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# SOUTHERN AFRICA

MAY 1978

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- Africa:  
The French  
Connection
- South Africa  
Invades  
Opryland

JUN 07 1978

ALSO:  
Ensuring  
A Revolution  
Within A Revolution

AN INTERVIEW WITH MARTHA FORD



# SOUTHERN AFRICA

VOLUME XI NUMBER 4

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Edmunds Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban Peggy  
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Stroman Stephanie Urdang Roberta  
Washington Jim Weikart Sybil Wong

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**COVER:** Mozambique workers on a state farm

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# Africa: The French Connection



By Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

For years France as a "back street" peddler of arms sold Mirage jets and other items of sophisticated weaponry to many of the third world's most reactionary nations and movements with relative impunity. More recently, however, France's open ties with the racist South African regime and its apparent willingness to intervene on the side of reaction in a number of African conflicts, have brought to an end the international silence on France's role in Africa. Increasingly, France is being criticized and isolated by progressive African and world opinion. No longer a marginal European power, in the past 15 years France has grown to be the third largest exporter of arms in the world, and today France is the number one seller of arms to South Africa.

## Nuclear Connection

The most recent controversy has centered on a contract between France and South Africa to build and to train personnel to staff South Africa's first nuclear power plant. Many believe

that nuclear technology cannot be separated from the political reality of nuclear armament for the repressive regime. Two French companies, C II Alcatel and Thompson CSF, are presently under contract with the South African government. According to South African figures, 100 nuclear technicians and their families are presently in training at a French nuclear power station in Buguey, only a few miles from Greys-Manville where massive anti-nuclear power demonstrations were stage in June 1977. While France has in recent years promised that it would support the embargo on arms sales to South Africa mandated by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1963, it has in fact continued to violate the ban by honoring contracts signed previous to the French decision to respect the ban. A "total arms embargo" was announced by France in August 1977 just two days before the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Louis de Guiringaud, left for a diplomatic tour of the "front line" countries. Yet while in Nairobi, de Guiringaud confirmed that two naval destroyers (each 1170 tons) and two

attack submarines would be delivered to South Africa to honor commitments made at an earlier time.

## Arms Sales

France used to sell Mirage jets, helicopters, tanks, missiles and other arms which could be used in counter-insurgency warfare. France "officially" ceased the sale of this equipment two years ago, but in the meantime South Africa has expanded and rapidly developed its own arms industry to the point where it is nearly self-sufficient except for naval vessels and the most sophisticated military hardware. Despite French denials that it has sold anti-personnel weaponry, there is evidence to the contrary. For example, the Menurhim Company had a 40 million franc contract with the Pretoria Metal Pressing Company in 1974 which resulted in the manufacture of 100,000 20 mm. bullets. The Menurhim Company has German and Swiss affiliates that mask the French multinational's direct contracts with South Africa.

When, in November 1977, the African countries, responding to a new wave of South African repression, pro-

posed the passage of a mandatory arms embargo in the Security Council, France joined the US and Britain in attempting to block the action. Only after the resolution had been considerably weakened (see *Southern Africa* December 1977), avoiding any description of South Africa as a "threat to the peace," did France, along with the other Western powers, accede to passage of the resolution. The French government subsequently announced that it would no longer deliver the naval destroyers, or honor other such pre-existing contracts.

Yet as one French arms manufacturer pointed out in a rare burst of honesty, this action had come much too late for real effectiveness.

"I am afraid we are closing the stable door after the horse has bolted," he said, commenting on the impact the embargo was likely to have on South Africa.

South Africa has been expecting and preparing for some form of international arms sanction for several years. Its annual defense budget doubled and redoubled, reaching some \$2 billion, as it stockpiled arms and spare parts, often obtaining these openly, or under the thinnest of disguises, from France, as well as the United Kingdom, the US, Israel and West Germany.

Most important of all, the South Africans have worked hard at building their own arms manufacturing capability—with the help of those same friends.

Thus, for instance, according to French Defense Minister Bourges, South Africa is producing, under French license, Mirage F-1 fighter-bombers, Panhard armored cars—of which it now has probably 1600—and Crotale anti-aircraft missiles.

"South Africa has acquired the license and has all the blue-prints," said the Minister.

### African Anger

On the 1977 de Guiringaud diplomatic tour, the French Foreign Minister was criticized in every country he visited. In Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere described the French sale of arms to the white minority regimes as reflecting a policy toward Africa that is "arrogant" and "mercantilist." Demonstrations against French policy in Africa caused de Guiringaud to break off his visit to Tanzania before it had officially begun. In Mozambique President Samora Machel was even more direct in his country's denunciation of France's links with the racist South African regime. He accused the Foreign Minister of supporting a "war

of extermination in South Africa." During the same visit, an apparent French offer of arms to Mozambique was rebuffed. Reaction in French diplomatic circles to the unsuccessful tour of the Foreign Minister indicated that France had underestimated the "sensitivity" of the African nations to the arms sales to South Africa.

With a history of lucrative arms deals with South Africa along with major contracts for commercial airliners, nuclear plants and other industrial goods, it is not surprising that France also exercised its veto power to protect South Africa from the late 1977 UN move to impose total economic sanctions on the regime. France also favors a tougher, more aggressive foreign policy to "contain communism" in Africa which it believes the US and Great Britain is failing to do.

### Containing Communism

Increasingly France sees itself as the only western power with a strong, clearly defined African policy aimed at curtailing Soviet influence on the continent by maintaining and expanding its influence among the former colonies. Where other western powers have feared to tread, France has rushed in with arms and direct military support to wavering neo-colonial regimes. The most publicized recent case of French intervention on the side of African reaction was the 1977 dispatching of 11 planes to transport Moroccan soldiers and several French officers to supervise the rescue of the Mobutu regime in Zaire threatened by a coalition of Katangan guerrillas. Similar military assistance has been given recently to Mauritania to combat

the POLISARIO national liberation movement in Western Sahara. Most recently France has decided to station 4000 soldiers in Djibouti to protect its interests in the Horn of Africa. These recent cases illustrate a less well-known pattern that was established in the 1960s and early 1970s when France: 1) parachuted troops into Gabon to reinstate an overthrown pro-French regime, 2) dispatched forces to Mauritania to fend off an invasion by Morocco, 3) sent several thousand French troops along with 500 crack Foreign Legion soldiers to Chad to battle Arab anti-imperialist guerrillas.

### Spheres of Influence

A "Euro-African Solidarity," according to President Giscard d'Estaing, would be chiefly economic and political but would provide European guarantees of the security of specific African nations. France sees the US crippled by an isolationist Congress and Great Britain and West Germany as lacking the political will to exercise influence on the African continent. With France in the vanguard, western Europe could re-assert itself in African affairs and neither the US nor the Soviet Union would play any major role. The guarantee of African security was explicitly referred to by Jonas Savimbi, leader of the South African and imperialist-backed UNITA forces in Angola, who lauded the French intervention in Zaire's Shaba province. "France has shown itself to be a true friend of the African people," Savimbi said, continuing that if the west had acted in Angola the way France acted in Zaire, the country would never have fallen to the "communists."

**The French Industries are proud to have been chosen for the turnkey supply of the Koeberg nuclear power station**



Overall view of typical French 2 x 900 MW nuclear power station

Zaire is a key country in any western strategy for maintaining a foothold in central and southern Africa. After the Shaba anti-Mobutu fighting, Mobutu harped for months about the lack of US support. Any political distance between Washington and Kinshasa is increasingly being filled by France which regards Francophone Zaire as its "natural" ally. Indeed Zaire's economic ties are even closer to Europe than they are to the US. Zaire sends almost 80% of its exports to Europe as opposed to 6% to the US and nearly 70% of its imports come from Europe versus 12% from the US. France has been buying only 7% of Zaire's exports and selling it 18% of its imports and the closer political ties to Zaire reflect a desire to corner a larger share of the market. Still France is gambling in Zaire. The regime is nearly bankrupt, with \$2 billion in unpaid debts and the price of copper declining, and the repressive regime of Mobutu may be collapsing under its own corrupt weight.

French ties with Mobutu extend to Rhodesia as well as South Africa. France has kept silent on the Rhodesian negotiations but clearly a stable Zimbabwe would help Zaire's economic situation. Since Zaire refuses to make its peace with the progressive



Embracing neo-colonialism: Mobutu and Giscard d'Estaing in Zaire in January.

regime in Angola, the Benguela railway line no longer operates into Zaire and Zairian copper must not travel through Zambia and Rhodesia to be exported from East London, South Africa. Escalating war in the struggle for Zimbabwe threatens this route. Recently there have been reports of the recruitment of French mercenaries to serve in Rhodesia as "guards."

The young Frenchmen are paid between 250 and 600 Rhodesian dollars to patrol the Rhodesian border and protect whites from black guerrillas.

The aggressive posture on the part of France is not limited to southern Africa but extends to North Africa where French officials fear that Algeria's progressive regime is seeking to undermine pro-west governments in Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania. In January of this year the French Defense Minister held talks in Ivory Coast to discuss the building of an inter-African air base to service France's security guarantees to Francophone Africa under its proposed "Euro-African Solidarity Project." At home, this general African policy has come under attack from the French Communist Party which has condemned France's relations with South Africa while denouncing its imperialist interventions in Zaire and Western Sahara. But as recent elections have made immediate political change inside France unlikely, the aggressive foreign policy in Africa charted by French commercial-political leaders is certain to continue for some time, a position for which Pretoria is extremely thankful. As South African Defense Minister Botha commented, "What would South Africa be today without France?" □

## 🌍 SPECIAL REPORTS

# The Grand 'Ole Racists: South Africa Invades Opryland



Demonstrators at Van der Bilt University

By Richard E. Lapchick

It was an unlikely setting; Nashville, the home of country music, god and apple pie; Vanderbilt University, self-proclaimed educational leader in southern higher education. The former, surely a wonderful place to visit, and the latter an equally wonderful place to learn, were rarely thought of when images of racial conflict were

*Richard Lapchick is National Chairperson of ACCESS, the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society.*

conjured up by people in the United States.

All that may be permanently changed now as a result of a tennis match that Vanderbilt insisted on staging and one that the city-fathers of Nashville refused to cancel as a threat to the peace. Nashville and Vanderbilt have been placed under close scrutiny as a consequence of their intransigence and both have come up lacking in terms of race relations. That is to be expected when the sports-lovers being hosted are none other than the racist representatives from South Africa.

## The Sacrificial Lamb



Daily ads in the *Tennessean* proclaimed, "Welcome South Africa, courageous fighters for white, western civilization: pro-small business, anti-communist."

The Klan announced that it would be out in force to help the police on demonstration days. When the police chief rejected their help, the state Klan leader announced that it was not important since many members of the Nashville police were Klansmen!

In a charged atmosphere, I was attacked in my college office after returning from Nashville where I was helping to organize the demonstrations. The assailants, wearing stocking masks, asked me, a "nigger lover," if I would continue doing what I had been doing and told me I had no business in South Africa. They carved a misspelled "Nigger" on my abdomen and beat me badly enough that I had liver and kidney damage and a concussion.

This was one month before the demonstrations. A week after the attack, the local medical examiner called the press to announce that I had done it to myself! Even after taking a polygraph (lie-detector test) and undergoing an exam with another forensic pathologist which completely substantiated that I was assaulted, local authorities did not relent in their attacks on my credibility. As one of the leaders in the anti-apartheid sports movement, it was widely felt that the attack on my credibility was an attempt to hurt the credibility of the entire movement.

For all who cared to look, it became apparent that the thread of racism ran from Pretoria to Peoria; that racism in South Africa, not only un deterred but enforced by law, was affecting race relations in the United States. The newspaper ads, the Klan and the attack all smashed the cherished illusion held by most Americans that such overt and violent racism was dead in this country. The South Africa issue has merely forced us to focus on it.

### Why All The Fuss?

To the casual observer, it might seem that Nashville was an unlikely setting and the matches an even less likely issue to generate major political activity. How could a tennis match, even between the US and South Africa, be so important that it would both bring together an enormous coalition of civil rights, religious, political and sports groups to call for protest and also provoke such racist responses against the protest?

The answer is not hard to discover. The sports boycott of South Africa has been a major issue internationally for more than a decade. Over that period of time, protestors have come to recognize the extent to which South Africa uses sports as a propaganda vehicle for both internal and external consumption.

Internally, the South African press tells whites, "The UN condemnations are irrelevant. Here you see the peoples of Britain, New Zealand, the US, etc., competing with South Africa in sports at the grass roots level. We are not as isolated internationally as the United Nations would have us believe. Our friends still love us."

However, over the course of the decade, almost all nations have come out in opposition to sports contacts with South Africa. As collective bodies, the Commonwealth heads of state (June 1977) and the European Economic Community heads of state (February 1978) have said that their nations will not compete with South Africa. The Socialist nations have been boycotting for years. With only the United States left as a major competitor, South Africa staked everything on this Davis Cup. The South Africans spent \$440,000 in the past year taking out ads proclaiming that sports were integrated in South Africa.

That was a small investment in relation to the potential economic benefits of continuing international acceptability. As the South African economy soured while violent repression increased, world opinion has turned increasingly virulent against South

## Davis Cup Protests

The weeks before the Davis Cup matches in Nashville were filled with intensive organizing both locally and nationally, to oppose South African participation in the tournament. Students and some staff mobilized at Vanderbilt University, site of the matches, and at other universities in the area; work was also done in the local communities. The NAACP spearheaded national opposition.

So successful were these efforts that over four thousand people marched in Nashville and assembled at Centennial Park on March 18 to protest the participation of South Africa in the North American Zone Finals of the Davis Cup in a demonstration sponsored by the NAACP. On the previous day over two thousand people, mostly black students from Fisk University, Tennessee State and Meharry Medical College, had marched to the Memorial Gymnasium at Vanderbilt University, the site of the Davis Cup tennis matches. This group, also including radical groups, church and peace activists, organized a rally and picket line, which they maintained all three days of the competition.

The speakers at the NAACP rally included Dick Gregory, Dr. Franklin Williams, President of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and chairperson of the Coalition for Human Rights in South Africa, Dr. Benjamin Hooks, Executive Director of the NAACP, Ossie Davis, Judge William Booth, President of the American Committee on Africa, and Bayard Rustin. In his speech Dr. Hooks called for an end to all US investments, and for total economic sanctions against South Africa.

It was an effective protest. The Davis Cup was a financial disaster for Vanderbilt and the US Tennis Association which sponsored the matches. Four thousand spectators were needed at each match to break even—but the 'crowd' only averaged 1300 at each session. W.E. Hester, President of the USTA admitted on national television that the US would not support South Africa's participation in next year's Davis Cup.

Africa and foreign investment had begun to seriously contract. Major activist campaigns in the US were increasing the pressure. A successfully staged David Cup could, many South African and US industrialists agreed,

turn the tide of US opinion back in favor of South Africa.

### The Propaganda Rolls On

Peter Lamb, the young South African "coloured" tennis player, was

named to the South African team. He was to be the seventh man—a position which restricted him to exhibition matches. Someone aptly named him "The Sacrificial Lamb."

As the matches neared, South Africa announced that it was completely integrating tennis, including social mixing after the actual athletic events!

Such new policies have been proclaimed in the past—always as an international athletic crisis was at hand. After the 1976 Olympics when the African states withdrew in protest of New Zealand's competition with South Africa (South Africa itself has not completed in the Olympics since 1960), Minister of Sport Koornhof reported a "new" integrated sports policy.

