LINKING UP

"Movement language is based on middle class psychological jargon which often obscures real power relations," said IPS Fellow **Charlotte Bunch** in a recent talk on "Language, Class and Sex" at the National Gay Academic Union Conference. "Thus," Bunch continued, "it gives those with power in the movement even more structureless, unaccountable power even if the opposite is the intent. For example, certain words are considered 'bad'—such as 'director'; instead we call someone a 'coordinator'—the same job with the same power, but the power is obscured by language."

Michael Moffitt participated in a University of Maryland conference on "Who Rules America?" and also spoke on "Economic Exploitation—A Third World View," at the Rocky Mountain Youth Seminar.

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In an address on "Economic Crisis and Health Workers" at the American Public Health Association Convention in Chicago, IPS Fellow **Robb Burlage** projected a coming depression for health workers and community health services—so long as physician fees, medical supply profits, and top-heavy institutional hierarchies fuel a highly inflationary component of fiscal crisis and of cutbacks in "social wages."

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Eqbal Ahmad and **Richard Barnet** gave speeches at the Pachem in Terris Conference and at the Ann Arbor Post-Vietnam Teach-in on Imperialism. □

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The War for Angola

The war in Angola grows out of issues of the past. Its key determinants came to a head in April, 1974, when an end to Portuguese rule was first decreed and radical elements of Portugal's Armed Forces Movement (AFM) overthrew the Caetano dictatorship, the successor regime to Salazar. Upon taking power, the AFM quickly announced the liquidation of Portugal's ageless empire. The decision by the AFM, in July 1974, included the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique and the most important of Portugal's African territories, Angola. The other territories swiftly moved into transitional phases of internal government with virtually no disruption of plans. But Angola had no national movement which seemed capable of assuming pre-eminence. Even though there was serious effort and hope, the opportunity for a smooth transition never evolved.

The outside forces now involved in Angola's national war are as varied as the issues in the conflict. Attracting considerable attention in Western circles, especially in the US, is the military participation of Cuba. But of much greater consequence to American opinion is the seemingly head-to-head rivalry of the US and the Soviet Union. Thus global tensions and world class weapons are tacked on to already complex social issues.

From the very beginning, when the declaration by Portugal to withdraw allowed the national liberation groups to re-enter Angola, skirmishes broke out among their cadres. These limited fights were efforts by each movement to gain strategic positions in advance of the Portuguese departure. Initially the fighting involved the two senior

nationalist groups: FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) and MPLA (Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola). The youngest and weakest movement, UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola), attempted to be neutral and to concentrate on appealing for outside assistance. The MPLA re-grouped from exile in the central section of Angola and in Luanda, the colonial capital, thus gaining a symbolic advantage over the other two movements. By the final two or three months before independence, UNITA moved into an alliance of convenience with FNLA. They agreed not to reconcile but rather jointly to oppose and forestall MPLA's greater potential for taking over the country. The FNLA-UNITA union did not change the character of the emerging national struggle but it did open the whole country to intermittent fighting.

During this period, details of events in Angola were only minimally reported. World attention centered on what observers saw as a profound turn of events in Portugal and western Europe. But even in the midst of its own internal crisis, Portugal found time and enough cooperation from the

PUBLICATIONS

"The state system which has emerged in the United States is a constitutional deformation which menaces the freedom and well being of the citizenry, and is a danger to world civilization," writes IPS Fellow **Marcus Raskin** in *Democracy Versus the National Security State* (Green Paper #10, available from IPS for $1).

IPS Fellow **Gar Alperovitz** and Jeff Faux have completed an analysis of projected economic and political trends in the United States over the next quarter century. The authors argue that the US is at the end of an economic era that began with World War II; their report calls for a sweeping reorganization of the major corporate and government institutions that dominate the economy in order to produce economic security and economic democracy. Portions of the report have been published in *Democratic Review* (Nov. 1975), and the *New York Times* (Jan. 5-6, 1975). The full report is available for $1.

A Foreign Policy Primer, published recently at the Institute, contains four essays toward developing a new US defense and foreign policy, and toward instigating widespread debate on those two critical areas of national life. The pamphlet may be purchased from IPS for $1.

