

**the complete text of a document
never intended for publication**

THE CIA'S GLOBAL STRATEGY



**INTELLIGENCE
AND
FOREIGN POLICY**

introduction and analysis by

Africa Research Group

Also: CIA Intervention in Africa

\$1.00

PREFACE

There are few people with any degree of political literacy anywhere in the world who have not heard about the CIA. Its notoriety is well deserved even if its precise functions in the service of the American Empire often disappear under a cloud of fictional images or crude conspiratorial theories.

The Africa Research Group is now able to make available the text of a document which helps fill many of the existing gaps in understanding the expanded role intelligence agencies play in planning and executing foreign policy objectives. "Intelligence and Foreign Policy," as the document is titled, illuminates the role of covert action. It enumerates the mechanisms which allow the United States to interfere, with almost routine regularity, in the internal affairs of sovereign nations throughout the world. We are publishing it for many of the same reasons that American newspapers defied government censorship to disclose the secret origins of the War against the people of Indochina. Unlike those newspapers, however, we feel the public has more than a "right to know"; it has the duty to struggle against the system which needs and uses the CIA.


In addition to the document, the second section of the pamphlet examines CIA involvement in a specific setting: its role in the pacification of the Leftist opposition in Kenya, and its promotion of "cultural nationalism" in other areas of Africa. The larger strategies spoken of in the document here reappear as the daily interventions of U.S. policy in action.

The final section of the pamphlet sketches the range of CIA activities. We have included a bibliography to aid further study of the CIA

The CIA is not omnipotent. But we need to know who it is and how it works. We have published this pamphlet to identify the CIA and its strategists as key formulators of foreign policy. Identification is just the beginning: it is a useful tool only if something is done with it.



The Africa Research Group is a radical research/action collective concerned with exposing and fighting American imperialist penetration of Africa. In addition to this pamphlet, ARG publishes a number of original articles about U.S. imperialism and reprints articles written by African radicals. For a complete list of publications including a new study of Southern Africa in the 1970's, Race to Power: the Struggle for Southern Africa; a critique of U.S. Africanists, African Studies in America; and an annotated bibliography, Radical Study Guide to Africa, write to the Group . P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass., 02138.



U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: Six groups comprising Intelligence Board are represented at its meetings by the directors or deputies shown on chart. The forty committee screens covert-action proposals for the President.

The New York Times/Andrew Sabatini Jan. 22, 1971

offer some insights which put those papers in a broader context.

"Intelligence and Foreign Policy" is the text of the minutes of a "confidential discussion group" which met in 1967-1968 under the aegis of the powerful and influential Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Widely known as a key center of foreign policy formulation, the Council literally is where the elite meet. It is here that corporation presidents and top bankers confer with government officials, leading academicians and foreign dignitaries. Currently headed by Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller, the Council publishes books, supports the work of Establishment scholars (Henry Kissinger is one of their prominent alumni), and enables the country's opinionmakers to brief each other on the state of their multinational interests. Even by Council standards, its sessions on Intelligence operations were extraordinary. Though dated, this document from one of those meetings offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive

of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Alan Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to officiate. The accompanying "Who's Who" of the participants offers some details about the well-regarded positions these "leaders" hold in the Established order. In this discussion digest — only one of a still secret series — these power brokers get down to the nitty gritty issues that confront their world. Contrast, if you will, the precision of their concerns with the popular images of intelligence work.

In the mass media, the CIA has been so over-identified with the James Bond — Mission Impossible image (perhaps not undeliberately) that it is difficult to appreciate the full range of its daily mundane work and power. On the left the tendency to associate the CIA only with coups and intrigue also mystifies its role as an administrator of complex political and economic institutions. Coups and assassinations are certainly within the

organization's purview, but so is the task of orchestrating the intelligence-diplomatic-corporate-military-foreign aid penetration of undeveloped countries by the U.S. "Overturning a regime is the easy part of political engineering," writes Richard Cottam, a political scientist privy to CIA operations. "Creating a stable and ideologically compatible regime is infinitely more complex..." In Vietnam, that strategy of shoring up a "compatible regime" has been called "Vietnamization." Elsewhere in the world, it is known as Neo-Colonialism.