A year later, when challenged by right wing MP's in the Nationalist Party, Koornhof assured them that mixed sport at the club level was against party policy. He gave the statistics: during the first year of the "new policy," there had been only 56 cases of individuals who had competed on mixed teams in 1,786 events with more than 500,000 participants. That is, the government had been "99.9955% successful" in applying the Party's apartheid sports policy. Nothing had changed then. Nothing is likely to change with the 1978 "new" sports policy.

In fact, it was revealed in the South African press that what had been announced as new "policy" by Koornhof in February was merely an expression of his personal beliefs and did not carry the weight of the Party! The fraud continues. So does the struggle against it.

### The Protest

Although widely divergent estimates of numbers of protesters were tossed about before the matches, what took place in Nashville clearly heightened consciousness about South Africa in the US.

It was the largest sports-related demonstration in history. There were over 2000 demonstrators on Friday and between 3-4,000 on Saturday at the NAACP rally. For the first time, demonstrators outnumbered spectators watching an event. It was reported that ALL spectators on Friday and Saturday were white! The United States Tennis Association announced that this was the last time South Africa would be in the Davis Cup. The USTA made it clear, however, that this would take place because of "disruptions" and not because of any moral questions raised. If the USTA abides by its decision—

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 1978

# This is how we discriminate in South Africa.

Take a good look at these pictures of South Africans at play. These were some of the events on our 1976 sports calendar. By the way, all these men are eligible to represent South Africa because our teams are selected on merit—and merit only.

Consider now the fact that South Africa has been barred from the Olympics and many other international sport organizations on the pretext that it practices discrimination in sports.

We know better. Sport is simply used by some as a means to try and change South Africa's politics, while Russia, Uganda, Cuba, Angola and many others—some of whose internal politics others may also not like—participate with impunity.

If you feel, like us, that politics has no place in sport, let us hear from you. Or better still, write to the International Olympic Committee, Château De Vidy, 1007 Lausanne, Switzerland, to voice your protest.

**OFFS** Committee for fairness in sport

Selling South African sport

## Stop Press

In a cautious step in the right direction the Committee of Management of the International Tennis Federation announced April 16 that South Africa would be barred this year from participating in all international tennis events, including the Davis Cup and the Womens' Federation Cup, to be played in Australia in December.

The ITF gave the three South African tennis bodies (one white, one black, one multi-racial) until February 1 to form one non-racial organization.

However ITF recognition was not withdrawn from the predominantly white South African Tennis Union, and individual players will still be allowed to compete in international tournaments—only a South African team being excluded.

This move by the Management Committee will have to be confirmed by a 75 percent majority at the annual general meeting of the ITF in July. A similar move last year was defeated.

## INTERVIEW

# Ensuring a Revolution Within a Revolution

by Stephanie Urdang

There is a new development within SWAPO. As the war of liberation escalates, as the number of trained guerrillas increases each month, as more and more people—particularly youth—flee their country to join SWAPO across the border in Angola, a new dimension of the struggle has blossomed and taken hold in the movement. It is the liberation of women.

This is not a new *idea* to SWAPO. As with other revolutionary movements, the question of the emancipation of women has been part of its ideology for many years. It is stated in the constitu-

gle for liberation to free her country from the yoke of colonialism and at the same time, free her and her male counterpart of the wrong practices and customs which served to keep them both 'unliberated.' Thus she ensures that there is a revolution within a revolution."

In February the South Africans finally allowed Ms. Ford to travel outside Namibia to take part in the latest round of talks with the five Western powers. I interviewed her in New York, and her words often gave way to infectious laughter as she elaborated, with a pleasing absence of empty rhetoric.

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## Interview with Martha Ford SWAPO Women's Council

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and based on their prior actions on South Africa there is no guarantee—then this could be an end to major international sports competition for South Africa. To assure this, most anti-apartheid groups feel the pressure must be kept on and intensified.

It is possible that the two major effects of Nashville will be unrelated to sports. The first may be a spill-over of momentum to the divestiture campaigns, in which many college students are already challenging their university's stake in apartheid via investment in US corporations who do business in South Africa.

The second may be an added impetus to the US civil rights movement and its support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa. The leadership provided by Ben Hooks of the NAACP, Franklin Williams of the Phelps Stokes Fund and others was forceful and dynamic. The crowd sensed the possibility of a new beginning. It was a feeling that has been missing since the death of Martin Luther King. As the ugly, hooded head of overt racism has been unmasked once again in this country, it is imperative that this revival becomes real. □

tion. But practice was not in tune with this aspect of ideology.

The practice has come about slowly, accelerating dramatically during the past year, because the women themselves took up the issue and began to make their own demands. SWAPO's experience illustrates once again the political lesson already demonstrated in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, that the liberation of women is not something that can be decreed from above. It becomes a reality only when taken up by the women themselves. At the same time, it is one facet of the total revolution, and not isolated from it.

The current position was recently summed up by Martha Ford, leader of the SWAPO Women's Council, founded in Namibia last year, in an article in the movement's journal, *Namibia Today* (1977, No. 3). "The Namibia woman is realizing that she should be actively involved in the national strug-

the groundswell of response to the liberation of women in SWAPO. She herself is an impressive and obviously highly capable woman who insists that men treat her with respect.

"In our society there are certain standards for men and other standards for women," she told me. "There are those who say that 'this is the man's role, and that is the woman's role,' dividing us from each other. Women are oppressed, so if we are talking about fighting against exploitation of man by man, then every form of discrimination and exploitation must be eradicated. We are fighting against the exploitation of women by man as well.

"We can say that women are even slaves of slaves. So we must free the most downtrodden: the women. But then, liberation works in two ways—the liberation of the oppressed leads to the liberation of the oppressor."

### Establishing Practice

It is one thing to recognize this and quite another to put it into practice. But by last year, soon after the Women's Council was formed, the women militants in SWAPO came to

*Stephanie Urdang is an editor of Southern Africa. She has recently completed a book on women in Guinea-Bissau.*

the end of their patience. They were tired of an attitude from many of their male comrades that relegated them to less responsible tasks. They were tired of men maintaining that women's work was in the home, that women did not really know much about politics, and that they would more easily betray their comrades than a man. The women found themselves constantly arguing with their male comrades, who held views similar to those that prevailed generally in the society at large.

She looked almost impish when she recalled an incident that had happened in 1975. The Pretoria regime banned a march to protest the triple veto in the UN Security Council which squelched a resolution calling for an arms embargo against South Africa. Martha Ford had travelled north with a group of women from her small town, Rehoboth, to Windhoek to participate in a demonstration planned to protest that ban. She, along with four other Rehoboth women, were arrested and detained over the weekend. "Well, was there a fuss! The people of the town called a meeting after this, and said that women must be kept in their place, otherwise they would make the men look as if they are cowards."

Often it is not only the men who criticize a woman's activities. If she leaves her home for a weekend to attend to SWAPO work, it may be her mother or other older women, more set in their ways, who are the first to chastize her for being a bad wife and mother.

### Establishing New Patterns

A few months after the formation of the Women's Council, its members decided to organize a rally in Windhoek to prove that the men were wrong. Previously when mass meetings were called by SWAPO, there had been one, maybe two women speakers. The interpreters were always men. This rally was organized, addressed and interpreted solely by the women. It was a resounding success.

Their male comrades came to the women and apologized for their attitudes. "Many said to me after the meeting, 'From now on we are never going to say such things again!'" Martha Ford laughed heartily at the memory. "They were completely surprised, in fact stunned, by what they saw us women do, and by the way we articulated our idea, as well as how up to date we were with the latest development!"

Since then, women have played a more active and equal role in political organizing alongside the men. The number of women attending mass



Martha Ford

rallies has also grown to over 40 percent.

It has not been easy for the women to discard their socialization and take a militant stand. "It is easier for women to be passive. But we have to realize that it is good to make decisions for ourselves. And it is vital that we support each other in this. We have been taught that other women are our rivals, our competitors.

"Women are dependent on their husbands. They bring up their children to be dependent on them. It is like being suffocated."

As women play a stronger role in SWAPO and as they become more politically developed, the experience that FRELIMO and PAIGC women speak of, is being relived: women are becoming even more political and militant than many of the men.

"When the women become active they are stronger, they are more forceful, they are more clear about what they want and how things should be done than the men. The men are just astounded, they don't know what is happening."

### Cautious Response

The response on the part of men to the 'new' woman is varied. Some have thrown their support behind the women's struggle. Others have been more cautious, even forbidding their wives to attend meetings. But the issue is alive and is being confronted constantly.

"We are all colonized. In the process of fighting this, we question a lot of the

old values. It must be tackled as part of the overall fight. But still, there are comrades who do not believe this is an issue that we should be dealing with now. They are very threatened. Of course they are, they are the oppressors! They say that focussing on women's liberation at this time is divisive, and women will see men as the enemy. Women will go off into a reactionary line."

While these attitudes are still prevalent, they are on the decline, and the change in the last year has been considerable.

"You should see what is happening with our women!", another member—male—of the SWAPO delegation commented to me. "In the last year there have been tremendous changes. The women are becoming a powerful force in the organization."

### Women in the Army

Women are joining the army in increasing numbers. An interview with a political commissar of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in *Namibia Today* (1977, No. 3) touches on this. "PLAN follows SWAPO's policy that each and every member of SWAPO should be trained regardless of sex or color. Men and women follow the same training. We are not in that old system of discriminating against women, saying that this is for women and that is for men. We don't do that; we are all equal."

"At the beginning," Martha Ford commented, "the men were very unhappy about the women commanders. They did not like to fall under the command of a woman. This was quite a problem, but it has been solved now and the men accept it."

To ensure that the attitudes of both men and women continue to change, the Women's Council which has established groups in all areas of Namibia, holds weekly discussion groups for women, and regular seminars for both women and men.

"The Council has the task not only of mobilizing women to participate in the national struggle, but to make them conscious that they have the same right and obligation as men to make decisions concerning their nation's interest. The discussions go deeper into what exploitation means and to understand the nature of the system. Women do feel oppressed. In the discussions we emphasize that it is not men who are the problem, but the system."

The sense that the liberation of women has become an alive question within SWAPO could be caught from

the enthusiastic way in which Martha Ford expressed the issues and the problems. She told me that women from every part of the country are insisting on the need for women to participate equally in the struggle. She said there was no difference in the level of response between the towns and the rural areas, between one ethnic group and another, or between young and old.

"But," she said, "these issues have to be taken up in a conscious and ideological way." If they arise only spontaneously as a result of a particular historical situation, they may fade away once the conditions change.

"It must become a fundamental part of the ongoing struggle. We don't want women to automatically drift back into the old patterns once we have our independence. I think in SWAPO, with so many women being active and being aware of the process and the time that such a struggle takes, this will not happen."

But it is a struggle that is still young. "We are still male dominated at the National Executive level and at the branch [regional] level and would like to see a conscious effort at drawing more women into the decision making organs of our movement. We have a long way to go but the struggle will continue." □



SWAPO members at a rally

## ZIMBABWE

# The Settlement Stakes

The signing on March 3 of an internal settlement between Ian Smith and three African leaders set off flurries of diplomatic activity as various of the forces involved in the struggle over Zimbabwe sought to fit the new development into their particular strategies. The Patriotic Front was quick to condemn the settlement, the Anglo-American axis kept all its options open ... welcoming "positive" features while acknowledging certain shortcomings (such as the total exclusion of the liberation movements!). In New York the Security Council met to consider the development, and shortly after the passage of a resolution terming the agreement unacceptable, the British and Americans began indicating that they hoped to develop a formula whereby what they termed "all the parties" would be brought together at a round table conference to discuss a

## With One Settlement 'In Place,' Another on the Drawing Board, Diplomats Keep Busy

final settlement. Energetic attempts to call such a conference by the end of May, attempts which included mid-April visits to Salisbury, Pretoria and Dar es Salaam by US Secretary of State Vance and British Foreign Secretary David Owen seemed to have met with little immediate success. The maneuvers had, however, served one useful purpose, bringing into the open some of the elements currently at work in the situation.

### 'Settlement' Government Sworn In

On March 21, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole,

and Chief Jeremiah Chirau (a participant in the racist regime) were finally sworn in with Smith as members of the four-man executive council that will head the transitional government. It was a telling irony of the three blacks' new position that the ceremony involved oaths of allegiance to the current Rhodesian constitution, since the Salisbury settlement is legally a piece of legislation enacted by the minority parliament. This makes official the view held by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, co-leaders of the Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance—that the three blacks working with

Smith have done nothing more than join the white-settler administration.

### Settlement A Fraud

This view shaped the stand taken by the African group at the United Nations when the matter was brought before the Security Council in early March. The two weeks of debate on the internal settlement represented the first clear international test of the Anglo-American attitude to the accord. At issue was the credibility of the Salisbury settlement.

Opponents of the settlement argued that it embodied a continuation of Smith's fight to prevent genuine majority rule; they pointed to the fact that the so-called universal franchise was a fraud, that elections would still be based on race, that although all Africans 18 and over would be eligible to vote for the 72 African seats in the new assembly, their candidates will be almost powerless to make changes in areas protected by the entrenched provisions. Whites, including Asians and 'Coloureds,' will control more than 25 percent of the seats, though they are only 4 percent of the population. They will have a blocking vote over critical areas such as private property, defense forces, courts, prisons, public services and police. Universal adult suffrage would provide the appearance of majority rule, not its content.

The eight entrenched provisions which can only be amended by 78 votes, guarantee that the present institutions of power remain intact. White property rights are protected in such a way as to make the initiation of urgently needed land reform virtually impossible. The entire judicial system with its notorious colonial judges will remain intact, as will the security apparatus which has played a dominant role in suppressing African resistance. The police who have long been known as torturers by the people are suddenly to be transformed into public protectors, while the public service, predominantly white-run, and responsible for implementing both the country's discriminatory racist policies, and the hated "protected villages," is also to remain in place.

Said Robert Mugabe, speaking in the name of the Patriotic Front on March 9:

The creation of an apartheid franchise cannot solve the problems of our country...

The institutions of power that are the linchpin of the racist colonial system... will remain as they presently stand. If one considers the



Freedom fighter inside Zimbabwe

fact that 100% of the Rhodesian judiciary is white, 99.9% of its civil service is white and the whole leadership of the security forces is completely white, then one understands the fact that, in terms of real power, this agreement does not settle anything.

Other critics stressed that the Smith government would play a dominant role in the transitional period, while elections were taking place and a constitution was being drawn up. This was a striking departure from even the terms of the Anglo-American proposals, which called for the Smith regime to step down as a prerequisite for a return to legality and any transfer of power.

### Anglo-American Ambivalence

Despite the obvious validity of these criticisms, Washington and London refused to oppose the settlement unequivocally, and sought to enable Bishop Muzorewa to present his case to the Security Council. The Bishop received a great deal of attention from the US media during his New York visit, but his appearance at the UN was ultimately blocked despite energetic British and American lobbying.

There was some hard bargaining over the text of a resolution—with the threat of a British veto blocking initial language "condemning and rejecting" the Smith accord. US Ambassador Young worked hard to achieve a resolution that obviated a split between the two parties to the Anglo-American pro-

posal, although rumors indicated more and more frequently that Britain was displaying a willingness to accept the internal settlement more or less "as is."

### Pushing Muzorewa

Muzorewa's rejection by the council was seen as a setback for Washington and London. Muzorewa's popular support among Zimbabwe's black population is a much-debated topic. Both in New York, and again in Maputo on the occasion of a rally of Muzorewa's supporters, said to number 150,000, Front leaders Mugabe and Nkomo have discounted the Bishop's claims to majority backing. Many experienced observers have reported that the Bishop has been rapidly losing support among the people since his acceptance of the Smith deal. Nevertheless, the Western press, following the lead of the State Department and the Foreign Office, seemed eager to promote the Bishop as the most widely supported black Zimbabwean leader. His participation in the internal settlement made it easier for Washington and London to justify some form of support for it.

