon to be published.

COSAWR, *Some Aspects of the South African Military Occupation of Namibia.* London: COSAWR (available from COSAWR, B.M. Box 2190, London, WC1V 6XX, United Kingdom—send \$2.00), 1980. 14pp.

Glen MOSS, "Total Strategy," in *Work In Progress*, no. 11, February 1980. Yeoville: Work in Progress (write: P.O. Box 93174, Yeoville 2143, South Africa), 1980. 11 pages. R 15.00.

"Report on the Human Casualties and Material and Other Damage Resulting from Repeated Acts of Aggression by the Racist Regime of South Africa Against the Peoples Republic of Angola." Note by the Secretary General of the United Nations in response to resolution 447. S/13473, 27 July 1979. 50 pages. Check your local library.

Good documentation that shows the full extent of South African aggression inside Angola. Prepared for the UN by the Angolan government.

South Africa's Nuclear Development

Z. CERVENKA and B. ROGERS. *The Nuclear Axis.* New York: Times Books, 1978. 464pp.

A.R. NEWBY-FRASER, *Chain Reaction.* Pretoria: Government Printer (The Government Printer, Private Bag X85, Pretoria 0001, South Africa), 1979. 212pp.

Dan SMITH, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability.* Oslo: World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (available from: Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, NY, NY 10038), 1980. 32pp. \$1.50 plus 15 percent p&h.

Western Linkages

Mohamed A. EL-KHAWAS and Barry COHEN. *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39.* Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976. 189pp.

Essentially the text of a secret US policy paper on southern Africa, this work provides a candid look at American policy in the Kissinger years.

John STOCKWELL, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story.* New York: Norton, 1978. 285pp.

Stockwell was CIA station chief in Angola in 1975.

US Military Involvement in Southern Africa. Edited by the Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars. Boston: South End Press (Box 68, Astor Station, Boston, MA 02123), 1978. 279 pp. ill. biblio. \$5.00.

Sean GERVASI, *The United States and the Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Evidence, Denial, and Refutation.* Southern Africa pamphlets, No 2. Binghamton: Braudel Center (SUNY-B, Binghamton, New York, 13901), 1978. 49pp.

"Cuba in Africa," in *Cuba Review*, Vol. VIII (3 & 4).

Hot Shells, Boston: World Television Series (WGBH Transcript 125 Western Ave., Boston, MA 02134) 1980. 28pp. \$3.00.

Details Space Research Corporation's shipments of artillery and artillery technology to South Africa.

Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and the OECD Countries, A Congressional Research Service Report prepared for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Dept. of Public Documents, Washington, DC 20402, September 1979. 46pp.

Michael KLARE. "South Africa's US Weapons Connections," *the Nation*, July 28-August 4, 1979. Reprints available from Institute for Policy Studies. 1901 Q Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20009.

Good short run-down of recent US arms transfers.

"Reagan and Africa: The Players and the Policy," in *Washington Notes on Africa*, Winter, 1980/1981.

Ann SEIDMAN and Neva MAKGETLA, "Transnational Corporations and the South African Military Industrial Complex," *Notes and Documents*, 24/79. New York: United Nations (address above), 1979.

Periodicals

Liberation Movements

Azania Today. Publication of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. Available from PAC observer mission to the UN: 211 E. 43rd Street, New York, NY, 10017.

Namibia Today. Publication of South West Africa People's Organization. Available from SWAPO, P.O. Box 953, Luanda, Angola. \$6.00.

Sechaba. Publication of the African National Congress of South Africa. Available from ANC: 801 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. \$5.00.

Solidarity. Publication of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania. Write BCM, 410 Central Park West, Apt. 3c, New York, NY 10025.

Other

Africa News. P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702. Subscriptions \$25 per year.

News Briefs. Weekly news cuttings from the South African press. Published by the ANC, see address above. \$10.00.

Resister. COSAWR, B.M. Box 2190, London, WC1V 6XX, United Kingdom. Subscriptions £4.00 per year.

Southern Africa. 17 W. 17th Street, New York, NY 10011. Subscriptions \$10 per year.

TCLSAC Reports. 427 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Canada. Subscriptions \$15-25 per year.

Washington Notes on Africa. 10 Maryland Ave, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Subscriptions \$5 per year. (Includes legislative and news on southern Africa issues).

(This list is intended to be only an introduction to available publications on militarism.)