As a strategy, neo-colonialism is failing in Vietnam largely because of resistance by a well-organized peoples' army. Of all the government agencies, the CIA appears to have understood that best, and consequently is viewed as a sober counterbalance to the military solutions so ineffectively attempted by the Generals. Elsewhere in the world revolutionary movements are not as advanced or as experienced as the Vietnamese. It is the CIA's mission to keep them that way. This objective underlies Mr. Bissell's enumeration of the ways the U.S. attempts to understand and influence any given country's "internal power balance." His is a program for grooming agents and allies in a way that makes them interdependent and ultimately indistinguishable.


These strategies are designed by an apparatus with immense resources at its disposal. A top-secret budget — estimated to range from \$600 million to several billion annually — permits the CIA to maintain a staff of at least 15,000 Americans along with several thousand non-American agents. At least half of its analysts and researchers have advanced degrees; a third hold doctorates. What the CIA does not know, it can find out through its links with universities, U.S. corporations, and other institutions.

The CIA monitors and indexes most major ongoing scientific and academic research with the aid of a specially designed data processing system. At least half of its daily "intelligence input" comes from open sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio monitoring, specialized journals, etc. Another 35 percent is collected through various electronic devices, ranging from bugs to satellites; and the remaining fifteen percent from agents in the field. This vast and well financed research nexus has its tentacles in virtually every sector of a nation's life: its schools, its media, its unions, its social organizations, and its political institutions.

Why does the United States require such an apparatus? Mr. Bissell doesn't really deal with this question, nor for that matter do the house experts who drafted the Pentagon Papers. The technocrats who serve American power are never ones to raise fundamental questions about the interests served by their global strategies. Unhappily, the periodic clamor for "controlling" the CIA also usually avoids any of the more basic questions about the covert character of American intervention. The latest reform effort underway is a bill introduced by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would force the CIA to share its analyses and projections with Congress. In offering their tentative approval, the editors of the liberal **Washington Post** admitted bluntly that the measure does not regard the CIA as an "ominous operational agency whose work must be checked." With enemies like this the CIA needs few friends.

The CIA clearly is an operational agency: it has established itself plainly on the beaches of Cuba, in the continuing heroin traffic of Indochina, and in its role in the murders of Che Guevara and patrice Lumumba, just to mention some of its better-known achievements. Throughout the world, revolutionary movements know they must "check" CIA dirtywork if they are to win back their countries from elites now dependent on foreign interests. In this country, the repressive apparatus is not only swelling but increasingly equipping itself with the sophisticated gadgetry long associated with counterinsurgency and foreign spying. CIA Director Richard Helms has even been publicly mentioned as a possible successor to the FBI's aging J. Edgar Hoover. Those corporate liberals now aboard the anti-FBI bandwagon would like nothing more than to see the FBI streamlined and professionalized along CIA lines. In other words, the covert action strategies now in use abroad may very well get introduced — if they aren't already — in the domestic political arena.

It will be an uphill battle for U.S. citizens as well as the people of undeveloped countries to check the operations of the CIA. The first step is understanding the scope and purposes of its actions. This document, like the Pentagon Papers, adds to our understanding of how U.S. really conducts foreign policy. Its appearance, like the appearance of the Pentagon Papers, is certain to alarm the keepers of national insecurity. They will redouble their efforts to prevent future leaks. But for this document it is too late. And next time it will be too.



CIA Headquarters - Langley, Va.

"TARGETING" THE CFR

"The Council on Foreign Relations," writes David Horowitz in *Ramparts* (October, 1971) "was created in 1921 with Rockefeller and Carnegie funds, and has since become a permanent caucus and strategic planning association for the establishment internationalists. Composed of the business and foreign policy elite, including such crucial names as Morgan, Rockefeller, Harriman, Root, Hughes, Stimson, McCloy, Lovett, Dulles, Lippmann, Stevenson, Bundy and Kissinger, the Council has been unrivaled over the decades in setting long term U.S. policy goals.