### Wooing Nkomo

Immediately after the UN meeting the Anglo-American team embarked on a new phase of the campaign to achieve a meeting of "moderate" minds, with the final product a mixture of the Smith design and the Anglo-American proposals. Their problem, of course, is that no paper plans will work if they face widespread popular resistance. Hence while one element in Western strategy has been the boosting of Muzorewa as a popular leader, another has been the prolonged attempt to drive wedges into the Patriotic Front. The aim has been to split off Nkomo and draw him into the "settlement" camp, in this way achieving credibility amongst the people of Zimbabwe, and providing a sufficient basis for the front-line states to give the settlement their public blessings.

Sithole made public, on March 17, documents which revealed that David Owen had urged the black leaders negotiating with Smith to try and draw Nkomo to the bargaining table.

"We are at your disposal," Owen was quoted as telling Sithole in an earlier meeting in London. "What can we do to help you in this? This holds the key to Zimbabwe." In mid-April there were reports in the British press that Salisbury had been in constant contact with Nkomo for the past two months, to try and assess his terms for returning from his base in Zambia.

Talks, conducted by 'trusted individuals' rather than at official level, had apparently failed to bear any fruit. The prospect of Nkomo's return was far from enthusiastically received by the black parties to Smith's settlement, who saw such a development as a threat to their power.

### Round Table Call

First public announcements of the Owen/Vance plan to convene a new all-inclusive conference on the basis of the Anglo-American proposals were made at the end of March. The plan involved two stages: first a meeting with the Patriotic Front to settle the disputed issues not agreed upon at the Malta meetings, and then an all-parties conference, its agenda to include ceasefire arrangements and the composition of the governing council during the transitional period.

### Hurdles to be Crossed

Several hurdles had to be crossed before such an all-party conference could possibly take place.

While the Patriotic Front had indicated its willingness to follow up discussions initiated at Malta on the Anglo-American proposals, there were still serious differences on many issues, and the Front had made its absolute rejection of the internal settlement clear. Both Mugabe and Nkomo had re-affirmed the continuation of the armed struggle and the ongoing effort to transform the guerrilla alliance into a unified political and military organization. "We are talking about a unitary constitution for ZANU and ZAPU," Nkomo said in an interview in New York in mid-March. And in a meeting with US supporters, Mugabe described the Front's plans for establishing liberated zones in rural Zimbabwe. "We will be transforming our struggle into a people's war. We will no longer be fighting for the people of Zimbabwe, as we have in the past, but with them."

It seemed likely that the new plan might founder on the Anglo-American inability to bring the Front to the table on terms acceptable to London, Washington and Salisbury.

### Front-Line Pressure

The task of delivering the Patriotic Front fell to the front-line states, who met to discuss the issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe in Dar es Salaam in late March. The summit meeting urged the Patriotic Front to make significant concessions on the Anglo-American proposals. Such concessions included

accepting both a UN military force and a dominant British role during the transitional period leading to majority rule, propositions the Front had strongly opposed at Malta.

The front-line states are showing themselves increasingly eager for an end to the guerrilla wars now being fought in Zimbabwe and Namibia. There have in the past been profound differences between the attitudes to South Africa and to the armed freedom struggle displayed by individual countries within this group—with Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania evidencing strongest support for the continuing liberation struggle in southern Africa. Now all the members of the group face serious economic problems, and there is clearly a desire for a period of peace.

Zambia, for instance, would benefit quickly from the re-opening of the Rhodesian border, closed in 1973 in support of UN sanctions. With the current low price of copper, the country's major export, the economy is in serious trouble, and has recently requested over \$300 million from the International Monetary Fund. Added to the low price are problems caused by transport difficulties. Landlocked Zambia used to export via the railroad line through Rhodesia to either Mozambican or South African ports. Now it uses Dar es Salaam, but the Tanzanian port is badly congested, and the old alternatives would both speed up and reduce the expense of copper shipments.

### Stumbling Blocks

As it turned out, it was not the Patriotic Front, or the front-line states who proved intransigent, but the parties to the internal settlement.

Even before Owen and Vance began their latest African safari the interim government members had announced that they opposed the all-parties conference. Smith and Chirau's opposition was obvious; that of Sithole and Muzorewa was possibly even more intense, reflecting the fear that they might easily be supplanted by nationalist leaders with greater credentials amongst the people.

There have recently been reports that Bishop Muzorewa has been training a so-called secret army—numbered at between 100 and 500. While the supposed site of the training camp for these troops—said to be in Libya—raises some questions, it would not be surprising if the Bishop had attempted to create for himself some military back-up force. Ndabaningi Sithole, in his turn, often claims the loyalty of what he describes as the ZANU guerrillas. Whatever the truth of these claims and reports, it is certain that the Patriotic Front leaders command the loyalty of a much larger militarily trained force.

### Scant Progress

In essence the Vance-Owen mission achieved scant progress toward the goal of a generally acceptable agreement, or even an all-parties conference.

At meetings held in Dar es Salaam on April 15 and 16 the Patriotic Front confirmed acceptance during a transitional period of a UN peacekeeping force, which would police elections, and of a British resident commissioner with ultimate responsibility for law and order, defense and foreign affairs.

The Front having retreated from insistence that it be solely responsible



Robert Mugabe (left) and Joshua Nkomo at the United Nations in March

for supervision of the entire transitional process, nevertheless balked at accepting all the Anglo-American proposals in toto. Despite serious internal problems, particularly inside ZANU, the Front leadership did not appear to feel that they were negotiating from a position of great weakness. Indeed military reports from inside Zimbabwe indicate that the liberation forces are applying greater and greater pressure on the white-minority run state.

While Vance responded to the Front's negotiating proposals in some-

what muted tones of regret, David Owen immediately began referring to the Front's intransigence, while downplaying the actual intransigence being displayed by the Salisbury government. The mission's trip to South Africa, during which the Anglo-American leaders were given somewhat cool indications of support and no indications of real pressure on Smith seems to reinforce the view expressed by George Silundika, executive member of the ZAPU wing of the Front, that the drift is towards accepting the in-

ternal settlement, or at least avoiding strong short-term pressures against it.

Commenting on the events and implications of April he said: "The British were completely insensitive and unappreciative of whatever concessions we made. Each time we made a concession, they stepped backward and wanted more concessions.

President Kaunda was right last fall when he kept asking the British how they planned to remove Smith. They haven't done it, and they will not do it." □

## SOUTH AFRICA

# Buthelezi Leadership Bid Runs Into Trouble

Gunfire at the funerals of black South African leaders and activists is nothing new. Over the last few years, the South African police have acted as if they believed it was a required part of the interment services.

But the shots that punctuated the funeral of Pan-Africanist Congress leader Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe on March 11 were different. These shots were fired not by the South African police but by the personal bodyguards of Gatscha Buthelezi—government-recognized chief of the 5.4 million Zulu people, "chief minister" of the KwaZulu "homeland," and increasingly aggressive aspirant for recognition as a major leader of black resistance to apartheid.

Obviously, many of the militant young people who have been in the front lines of that struggle since the uprising in Soweto almost two years ago were unwilling to accept leadership from a man who owes his standing to the blind chance of heredity and the conscious apartheid policy of fostering tribal separation.

An angry crowd of young people chased Buthelezi away from Sobukwe's funeral. Faced with a barrage of rocks and denunciations as "Vorster's man," "government stooge," and "sellout," Buthelezi stood his ground for a few minutes and proclaimed that "I am prepared to die." Eventually, clergymen who apparently feared that the youths would take Buthelezi up on this promise persuaded him to leave. But

## Ejected from Sobukwe Funeral By Angry Militants

he was not allowed to make a dignified departure. Many of the youths chased after him, one of his bodyguards was seen brandishing a revolver, several shots were fired, and three young people were struck by bullets. The American Ambassador took the cue and followed Buthelezi from the field. Two other black leaders asked to leave were Sonny Leon and the Rev. Abel Hendrickse of the "colored" Labor Party, currently part of an alliance with Buthelezi's *Inkatha* movement. A third was M. Njisane, ambassador to South Africa from the Transkei, the first "independent" bantustan.

Afterwards, Buthelezi attempted to shrug off the incident, commenting that "It makes me proud. I remember our Lord's crucifixion. He was spat on too."

### Bid for Leadership

But the episode clearly marked a setback to Buthelezi's campaign for credibility as a leader with a broad national following. And many observers regarded the eruption of violence as an early skirmish in what is likely to be a long and bitter battle over the leadership and the direction of the struggle against apartheid.

Taking advantage of the fact that virtually all of the well-known militants

were banned or jailed last October, Buthelezi has moved quickly to build a base outside KwaZulu.

He used a government-authorized election rally in Soweto to make a pitch for support in a community that has become not only an international symbol of black resistance, but, in the words of the *Johannesburg Star*, "the cutting edge of the black future in South Africa."

After that rally, much of the western press appeared ready to concede Buthelezi a major role in that future. A reportedly enthusiastic crowd of 15,000 heard him invoke the names of jailed leaders and banned organizations who have battled against cooperation with apartheid and explain his "homeland" position as "nothing more than just local regional administration in which we are involved in order to do the best in the circumstances for the black people of KwaZulu."

While most press coverage of the event focussed on the warm reception accorded Buthelezi, a correspondent for the *Tanzanian Daily News* noted a more ominous element which foreshadowed the clash at Sobukwe's funeral. The rally "demonstrated another facet of (Buthelezi's *Inkatha*) movement—its para-military emphasis," the correspondent wrote. "The officials of the

movement were dressed in Khaki uniforms, with black berets, sporting ties and epaulettes in the *Inkatha* colors of black, green and gold—the same as those of the now-banned African National Congress.” Tactics like this, and Buthelezi’s recent praise of liberation movement leaders like Nelson Mandela seem designed to assume the militancy necessary to win popular approval without actually taking a confrontational stand on any issue of substance.

### Seeking Allies

In an effort to broaden his base during the weeks before the Soweto rally, Buthelezi worked out an alliance between *Inkatha* and two other non-white parties—the “colored” Labor Party and the “Indian” Reform Party. The alliance has announced that it will organize a national convention of all ethnic groups to map out a charter for a non-racial South African community.

After the Soweto rally, *Inkatha* leaders jubilantly assessed the large crowd and its response to Buthelezi’s call for “unity” as proof of their party’s growing national stature. Almost as jubilant were white South African business leaders, as they hailed Buthelezi’s statements opposing the drive for economic sanctions and disinvestment. Buthelezi’s views on sanctions were described by Hennie Reynders, head of the Federated Chamber of Industries, as “absolutely right,” and by his counterpart in the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce as “reflecting the general view of business leaders in South Africa.”

### Sellout

Whether they reflect the views of the interests of blacks in South Africa is another question—a question that the young militants who chased Buthelezi away from Sobukwe’s funeral are prepared to answer with an emphatic “no.”

They aren’t the only ones who regard Buthelezi as a “sellout” or who see the need for a fierce struggle against his brand of leadership.

Two weeks before the Sobukwe funeral, the external representative of the banned Black Peoples Convention, Siphso Buthelezi, interviewed by *Southern Africa* in New York, dispensed with any concession to political circumlocution in talking about the *Inkatha* leader. “People like Gatsha Buthelezi are very dangerous to us,” he stated simply. “These people are the servants, the paid agents, of the Vorster regime.”

The BPC leader denounced not only Gatsha Buthelezi’s views on sanctions,



Two faces of Gatsha Buthelezi:

‘Liberation’ leader in Soweto—“We owe it to the founding fathers of the ANC... to uphold the tradition of this titanic struggle for liberation.”

which contradict the stand taken by practically every one of the banned organizations, but his pronouncements on “unity,” which has been the stated goal of the Black Consciousness Movement.

“Basically, people like Gatsha Buthelezi still regard themselves as Zulus, Coloreds and Indians. Now, suddenly, they are coming up with the idea of unity—something we have already achieved through the Black Consciousness Movement. When we talk about black people, we aren’t talking about the color of their skin but about those who are socially, politically and economically oppressed as a group. So when these other people talk about an alliance between Zulus and Coloreds and Indians it is really a retrogressive step, since we have already recognized that we should be talking in terms of the oppressors and the oppressed.”

### Danger of Elitism

In analyzing the conflict between the Black Consciousness Movement and the *Inkatha* leadership, Siphso Buthelezi referred to the class origins of an “elite leadership” which builds from the privileges parceled out to it by the apartheid system. And he referred also to the situation in Zimbabwe.

“Some of us have learned the hard way about the viciousness of elite lead-



Socialite at an exclusive wine auction in the Cape, where guests were wined and dined, several hundred thousand rand changed hands, and the event ended with a special auction to raise funds for “our [white] boys on the border”!

ership,” he said. “The elite uses anything—lies, bribes, guns. You will see in Zimbabwe, they will use the army much more efficiently than Ian Smith. And we have to be prepared to fight just as hard to undermine this kind of opportunism.”

The same analogy was cited by *The Economist* to explain “Why they attacked Buthelezi”:

“To some extent it resembles the bitter black rivalries in Rhodesia [sic]: Chief Buthelezi wants to force the Vorster government to negotiate an internal settlement for South Africa, while the young radicals, like the Patriotic Front, want no bargaining and no compromises but an outright victory that will bring a completely new, all-black regime to power, as happened in Mozambique.”

A photograph pinned to the wall of the *Inkatha* office in Tembisa township outside Johannesburg says something about where Gatsha Buthelezi and friends will look for support in the impending struggle. Placed prominently to catch the eye of visitors is a signed and dedicated picture of the US ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young.

But in the aftermath of the Sobukwe funeral, *Inkatha* leaders may not find the dedication entirely reassuring. “The youth are not just the hope of tomorrow,” it reads, “they set the patterns of today.” □

# Plans for Planning

"Most of the time we aren't planning," said Marcelino dos Santos, Mozambique's Minister of Development and Economic Planning. "We are simply laying out a program of work." The data for genuine planning simply aren't available, he noted—nobody knows the total production of corn, for example, only that which is sold or imported.

Not even the population figures are trustworthy—while the general estimate is around 10 million Mozambicans, the Health Ministry now says, on the basis of vaccination campaigns, that there are over 11 million. It is best for us to realize, the Minister emphasized in opening the offensive for planning in 1978, that we are just at the beginning.

FRELIMO's Third Congress, in February 1977, had laid out general directives for the economy, beset by the loss of skilled technicians, the impact of the border closure with Rhodesia, and the struggle to redirect it in socialist rather than capitalist molds. A Program Coordinating Commission was set up in 1977, with responsibility for coordinating the actions of government agencies. And in enterprises around the country, both state-owned and those still under private ownership, workers' "production councils" took their first steps in planning production goals and guidelines at the factory level.

But all this fell short of adequate economic planning, as was evidenced by the inadequacy of transport and marketing facilities, particularly in the north, where in many cases peasants were unable to sell their increased agricultural production. Factories had similar problems. Because of deliberate sabotage (by owners intending to leave the country, or by other opponents of FRELIMO) or simply because of inadequate planning, essential raw materials were frequently not available on time, and machinery stood idle for lack of spare parts.