Reader's Guide

Continued from page 27

pamphlet details numerous cases where the South African regime received Western military hardware in flagrant violation of the UN embargo.

Anyone seriously concerned about US links with South African militarization, should read *US Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, published by the Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars. This is a comprehensive survey of US involvement and support for minority rule throughout the region. Chapters by well-known authors deal with issues such as nuclear collaboration, arms supplies, mercenaries, the CIA and the broader issues of Western strategy and policy.

The literature on resistance to the apartheid state and its military apparatus is scanty. The African National Congress' publication, *Sechaba*, has been providing information on the ANC for over twelve years. Recently the Black Consciousness Movement in exile has also begun publishing a magazine, entitled *Solidarity*.

The beginnings of a civilian anti-war movement among white South Africans has fostered some new publications: *Resister*, produced by the London-based Committee on South African War Resisters, and *Omkeer*, published anonymously in the US. While *Omkeer* is not generally available, *Resister* provides accessible information on this movement as well as useful updates of the SADF's deployment and the dissension which is emerging among white conscripts. *Resister* also provides a useful supplement to the scant material that is available on the SADF in Namibia. □

Zimbabwe

Continued from page 6

The government announced January 10 that effective next month, the country's major newspapers will be run by the newly created Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust. The trust will be a "non-government, non-party and non-profit-making" body which will purchase the papers with the aid of an \$8 million grant from Nigeria. To date, the newspapers owned by the South African Argus newspaper chain have remained mainly white-oriented and somewhat negative toward close allies of Zimbabwe, like Mozambique. Under the new Trust, according to Zimbabwe UN delegate Jami, the papers will report news to the people and also help the government in serious efforts to unite the country."

The Commercial Farmer's Union, representing Zimbabwe's largest farms,

also released estimates of the country's next maize (corn) harvest, which could hit a record level of 1.6 to two million tons. A heavy harvest of the country's staple would be a blessing not only for the region, suffering from poor harvests recently, but for Prime Minister Mugabe's program of support for white farming efforts and the nation's level of exports. □

Economic Independence

Continued from page 8

While participants hoped that these grants would help break the region's economic dependence on South Africa, a conference spokesperson emphasized that the overall aim was a fairer relationship with all countries and not only with South Africa. Asked if the end of apartheid in South Africa would signal an end to the SADCC effort, he replied that apartheid was only one of the issues confronting the region, albeit a central one. "We object to apartheid but that is a separate issue," he said emphasizing that this was not a conference that attacked apartheid per se, or advocated sanctions against South Africa.

Development of the region is not the answer to the problem of apartheid, but it will be an important step in fortifying these countries against continued exploitation. In the long run, development will make it possible for countries to act against the apartheid state without fearing overwhelming economic retaliation. □

This report was compiled by Stephanie Urdang from information supplied by reporters attending the conference and from bulletins prepared for the conference by the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM).

Intervention

Continued from page 18

Indian Ocean Fleet involving some NATO allies and using bases in South Africa.

- Apply great pressure against Mozambique and Angola, and possibly assist other Western and Arab efforts to overthrow the latter.
- Force a major modification or abandonment of the UN plan for the decolonization of Namibia.
- Put, jointly with the United Kingdom, great pressure on the government of Zimbabwe to force it away from a radical path, and possibly to assist covertly in its subversion by South Africa and the Thatcher government.
- Expand military assistance to moderate countries in the region.
- Expand covert action, including covert arms transfers, throughout southern Africa.

Such actions can only carry us closer to a dangerous commitment to support apartheid.

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Lutherans

Continued from page 32

the side of divestment. When the vote was taken, 447 delegates voted for divestment.

The Coalition celebrated with a rip-roaring party. The trustees convened an emergency meeting to discuss what had just happened. And, unknown to all of us, Bishop Dlamini sat down to write one of the bitterest, most guilt-producing speeches that the convention had, possibly, ever heard.

It came on Monday. Dlamini attacked the delegates for voting for divestment. He lashed out at "white people who vote for divestment so that my people can suffer." He threw the convention into a turmoil.

Some delegates angrily accused the Coalition of having "tricked and misled them." Others, who had not attended the open hearings, claimed that Bishop Dlamini was the only South African person they had ever heard on this issue. And one delegate went to the microphone and introduced a resolution to repeal Saturday's 447-331 vote for divestment.