The CFR finances its \$1,000,000 annual budget mainly with foundation grants, fees from major corporations (which it supplies

with the latest foreign policy information), sales of its very influential magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, (and its own book series. The Council's membership is restricted to 1400-700 of whom must live in the immediate area of New York City. It includes top government officials, ranking academics, and corporate executives.)

The CFR recently appointed "alleged" war criminal William Bundy as editor of *Foreign Affairs*. Bundy's appointment provoked a rare internal split with Princeton professor Richard Falk and other left-leaning Council members publicly demanding that the appointment be rescinded. They charge Bundy is guilty of genocide and should be tried, not honored. Council President David Rockefeller predictably sides with Bundy in the dispute.

The following document is the actual transcript of a Council on Foreign Relations discussion group meeting which took place on January 8, 1968. The confidential weekly discussion group meetings sponsored by the Council range over virtually every topic relating to the national interest.

RESTRICTED TO GROUP MEMBERS ONLY
NOT TO BE QUOTED OR CITED

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DISCUSSION MEETING REPORT

INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Discussion Leader: Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Chairman: Douglas Dillon
Secretary: William J. Barnds
Rapporteur: William R. Harris

Third Meeting
January 8, 1968

Digest of Discussion

(This digest has not been edited by the participants.)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

The third meeting of the Discussion Group on Intelligence and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on January 8, 1968, at 5.00 p.m. Present were: Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Discussion Leader; Douglas Dillon, Chairman; William J. Barnds, Secretary; William R. Harris, Rapporteur; George Agree, Frank Altschul, Robert Amory, Jr., Meyer Bernstein, Col. Sidney B. Berry, Jr., Allen W. Dulles, George S. Franklin, Jr., Eugene Fubini, Julius C. Holmes, Thomas L. Hughes, Joseph Kraft, David W. MacEachron, Philip W. Quigg, Harry Howe Ransom, Theodore C. Sorensen, David B. Truman.

* * * * *

The Chairman, Mr. Dillon, opened the meeting, noting that although this entire series of discussion was "off-the-record," the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions.

Mr. Dillon noted that problems involving CIA's relationships with private institutions would be examined at a later meeting, though neither Mr. Bissell nor others should feel restricted in discussion of such problems this evening.

As the session's discussion leader, Mr. Bissell offered a review and appraisal of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy.

Touching briefly upon the question of responsibility, of whether these agencies are instruments of national policy, Mr. Bissell remarked that, in such a group, he needn't elaborate on CIA's responsiveness to national policy; that we could assume that, although CIA participates in policy making (as do other "action agencies," such as AID, the military services and Departments, in addition to the Department of State), CIA was a responsible agency of national policy.

Indeed, in Mr. Bissell's personal experience, CIA's role was more carefully circumscribed and the established limits observed more attentively than in ECA, where Mr. Bissell had previously worked.

The essential control of CIA resided in a Cabinet-level committee, comprising a representative of the White House staff, the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and in recent years the personal participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. Over the years this committee has become a more powerful and effective device for enforcing control. It reviews all new projects, and periodically scrutinizes ongoing projects.

As an interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who meet only once per week, this control group is of limited effectiveness. Were it the only control instrument, Mr. Bissell would view it as inadequate, but in fact this committee is merely the summit of control, with a series of intermediate review procedures as lower levels. Projects are usually discussed in the relevant office of the Assistant Secretary of State, and, if at all related to Defense Department interests, at a similar level in DoD, frequently after consideration at lower levels in these departments. It was rare to take an issue before the Special Group prior to discussion at lower levels, and if there was objection at lower levels, most issues were not proposed to the Special Group -- excepting large projects or key issues, which would be appealed at every level, including the Special Group.