Published last month, the first issue of *Mother Jones*, a magazine for the rest of us, includes "What You Don't Know May Hurt You," by **Paul Jacobs**, a Mother Jones editor and TNI Fellow. Jacobs' article examines how "a series of disasters at a nuclear power plant in India reveals a great deal about America's stake in the dangerous business of nuclear exports." Subscriptions to *Mother Jones* are $12 a year (10 issues), from 607 Market St., San Francisco, Cal. 94105.

The model health legislation proposal of the IPS's **Community Health Alternatives Project** can now be obtained from CHAP for 50 cents. A pamphlet summarizing the model bill is also available.

The IPS **Conference on alternative State & Local Public Policies** published its first newsletter in January, 1976. Annual subscriptions to the quarterly bulletin are $5.

Other recent publications include: **Eqbal Ahmad**, "Mirage: The Sinai Accord," *Seven Days*, Oct. 6, 1975. **Richard** Barnet, *The Crisis of the Corporation* (pamphlet published by American Management Associations). **John Berger**, "Devouring the World," *The Elements*, Dec. 1975. **Bettina Conner**, "World Blood Trade," *The Elements*, Jan. 1976; "How the Rich Bleed the Poor," *San Francisco Examiner*, Jan. 10, 1976. **Mary Ann Fraulo**, "Air Pollution" and "Beefalos" (scripts for two documentary films). **Fred Halliday**, "Inter-imperialist Contradictions and Arab Nationalism," *Israel & the Palestinians* (London, 1975); "Imperialism's Last Stand?" *New Statesman*, Jan. 2, 1976; "Djibouti, Africa's New Trouble Spot," *The Times* (London), Jan. 20, 1976; **Michael Klare**, "Defending Resource Lifelines," *The Elements*, Feb. 1976; "Latin American Weapons Market: How to Trigger an Arms Race," *The Nation*, Aug. 30, 1975; "The Nixon/Kissinger Doctrin and America's Pacific Basin Strategy," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, June 1975. **Milton Kotler,** *The Ethics of Neighborhood Government* (pamphlet published by the New School for Social Research). **Michael Moffitt**, "The Rich and the Poor," *Monthly Review*, Dec. 1975; "Phosphate Fertilizers," *The Elements*, Dec. 1975. David Pion, "Chile Copper," *The Elements*, Dec. 1975. **Political Economy Program Center** (eds.), *Benchmarx*: "Toward a Community Health Alternative," Dec. 1975. **Marcus Raskin**, "For a Radical Restructuring of the Political System," *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1975. **Arthur Waskow**, "Toward a Palestinian State, *New York Times*, Jan. 13, 1976.

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three Angolan movements to piece together some elements of a free Angola.

Sensitive to the kind of critical political situation they would be leaving, the Portuguese worked out with the three movements a fast-paced plan for transition. The Alvor Agreement, signed at the end of the Algarve Conference in January 1975, produced a transitional government in Angola. Parties to the Agreement were the three nationalist groups and the Portuguese. The Alvor scheme created the first opportunity *ever* for regulars of the three movements to work together inside Angola. The scheme also called for a three-person presidential colloquium with each movement's representatives rotating as president, a council of ministers, and a defense council. The 12 ministries were parcelled out four apiece to each of the movements and to Portugal. MPLA received two of the most strategic ministries, information and finance, giving it control over the media and incoming revenues of the country. The civil aspect of the Alvor plan proceeded, but tensions persisted from the movements' lack of experience in running the government. A more crucial difficulty centered on the part of the plan calling for a phased integration of the movement armies. It was an issue on which little progress was ever made.

The transitional government was to rule until November 11, 1975. Before November, national elections for a constituent assembly were to be held. Even though this part of the scheme bore serious contradictions, it afforded a process to establish an independent government. During March, April, and May, heavy fighting between FNLA and MPLA generated a rapid disintegration of the Alvor accord and the troubled structure it had initiated.

The Alvor Plan had inherent weaknesses. It was a capricious formula offered by a Portuguese government desperate to turn to its internal affairs. From the start the arrangement lacked real force to weld together three movements with different ideologies and years of rivalry behind them.

Fearing that Angolan independence might not be granted on the date planned, other African leaders became involved in encouraging peace among the Angolan groups. On the invitation of Jomo Kenyatta, Angolan leaders went to Nakuru, Kenya in June for talks directed at ironing out their differences. This six-day summit-style meeting issued a carefully worded resolve, the Nakuru Agreement, designed to restore and make operative the original, Alvor-created, transitional government. But fighting erupted just days after the Nakuru talks, a new cycle of arms began to reach the movements from the outside, and for the first time UNITA entered the fighting.