Again the Coalition went into lobbying action. We spent the whole night answering all kinds of newly discovered questions. But as someone put it, God was on our side.

On Tuesday morning, the delegate who had introduced the motion to rescind, returned to the microphone and pleaded that the resolution passed in support of divestment be allowed to stand. "I have talked to other Black South Africans and I now understand that Bishop Dlamini would be in serious trouble if he went back home and was said to have supported divestment. The law provides for a mandatory five years in jail or the maximum of death by hanging. I now understand. . . ." □

SWAPO Woman

Continued from page 2

and administrative training. In the late '70s she went to Angola as the assistant secretary for finance of the SWAPO Women's Commission, which had been formed in 1969.

"Originally there were only four women with positions of power in the party. But after the Portuguese coup, when we were able to go into Angola and meet with freedom fighters, we saw what women had done. Many women joined after that.

"In Namibia, women's problems are like those in South Africa. The men go to the urban areas to find work but because of the pass system, the women must stay in the villages. Sometimes they earn as little as three rand a month for working in the fields. But most can't even find work on the farms and must try to feed their families with the little they can grow.

"We are trying now to teach women to fight. Some are base commanders. But also we want to show they must participate side by side with men on all levels. Kwame Nkrumah said, 'When you train a man, it's only one man. When you have trained a woman, you've trained a nation.'

"We have shown that without the participation of women, you do not truly have a revolution. It's very hard to find our combatants inside the country, because the women in the villages care for them. They give them food and shelter."

Musialela has been inside the country several times since she left. "I enjoyed myself when I was inside. I saw that my people were determined. We were never short of food, because people took care of us.

"But the situation inside the country is very bad now. There is martial law. The enemy is confined to bases because we control territory. They get frustrated and then go out to harass villages, burning and destroying their food. It is important for the world to double its efforts to help our struggle. Nothing will stop us." □

ANC Interview

Continued from page 26

But again you see the contradictions of the South African political system are such that the development of the Black middle class is going to be affected by the fact that in the urban areas they continue to be subjected to the same form of disabilities that affect the general mass of the people. They are not immune from pass laws. They are not immune from having their business located in the rural areas, far away from the white sections of the population and planted right in the midst of an impoverished population. Those people must realize for them to have full development it is necessary to remove this system which imposes certain curbs on them. This situation would tend to make them swing more to the patriotic forces.

What are the most important tasks at this point for the international solidarity movement?

There is the usual program we have put forward: economic sanctions; oil embargo; arms embargo; isolation of the regime in all spheres including the question of the sports boycott and so on. Of course, that must include the demand for the release of political prisoners—in support of the movement that has already developed inside the country.

Now, particularly at this time, we are calling for much more vigilance on the part of the international community to remain committed to the struggle for the isolation

of the regime in spite of what it might do in the future to try and convince them that change is possible within the apartheid system. MF & JC

Resistance

Continued from page 25

survive repeated suppression. The internal and external wings need each other either is to succeed.

There are signs of increasing cooperation between the internal and external movement. Some black consciousness leaders such as trade unionist Tozamile Botha have made a relatively smooth transition into the exile movements upon leaving South Africa. ANC attacks on black consciousness have recently subsided, and the ANC broke sharply with bantustan leader Gatsha Buthelezi following criticism from inside the country. Widespread support for the Free Mandela campaign and the willingness of the people to shelter armed guerrillas are another indication of growing unity among the Black opposition.

After 300 years of oppression, history is finally catching up with South Africa's ruling whites. The guerrilla attacks and domestic unrest that have occurred continuously since 1976 are but a foreshadowing of things to come. And Pretoria knows it. This is why they have adopted a "total strategy" and continue to pour billions into tanks and missiles and planes. But weapons didn't stop the liberation of Mozambique or Angola or Zimbabwe, and it won't stop the liberation of South Africa.

Steve Biko once noted that "The mightiest weapon of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed." If this is so then the white supremacists have already lost the greatest of their arsenal. In South Africa the minds of the people are set on freedom. M.F.

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Resources

Publications Received

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Southern Africa & General

Adjustment of Whites to Black Rule in East and West Africa. By Ronald WATTS. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs (Jan Smuts House, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, RSA), 1980. 9pp. No price listed.