Similar procedures applied in the field. Generally the Ambassador had a right to know of any covert operations in his jurisdiction, although in special cases (as a result of requests from the local Chief of State or the Secretary of State) the chief of station was instructed to withhold information from the Ambassador. Indeed, in one case the restriction was imposed upon the specific exhortation of the Ambassador in question, who preferred to remain ignorant of certain activities.

Of the "blown" operations¹, frequently among the larger ones, most are known to have been approved by the President himself. The U-2 project, for example, was an offshoot of the Land (intelligence) Committee of the Killian panel² on surprise attack; it was proposed as a Killian panel recommendation to the President, supported by USIB³; its procurement, in utmost secrecy, was authorized by the President, and, with the

exception of the first few flights (the initial authorization being to operate for a period of ten days, "weather permitting"), each individual flight was authorized by the President, with participation by the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Covert operations should, for some purposes, be divided into two classifications: (1) Intelligence collection, primarily espionage, or the obtaining of intelligence by covert means; and (2) Covert action, attempting to influence the internal affairs of other nations -- sometimes called "intervention" -- by covert means.

Although these two categories of activity can be separated in theory, intelligence collection and covert action interact and overlap. Efforts have been made historically to separate the two functions but the result has usually been regarded as "a total disaster organizationally." One such attempt was the establishment in the early days of CIA (1948) of the OPC⁴ under Frank G. Wisner⁵ as a separate organ for covert action. Although supported and given cover by the CIA, this organization was independent and Wisner reported directly to the Secretaries of State and Defense. "Beedle" Smith⁶ decided when he became Director of Central Intelligence that, if he were responsible for OPC, he was going to run it and it was merged with the clandestine intelligence organization in such a way that within the combined Clandestine Service there was a complete integration of intelligence collection and covert action functions in each area division.

In addition to our experience with OPC, the Germans and the British for a time during the war had organizations for covert special operations separate from, and inevitably in competition with, their espionage services. In every case the experience has been unfortunate. Although there are many disagreements within CIA on matters of doctrine, the view is unanimous that the splitting of intelligence and covert action services would be disastrous, with resulting competition for recruitment of agents, multiple recruitment of the same agents, additional security risks, and dissipation of effort.

Concerning the first category, intelligence collection, we should ask: (a) What is the scope of "covert intelligence collection"? (b) What intel-

ligence collection functions can best be performed covertly?

The scope of covert intelligence collection includes: (1) reconnaissance; (2) communications and electronic intelligence, primarily undertaken by NSA⁷; and (3) classical espionage, by agents. In gauging their utility, Mr. Bissell ranked (1) the most important, (2) slightly below, and (3) considerably below both (1) and (2).

Although it is less effective, classical espionage is "much the least costly," with the hardware components of recon and NSA activities raising their costs considerably.

[In the after-dinner discussion, an authority on communications-electronics expressed his concurrence in Mr. Bissell's relative rankings. Notwithstanding technological advances in cryptology, the increased sophistication in most cryptosystems assured that (1) (reconnaissance) outranked (2). Another observer noted that the budgets correlated in similar manner, the former speaker concurring and noting that, however surprising, the budgets approximated maximum utility according to cost-effectiveness criteria.]

Postwar U.S. reconnaissance operations began, historically, as "covert" operations, primarily a series of clandestine overflights of Communist territory in Eastern Europe, inaugurated in the early 1950s. These early efforts were followed by the U-2 project, which provided limited coverage but dramatic results.

Now we have reconnaissance satellites. Overhead reconnaissance is one of the most open of "secrets" in international affairs; it is no longer really a "covert activity," and bureaucratic responsibility for it now resides in the Pentagon.

Classical espionage, in the early postwar years, was conducted with special intensity in West Germany, and before the Berlin wall, in that city, which was ideal for the moving of agents in both directions, providing a sizable flow of political and economic intelligence (especially from East Germany).