This further deterioriation of Angola's transitional process prompted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to try to persuade the Angolan parties to maintain peaceful arrangements. At the OAU's Kampala summit in July 1975, concern mounted that the behavior of the movements jeopardized Angolan independence. The summit therefore sought to influence the movements to abandon their differences and to work toward the creation of a unified government of independence. But the OAU deliberations had little effect on the internal situation of Angola.

By September the fighting among the nationalists had intensified and the Portuguese suspended the Alvor Accords. The movements became more entrenched in their respective ethno-linguistic areas, creating a *de facto* if unintended partitioning of Angola. From their tribal strongholds, the movements began making claims of pre-eminence and legitimacy even though none was in fact politically dominant.

MPLA displayed greater fighting ability and seemed more adept at political-military strategy. By the November 11 independence date, MPLA had proclaimed a "Peoples Republic of Angola" from the old capital Luanda. FNLA and UNITA, now acting together, were left to announce from Zaire the creation of a rival government, the "Democratic People's Republic of Angola," with Huambo as its capital. Then the movements began large-scale fighting for national ascendency.

The three national liberation groups grew out of at least 20 years of defending native rights and opposing Portuguese rule. During this period the political character of each group and the factors which generate enmity among their leaders were nurtured.

The initial anti-colonial militants were Africans who possessed some degree of formal education or skill, coming from each of the largest tribal groups. Educational opportunity in Angola never embraced more than five percent of the Africans, so cadre ranks of the evolving *resistence* were very thin.

During this period, Salazar's response to the rise of resistance in the colony was brutal and repressive, forcing the movements underground and into exile. In exile, they re-aggregated according to ethnic loyalties and sustained more than a decade of anti-co-

lonial war, while at the same time fighting for primacy among themselves.

The FNLA emerged from the Bakongo people, now estimated to comprise a population of 700,000. Holden Roberto has been the principal personality of this group since the late 1950s. Roberto's first organizing appeal rested on the notion of reviving the old kingdom of Bakongo. But under pressure from other African leaders, he backed away from his royalist position and set about constructing a modern nationalist movement. FNLA was exiled to Zaire and became the recipient of considerable patronage from Mobutu Sese Seko, who developed an unusually close political relationship with Roberto. Over the years, FNLA attracted the support of several other moderate governments in Africa and in 1961 it became a recipient of covert assistance from the US. By the time FNLA returned to Angola it boasted a troop strength of 20,000, based in the

far-northern provinces.

In the early 1960s, Salazar exiled the MPLA and its leader, Agostinho Neto. For several years MPLA scrambled about Africa for a place to operate. It tried Algeria and Guinea, but finally developed a permanent base closer to Angola, in Congo-Brazzaville. Its largest support came from the 1.3 million Mbundu who were scattered across north-central Angola. The movement sought to mobilize the exploited classes and create an all-Angolan state, and its leaders benefitted from the support of the Portuguese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. MPLA's army was better trained than the other groups; its troop strength estimates are between 20,000 and 25,000. From its Luanda headquarters, MPLA has been militarily

effective in provinces as far south as Benguela and Moxico, and eastward to Lunda.

In 1966, UNITA emerged as an Ovimbundu-speaking movement, based in the south, where 40 per cent of Angola's population lives. UNITA's only leader, Jonas Savimbi, broke away from the leadership ranks of FNLA. Even though Savimbi's organizing concentrated upon the rural southern tribes inside Angola, his ideology was nurtured in FNLA's bourgeois-nationalist ambition to supplant Portuguese rule. UNITA has the smallest army, estimated to be no more than 10,000.

In an effort not to be squeezed out of the struggle for power and primacy, UNITA recently allied with FNLA. This Bakongo-Ovimbundu front signalled the establishment of a majority coalition. But, as a purely military challenge to MPLA, the FNLA-UNITA front remains unsuccessful. UNITA has remained the most isolated of the movements; only through the reconstituted association with Roberto has Savimbi become the beneficiary of Zaire-channelled support. UNITA's only important link to the outside is a relation with Zambia which is based on an agreement that UNITA will assist Zambia copper across the rail line running through Ovimbundu territory.