W.D. HAMMOND-TOOKE (ed.), *The Bantu-speaking Peoples of Southern Africa*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul (9 Park St., Boston, MA 02108), 1980. 525pp. \$35.00 pb. Note: This is the first paperback printing of the 1974 edition of this ethnographic survey.

Dorothea MEZGER, *Copper in the World Economy*. New York: Monthly Review (62 West 14th St., New York, NY 10011), 1980. 282pp., bib. \$18.00 hb, plus 75¢ p&h.

Robert I. ROTBERG, *Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (79 Garden St., Cambridge, MA 02138), 1980. 311pp. \$15.00 hb.

Southern Africa in the World. By Richard E. BISSELL. Monograph No. 23. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute (3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104), 1978. 67pp. \$4.00.

Angola

Angola: Socialism at Birth. London: Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre (34 Percy St., London W1P 9FG), 1980. 34pp. 50p. Note: There is no US distributor of MAGIC publications.

Phyllis M. MARTIN, *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. African Historical Dictionaries No. 26. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press (Box 656, Metuchen, NJ 08840), 1980. 174pp., bib. \$11.00 hb.

Botswana

Paul MAYLAM, *Rhodes, the Tswana and the British: Colonialism, Collaboration, and the Conflict in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1899*. Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies No. 4. Westport: Greenwood Press (51 Riverside Ave., Westport, CT 06880), 1980. 245pp. \$29.95 hb.

Malawi

Cynthia A. CROSBY, *Historical Dictionary of Malawi*. African Historical Dictionaries No. 25. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press (address above), 1980. 169pp., bib. \$14.00 hb.

Namibia

Namibia: The Facts. London: International Defense & Aid Fund (available from IDAF-North American Office, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138), 1980. 100pp. \$4.25, plus 70¢ p&h, bulk discount available.

Namibia: The Strength of the Powerless. By Heinz HUNKE. Rome: IDOC International (Via Santa Maria dell'Arma 30, Roma, Italia), 1980. 161pp. Lire 12,000, plus Lire 2,000 for airmail; send Italian currency or equivalent. Note: There is no US distributor for IDOC publications.

A Review of the Diplomatic Efforts of the Western Contact Group on Namibia, 1976-1980. By Andre DU PISANI. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs (address above), 1980. 8pp. No price listed.

South Africa

Alan BROOKS & Jeremy BRICKHILL, *Whirlwind Before the Storm: The Origins and Development of the Uprising in Soweto and the Rest of South Africa from June to December 1976*. London: International Defense & Aid Fund (available from IDAF-North American Office, address above), 1980. 368pp. \$10.00 pb, plus \$1.00 p&h, bulk discount available.

Gwendolyn M. CARTER, *Which Way Is South Africa Going?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press (10th & Morton Sts., Bloomington, IN 47401), 1980. 162pp. \$12.95 hb.

John DE ST. JORRE, *A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, DC 20036), 1977. 136pp. \$4.00 pb.

Health Situation in South Africa Today. By Aziza SEDAT. Notes & Documents No. 17/80. New York: Centre Against Apartheid, United Nations (address above), 1980. 30pp. Free.

Israel and South Africa: Ideology and Practice. By Alfred T. MOLEAH. London: International Organisation for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (35-37 Ludgate Hill, London EC4M 5JM), 1980, 10pp. No price listed.

Keith KIEWIET & Kim WEICHEL, *Inside Crossroads*. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill, South Africa (P.O. Box 371, Isando 1600 TV2, RSA), 1980. 127pp. No price listed hb. Note: McGraw-Hill (US) does not distribute this book and it is only available from South Africa.

Ken LUCKHARDT & Brenda WALL, *Organize or Starve! The History of the South African Congress of Trade Unions*. New York: International Publishers (381 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016), 1980. 520pp., photos. \$16.00 hb, plus \$1 p&h. Note: According to the publisher this book will not be available in the US in a paperback edition.

Robin MCGREGOR, *Who Owns Whom 1980, Vol. 1: South Africa's Listed Companies*. Somerset West: Purdey Publishing (P.O. Box 589, Somerset West 7130, RSA), 1980. 449pp. Rand \$19.95 pb.

James MICHENER, *The Covenant*. New York: Random House (201 East 50th St., New York, NY 10022), 1980. 881pp. \$15.95 hb. Note: Bestseller novel spanning 15,000 years of South African history.