## Planning Offensive

The "offensive for planning" for 1978 began in 1977 with a call for ministries, provincial governments and enterprises to prepare their 1978 plans. The



Planning Minister Marcelino dos Santos (right) visiting the rural areas

Ministry of Development and Economic Planning focussed its energies on developing ways to coordinate all the planning. It could draw on the experience gained during the war of liberation, when FRELIMO succeeded in planning both the war and the administration of the liberated areas, in spite of a gigantic lack of trained personnel or exact statistics. FRELIMO's planners also visited several socialist countries in 1977 to study their experiences in planning—the People's Republic of China, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the USSR and the German Democratic Republic.

The result was a combination of centralization and decentralized planning, which will have its first full-scale trial in 1978. In mid-December, Marcelino dos Santos introduced the main lines of the program to the nation during a visit to Tete province. He announced that 17 strategic enterprises, including both state and privately owned firms, would be directly responsible to the Council of Ministers, Mozambique's highest administrative body.

## Workers' Planning Role

During a visit to two of the strategic enterprises in Tete province, the coal

mines of Moatize and the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project, Development Minister dos Santos stressed that the workers must take on the responsibility of involving themselves in planning. He urged that they take action through their dynamizing groups and production councils, and begin planning for personnel training and improvement of working conditions. The giant technologically advanced hydroelectric project, still run by foreign capital, might seem impossible to control, he told the Cahora Bassa workers, but organized and united we can understand it and control it.

## Planning Process

In the provincial capital of Tete, the Minister met with party and government officials to discuss the planning process. Apart from the strategic enterprises directly responsible to the Council of Ministers, some enterprises would be the responsibility of particular ministries, while others would fall under the control of the provincial governors. Each province and each ministry should work out a list of which enterprises were most strategic for their sector of the province, and present the list to the national planning body. Overlaps would have to be

*continued on page 19*

## A Note on June 16

1978 has quite possibly been the best year ever for widespread US solidarity work with the South African liberation struggle.

Perhaps because the impetus for the new activity came from rising up of the students in Soweto and a thousand other South African towns, villages and reservations, the first large group to move in the US was also the students. They have built a powerful campaign against continued US economic collaboration with apartheid in the past few months, and will have to find ways to sustain that struggle for a long time to come—because they are challenging powerful forces unlikely to crumble quickly.

Students alone cannot transform a society, either here in the US or in South Africa—and the broadening of the base is an important task in both countries. The Mobilizations being planned around June 16, the second anniversary of the so-called Soweto uprising, show encouraging indications of such a broadening. In New York, for instance, a coalition of groups is planning a series of linked demonstrations aimed at reaching out to new layers of people. Capitalizing on the fact that New is the home base of five of the six largest US banks, all of which are major lenders to South Africa, the organizers plan a major June 16 demonstration in the heart of the financial district around Wall Street. Then, because of the special need to address the black community's relationship to the issues of June 16 they plan a second day of demonstrations and

activities in the black community, with slogans like "Harlem-Soweto; Same Struggle, Same Fight" and "Bed-Stuy-Soweto; Same Struggle, Same Fight."

The first organizing call explains that an important aim is to concentrate the ties of these black communities-in-struggle. "We want to emphasize the conditions and struggles of black youth, especially because in its inception, Soweto was a rising of black youth against the conditions of their oppression. In this regard, we would speak to the massive unemployment of our black youth, police harassment and brutality, victimization by the drug traffic and the various rip-offs by the fantasy-escapism merchants, the struggles in the city colleges where open admissions, financial aids, black studies, and various other gains of students are increasingly under attack, and other such issues."

Solidarity actions on June 16 have a kind of natural logic, marking as they do recognition of the ground-swell of popular resistance, suddenly expressed in an explosion of great force. Such days occur in the history of all oppressed people, they are not organized, though they often reflect the existence of organization among the people. In isolation they will not win freedom, but they stand as symbols, as markers of the uncrushed human spirit, of the refusal to accept slavery, of the determination to win freedom. These are precious days—and they can be used to build the struggle they symbolize.

# news briefs

 **SOUTH AFRICA'S** Pretoria Twelve trial—the longest trial under the terrorism act so far—has come to an end with the conviction of 6 of the 12 accused. The rest were acquitted. They were all charged with being members of the banned African National Congress and plotting to overthrow the government since 1962, as well as recruiting guerrillas for training in Mozambique and the Soviet Union.

The convicted are: Mosima Gabriel Sexwale, 24 (who in addition to the main charge was convicted of throwing a grenade into a police vehicle); Naledi Tsike, 21; Lele Jacob Motaung, 44; Simon Samuel Mohlanyaneng, 23; Martin Ramokgadi, 67; Jacob Goanaka Seathole, 47.

The only woman among the twelve—Pauline Mohale—was acquitted, as were Petrus Nchabeleng, 50; Nelson Letsaba Diale, 41; Michael Ngubeni, 42; Elias Tieho Msongo, 24; and Joseph Gqabi, 48.

Sentences were not passed at the time of conviction.

Despite the South African government's moves to do away with many petty apartheid restrictions, it is not clear whether the \$50 million opera house, presently under construction in Pretoria, will admit mixed audiences or not.

If the Transvaal provincial administrator has his way, apartheid will prevail. There is no need to admit blacks, administrator Sybrand van Niekerk insists, because they don't like opera. "They do war dances," he said.

The so-called independent Transkei has employed the services of New York lawyer, Bernard Katzen, as its counsel and representative. According to a notice sent out by the lawyer, "the duties, cheerfully, even eagerly, assumed will encompass demonstrating to those concerned that despite

popular misconceptions, the Republic of the Transkei is an independent, sovereign nation and entitled to recognition as such."

"South Africa" will cease to exist if the Minister of Plural Relations (formerly Bantu Affairs) has his way. He is recommending that the name be changed to fit the future concept of South Africa. The rationale: once South Africa has divested itself of all the black "homelands" it will no longer be—both politically and geographically—"South Africa." Hence the need for a new name. Those under consideration are the Republic of Good Hope and Azania—the name that the banned Pan Africanist Congress has adopted for the country.

The plan calls for a redefinition of South African citizenship. Africans will have citizenship in one or other of the "independent" bantustans, while whites, "Coloureds" and Indians will be citizens of the new state. Travel documents and passports would be issued in the name of the "Commonwealth" or "Confederation of Southern Africa" to facilitate travel abroad.

A French consortium signed an agreement in February in Umtata, capital of the Transkei bantustan, to build a harbor in the territory.

Two undisclosed United States suppliers to the South African electronics industry have warned that they can no longer deliver equipment to South African customers for fear that if the goods are passed on to the police or defense force, their export licenses to other parts of the world may be revoked. "There's a bit of a panic going on," commented a South African electronics executive. The decisions of the two US companies are seen by the South Africans as the beginning of a disturbing trend.

Profits still come first. Control Data Corporation, one of the largest US computer manufacturing companies, is planning to stay in South Africa despite increasing political pressure.

"The South African branch is the most profitable in the group outside America. South Africa is a growing market. There are greater opportunities here than anywhere else," the

managing director, Ian Jones, said in Johannesburg recently.

Two white Johannesburg women have been given prison sentences for refusing to testify in court about their visits to Winnie Mandela in her place of banishment. Ms. Mandela was charged last year with breaking her banning order and given a 6-month sentence, suspended for four years, for breaking her banning order.

73-year-old Helen Joseph was sentenced to two weeks, reduced from 4 months. Ms. Joseph has been very active in anti-apartheid work since the 1940's, for which she was banned for nine years. Her banning order was lifted in 1971 while recovering from an operation for cancer. She has since recovered from the disease, but suffers from a heart ailment.

The second woman is Barbara Waite, a 42-year-old nurse who was sentenced to two months, reduced from one year. She is appealing.

Two other women, Jackie Bosman and Ilona Kleinschmidt, had their 12 months sentences set aside because of technicalities.

The apartheid regime has a firm friend in Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz). He recently paid a ten-day visit—his third—to South Africa and roundly criticized the Carter Administration's Africa policy focusing mainly on Andrew Young.

"Andy Young speaks only for Andy Young, although his position gives his words more credence than they deserve," Goldwater told a group of mainly Afrikaans-speaking university students. "Most Americans don't know why Carter tolerates him," he said. "If left to a vote, he would be ousted by an overwhelming landslide." Maintaining that Young does not enjoy popularity even in his home state of Georgia, he added, "I don't think many of the black people even look on Andy Young as a black man. Have you seen him? He's not very black."

He assured his audience that unless "we get the wrong man in," a Republican administration would lift the arms embargo.

He was kinder to Carter than to Young. "I think the man acts from very sincere motives," he said, "but I don't think he understands."

 **THE WAR IN NAMIBIA** is intensifying according to a SWAPO war communique issued in Dar es Salaam in mid-March which reports that 100 South African soldiers were killed and six military vehicles were captured by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) between December 1977 and January 1978. The communique details the actions by PLAN and the number of South African soldiers killed per action.

On March 12, SWAPO presented a captured South African soldier to journalists in Luanda. He was identified as 24-year-old Johan van der Mesch, who was captured on February 8 at Elundo in Northern Namibia during an action in which nine South African troops were killed.

 **THE RHODESIAN REGIME** despite the censorship on news of internal fighting in the country, admitted that troops patrolling an area in the south-east came under ZIPA fire. The communique claimed that "in the ensuing firefight 17 tribespeople (Africans) were killed." One white member of the Rhodesian troops was also reported dead.

In early February Rhodesian troops entered Zambia and raided guerrilla staging camps in the Gwembe Valley. Their claim that more than 50 Patriotic Front guerrillas died in the attack has been denied both by the Front's joint leader, Nkomo, and the Zambian Government.

However, an estimated 11 people have been killed by landmines which were planted by the Rhodesian forces before they withdrew. Eight Zambian soldiers and three Zambian civilians died in the explosions.

Smith's Rhodesian troops crossed Botswana's border to fight nationalist guerrillas and Botswana soldiers. The Rhodesians claim that they followed the guerrilla's tracks into Botswana in the Kazungula area, caught up with them, and began to fight. They withdrew when they discovered that the guerrillas were reinforced by Botswana defense forces.

Botswana authorities describe the clash as one of the worst incidents in-

volving regular forces from both countries—15 Botswana soldiers and two civilians were killed—and they have reacted by closing the border post.

Dissatisfaction with their treatment has brought to light the fact that there are at least 70 to 80 French mercenaries in the Rhodesian Army. One of four deserters who passed through Johannesburg disclosed the number of mercenaries and described increasing dissent, in particular the mercenaries' resentment that the Rhodesians do not announce the names of their colleagues when they are killed.

Rhodesian Justice Minister Squires declined to tell Parliament how many people had been executed in Rhodesia since it seized independence from Britain in November 1965.

Hangings are not announced. Relatives of an executed person are only informed that he or she has gone to the gallows if they inquire. Reporters' queries are not answered.

According to informed sources 173 people were executed between 1965 and November 1969. Between May 1973 and April 1975—when the Government decreed that henceforth executions should be kept secret—29 people were hanged. According to the International Defence and Aid Committee in London, 58 people were executed between April 1975 and October 1976.

In 1976, 64 people had appeals against death sentences rejected; in 1977 there were 49 appeals rejected. Amnesty International has said 90 people were executed in 1977.

The whites grab it all in Rhodesia, according to a recent ILO report. The whites (5 percent of the population) received 62 percent of total wages and collected 90 percent of company profits. Whites earn an average of 11 times more than Africans, work less hours, and enjoy many privileges.

Discriminatory education means that 2.6 million Africans over the age of 17 have received no education. In 1976-77 the outlay for each African pupil was \$45.9, for each white, \$531. African trade unions are curbed in the industrial sector, while domestic and plantation employment is still subject to a 1901 Masters and Servants Act,

which imposes severe conditions. The act was abolished in Britain in 1872!

 **ANGOLA'S STABILITY** continues to be threatened: UNITA is to be the beneficiary of a secret \$20 million fund that has been established in an attempt to destabilize MPLA and rid the area of what the contributors feel to be undue Russian and Cuban influence in the area. The fund's backers are an undisclosed source in France, as well as the governments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and one other unnamed Arab country—thought to be Kuwait. The Arab countries are providing the bulk of the money.

 **THE ISRAELI** government's close ties to South Africa have come under sharp attack from organized labor in Israel and from the World Zionist Congress which met in Jerusalem on February 21.

Histadrut, the Israeli labor federation, has decided to dissolve its partnership with South African interests in two investment companies, one in metals, the other in chemicals. The decision was reportedly made in order to preserve the federation's good relations with third world countries.

Histadrut owns Koor, a huge holding company, with interests in some 6000 enterprises in Israel and abroad. Koor had previously been reported as associated through its South African subsidiary, Iskook Steel Services, with Iscor, the government-controlled steel company. Koor Chemicals was reported to be associated with Sentrachem of South Africa in the chemical industry there.

 **THE NORDIC COUNTRIES** have adopted a program that outlines actions against the apartheid regime, the most far-reaching that any western nation has adopted to date. The program was endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark in early March, and includes a ban on new investments and negotiations with Nordic enterprises aimed at cutting down their production in South Africa. It also requests an end to athletic and cultural ties, and increased support to refugees, liberation movements and victims of apartheid.

# update

## South Africa Steps Up Namibia Campaign

South African forces mounted an airborne assault near the southern Angolan mining town of Cassinga in early May—a locale in which the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, operates guerrilla training camps and refugee centers.

"The South African attack inside Angola strengthens SWAPO's case," the group's UN representative, Theo-Ben Gurirab told *Africa News*. "It is a good illustration of why SWAPO has not agreed to South African troops being stationed in northern Namibia during an election campaign." Gurirab said that large numbers of noncombatant women, children and old people were in the Cassinga camps at the time of the South African action.

SWAPO is pressing its case in talks with the five Western members of the UN Security Council, arguing that the UN peacekeeping role envisaged in a proposed Namibia settlement must be upgraded.

South Africa announced in late April that it had accepted the Western plan for a settlement in Namibia, on condition that a complete cessation of SWAPO guerrilla activity precede South Africa's troop reduction to 1500.

SWAPO reacted cautiously to the South African announcement, and its position may well harden following the South African raid into southern Angola.

## Muzorewa Under Pressure To Quit Smith Government

Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) is under mounting pressure to quit Rhodesia's new interim government, following the firing of black Justice Minister Byron Hove.

Hove lost his job when he refused to retract remarks concerning the need for restructuring the Rhodesian police and promoting Africans in that branch of the civil service.

Muzorewa has denied taking part in the decision to dismiss Hove, although Executive Council decisions are supposed to be unanimous. Calls for the

UANC to withdraw from the government were reinforced by some 1500 demonstrators who gathered outside the UANC headquarters.

## Mugabe Denies Front's Intransigence

Patriotic Front co-leader Robert Mugabe charged recently that Britain and the US had deliberately misrepresented the outcome of the late April Dar es Salaam talks on Zimbabwe.

Mugabe told reporters in Dar that the negotiations, which were attended by the American and British foreign ministers along with representatives of the Front, had resulted in important agreements concerning the transition plan of the Anglo-American proposals. Mugabe said the two sides worked out suitable arrangements concerning the powers of the British Resident Commissioner and the role of UN troops.

Despite these advances, Mugabe said, the Anglo-American team—and particularly Britain—was unwilling to issue a communique that reflected the nature of the agreement. The ZANU leader charged that the final communique made the Front appear intransigent, by stressing its refusal to adopt the entire Anglo-American plan without reservation. Mugabe said Britain feared a more positive statement because it might "prejudice their case vis-a-vis the so-called internal settlement."