The Southern African Question

Angola's future is a deep concern of its neighbors. Zambia fears that a new political dynamic in Angola may cause trouble for its policy of moderation toward white Rhodesia and South Africa. Tanzania, Mozambique, and Congo-Brazzaville would like another force in the area working for meaningful independence, resisting the remaining problems of colonialism. Zaire's Mobutu has put years of effort into advancing the wedge of black moderation in the immediate area; what happens in Angola will have a critical impact on the future of his scheme.

But of all the outside forces concerned about Angola, South Africa has the most to lose. It reacted strongly to the ascendency of MPLA by sending troops onto Angolan soil—not because of the allegation that MPLA is Communist, but because the Vorster regime does not want *any* Black government in its northern "buffer" zone.

South Africa has already suffered from the loss of support and collaboration it received from Portugal in

maintaining a southern African status-quo favorable to white regimes. It is probably safe to say that the United States shares South Africa's concern. But the US is also concerned with the impact that events in Angola will have on the moderate Black states in southern Africa. Like South Africa, the US must look to Zaire and Zambia to uphold the posture of "detente" among other independent Black states. The struggle in Angola threatens not only the direction of politics in Zambia and Zaire, but also their economic well being.

The Vorster regime is probably the United States' most important, although undeclared, ally in southern Africa. The US is dependent on South Africa for important raw materials; American capital investment there exceeds a book value of $1.2 billion; and more than 300 American companies are involved in South African manufacturing or extractive industries. Until recently, white South Africa has been a secure place for American investment, and the returns have been steadily high.

The US-South African blanket of influence in southern Africa could be seriously threatened if Angola had a nationalist government with new orientations to politics. Recognizing such a possibility, last August the US escalated its covert support of the FNLA-UNITA front and asked Congress to increase public support to Zaire. The unofficial client, South Africa, saw more immediate danger to its interests and began a land invasion of Angola late last year.

The involvement of the USSR, a factor heatedly debated in Washington, is at least consistent. The Soviet government has supported MPLA from the beginning of the movement's fight against Portuguese colonialism.

To the USSR and Cuba, MPLA represents the most favorable political force in the area. But, given the similarity of MPLA to FRELIMO and PAIGC, there are no overriding reasons to think that an MPLA-ruled Angola would become—as Mozambique and Guinea Bissau have not— puppet states of Moscow. Of course, the MPLA will owe a debt of friendship to the socialist countries, as well as to the 22 African states that support it, if it emerges from the war successful.

The most critical step in creating a new Angola has already been achieved. And while the outcome of the current struggle is unclear, enough evidence is available to form basic opinions abut the potentials.

At the base of Angolan society and crucial to the present crisis are the sensitive factors of national identity. Revolutions before Angola have faced this matter with difficulty. There is no Angolan *lingua Franca*, nor a language equivalent to Ki-Swahili in East Africa. Angolan revolutionaries speak Portuguese. Adding to the problem of language and therefore of politics is the more complex structure of ethno-linguistic alignments among the Angolan people. Resolving the tensions and contradictions posed by the ethinic factor will be difficult for any of the three Angolan parties. Nevertheless this factor may remain crucial for many years.

If either FNLA or UNITA becomes pre-eminent, most observers feel that neither will take extraordinary steps to de-colonize Angolan society. There are indications that Roberto or Savimbi might try to popularize a personalistic nationalism similar to that practised by Mobutu. It is the kind of leadership that is already failing to provide the promises of freedom in many African states. It seems clear also that neither

Roberto nor Savimbi want to push Angola beyond the type of status-quo regional politics pursued by Zambia and Zaire. Both leaders indicate that they are not opposed to relationships with international capitalists; and if either gets the chance to go too far with capitalism, the Angolans will lose control of their destiny.

Because of MPLA's progressive commitments and its approach to building mass constituencies, it appears the best choice in Angola. And from what is known of the other two parties, MPLA also represents the greatest potential challenge to racism in southern Africa. But if MPLA achieves a military and/or diplomatic victory, it may be forced to assert martial authority over the territory. Although it is the most pan-Angolan and popularly-oriented party, it controls a much smaller territory than the combined areas of FNLA and UNITA. Also, MPLA's big strength comes from Mbundu, who represent only 25 percent of Angola's tribal population. However, because Angolan ethno-cultural alignments have gone unchanged for hundreds of years, anyone of the three groups will face the same problem of trying to net together both a government and a nation in Angola. And of the three, MPLA is best able to solve the problem—by using its organizing ability to build pan-Angolan loyalties on the basis of program and ideological appeal. □

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