Margaret NASH, *Black Uprootings From "White" South Africa: The Third and Final Stage of Apartheid*. Braamfontein: South African Council of Churches, 1980. 120pp. Note: This booklet was banned by the South African government immediately following its publication in March. Some copies are available from the South Africa Task Force, Stanford Memorial Church, Stanford, CA 94305 for \$4.00 pb.

Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link. By Martin BAILEY. Notes & Documents No. 15/80. New York: Centre Against Apartheid, United Nations (address above), 1980. 26pp. Free.

Report of a Group of Experts on South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field. UN Document A/35/402. New York: United Nations (available from UN Publications, address above), 1980. 42pp. No price listed.

Women Under Apartheid. Portable photographic exhibition. London: International Defense and Aid Fund (available from IDAF-North American Office, address above), 1980. 14 25"x17" sheets, 67 photos & text. \$12.50, plus \$1.30 p&h.

Zambia

Michael BRATTON, *The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party-State Development in Zambia*. Hanover: University Press of New England (Box 979, Hanover, NH 03755), 1980. 334pp. \$17.50 hb.

Zimbabwe

Robert SKIMIN, *The Rhodesian Sellout*. Roslyn Heights: Libra Publications (391 Willets Rd., P.O. Box 165, Roslyn Heights, NY 11577), 1977. 153pp. \$6.95 hb.

United States & Southern Africa

The Candidates and Africa: Analysis of the 1980 Presidential Election and Its Implications for US-African Relations. Habari Special Report. By Francis A. KORNEGAY, Jr. Washington, DC: African Bibliographic Center (Box 13096, Washington, DC 20009), 1980. 37pp. \$2.75.

Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and the OECD Countries. Prepared for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee for Foreign Relations, United States Senate by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (Division of Public Documents, Washington, DC 20402), 1980. 375pp. \$17.50 hb.

Elizabeth SCHMIDT, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: US Business Support for Apartheid*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies (1901 Que St., Washington, DC 20009), 1980. 127pp., bib. \$4.95 pb, plus 15 percent p&h (US), 20 percent p&h (outside US), bulk discount available.

(Inclusion in this list of publications does not preclude later review.)

DIVESTMENT—THE STATE OF MICHIGAN . . .

The State of Michigan has joined the ranks of those cities and states which have taken a stand against apartheid. House Bill 5446 reads as follows: to be a depository of state funds, "a financial institution shall not encourage or condone legally required discrimination against an individual on the basis of race or color, by knowingly making or maintaining after July 4, 1982, a loan to the Republic of South Africa, a national corporation of the Republic of South Africa, or to a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa." The bill requires banks which seek state deposits to file an affidavit with the state treasurer attesting to the fact that such loans to South Africa are not made.

Negotiations between the House and Senate were completed in November, with the final House vote of 68-28 being taken on November 25. The legislation was sponsored by State Representative Virgil Smith of Detroit and co-sponsored by Perry Bullard of Ann Arbor. The bill was supported by an active citizens coalition, and it is expected that a bill focused on state educational funds will be pursued in 1981.

SWAPO/SAMRAF TOUR . . .

SWAPO representative Ellen Musaillela has completed her three month tour of the US. The tour, which ended in December 1980, was an attempt to gain support and funds for the people of Namibia. She and South African Military Aid Fund (SAMRAF) representative Mike Morgan visited eighteen states including: Washington, California, Colorado, and New York. According to SAMRAF representative Joe Morrissey, the tour raised a gross figure of \$26,000, and collected 25 tons of clothing.

Musaillela and Morgan met with a wide range of groups, including students, church groups, and community organizations. The SWAPO representative felt the tour was well received by most of the people they met. She was impressed in particular with the draft resister groups she met, as well as the people of the Mohawk nation.

According to SAMRAF, the tour also signalled the beginning of fifteen ongoing SWAPO support groups in the US.

Lutherans Move Towards Divestment

by Dumisani Kumalo

In early October, the Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa scored a significant victory in the campaign for divestment. Against the strenuous opposition of much of the church hierarchy, delegates to the convention of the American Lutheran Church (ALC) voted 447-331 to unload \$20 million invested in companies operating in South Africa.