Throughout the period since the early fifties, of course, the Communist bloc, and more especially the U.S.S.R. itself, has been recognized as the primary target for espionage activities. Circumstances have

greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within the bloc so much of the effort has been directed at bloc nationals stationed in neutral or friendly areas, and at "third country" operations that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as sources of information on the Soviet bloc.

More recently there has been a shift in priorities for classical espionage toward targets in the underdeveloped world. Partly as a result of this change in priorities and partly because of other developments, the scale of the classical espionage effort mounted in Europe has considerably diminished. The U.S.S.R. remains a prime target but Communist China would today be given the same priority.

As to the kinds of information that could be obtained, espionage has been of declining relative importance as a means of learning about observable developments, such as new construction, the characteristics of transportation systems, the strength and deployment of military forces and the like because reconnaissance has become a far more effective collection technique and (except in China) travel is freer and far more extensive than some years ago. It had been hoped that espionage would contribute to the collection of intelligence on Soviet and East European technology, since this is a body of information not readily observable (until embodied in operational systems). Another type of intelligence for which espionage would seem to be the only available technique is that concerning enemy intentions. In practice however espionage has been disappointing with respect to both these types of intelligence. They are for obvious reasons closely guarded and the task is just too difficult to permit results to be obtained with any dependability or regularity. With respect to the former category -- technology -- the published literature and direct professional contacts with the scientific community have been far richer sources.

[A communications-electronics expert interjected the observation that the same reasoning applied to inadequacies in S&T intelligence collection⁸; technology is just too difficult for agents, who are insufficiently trained to comprehend what they observe as the technologies become increasingly complicated.]

As to friendly neutrals and allies, it is usually easier to learn what one wishes by overt contacts, human contacts of overt members of the U.S. mission or private citizens. We don't need espionage to learn British, or even French intentions.

[The speaker was questioned as to whether the other side's espionage was of similarly limited utility, or whether -- with their Philbys⁹ -- they were more successful?]

Mr. Bissell remarked that Soviet Union successes were primarily in counterintelligence, though going back away, the Soviet Union had been more successful in recruiting U.S. scientists.

[The question was raised as to whether Burgess and MacLean constituted merely C.I. successes¹⁰.]

Mr. Bissell thought so.

[In another's recollection, Soviet atomic intelligence efforts had been of substantial assistance in facilitating the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Although it is not possible to estimate with precision the effects of this intelligence, it was Lewis Strauss's guess that atomic intelligence successes allowed the Soviets to detonate their first device at least one and one-half and perhaps as much as two and one-half years before such a test would have been possible with purely indigenous efforts.]

The general conclusion is that against the Soviet bloc or other sophisticated societies, espionage is not a primary source of intelligence, although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin Tunnel¹¹ and several of the high level defectors). A basic reason is that espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and it is enormously difficult to recruit high level agents. A low level agent, even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of communicating with him simply cannot tell you much of what you want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policy makers and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen even of middle rank.

In contrast, the underdeveloped world presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection, simply because governments are much less highly organized; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties,

localities, organizations, and individuals outside of the central governments. The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance.

Why is this relevant?

Changes in the balance of power are extremely difficult to discern except through frequent contact with power elements. Again and again we have been surprised at coups within the military; often, we have failed to talk to the junior officers or non-coms who are involved in the coups. The same problem applies to labor leaders, and others. Frequently we don't know of power relationships, because power balances are murky and sometimes not well known even to the principal actors. Only by knowing the principal players well do you have a chance of careful prediction. There is real scope for action in this area; the technique is essentially that of "penetration," including "penetrations" of the sort which horrify classicists of covert operations, with a disregard for the "standards" and "agent recruitment rules." Many of the "penetrations" don't take the form of "hiring" but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time).

In some countries the CIA representative has served as a close counselor (and in at least one case a drinking companion) of the chief of state. These are situations, of course, in which the tasks of intelligence collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable.

[The question was raised as to why ordinary diplomats couldn't maintain these relationships.]