## South Africa's New Black Challenge

Less than six months after South Africa outlawed the Black People's Convention and seventeen other anti-apartheid organizations, a new group has sprung up to claim the mantle of black consciousness. Called AZAPO (for Azania People's Organization), it will focus on rallying black workers to press for changes in the system of white rule.

Over 60 delegates attended AZAPO's founding conference. Three of the movement's leaders were promptly detained by police, according to the BBC.

AZAPO's formation comes at a time when South African authorities are in-

creasingly worried about their ability to hold at bay the forces which have brought black rule to most of its neighbors and guerrilla war to the remaining outposts of white control—Rhodesia and Namibia.

South Africa faces attack from all sides, Defense Minister Piet W. Botha told Parliament recently. "It is a psychological onslaught, an economic one, a military onslaught—a total onslaught."

## US Looks to Kaunda Visit

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda will reportedly make an official visit to Washington this spring to discuss southern African problems with US policymakers.

According to some administration officials, the US still hopes to persuade Zimbabwe nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo to join the Rhodesian transitional government and Washington feels that Kaunda may be able to woo Nkomo away from his alliance with Robert Mugabe of ZANU.

Previous Western hopes for a split in the Patriotic Front have gone unfulfilled, and Nkomo aides say it won't happen now.

## Lobbyists Peddle Rhodesian Settlement

Right-wing lobbyists are active in Washington and other US cities trying to win American government support for Rhodesia's 'internal settlement.'

Among the most prominent of these apologists for Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith's new power-sharing arrangement are publisher Robin Moore and lobbyist Neville Romain.

Moore, who wrote *The Green Berets* and *The French Connection*, has for some time operated an unofficial American embassy in the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury. There Moore provides beer, a place to relax, and news of home for the American mercenaries and other foreign soldiers who comprise a significant proportion of Rhodesia's armed forces.

But several months ago Moore moved his base of operations to the US, where he has founded the Crippled Eagle Foundation to promote the internal settlement.

Moore has a loose working alliance at this point with Neville Romain, who works for Rhodesian nationalist leader Ndabaningi Sithole. Romain says he is trying to build a broad US coalition to back what he calls an "independent Zimbabwe where I hope to make my home."

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worked out by discussion. Each province would, moreover, set up a coordinating planning commission, and set priorities.

At the first national planning conference in March, representatives from the provincial governments and from strategic enterprises began to pool their results and reconcile differences. The conference also served to establish a National Planning Commission.

### Railways In Trouble

More detailed reports from the conference are not yet available, but some idea of the problems Mozambican planners must cope with can be seen in the difficulties reported by Mozambique Railways (Caminhos de Ferro de Mocambique), which employs 40,000 workers. Cargo handled in the southern port of Maputo, which serves South Africa and Swaziland, continued to decline from 1976 to 1977, although not as drastically as in the 1975-1976 period following the closure of the Rhodesian border. A major accident and poor maintenance at the mineral loading docks in Matola were partly

responsible. But the number of locomotives available had dropped between 1975 and 1977 from 80 to 46; switchengines were down from 30 to 15.

There were similar problems on the northern Nacala line, which serves Malawi and Mozambique's northern provinces. Cargo handled in the port was up, some 70,000 tons above the previous high in 1974. But out of a stock of 33 steam locomotives and 7 Diesels, 22 steam engines were out of service. The repair shops had lost 9 of their 11 qualified workers by 1977. The truck fleet, which carries goods from the rail line to other areas in the interior, is composed mostly of pre-1960 models, frequently in need of repair.

The loss of foreign technical personnel and the deterioration of the capital stock revealed in this report on the railways are common problems for most of Mozambique's enterprises. Turning the situation around will require planning and coordination at the enterprise level, determining the imported goods necessary to keep the machinery working, training replacements for the departed personnel, and

substantial ingenuity in "making do" when what is needed is not available.

Most important of all is the mobilization of Mozambique's human resources, the workers themselves. There have already been striking increases in production following nationalization or the organization of production councils in a variety of enterprises, including a coconut plantation in Zambezia, a construction firm in Cabo Delgado and factories in Maputo and Beira. On the railways the organization of collective management at different levels has begun to create mechanisms for identifying and dealing with problems.

Mozambique's "plans for planning" at the national level depend, above all, on keeping in motion and coordinating the planning capacity of Mozambicans at diverse levels, from the factory or cooperative farm through the provincial governments, up to the national ministries. It is in this effort, rather than in producing a "plan" which will look good on paper but have little relation to reality, that Mozambique's development energies are being concentrated this year. □

## NAMIBIA


# West Anxious for Settlement

During the past two months, American diplomats have worked feverishly to renew negotiations on Namibia. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's well-publicized trip to Africa followed similar efforts by UN Ambassador Andrew Young and his assistant Donald McHenry. Jimmy Carter, who became the first American president to visit black Africa, voiced his desire to see an early settlement in Namibia.

Despite these activities and the corresponding increased news coverage, nothing of substance has changed on the diplomatic front.

The two stalling points remain the same: the status of the port city, Walvis Bay, and the size and placement of South African troops.

SWAPO has insisted all along that Walvis Bay—the only developed outlet to the world and a vital part of the country—be re-integrated into an independent Namibia. The five Western powers that have led negotiations over Namibia maintain the position that Walvis Bay should be shelved until South Africa has granted independence.



Formidable South African presence in Namibia

South Africa is determined to keep its troops in Namibia to protect itself against future incursions by liberation forces across the long border between

the two territories. The apartheid regime also cannot be happy about the effect the inevitable upsurge of popular militancy once there are no longer

troops to prop up the puppet leaders would have on its own "tribal homelands."

SWAPO has limited the number of South African troops it will accept prior to independence to 1,500, on the condition that they occupy certain areas of the country and are not used to prevent the free movement of SWAPO.

These stumbling blocks are not new, and while the press has speculated that SWAPO is willing to change its position, there has been no concrete evidence to support this.

There are indications that the front-line states have placed SWAPO under increased pressure to accept the settlement proposals outlined by the five Western powers. South Africa, however, has not been subjected to similar pressure by the five.

### Resistance Continues

Inside the country, the situation has been far from static. Mounting repression over the past months has resulted in the escalation of frustration, and resistance, on the part of Namibians themselves.

For many weeks, Katatura Township, outside Windhoek, had been the scene of violent clashes in which at least 25 people died and over 100 were wounded. The issues at stake were fundamentally political and resulted from the antagonism between the supporters of the South Africa-created Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) on one side, and supporters of SWAPO on the other.

SWAPO charges that the clashes, labelled as ethnically based by the press and the South Africans, were instigated by South African provocateurs to justify stricter security measures. It points out that the violence claimed the lives of 23 Ovambos—traditionally SWAPO supporters—and only two DTA Herero supporters.

The clashes culminated in a general strike, when 60 per cent of the work force stayed home, leaving the city of Windhoek without vital services. The strike ended after South Africa appointed Administrator General Martinus Steyn, accompanied by an armed police guard, visited the townships and met with 5,000 SWAPO supporters to hear their grievances.

It is against the backdrop of this violence that the assassination of Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo took place on March 27. He was shot by two men as he walked towards his grocery store in Katatura Township. South African officials immediately pinned responsibility for the killing on SWAPO, argu-



Chief Kapuuo (center) with members of his Turnhalle delegation

ing that the bullets were from a Russian machine pistol. This has been denied by SWAPO.

Chief Kapuuo was the most prominent Namibian "leader" backed by the South African regime. Hailed in the West as the only hope for heading a moderate independent government in Namibia, he led the Herero delegation to the Turnhalle talks and played a major role at the conference. He backed South Africa's so-called internal settlement from the start.

Kapuuo was not popular among all the people of Namibia. His only base of support came from the Hereros, and resulted more from his status as their chief than from his political views.

The killing of Kapuuo ignited more clashes. Again they were depicted in South Africa and the West as "tribally instigated."

His murderer has not yet been found although accusations have come from all sides. But regardless of the speculation, what is clear is that the murder was not an isolated act perpetuated in the midst of peace. It was a dramatic point in disturbances that have been going on for some time and that are likely to continue until Namibia is truly independent.

### DTA Protected

The DTA, now led by white Namibian Dirk Mudge, who also played a prominent role in the Turnhalle talks, has begun to campaign for the yet-to-be-scheduled elections. On its side are the tens of thousands of South African police and army troops who provide protection whenever necessary.

SWAPO, while a legal political organization on paper, can rarely hold a rally without police harassment.

In areas where SWAPO has strong support—northern Namibia, for instance—candidates must fly to rallies in chartered helicopters (costing more than \$1000 per day) to avoid landmines and ambushes. A mineproof vehicle has been purchased for \$1500 to make necessary overland trips.

DTA rallies are held under the armed protection of the Ovambo Home Guard, a police force recruited by South Africa from among the Ovambo people. In February, Toivo Shiyagaya, the South African-appointed Minister of Health in Ovamboland, was shot to death at a political rally.

Meanwhile the war is escalating as SWAPO intensifies its military actions.

SWAPO has given South Africa some harsh blows. Twelve South African soldiers on the average die each week in the north of Namibia. A SWAPO communique issued in mid-March reported that 100 South African soldiers were killed and six military vehicles captured by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia between December 1977 and January 1978.

Among South African soldiers, morale is low, and the number of deserters increases steadily. As many as 4,000 men failed to appear for military service last year, according to deserter projects. Some deserters are living in England and Holland, others are in Botswana waiting for arrangements to be made so they can move on.

A South African soldier, 24-year-old Johan van der Mersch, was presented

at a press conference in Luanda on February 19. He was captured ten days earlier at Elundo in northern Namibia during an action in which nine South African troops were killed.

Responding to questions from SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, he indicated that 55,000 South African soldiers, as well as West German, Italian and Portuguese mercenaries, are fighting in northern Namibia against SWAPO. SWAPO has offered to exchange him for SWAPO prisoners-of-war.

The UN Council for Namibia emphasized the escalating war in a state-

ment it issued after travelling to Africa and speaking with African leaders and SWAPO:

"South Africa has, over the last few months, embarked on a reinforcement of its already huge army in Namibia in preparation for a major confrontation with the liberation forces led by SWAPO. South Africa's activities involve a huge military build-up within Namibia, including the shipment into Namibia of large numbers of tanks, large quantities of ammunition and construction of army barracks."

The five Western powers are anxious that a settlement is reached as soon

as possible. They are worried that Cuban troops, which so successfully assisted the MPLA in Angola just across the border, could become involved in the fighting. Hence the visits from top US officials to try to influence the situation.

But as long as the Western powers refuse to exercise real pressure on South Africa—in the form of threatened economic sanctions—South Africa need not heed their suggestions. The Western powers' refusal to recognize SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia will inevitably lead SWAPO to continue its armed struggle. □

## Victims of Torture Speak Out

South Africa has made torture a commonplace in Namibia today. Even those arrested for non-political reasons are likely to find themselves tortured during interrogation. But the most brutal methods are reserved for the political detainees.

Rauna Shimbode was just twenty-four when she was picked up in Windhoek, where she worked as an assistant nurse. Her crime, the police captain who made the arrest informed her, was being a friend of the terrorists.

Her torture began soon after, when she was moved to Oshakati in Ovamboland. An African policeman named Joseph questioned her first, talking to her in Ovambo, her native language. When he was dissatisfied with the answers, he blindfolded her and took her to another room, where, he assured her, they make people talk.

Ruana Shimbode could see nothing that was going on around her, but from the voices of the other policemen, she gathered they were white. They spoke Afrikaans.

After placing a block of ice in her mouth and gagging her, they hung her by the wrists from the bars of a window so that her feet dangled well above the ground. Many questions were put to her and she answered those few that she could.

But her interrogators were not satisfied. Her protestations that she did not know the answers to the rest did little to satisfy them. Suddenly she felt a terrible pain and shaking and trembling through one side of her face and down the side of her body. The agony went on for one or two minutes and then suddenly stopped.

If she didn't talk, the voices warned her, they would kill her. So she an-

swered yes to all of their questions, although she knew she was not telling the truth. Anything to avoid the repetition of the torment. But they were still not satisfied. Once again, the pain and trembling and shaking convulsed her body, this time on the other side.

The electric shock was applied four times while she hung from her aching wrists. After about two hours she finally passed out. She regained consciousness to find herself lying on the floor, and being doused with cold water. By the time her blindfold was removed, her tormentors had disappeared leaving behind Joseph who immediately told her to get up and clean the floor because she had urinated.

Shimbode was then taken to a cell and locked up. She awoke many hours later to find that she was hemorrhaging profusely. Before her arrest she had presumed she was three months pregnant, although she had not yet had a test. She asked to see a doctor who prescribed an antibiotic but did nothing further. She continued to hemorrhage for 15 days.

She was kept in solitary confinement for another week, then subjected to one more day of interrogation—this time without assault. Then back to solitary confinement for two weeks before being released on May 10, 1977. No charges were brought against her.

After being told that she was free to go, she was driven by a white policeman and Joseph to the outskirts of Oshakati and told to get out of the car. She was five hundred miles from Windhoek and in the middle of nowhere.

"But how can I get to Windhoek?" she asked.

"Ask Sam Nujoma," came the reply, and the car drove off.

She managed to get a ride back to Windhoek where she saw a doctor. Months later, still under treatment, she continues to suffer the effects of her torture. Her body has not yet regained its fertility. It possibly never will.

### Torture Documented: Barbarism

This is one of the many accounts of torture which is documented in a booklet, *Torture—A Cancer in our Society*, recently published in London by the Catholic Institute for International Relations. It was prepared by Fr. Heinz Hunke, Father Provincial of a Catholic Order in Namibia and Justin Ellis, an Anglican layman on the staff of the Christian Center in Windhoek. Not surprisingly, it was immediately banned by the South African authorities.

The document does not set out to support SWAPO, and is cautious in its approach to "terrorism." "This paper does not pretend that the victims speaking [in] these pages are the only victims of terrorism in this country," it states. However, despite their caution, it provides a forceful account of the widespread practice of torture in Namibia.

The writers are not ambivalent in their condemnation of the South Africa regime. "But if what is alleged in this paper is true," the authors continue, "then the present system of law and order which legitimizes itself as western, democratic and christian, is just another form of ill-concealed barbarism."

The introduction goes on to stress that torture is not an isolated event.

"Institutionalized torture means that this practice is not casual or occasional, but that it is a generalized practice, so that people who are arrested under particular circumstances, face a considerable probability that they will be tortured. . . . [It is] precisely this form of torture [which is] proliferating in Namibia."

The substance of the 67-page booklet is devoted to the affidavits of over fifteen people who were tortured in the hands of the South African police. These statements are a powerful indictment of the apartheid administration which has shown itself determined to crush all resistance, in order to maintain its control of the territory, either directly or by puppet leaders who may nominally take control in the future.

The following excerpts from affidavits of three other ex-detainees—a student, a village headman and a Ovambo peasant—speak for themselves:

**HOSEA MBANDEKA** was a student at the Ongwediva College in Ovambo when, in October 1977, a dispute between the students and the administration broke out over the wearing of African dress and the administration's use of corporal punishment. In the course of the dispute, all the students left the college and went home.

Mr. Mbandeka was arrested at the end of October, and severely tortured: "I was . . . made to sit down on a chair and my hands were tied behind the chair. My feet were also tied together. A rope was also put around my body, securing me to the back of the chair. An object was then put against my forehead, above my left eye, and something which felt like a cloth, was then wound around my head, pressing the object against my forehead. Water was then thrown onto my head and forehead on the side where the object had been placed. My trousers were also pulled down to my knees and something which felt like a clip, attached to my genitals. . . . I then heard what sounded like the whine of a machine and felt a sudden violent burning sensation in my head. . . . I could not breathe. I felt confused and frightened and felt that my head was breaking into fragments. At the same time, I felt an agonizing burn in my testicles. This burning pain ran through my legs, and also went into my stomach. My whole body was jumping. . . . I was burnt again and again, the officer insisting that I knew the names of the people who had set alight the college.