The vote capped nearly two years of organizing and education by the Coalition, since initially there was little hope that the ALC could be brought to vote for divestment. The church is deeply involved in South Africa and is among the "better church institutions" there. It is the only denomination with five Black bishops including the highly respected Bishop Manas Buthelezi, an active opponent of apartheid within South Africa. More than most churches the ALC has initiated and supported social programs within South Africa.

The divestment motion, however, was a highly divisive issue. Delegates would have to decide if their church should continue implicit support of apartheid with the church's \$20 million investment in corporations operating in South Africa, or divest these corporate stocks—conflict was inevitable.

The Coalition began its campaign at the local level, using a strategy that may be useful to other activist groups working for divestment within institutions like churches or unions. It launched an education campaign with the individual churches and called for them to withdraw funds from banks lending to South Africa. Delegates from these churches then introduced resolutions at district meetings calling on the trustees to withdraw their funds from South Africa. Within a year, several regional synods had taken on the issue of divestment, with some endorsing the move and others urging the trustees to discuss the matter and answer certain questions.

Needless to add, this did not make the Coalition popular within the church.

Opponents attempted to dismiss its efforts by branding the Coalition a "radical group." But this campaign of rumors was disarmed by the Coalition's active support from a broad range of lay people, pastors, and even bishops. This wide support enabled the Coalition to entice sympathizers even within the church bureaucracy.

Dumisani Kumalo is an exiled South African journalist who is currently a field representative for the American Committee on Africa.

I arrived in Minneapolis on October 2 to find the Coalition operating from a trailer in a parking lot outside the Convention Center. The church insisted there was no room within the Convention Center.

The trustees organized open hearings of divestment for the 1,000 delegates. They also orchestrated testimony at these hearings from hand-picked "consultants," including the high-powered church lawyers, the trustees themselves, and other invited individuals like Edward May of the Lutheran Federation and Dr. Peter Kjeseth, a professor at Wartburg Seminary in Iowa. May and Kjeseth provided a different view from the other consultants. A breakthrough came when I was allowed to speak each time a delegate yielded his or her time at the podium to me. I was the only witness who had been chosen by the Coalition to present the case for divestment.

Meanwhile, the trustees had treated Bishop Dlamini, one of the most conservative Black bishops in South Africa, to an all-expense-paid trip to the convention to deliver a vaguely defined address: "A Black South African speaks to the church." Although Dlamini's formal diatribe against divestment was scheduled for two days after the vote on divestment, church leaders arranged for the bishop to hold preliminary "private discussions" with some key delegates. The Coalition responded by intensifying its own lobbying efforts.

On the day of the vote, the rules committee of the convention suddenly decided that divestment was a policy matter and could only be passed by a two-thirds majority. Perversely, the same committee ruled that opposition to apartheid was not a policy matter and required only a simple majority for passage. When Coalition supporters from the convention raised strong objections against juggling the rules so, an exemption was passed, permitting a simple majority to suffice.

As it turned out, the majority of the 1,000 delegates voted against apartheid. While the balloting took place, someone suggested that delegates opposed to apartheid should vote by standing up. That made it very difficult for anyone to remain seated in that convention center. When all the delegates were on their feet, another individual requested that even the visitors in the galleries who were opposed to apartheid should also stand. In an electrifying moment, the entire convention rose to its feet.

The unanimity disappeared with the ensuing debate on the divestment resolution. But the spirit carried over to bring some who had been wary of the Coalition onto

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news briefs

 **ANGOLA'S ESCALATING** problems with corruption, its continuing difficulties meeting production targets, and the constant war with Pretoria were all highlighted at an extraordinary Congress of the ruling MPLA party held in mid-December 1980. The six day session—Angola's first since the Party Congress in 1977—began on December 17 in Luanda, the capital of Angola. The 450 delegates present included workers from the industrial and agricultural sectors as well as members of the government and military.

One of the first items of business was a vote to confirm Jose Eduardo dos Santos as president, and elect him to a five year term. Dos Santos was provisionally appointed president of Angola by the MPLA Central Committee in September 1979, following the death of Angola's first President Agostinho Neto.

Speaking at the second day of the conference, dos Santos noted that Angola's economic achievements have been especially good in fields such as the development of natural oil resources. But, while there have also been gains in the fields of education and health, the gains have been disappointing and the country's food production levels have fallen far short of the goals set by the 1977 Party Congress.