Mr. Bissell observed that often they could. There were special cases, however, such as in one Republic where the chief of state had a "special relationship" with the senior CIA officer without the knowledge of the U.S. Ambassador because the President of the Republic had so requested it. The CIA man sent reports by CIA channels back to the Secretary of State, but the Ambassador in the field, as agreed by the Secretary of State, wasn't to be informed. In this case, a problem arose when the relevant Assistant

Secretary of State (who had received cables from the CIA man) became the new Ambassador, but the President of the Republic liked the new Ambassador and asked that a "special relationship" be established with him too.

Aside from this unique case, it seems to have been true generally that the Ambassador has to be a formal representative of the United States most of whose relations with the government to which he is accredited are through or with the knowledge of its foreign office. On the other hand, the CIA representative can maintain a more intimate and informal relationship the privacy of which can be better preserved both within the government of the country in question and within the United States government. Moreover, if a chief of state leaves the scene or changes his mind, you can quietly move a station chief, but it could be embarrassing if it were necessary suddenly to recall the U.S. Ambassador.

[Was the previously described relationship really a "covert operation"?)

The "cover" may be to shield visibility from some junior officials or, in the case of a "private adviser" to a chief of state, to shield this fact from politicians of the local government.

[Another observation was that the method of reporting, through CIA channels, constituted one difference and had some influence. A chief of state who knew that CIA's reports would be handled in a smaller circle, with less attendant publicity, might prefer these channels for some communications.]

Concerning the second category, covert action:

The scope of covert action could include: (1) political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and "technical assistance" to political parties; (4) support of private organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) "private" training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary for political action operations designed to overthrow or to support a regime (like the Bay of Pigs and the programs in Laos). These operations can be classified in various ways: by the degree and type of secrecy required by their legality, and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile character.

From whom is the activity to be kept secret? After five days, for

THE CIA

PUZZLE

PIECES OF FOREIGN POLICY

(stump your friends!)



CLASS
ADS
 Apartment, Shabby 2-room on back
 Zagreb. Candy store front. Excellent co-
 name. Grosses 10,000 yearly. Wish
 change for similar set-up in Belgrade. Write
 (su clair) C. Borgyevitch, #83 Grana, Belgrade.
 Home. Available Dec. 10. Sublet until
 when new lease available. Practically new
 carroom equipment, short wave, microfilm cam-
 era. Furniture available. Write c/o Lanig
 American Embassy, Bonn.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT: CS-3/479,154

DATE: 29 June 1961

NO. OF PAGES: 1

REFERENCES: PL

TOPIC: Food Robberies and Begging in
 Avangtung

PLACE & DATE ACQ: Cambodia, Phnom Penh

SOURCE: Anti-Communist Education in Phnom Penh

1. A Chinese woman, named Phnom Penh who visited the Chinese Embassy in April and May 1961, was arrested by the Chinese Communist Customs Office at Phnom Penh. She was arrested on the charge of carrying large quantities of foodstuffs. She was taken to the military camp for political prisoners in Phnom Penh. She was held there for several days before she was released. She was released on the condition that she would not return to Cambodia. She was offered to leave the country if she was willing to work for the Chinese Communist Party. She was offered to work for the Chinese Communist Party in Phnom Penh. She was offered to work for the Chinese Communist Party in Phnom Penh.

from Washington Expose
 by Jack Anderson

Intelligence Agency report
 on begging in Red China

example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians but these operations remained highly secret in the United States, and with good reason. If these overflights had "leaked" to the American press, the U.S.S.R. would have been forced to take action. On a less severe level the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. "Unfortunately, there aren't enough of these situations."

[The remark was interjected that there was another reason for secrecy; if one had to admit to the activity, one would have to show the results, and exactly how good or bad they were.]

Covert operations could be classified by their legality or illegality. Many of them are legal.

They can also be classified as "benign" or "hostile." Most operations in Western Europe have been "benign," though involving the gravest improprieties, and in some cases clearly illegal action. (E.g., covert support of political parties.)