"Realizing that I was simply unable to give the information they wanted, the officer questioned me as to the identity of those students who had led the walk-out. I said that that had been a decision of the students taken as a whole. I was also asked for the names of the men [which the interrogator said, came from Angola, and told the students to walk out. I knew nothing about that and that again led to my being burnt."

Mbandeka was released on November 16, 1977 and allowed to go home. He was not charged with any crime.

**NAFTALI SHIGWEDHA** is a village headman who was arrested by a patrol of 20 policemen in armored cars in early March 1977. One of the members of his village, who was commonly known to be mentally retarded, had accused him of killing an ox to feed SWAPO guerrillas. Shigwedha later learned that this accusation had been made under torture.

This is how he describes his torture: "Upon my having denied the allegations made against me, the White policeman grabbed a piece of heavy electric cable with which he then repeatedly beat me all over my body with great violence and force. The blows rained down on me to such an extent that I cannot even guess at how many times I was hit. . . .

"Having been blindfolded, I was made to sit on a chair where I was forced forward into a crouching position with my arms between my legs. Prior to this my wrists had been tied. . . . Having previously been told to undress, and whilst I was hanging in this almost bat-like position, a piece of cloth was put into my mouth and tied at the nape of my neck. A tub was placed under me and water poured all over me.

I then had electric wires attached to each of my temples and was given electric shocks. Owing to the indescribable pain of having been shocked, I cannot coherently describe the extreme pain I suffered and words are insufficient to describe the feeling of one's body being torn apart."

Three weeks later, Shigwedha was released with no charges placed against him.

**LAMEK ITHETE** is a 51 year old Ovambo farmer living in the north of Namibia. He was arrested in early May 1977, questioned about his sale of SWAPO membership cards, although SWAPO is a legal organization in Namibia, and his relations with other SWAPO branches.

He was then tortured. This is how he described his torture.


"I was told to stand against a plank to which my body was tied. My arms were then tied to an iron rod which was behind me. My arms were outstretched, and once tied, I could not move away. . . .

"A device was then applied to the left of my stomach and then another to the right of my stomach and then I suddenly felt a frightening, burning pain which went through my body, causing me to shake uncontrollably. I screamed. The pain was burning and swift and my body quivered.

"The pain was unbearable and seemed to go on for ever. My whole body seemed to be burning."

Ithete was released in late July of the same year. No charges were filed against him.

*Torture—A Cancer in our Society* is published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL, in cooperation with the British Council of Churches. Copies can be obtained through CIIR at 50p each (about \$1.00) plus postage. □



## Brzezinski Says No End To Nuclear Ties With Pretoria

In a letter to the Congressional Black Caucus last December, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski said that the US could not support a UN prohibition against co-operation with South Africa in "peaceful uses of atomic energy." He argued that "a complete break now would put South Africa on an irrevocable 'go-it-alone' path." Brzezinski added, however, that the US will not ship any nuclear material or technology to South Africa "until we have clear assurances . . . that [South Africa] will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit its nuclear facilities to effective safeguards." The Administration has not

# Olin Convicted of Violating Arms Embargo

Olin Corporation has won the dubious distinction of being the first US corporation to be charged and sentenced for breaking the US arms embargo against South Africa.

Olin pleaded no contest—a tacit admission of guilt—to a March 14 federal indictment claiming that the company conspired to illegally ship arms to South Africa and falsified export applications for 3,200 firearms and 20 million rounds of ammunition.

All such applications must be approved by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control. Arms exports to South Africa have been illegal since 1963.

Olin was fined \$510,000 for its actions.

According to the 21-count indictment, Olin's Winchester division collaborated with an arms dealer in South Africa who solicited orders from retail dealers.

The South African dealer then made arrangements with dealers in other countries to order the weapons. These were then transhipped to South Africa.

One advantage to Olin of entering a no contest plea is that it eliminates the possibility of a potentially embarrassing trial.

Olin has placed the blame on "certain Winchester salespeople" no longer with the company and has claimed that higher-ups in the company knew nothing of the scheme. This contention

seems open to doubt given the size and sophistication of the operation as well as the fact that it continued over at least four and one-half years between 1971 and 1975.

No individuals were named in the Olin indictment, but it has been reported that some of the individuals involved have testified before a grand jury under a grant of immunity.

In an article in the *New Haven Advocate* in 1976 which broke the Olin story, Marcia Biederman revealed the names of three Olin employees who had been terminated in connection with the arms-selling operation.

In that article, she also named two arms dealers in South Africa known to have done business with Olin.

acted on a two-year-old application for the sale of highly enriched uranium for South Africa's testing facility.

Brzezinski's letter came in response to twelve policy recommendations on South Africa that the Black Caucus put to President Carter after the October crackdown in South Africa. Brzezinski did not respond to recommendations to end Export-Import Bank financing or tax credits, saying instead that these matters were still being considered as part of an economic policy review.

Flatly rejecting the Caucus' proposal for a moratorium on US-South African exchange programs, Brzezinski insisted that "lines of communication" should be left open.

## More US Planes For South Africa

The Carter Administration has decided to continue selling airplanes to South Africa despite growing opposition in Congress. The Commerce Department has given the go-ahead to manufacturers including Cessna and Piper to sell 70 to 80 light aircraft, worth \$3.5 million, to civilian purchasers, according to the General Aircraft Manufacturers Association.

Twenty-one members of Congress immediately protested the decision. In a telegram to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, they noted that these aircraft "can be easily used in military or paramilitary operations... This loophole must be plugged."

The Administration has attached some additional conditions to the latest sale in the hopes of avoiding the criticism it received after permitting the sale of six similar planes last December. None of the planes may be used "in connection with" the South African military or by the civilian Air Commando units. South African distributors will have to inform the US Embassy of the names of the ultimate purchasers before any sale can be made.

Congressional opponents and legal experts charge that these new restrictions cannot fulfill the terms of the five-month-old UN mandatory arms embargo and effectively prevent South Africa from using the equipment for military purposes. The Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law notes that a provision of the South African Defense Act No. 44, which allows the government to commandeer any civilian planes for military use, would clearly supersede the American restrictions.

Liberals in the House of Representatives are now pushing a new bill, HR 10722, to prohibit the export to South Africa of all aircraft, aircraft parts, helicopters and so-called nonmilitary arms (including shot guns and billy clubs). In addition, the bill would give either house of Congress thirty days to veto the sale of any other goods, such as computers, which require a validate license. This move is spearheaded by Rep. Cardiss Collins, who introduced the resolution condemning South Africa's crackdown on black activists last October which was supported by 80 percent of the House.

In a related development, the general manager of IBM in South Africa, J.F. Clarke, told the *Johannesburg Star* that IBM will continue to provide maintenance service, including the provision of parts, to the military and police. State Department sources indicate that, after a heated internal debate, the provision for a 60-day grace period for maintenance work was included in the new arms embargo regulations released in February. These sources say IBM and other manufacturers will be able to continue to provide whatever maintenance they can after the two-month period, but will no longer be able to provide spare parts.

## Embarrassing Evidence

There is some evidence to suggest that the US government, as well as Olin, preferred that there be no trial because of potentially embarrassing revelations.

Biederman, in a recent article in the *Advocate*, noted that while Mozambique, Spain, Crete and Austria were named in the indictment as transshipment points for Olin arms, West Germany and Botswana were conspicuously absent, despite the fact that they were among transshipment points widely discussed in Olin circles.

She quoted James Pickerstein, chief assistant US Attorney in Connecticut, who has been in charge of the investigation, as saying in response to a query on why the two were left out, "I wouldn't want to go into that."

## Turning Blind Eye

Biederman commented, "Possibly Botswana is omitted because it would embarrass the State Department to concede that it granted licenses to ship commercial munitions to a landlocked country which receives goods at South African ports and where there is no market for such goods."

The question of the US government's role was also raised by Biederman in her 1976 article.

She noted that Olin 1974 export figures showed a dramatic increase in shipments to the Canary Islands—to \$156,000 from \$17,000 for arms and to \$250,000 from \$35,000 for ammunition—enough, presumably, to have raised questions at the State Department.

She further raised the point in discussing the case of Walter S. Plowman, a former employee of Colt Industries, Inc., who pled guilty in 1976 to illegal arms sales as a result of earlier investigations of the South African arms trade.

Plowman's attorney charged at that time that the State Department had "acquiesced" in allowing the Colt sales, a charge that the government, through Pickerstein, denied.

The only person whom Plowman implicated besides himself was his immediate supervisor, Jack Fiedler, who had left the company. Fiedler had worked for Winchester before moving over to Colt.

## Stockholder Suits

It is possible that more information on the Olin situation may come out of two stockholder suits filed in federal court in Manhattan subsequent to the federal action.

One seeks damages of \$4.8 million on the grounds that Olin's illegal actions in the arms case and in another involving chemicals dumping in upstate New York caused the price of the stock to drop.

The other, also seeking damages, but of an indeterminate sum, claims that Olin falsely inflated the value of its stock by misrepresenting how well the company was doing—thanks to the illegal arms sales. It notes that Olin's annual reports showed substantial increases in sales and earnings during the years of the illegal sales, after a period of poor performance, and credited the improvement to good management.

Olin has repeatedly stressed the importance of the Winchester group to overall performance, the suit charges, citing a 1975 annual report statement that "Achieving satisfactory earnings from Winchester is Olin management's top priority objective."

## Fine Ordered

The judge in the Olin case, which was heard in New Haven, set a precedent by ordering Olin to pay \$510,000—the maximum fine—in the form of contributions to charity programs in the town area. "The financial fine is not

enough," he said. "These violations could reflect on the credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world. As a result, every citizen of this country suffers."

The fine, of course, can conveniently be written off as a tax-deductible contribution. In any event, the amount is hardly of consequence to Olin, whose total sales in 1977 topped \$1.47 billion, about one-fifth of which came from Winchester's operations.

Various groups are attempting to raise the issue that at least a portion of the fine ought to go to those who have been most affected by Olin's action—the blacks in southern Africa who die daily at the hands of the military and police.

As a footnote to the Olin case, Biederman noted in a recent article in the *Advocate* that there is evidence to suggest Olin's illegal operations may have extended to Rhodesia. Correspondence she obtained from the files of one of those dismissed by Olin in 1976 indicate an intent by Olin to service a rifle owned by a Rhodesian resident. Since 1968 it has been illegal for US companies to conduct trade with Rhodesia.

Biederman noted that US officials investigating Olin said no instance of trade with Rhodesia has been found. □

# Gun-Running to Rhodesia Exposed

Four Ohio men, including a former bounty hunter in Rhodesia who once worked for *Hustler* publisher Larry Flynt, have been sentenced for their roles in an aborted scheme to run guns to Rhodesia.

The four were arrested in Hartford, Connecticut, on January 19 after a year-long investigation by the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. At the time, they were about to conclude a deal to buy 615 semi-automatic handguns from undercover federal agents posing as Canadian arms dealers.

The four also had discussed potential purchases of M-16 machine guns with the undercover agents, who had been alerted to the group's purpose by an arms dealer in Ohio.

The federal agent in charge of the investigation declined to discuss either the source of the \$51,500 the four were to pay for the guns, or the guns' intended destination.

However, Mary Jane McFadden, the Ohio US Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the case, speculated that the guns were to be sold to Rhodesians and possibly to South Africans as well. She said the guns, which retail for up to \$250 here and up to \$800 in South Africa, could be used for paramilitary purposes but were more likely intended for civilian use.

"It looked like they were going to sell them wherever they could get the best deal," she said.

The guns used by the federal agents to entice the group to Connecticut were confiscated weapons being held in a storehouse there.

## Green Beret and CIA Links

Although two members of the group, John C. Harrison, 44, a Xenia, Ohio, attorney, and James Bolen, 36, the former bounty hunter, were identified as former members of the Green Berets, officials involved said there



CIA agent, bounty hunter, Hustler employee Bolen, here on patrol near Mozambique border.

was no reason to believe that there was any CIA or other government connection with the scheme.

"I think these guys were a small change operation," McFadden said. "There were macho guys out to make a big buck, people who never grew up."

The Rhodesian connection in the case is Bolen, of Columbus. Sources there describe him as an operator of bars in the area.

At a bond hearing in Connecticut, Bolen's attorney described his client as having been a member of the Green Berets from 1963 to 1969, according to a tape of the hearing quoted in the *Dayton Daily News*.

The attorney said that during nearly three years of this time, Bolen was "in Vietnam when he was working under the direction of the CIA in Laos and Cambodia."

According to the *Daily News*, Bolen described himself at the hearing as having worked for 14 months during 1976 and 1977 as an "administrative assistant" to Flynt. Flynt has said Bolen was a bodyguard for him, but is no longer an employee, the report said, adding that Flynt has denied any knowledge of illegal gun sales.

Bolen said at the hearing that he travelled to South Africa in 1976 and to France and Britain in 1977 "as part of my duties" for Flynt. His attorney claimed that while in Rhodesia, Bolen acted as a "consultant in security matters... he was asked to consult in re-

gard to their atomic facilities—obviously in response to his long security history while he was in the US Special Forces."

An Ohio grand jury charged in its indictment of Bolen that his travels were for the purpose of arranging to sell the weapons to be purchased in the US.

#### Bounty Hunter

Two photos of Bolen were featured in the March, 1978, issue of *Soldier of Fortune*, a magazine which reports extensively on mercenary opportunities and activities. It has carried ads for bounty hunters, hired by white Rho-

## Right Wing Supports Smith Settlement

Powerful forces in the US and Great Britain are now calling for endorsement or at least sympathetic consideration of the Zimbabwe internal settlement.

Washington's equivocation was evident during the UN Security Council debate on the issue which began on March 9. The Patriotic Front, with strong African backing, called on the Security Council to condemn the internal settlement as soon as it was signed. The African members of the Council drafted an initial resolution

desian farmers to shoot cattle thieves and members of the liberation forces.

At Bolen's bond hearing, the prosecuting Assistant US District Attorney in Connecticut said, "Essentially we know of [Bolen] to be an individual who has at least made part of his livelihood by hunting people at approximately \$1,200 a person in Rhodesia.

"In fact, it appears that while he was in Rhodesia the opportunity to sell weapons, both handguns and automatic weapons, arose, which led him to come back to seek those weapons in the United States."

In February, Bolen was featured in *Hustler* magazine, standing with a rifle outside a thatched hut. The photo caption says the smiling, red-bearded Bolen is bringing the *Hustler* message "to more people in foreign countries. He'll even go door-to-door in his search for new subscribers, like these happy Rhodesians."

#### Chargers Reduced

Bolen originally was charged with conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearms. Through plea bargaining, charges were reduced and he was given a probationary sentence.

The other major figure in the case was Harrison, the attorney, who federal officials indicated played the leading role in organizing the conspiracy. He received a sentence of a year and a day after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to deal in firearms under plea bargaining arrangements.

The other two men arrested, Robert Hackett, 33, and Dan Tankersley, 25, both of Dayton, who were described as having been hired by Bolen and Harrison to assist in the transport and protection of the weapons, were both given probationary sentences. □

condemning and rejecting the settlement, but, under intense pressure from the US and Great Britain, they agreed to tone down its language, declaring the settlement "illegal and unacceptable."