More generally, the Congress said that Angola's inability to meet economic targets meant that, since 1977, there had been no

Correction

Due to an editing error, the article in our November/December 1980 issue entitled "Reagan's Africa Arsenal" mistakenly identified William Casey as a lobbyist for the South African Government in 1974. This is not accurate.

The law firm of Casey, Line and Mittendorf was registered with the Department of Justice as a lobby for the South African Sugar Association between 1971 and 1978. William Casey, who directed the Reagan transition team, has no known connection with this firm. Casey, Line and Mittendorf stopped representing the Sugar Association after a 1978 court case charged the firm with making political contributions without adequately reporting them to the Department of Justice.

improvement in the average Angolan's standard of living and that the government had failed to deliver much tangible material support to the majority of Angola's population that lives in the countryside.

Participants in the conference also spoke of growing problems with "hoarding, speculation and black marketeering" as another cause of the country's economic ailments.

In a move designed to correct some of the causes of Angola's economic woes, the conference sharply criticized party members who fail to carry out party guidelines. The conference also pledged to improve party discipline and control and to provide for more careful selection of party members.

The closing resolutions of the Congress clearly reflected these concerns, with resolutions on political, economic, and defense development and a specific resolution on living standards. A new five year economic plan that would revise the present 1977 plan in light of the missed production goals and other problems is now being drafted.

The final report of the Conference pledged Angola's continued support for SWAPO and the ANC and reaffirmed Angola's ties with Cuba and the USSR. The report also criticized the US and other Western countries for obstructing the UN plan for Namibian independence.

 **UNDER SOUTH AFRICA'S** watchful eye, the Ciskei, one that country's several bantustans or tribal reserves, held a referendum on "independence" on December 4. Not surprisingly, 98 percent of the votes counted were in favor of independence and the barren reserve awaits only the outcome of final negotiations with South Africa before independence is granted.

If Ciskei does become independent, it will join Transkei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana as bantustans that are formally independent yet are still dependent politically and economically upon South Africa. None of the independent bantustans are recognized internationally, and seventy percent of the land allotted is generally unsuitable for cultivation.

Ciskei is one of the most poverty stricken, overcrowded parts of South Africa, and "There just isn't anything like a viable economic structure," says Wesleyan economics professor Peter Kilby. Kilby took part in a commission appointed by the Ciskeian government in August 1978 to study the feasibility of independence for the Ciskei.

The commission, which included two prominent American academics as well as two white South Africans, advised Ciskei

not to opt for independence.

The majority of the people who will be relegated to the Ciskei, however, did not have any choice. Ciskei's Chief Minister Lennox Sebe warned his constituents not to go to the polls unless they planned to vote for independence. Otherwise, Sebe declared, "The spirits of our great chiefs will make a piercing cry: 'Deliver him or her to the officer and be cast in prison.'" Brig. Charles Sebe, the Chief's brother who is a former member of the South African security police, enforces loyalty to the only political party, the Ciskeian Independence Party.

Independent Ciskei is likely to remain, however, more fiction than reality. "Citizens" of the Ciskei receive, on average, 65 percent of their income from the Republic and, according to press reports, the bantustan's government receives 70 percent of its budget from South Africa.

A white judge in South Africa has imposed heavy jail sentences on six Black men accused of involvement in the Silverton bank siege. At the same trial three other Blacks were sentenced to death for their part in a guerrilla attack on the Soekmeaar police station last January.

The "Silverton nine" were acquitted on two counts of murder and twenty-three counts of attempted murder stemming from the January 23 takeover of the Volkskas bank by ANC guerrillas. As a result of the takeover 23 hostages were seized and the guerrillas demanded the release of imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela. None of the defendants actually participated in the takeover, in which all three guerrillas and two hostages were killed by police gunfire.

Despite the not guilty verdict, all nine defendants were convicted of treason for membership in the banned African National Congress, and received prison sentences ranging from 10 to 20 years. Three defendants, Ncimbithi Johnson Lubishi, Petrus Tseo Mashigo, and Naphtali Menaga were then sentenced to death for participating in an earlier attack on the Soekmeaar police station near Pretoria.

No lives were lost during that attack, but the three were convicted of attempted murder, a capital offense under strict South African law. The harsh sentences have prompted an international outcry for clemency. The ANC, a recent signatory to the Geneva accords on prisoners of war, has demanded that the guerrillas be treated as war prisoners under international law—thus barring execution.

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