In the case of a large underdeveloped country, for example, money was put into a party's funds without the knowledge of that party. The relatively few economic operations that have been undertaken have been both benign and legal. One of these involved the provision by CIA of interim ostensibly private financing of an overt project pending an overt and official loan by AID. Its purpose was to give AID time for some hard bargaining without causing a complete failure of the transaction. The stereotype, of course, is that all covert operations are illegal and hostile, but this is not really the case.

The role of covert intervention can best be understood by contrast with the overt activities of the United States government. Diplomacy seeks results by bargaining on a government-to-government basis, sometimes openly -- sometimes privately. Foreign economic policy and cultural programs seek to modify benignly the economies of other countries and the climate of opinion within them. Covert intervention is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with fairly short-term objectives in view. An effort to build up the economy of an underdeveloped

country must be subtle, long continued, probably quite costly, and must openly enlist the cooperation of major groups within the country if it is to have much influence. On the other hand an effort to weaken the local Communist party or to win an election, and to achieve results within at most two or three years, must obviously be covert, it must pragmatically use the people and the instrumentalities that are available and the methods that seem likely to work. It is not surprising that the practitioners within the United States government of these two types of intervention differ temperamentally and in their preferences for methods, friends, and ideologies.

The essence of such intervention in the internal power balance is the identification of allies who can be rendered more effective, more powerful, and perhaps wiser through covert assistance. Typically these local allies know the source of the assistance but neither they nor the United States could afford to admit to its existence. Agents for fairly minor and low sensitivity interventions, for instance some covert propaganda and certain economic activities, can be recruited simply with money. But for the larger and more sensitive interventions, the allies must have their own motivation. On the whole the Agency has been remarkably successful in finding individuals and instrumentalities with which and through which it could work in this fashion. Implied in the requirement for a pre-existing motivation is the corollary that an attempt to induce the local ally to follow a course he does not believe in will at least reduce his effectiveness and may destroy the whole operation. It is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor, and cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the Agency's objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective.

Turning to relations with other agencies, Mr. Bissell was impressed by the degree of improvement in relations with the State Department. Seen from the Washington end, there has been an increase in consultation at the country-desk level, more often at the Bureau level or the Assistant Secretary of State level as the operation shapes up. The main problem some five to six years ago was not one of responsibility or authority but of

cover arrangements.

Mr. Bissell provided a brief critique of covert operations, along the following lines:

That aspect of the Agency's operations most in need of change is the Agency's use and abuse of "cover." In this regard, the "background paper" for this session raised many cover-oriented questions.

On disclosure of private institutional support of late, it is very clear that we should have had greater compartmenting of operations.

If the Agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have "blown" cannot be resurrected.

We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of "cut-outs."¹² CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected.

If various groups hadn't been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than occurred.

The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied.

The problem of Agency operations overseas is frequently a problem for the State Department. It tends to be true that local allies find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American -- since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee. There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the Embassy compound, if only for local "command post" and communications requirements.

Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture.

The United States should make increasing use of non-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American

staff. As we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover; to see how far we can go with non-U.S. nationals, especially in the field. The CIA might be able to make increasing use of non-nationals as "career agents" that is with a status midway between that of the classical agent used in a single compartmented operation perhaps for a limited period of time and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations and well informed of the Agency's capabilities. Such career agents should be encouraged with an effort at indoctrination and training and with a prospect of long-term employment to develop a second loyalty and they could of course never be employed in ways that would conflict with their primary loyalties toward their own countries. This still leaves open, however, a wide range of potential uses. The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and is likely to be increasingly circumscribed.

These suggestions about unofficial cover and career agents illustrate and emphasize the need for continuing efforts to develop covert action capabilities even where there is no immediate need to employ them. The central task is that of identifying potential indigenous allies -- both individuals and organizations -- making contact with them, and establishing the fact of a community of interest.