Even so, when the resolution was adopted by a 10-0 vote, the five Western members of the Council—the US, Great Britain, West Germany, France and Canada—abstained, maintaining the solid front which has become the hallmark of Western diplomatic tactics toward southern Africa in the last year.

Without strong pressure from the United States, Great Britain might well have vetoed the resolution. Many African members seemed pleased by Ambassador Andrew Young's energetic attempts to save the Anglo-American initiative and appeared willing to support his efforts by moderating their own positions. Yet in the end even this restraint did not produce US support for the resolution.

Both the United States and Great Britain see the internal settlement as providing the basis for a transitional government not dominated by the Patriotic Front, thus enhancing the possibility of a "moderate" solution. After separate meetings with Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, Secretary of State Vance echoed the sentiment of British Foreign Secretary David Owen that the Salisbury accord was a "significant step." President Carter was equally positive, stressing the settlement's congruence with points in the Anglo-American proposals.

The President, Mr. Vance and Dr. Owen urged all the parties to gather in an immediate conference. Neither the Patriotic Front nor the new Rhodesian government responded with any immediate enthusiasm, although the Front indicated it would participate in a continuation of the talks on the Anglo-American proposals which began in Malta earlier this year.

Then, while Ambassador Young was reassuring Tanzania, Zambia and the Patriotic Front that the US had not abandoned the Anglo-American proposals and that the internal settlement would have "little or no support from the United States," US and British and representatives went to Africa—first to South Africa and later to Salisbury—to meet with the internal settlement participants including the Rhodesian Front leadership.

### British Politics

Conservatives with financial interests in Rhodesia have been mounting heavy and effective pressure on the British government to go along with the new deal. Rising workingclass anger in Britain against non-white immigrants could also spell trouble for the Labour Party if it seems to be lacking in sympathy for Rhodesian whites.

In the United States, the problem cannot be divorced from questions of great power prestige and hegemony over Africa. Both conservatives and liberals alarmed at the "loss" of Angola

and at the easy "victory" of the Soviet Union and Cuba in bringing a swift reversal of Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia. They are preoccupied with what they see as the future Soviet-Cuban dominance over the whole Horn of Africa, which would threaten western interests in the Middle East and would expose the powerlessness of US diplomacy. *Newsweek's* story "Will Rhodesia be Next?" expresses a common anxiety not confined to conservatives.

Republican Party chairman Bill Brock has made it clear that Republicans will campaign this year against Carter's Africa policy. A report released by Brock on March 23 calls for "effective military and other aid" to



those Africans who oppose the Cuban forces," and demands support for the "pro-western black majority" who signed the Rhodesian internal accord.

### SALT Linkage

While the Republicans accuse Carter of wavering on "linkage," national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has in fact warned that the Soviet "adventures" in Africa might jeopardize the SALT negotiations. But "linkage" may not be leverage, for the Soviet Union seems not to be as interested in SALT as it once was.

Predictably Congressional representatives, such as Derwinski, Ichord and Dent, who led the fight for the Byrd Amendment and against Rhodesian sanctions, have called for the recognition of the internal settlement and the lifting of sanctions. Their reso-

lutions may not have an effect on legislation.

What may be more significant is a resolution which Senators Case, Javits, Sparkman and Stone have introduced calling on the US to give the internal settlement "serious and impartial" consideration. This combination of moderate Republicans and conservative southern Democrats, all of whom are members of the Foreign Relations Committee, is not being taken lightly by the Administration. Case, the leader of the group, supported sanctions in the past but now feels the Administration has gone out on a limb in seeking to draw the Patriotic Front into a negotiated settlement.

That the Administration needs moderate and conservative votes to pass the Panama Canal treaty and a prospective strategic arms limitation treaty does not make its diplomatic efforts in southern Africa any easier.

### Black Caucus Condemnation

But the internal settlement is also meeting with rising criticism in Congress. The Black Caucus favors US condemnation of it and resumption of negotiations based on the Anglo-American plan. Four members of the liberal Monitoring Group on South Africa warned the President "to refrain from any word or deed that might imply support for the Salisbury agreement."

Although Senator Dick Clark of the subcommittee on African affairs shares Ambassador Young's view that no solution can work without the Patriotic Front, he prefers to work privately to urge caution in the Administration.

Senator Muriel Humphrey, however, issued a strong criticism. "To view the Patriotic Front," she stated, "as the instrument of Communist penetration is to misread the last two decades of Zimbabwe nationalism. A lasting solution in Rhodesia must be based upon a meaningful transfer of power to African hands."

### Selling of the Settlement

No sooner was the ink dry on the agreement than the Africans who had signed it began an intensive effort to market it abroad. Eager to reach a broader sector of American public opinion, including elements in the black middle class, they had the ready-made support of US business interests and conservative politicians.

Union Carbide, which owns four chrome mines and a ferrochrome plant in Rhodesia, sponsored a reception for Bishop Muzorewa when he was in New

York for the UN session. The reception gave him a chance to meet business representatives who are now anxious to reopen Rhodesia to American trade and investment.

Later, Representative Ichord and Dent, who had played a leading role in fighting sanctions, hosted a Capitol Hill reception in co-operation with the conservative research group, Heritage Foundation.

Over lunch at the Cosmos Club, Bishop Muzorewa asked NAACP officials to help him sell his case to black Americans and to Congress. Support from the NAACP could give the internal agreement considerable legitimacy, but such action would cast doubt on the NAACP's newly projected role as a leader on African questions. It

would certainly lead to considerable conflict within the organization.

### Sithole's Man—Ex-CIA

Meanwhile, Bishop Muzorewa's colleague, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, was being represented in the US by Neville Romain. Romain is a South African-born American who claims to be a former CIA agent. The Rhodesian Information Office in Washington is forwarding calls for Romain to the office of Kent B. Crane, a conservative Republican who served as principal foreign policy adviser to Vice President Agnew and was head of the US Information Agency for East Asia and the Pacific during the last years of the Vietnam war.

Romain is embarking on a speaking tour in the US on behalf of Sithole

which has been organized by the Friends of Rhodesia, a right-wing organization affiliated with the Liberty Lobby, which has supported the Smith regime since UDI. Its chairman is Robin Moore, a Vietnam green beret and now self-appointed "American Ambassador" to Rhodesia, where he operates the Crippled Eagles Embassy to serve the needs of the hundreds of American mercenaries fighting for the Smith regime. Moore and Romain recently wrote a novel together, *Only the Hyenas Laughed*, which portrays the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front as dealers in dope and terror. Those who know Romain's history will scarcely be impressed by the fact that he also wrote a "GI bill" for the new transitional government to lure guerrillas away from fighting. □

## Banks Curb Loans for South Africa

The mounting pressure on banks to stop lending money to all borrowers in South Africa has had some results. However, Prexy Nesbitt, an organizer of the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, stressed in a recent interview, that victory was far from won.

The most noteworthy advance to date was the early March statement by Citicorp, the holding company of Citibank, the second largest bank in the US and the largest US lender to South Africa, that it will make no new loans to the government or to government-controlled parastatal corporations such as the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) and the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM).

Chemical Bank followed suit on March 21, just hours before demonstrations took place at three of its branches in New York City. While continuing to give short-term loans to private business, Chemical announced that it would prohibit any loan transactions with the South African government. Chemical's stand on parastatals is not yet clear.

March also brought similar statements from four midwestern banks, Continental Illinois, First National Bank of Chicago, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis and First Wisconsin.

A number of factors, however, soften even these successes which fall far short of meeting the objectives of the national bank campaign which seeks to end all loans to South Africa.



First National City Bank — Durban, South Africa branch

*Africa News*

### Continuing Corporate Loans

The banks have indicated no intention to discontinue loans to US, European or South African corporations which play a major part in financing the South African economy. Contrary to the banks' claims, loans to the private sector do not promote economic opportunity for the black majority in South Africa. The June 1977 Citibank loan of \$60 million, for example, for a joint mining venture headed by the US Phelps-Dodge Corporation and the

British-owned Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa will be used in an industry notorious for maintaining a gross disparity in wages between black and white miners.

The banks will continue to finance trade between the US and South Africa. In addition, banks with subsidiaries in South Africa are obliged by law to place a portion of their assets in "prescribed investment," which are normally government financial instruments. Thus, because of its presence

inside South Africa, Citibank must inevitably make funds available to the government.

The current actions of all six banks fall short of precedents already set by other banks. In 1973, First Pennsylvania Bank, the largest in the state, adopted a policy against loans to the South African government and corporations, while Maryland National Bank and Merchants Bank of Indianapolis terminated their loans to government-controlled corporations in South Africa.

The banks have indicated little concern about the human implications of either their lending policies or the

politics of Pretoria. In their view, apartheid is bad only insofar as it turns the mineral-rich country into a bad credit risk. "We regard apartheid as having a negative effect on South Africa's economic viability," read the Citicorp statement, "and so long as this is the case we will continue to moderate our business involvement in the country."

Some banks are refusing to give in to pressure. Four of South Africa's largest lenders—Bank of America, Morgan Guaranty, First Boston and Manufacturers Hanover—have refused to place restrictions on lending. But, in fact, no American bank seems willing

to make public loans at the moment, apart from short-term, trade-related credits.

Protests may well have influenced this decision, but the most powerful factor is certainly South Africa's current economic difficulties. A Chase Manhattan analysis issued in March says, "the economy remains on a low plateau," and foresees "little improvement" this year.

For the moment anyway, the banks seem to feel that South Africa is a high credit risk. That is the only factor keeping them out of the country; they would otherwise be quite happy to go on financing apartheid. □

## ANGOLA

# Conflicts With Church Hierarchy Rooted in Colonial Past

by Michael Shuster

Apart from occasional references to the "Cuban presence," there has been little news from Angola in the US press in recent months. But the closing of the Catholic radio station in Luanda recently did generate some interest among the American news agencies.

The press has always delighted in highlighting any signs of hostility to the church or even criticism of religious institutions from socialist governments and movements. This attitude is particularly ironic in the Angolan case.

The Catholic Church played a leading role in Portugal's oppressive "civilizing mission" in Africa. The Portuguese airforce proudly displayed the cross on its wing tips as it flew bombing missions against the MPLA, FRELIMO (Mozambique) and PAIGC (Guinea-Bissau). None of this was thought worthy of any press coverage. Yet when the church comes "under attack," as the press portrayed the recent radio takeover, it's news.

### Attack By Bishops

The conflict between MPLA and the Catholic Church has old roots, but its most recent budding began in Decem-

ber, soon after the first MPLA Congress completed its work. In the southern city of Lubango, all the country's bishops gathered to write a letter which was later read publicly in many Angolan churches in January.

The church, the bishops wrote, "believes in the independence of Angola." But, they went on, "the Church cannot accept an ideology that denies the existence of God and which asserts itself as radically incompatible with the fundamental principles of the Christian concept of man. To impose materialism on a population as traditionally spiritualist and believing as Angola's appears to us to constitute a violence which risks having the most disastrous consequences within the great Angolan family."

The letter accused MPLA of fomenting attacks on churches and clergymen, which, it said, had gone unpunished. And it attacked a recent MPLA program of sending young children to be educated in foreign countries. "We view with apprehension," the bishops wrote, "the adoption of a single model for the education of young people." Faith is threatened, they added, "when the young are sent to pursue their studies in faraway countries." According to the bishops, this would provoke "grief among the parents whose authority would not be respected."

### MPLA Response

The public reading of the letter elicited swift and strong reaction from MPLA. MPLA Secretary Lucio Lara denied that the government had sanctioned attacks on the church and reiterated that the nation's constitution guarantees freedom of belief and religion. "This incorrect attitude of the bishops is an insult to the dignity of our people and our government," Lara told a meeting in Benguela. "The choice of an ideology cannot be made without straight liaison with the people. If neither Marx, nor Engels, nor Lenin were born among our people, the same can be said for Christ."

Lara said that the church had broadcast some programs "overtly reactionary" over its radio station in Luanda even after independence. That, he said, couldn't be tolerated.

Lara acknowledged that children were being sent abroad to be educated but said this was done only with parental approval. "We're overwhelmed with the number of children we have to educate," he said. "Thus, we have asked municipal and community authorities to make a census of orphans and children whose parents find themselves in a difficult situation and are disposed to sending one or more of their children away to study." More

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*Michael Shuster, a member of the Southern Africa collective, travelled widely in Angola during 1976.*

than a thousand young children ages two to four have been offered, Lara said, "none without the consent of its parents."

"We aren't against the fact that the church forms its priests, and educates the children of those who want them to be religious, Catholic or Protestant," Lara pointed out. "But we want them to be taught within the appropriate institutions, not in the public schools."

"We are asking all militants to respect religion. We don't have anything against religions. But we are asking their representatives this: If they are in disagreement with Marxism-Leninism—and it's normal—they must act like us, that is, they must lead an ideological struggle. We will spread our message to the people. And the people will continue to receive the messages of different religions. We'll see which side the people will go to in the end."

### Criticism Inside Church

There are some dissenting voices even within the Angolan Catholic Church. Since 1959 a small mission of priests from the Spanish Basque country has carried on its activities in Malange, an agricultural town in central Angola. The Basque fathers have always been as active politically as religiously and therefore have always been at odds with the church hierarchy.

In a series of documents in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Basques were openly critical of the church's role in the colonial system. "The church is practically allied to the political power [of Portugal]," they wrote in 1973, adding that "the Angolan, principally the black Angolan, lives under a totally oppressive regime, without any possibility of defense, self-decision, nor participation in the political destiny of his country."

In 1974 the Basque fathers confronted the bishop of Malange directly. Their exchange was published in a European magazine. "Is the church hierarchy in Angola in favor of the self-determination for the peoples of Angola, yes or no?"

"The hierarchy in Angola," the bishop responded, "has never taken a position for or against self-determination for the peoples of Angola. For the independence of a people is concretely a political act."

Did the bishop find the political and social situation in Angola just or unjust? the Basque fathers asked.

"To pose such a question is to violate the rights of the person," responded the bishop.

### Supporting Social Change

Soon after the Portuguese dictatorship fell from power in 1974, a strong movement to form agricultural cooperatives developed among the peasants of Malange province. At its center almost from the beginning were the Basque fathers who had worked on behalf of many of the area's farmers even before 1974.

I spent more than a week living with and viewing the work of the Basque fathers during a visit to Angola in 1976. A group of four, they were practically the only whites left in Malange after most of the province's Portuguese settlers had fled south when fighting broke out between MPLA and FNLA in the summer of 1975. "Life here was organized in such a way that whites had no idea of what Africans thought or felt, what their lives were like," one of the priests, Father Jesus, told me. "When the war started, the whites, even progressive whites, thought that the people would cut them up into little pieces. There was no way for them to know any different."

Jesus said that when fighting broke out, one Italian priest in the town organized a caravan of 2,000 cars to carry the whites to "safety" in Nova Lisboa.

### Empty Churches

I spent several days in early August 1976 with Father Benjamin in the small dusty town of Brito Godins, a very active center of cooperative organizing. While I was there, Benjamin held mass for the area's Catholics. At the time, Benjamin was 29, had been in Angola for four years, and spoke almost fluent Kimbundu, the dominant language of central Angola. "During the colonial period the church was almost always full," Benjamin mused. "Now only a handful show up for mass."

I wondered why. A local government official who was listening offered, "Its because the colonialists are gone. The people no longer have to go to church."

"No, its not just that," Benjamin said. "When the Portuguese lived in Brito Godins, they never set foot in this church. In fact they didn't go to church. This was always a church for Africans."

"The Portuguese never liked us," Benjamin went on, referring to the Basque fathers. "They knew we were more closely involved with the people, that we weren't colonialists. But they would have been too embarrassed to throw us out of the country."

"No, the reason people don't go to church any longer is something more than just that. Their lives have changed, that's for sure."

### Learning From the People

Benjamin has been greatly influenced by the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, especially by his "Pedagogy of the Oppressed." Freire's writings had helped Benjamin create a method of work among the area's peasants that allows him, the educated Westerner, not to overlook the value of the people he is organizing.

"Freire says, no one is just the teacher, and no one is just the student," Benjamin pointed out. "To be an organizer, it is really important to live with the people, to eat what they eat and not demand special treatment; to work as they work without always demanding special privileges. This way, you learn a great deal, and it makes you a more effective organizer, for the people accept you, they trust you and believe you."

I was curious how the Basque fathers saw themselves as missionaries, given the traditional contempt displayed by Christian missionaries through several centuries of "Christianizing the savages."

"For me," Benjamin said, "church work and political work are not two different things. I'm not here to convince Africans that life will be better later on. I'm here to work now, to help people organize themselves politically so that they can progress."

"If they have faith and that faith helps them do this work, that's fine. I have faith, but I'm not here to convince all the others that they should have faith as well."

"For me Christianity has to do with freedom, helping to bring freedom to people. I know a lot of people in the church who are reactionaries. To me they aren't Christians. And I know a lot of people who aren't in the church who are revolutionaries. To me they are fulfilling the teachings of Christ the way I understand them."

In the course of a meeting of the episcopate of Malange in April 1977, the bishop of Malange decided to dissolve indefinitely the mission of the Basque fathers. But the fathers have not abandoned their work. Despite the efforts of the church to enforce the use of a law prohibiting the renewal of visas to clergy not integrated into ecclesiastical structures, the Basque fathers are now working within the Ministry of Agriculture where they are still involved in cooperative organizing and teaching. □

# RESOURCES

Solidarity Committee, P.O. Box 181,  
Bronx, NY 10453.

**BOOKS RECEIVED**—Listing below does not preclude future reviewing.

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**POLITICS AND EDUCATION** magazine provides news and analysis of a wide variety of trends in higher education and campus activism. The current issue has a special section on recent anti-apartheid efforts. Student activist Neva Seidman Makgetla discusses the importance of American investment to the South African economy, and two Stanford University organizers give an insider's report on the extensive anti-apartheid efforts at that school. Also included is news of anti-apartheid activity at colleges and universities across the US. For a copy of this issue, send \$1.25 to: Politics & Education, Wesleyan Station, Fisk Hall, Middletown, CT 06457.

*Politics and Education* will continue to cover anti-apartheid activism in future issues. Subscription rates are \$5.00 a year for students, \$6.00 for others.

**ZIMBABWE BULLETIN**, published by the ZANU Solidarity Committee, includes articles on the current struggle in Zimbabwe, and reprints from official ZANU sources. Subscriptions are \$3.00 per year, payable to ZANU

## Cable Reprints Available

The confidential cable sent by US Ambassador to South Africa, William Bowdler, to the State Department which reveals black hostility to US investment in South Africa and which *Southern Africa* published in April is being made available as a reprint. To obtain one or bulk copies, write to *Southern Africa*, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, New York, NY 10010.

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# Text of agreement signed by Ian Smith, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Senator Jeremiah Chirau

WHEREAS the present constitutional situation in Rhodesia has led to the imposition of economic and other sanctions by the international community against Rhodesia and to armed conflict within Rhodesia and from neighboring territories:

AND WHEREAS it is necessary in the interests of our country that an agreement should be reached that would lead to the termination of such sanctions and the cessation of the armed conflict:

AND WHEREAS, in an endeavor to reach such an agreement, delegates from the Rhodesian Government, African National Council (Sithole), United African National Council and Zimbabwe United People's Organization have met during the last two months in Salisbury and, having discussed fully the proposals put forward by the various delegations, have reached agreement on certain fundamental principles to be embodied in a new constitution that will lead to the termination of the aforementioned sanctions and the cessation of the armed conflict.

NOW, THEREFORE:

## A.

It is hereby agreed that a constitution will be drafted and enacted which will provide for majority rule on the basis of universal adult suffrage on the following terms:

### [1]

There will be a legislative assembly consisting of 100 members and the following provisions will apply thereto:

(a) There will be a common voters' roll, with all citizens of 18 years and over being eligible for registration as voters, subject to certain recognized disqualifications.

(b) 72 of the seats in the legislative assembly will be reserved for blacks who will be elected by voters who are enrolled on the common roll.

(c) 25 of the seats in the legislative assembly will be reserved for whites (i.e., Europeans as defined in the 1969 Constitution) who will be elected as follows:

(i.) 20 will be elected on a preferential voting system by white voters who are enrolled on the common roll.

(ii.) Eight will be elected by voters who are enrolled on the common roll from 16 candidates who will be nominated, in the case of the first parliament, by an electoral college composed of the white members of the present House of Assembly and, in the case of any subsequent parliament, by an electoral college composed of the 25 whites who are members of the parliament dissolved immediately prior to the general election.

(d) The reserved seats referred to in (c) above shall be retained for a period of at least 10 years or of two parliaments, whichever is the longer, and shall be reviewed at the expiration of that period, at which time a commission shall be appointed, the chairman of which shall be a judge of the High Court, to undertake this review. If that commission recommends that the arrangements regarding the said reserved seats should be changed:

(i.) An amendment to the constitution to effect such change may be made by a bill which receives the affirmative votes of not less than 51 members.

(ii.) The said bill shall also provide that the 72 seats referred to in (b) above shall not be reserved for blacks.

(e) The members filling the seats referred to in (c) above will be prohibited from forming a coalition with any single minority party for the purpose of forming a government.

### [2]

There will be a just declaration of rights which will protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and, inter alia, will provide for protection from deprivation of property unless adequate compensation is paid promptly, and for protection of pension rights of persons who are members of pension funds.

iversity, Oxford University Press, 1977, \$11.95.

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Wilson, Francis. *Migrant Labour in*

[3]  
The independence and qualifications of the judiciary will be entrenched and judges will have security of tenure.

[4]  
There will be an independent public services board, the members of which will have security of tenure. The board will be responsible for appointments to, promotions in and discharges from the public service.

[5]  
The public service, police force, defense forces and prison service will be maintained in a high state of efficiency and free from political interference.

[6]  
Pensions which are payable from the consolidated revenue fund will be guaranteed and charged on the consolidated revenue fund and will be remittable outside the country.

[7]  
Citizens who at present are entitled to dual citizenship will not be deprived of their present entitlement.

[8]  
The above-mentioned provisions will be set out or provided for in the constitution and will be regarded as specially entrenched provisions which may only be amended by a bill which receives the affirmative votes of not less than 78 members.

## B.

It is hereby also agreed that, following the agreement set out above, the next step will be the setting up of a transitional government. The prime function of the transitional government will be:

(a) To bring about a ceasefire, and

(b) To deal with related matters such as:

(i.) The composition of the future military forces, including those members of the nationalist forces who wish to take up a military career, and the rehabilitation of others,

(ii.) The rehabilitation of those affected by the war.

## C.

It is also hereby agreed that it will be the duty of the transitional government to determine and deal with the following matters:

(a) The release of detainees,

(b) The review of sentences for offenses of a political character,

(c) The further removal of discrimination;

(d) The creation of a climate conducive to the holding of free and democratic elections;

(e) The drafting of the new constitution in terms of this agreement.

(f) Procedures for registration of voters with a view to the holding of a general election at the earliest possible date.

## D.

It is also hereby agreed that the transitional government will comprise an executive council and a ministerial council, and the following provisions will apply thereto:

### [1]

(a) Composition:  
The executive council will be composed of the prime minister and three black ministers, being the heads of those delegations engaged in the negotiations. The members will take turns in presiding as chairman of the executive council in such sequence and for such period as that council may determine. Decision of the executive council will be by consensus.

(b) Functions:

(i.) The executive council will be responsible for insuring that the functions given to and the duties imposed on the transitional government by the constitutional agreement are dealt with as expeditiously as possible. It will take policy decisions in connection with the preparation and drafting of the new constitution and the other matters set out in sections B and C of this agreement and with any other matters which may arise.

(ii.) The executive council may refer the matters set out in sections B and C of this agreement, or any other matter, to the ministerial council for examination and recommendation.

(iii.) The executive council will review decisions or recommendations of the ministerial council and may confirm such decisions or recommendations or refer them back to the ministerial council for further consideration.

### [2]

## MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

(a) Composition:

The ministerial council will be composed of equal numbers of black and white ministers. The black ministers will be nominated in equal proportions by the heads of those delegations engaged in the negotiations. The white ministers will be nominated by the prime minister. The chairmanship of the ministerial council will alternate between black and white ministers. The prime minister will nominate which white minister shall take the chair, and the heads of those delegations engaged in the negotiations will nominate which of the black ministers shall take the chair in the sequence and for the period determined by the ministerial council.

(b) Functions:

(i.) The ministerial council will operate on the cabinet system. For each portfolio, or group of portfolios, there will be a black and a white minister who will share responsibility.

(ii.) The ministerial council will be responsible for initiating legislation and for supervising the preparation of such legislation as may be directed by the executive council.

(iii.) The ministerial council will make recommendations to the executive council on all matters referred to it by the executive council and on any other matter it thinks fit.

(iv.) Decisions of the ministerial council will be by majority vote and subject to review by the executive council.

### [3]

## PARLIAMENT

(a) Parliament will continue to function during the life of the transitional government and will meet for the following purposes as and when the executive council considers it should be summoned.

(i.) To pass a constitution amendment act enabling ministers who have not been elected to parliament to serve for periods in excess of four months;

(ii.) To pass legislation for the registration of voters;

(iii.) To pass the 1978-79 budget;

(iv.) To enact any legislation or deal with any other matter brought forward by the transitional government (e.g. for the further removal of discrimination);

(v.) To enact the new constitution;

(vi.) To nominate 16 whites for election by voters on the common roll to eight of the seats reserved for whites.

(b) The work of the various select committees and of the Senate Legal Committee will proceed as normal.

## E.

It is also hereby agreed that independence day shall be Dec. 31, 1978.

Signed at Salisbury, this third day of March 1978.

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# action news notes

## APARTHEID CONFRONTS STOCKHOLDERS . . .

American corporation and bank activities in South Africa are clearly the burning issue raised by dissident stockholders this year, the *New York Times* reported in March. Resolutions urging withdrawal or an end to further investment, sales, or loans in South Africa have been proposed at more than 20 corporations, and more than 12 other resolutions direct companies to end discriminatory labor practices in their South African subsidiaries.

Churches, universities, and labor unions are sponsoring most of the resolutions.

Two of the largest institutional investors in the US, the Teachers Insur-

ance and Annuity Association and the College Retirement Equities Fund, have sent a letter to all companies in their portfolio with interests in South Africa recommending that no further loans or investments be made to the country.

MACSA (Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa) has compiled a list of companies operating in South Africa in which the state of Wisconsin has more than \$500,000 invested. It urges support of the 1977 Assembly Bill 1213, which would require the State Investment Board to sell all those stocks and bonds with total value over \$1 billion.

On March 21, 18th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, about 50 people in mid-Manhattan demonstrated against Chemical Bank's lending policy towards South Africa. A second demonstration took place near Columbia University. Chemical is one of the top six banks doing business with South Africa.

**EXPORT-IMPORT LOAN GUARANTEES . . .** The AFL-CIO Executive Council called in February for the end of Ex-Im Bank insurance and loan guarantees for South Africa and other US government operations which promote the flow of capital or credit to South Africa.

Among steps the UAW has urged President Carter to take to discourage US investment in South Africa is an end to all export-import loan guarantees for exports to South Africa.

**CAMPUS ACTIONS CONTINUE:** At the beginning of April over 850 Princeton University students demonstrated their opposition to the school's links to South Africa, both through corporate holdings and trustees who serve as high ranking officials in corporations tied to South Africa. The Princeton People's Front for the Liberation of South Africa staged a sit-in on the eve of the trustee meeting on April 15, where demands for divestiture were heard.

At Wesleyan University in Connecticut, over 300 students marched, chanted and rallied on April 8 while the University Board of Trustees was meeting. At the end of the rally the President of the College informed the crowd that the trustees adopted a proposal calling for consideration of proxy resolutions urging US corporations to take positive actions to end apartheid. The proposal also includes the establishment of a committee to oversee such considerations. The Southern Africa Action Group rejected the proposal and continued to campaign for divestiture, taking over a university building the following week.

The Harvard University Corporation held a public meeting April 14, on demands by the Southern Africa Solidarity Committee that the university end its link to US banks which loan to South Africa, and support for shareholder resolutions advocating withdrawal.

*The above is only a sample of the escalating activity on campuses throughout the US on the question of divestiture. In the June issue, Southern Africa will give a more complete roundup of actions and events that have taken place in the past few months.*

**NOBEL PEACE PRIZE NOMINEE:** Stephen Biko has been nominated by

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the American Friends Service Committee for the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. The Quaker organization, as a co-recipient of the prize in 1947, is entitled to make a nomination each year. In the press release making the announcement ALSC Executive Secretary was quoted as saying: "To recognize Stephen Biko for his work, is to acknowledge the love and esteem in which he was held as a gentle, yet forceful, leader. But it may also serve to acknowledge the labors and lives of Biko's colleagues, and the tens of thousands of South Africans whom he inspired."

**CANADIAN ACTIONS . . .** Pressure on the government by Church groups, unions and students was instrumental in the decision by the Canadian External Affairs Department to draw up a code of conduct on treatment of employees of Canadian companies operating in South Africa. The code will deal with fair pay, criteria for employment, social welfare benefits, recreation, overtime and other matters concerning black employees. However no punitive measures would be taken against those companies refusing to comply.

The Department has also ruled that South Africans must henceforth apply

for visas to enter Canada, and is considering revoking the Commonwealth trade preferences that South Africa has continued to enjoy despite its withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1960.

The provincial government of Quebec meanwhile has banned the sale of South African liquor. This co-incided with a petition circulated by Amnesty International and signed by 3,000 Quebecers calling on the provincial government to condemn South Africa for its denial of human rights. The petition was tabled in the national assembly, and unanimously endorsed.

**KRUGERRAND (CONT.) . . .** Anti-Krugerrand activity has produced results in Pittsburgh and Boston. After being picketed weekly for two months by the Free Southern African Committee, Pittsburgh coin dealer Charles Litman has agreed to stop selling the gold coin. He is the first Pittsburgh dealer to take such an action.

In Boston the City Council has passed a resolution opposing Krugerrand sales.

Marches and picket lines have protested sales of Krugerrand in Denver.

**FILM AWARD . . .** "O Povo Organizado," Robert van Lierop's film on independent Mozambique recently won the Grand Prize as the Best Film of 1977 at the Black Filmmakers Hall of Fame Competition in Oakland, California. The presentation of the award was made mid-February.

**BRIEFS . . .** The Rochester Coalition to Support Southern African Liberation held a February meeting to promote public awareness of the South African and Zimbabwean freedom struggles . . . John Gaetsewe, General Secretary of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, spoke at New York's Cooper Union in March . . . In San Antonio in February, over 200 people attended a Steven Biko Memorial Evening held in connection with Black History Month. Speaker Dennis Brutus accused the US government of complicity in the murder of Africans through the hundreds of US citizens fighting as mercenaries for white minority regimes. Some mercenaries, he said, are from San Antonio.

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