There is some room for improvement, Mr. Bissell thought, in the planning of covert action country by country. Covert intervention is probably most effective in situations where a comprehensive effort is undertaken with a number of separate operations designed to support and complement one another and to have a cumulatively significant effect. The Agency probably finds itself involved in too many small covert action operations having no particular relationship with one another and having little cumulative impact.

There is no doubt that some covertly funded programs could be undertaken overtly, Mr. Bissell thought. Often activities have been initiated

through CIA channels because they could be started more quickly and informally but do not inherently need to be secret. An example might be certain exchange of persons programs designed to identify potential political leaders and give them some exposure to the United States. It should be noted, however, that many such innocent programs are more effective if carried out by private auspices than if supported officially by the United States government. They do not need to be covert but if legitimate private entities such as the foundations do not initiate them, there may be no way to get them done except by covert support to "front" organizations.

Many propaganda operations are of declining effectiveness. Some can be continued at slight cost, but some of the larger ones (radio, etc.) are pretty well "blown" and not inexpensive. USIA doesn't like them, and although they did have a real justification some ten to fifteen years ago as the voice of refugees and emigrés, groups which also have declined in value, and in the view of some professionals are likely to continue declining in value.

In his last two years in the Agency, Mr. Bissell felt that the Clandestine Services could have been smaller. Indeed, steps were taken to reduce their size. It is impossible to separate the issue of size from personnel and cover problems. It was Mr. Bissell's impression that the Clandestine Services were becoming increasingly a career service, too much like the Foreign Service (personnel looking to a succession of overt posts in a safe career). One result was the circumscription of local contacts. There was a subtle change taking place, which threatened to degrade some of CIA's former capabilities. Formally, the CIA had a staff with a wide diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and capabilities. Its members were recruited from every sort of public and private occupation. If this diversity and variety is lost through the process of recruiting staff members from college, training them in a fairly standard pattern, and carrying them through orderly planned careers in the Agency, one of the organization's most valuable attributes will disappear.

Finally, Mr. Bissell remarked on large operations. It is self-evident that if an operation is too large, it can't remain a deeply kept secret. At best, one can then hope for a successful formal disclaimer. The worst

GOLDWATER SAYS C.I.A. IS FINANCING SOCIALISM IN U.S.

Clark Attacks Secrecy
Gifts to Right or Left—
Jackson Backs Agency

By ROY REED

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26

Barry Goldwater demanded today to know why the Central Intelligence Agency had been financing "left-wing" organizations but not conservative groups such as the Young Republicans.

Helms Defends the C.I.A. As Vital to a Free Society

Rare Speech Discloses
Some Russians Aided
U.S. in Cuban Crisis

Excerpts from Helms address
will be found on Page 30.

By RICHARD HALLORAN


Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14

The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, vigorously defended his agency today as necessary to the survival of a democratic society and asked the nation to "take it with faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

Footnote: One of the CIA's greatest triumphs, heretofore untold, was fishing out some of the late Premier Nikita Khrushchev's excrement before it was flushed down the toilet. The great bathroom caper was pulled during his 1959 state visit to the U.S. The filched feces was eagerly analyzed by CIA medics who concluded that Khrushchev then was in excellent health for a man of his age and rotundity.

Thursday, Sept. 16, 1971



Where does this piece fit?



Stephen Goodman is an economist who specializes in Southern Africa research for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

AFRICA REPORT, JUNE 1970

of many faults of the Bay of Pigs operation was excessive reliance on the operations's disclaimability.

It has been a wise decision that operations of that scale not be undertaken by the Agency, except in theaters such as Vietnam, where the stakes and standards are different.

Covert action operations are generally aimed at short-term goals and the justification for the control machinery is that bias of operators to the short run can be compensated for in the review process. Mr. Bissell can conceive of no other way to force greater attention to long-range costs and values. One alternative is that caution will lead to ineffectuality. "Operational types" will be risk-takers; the counterweight is, and should be, applied by the other agencies in government.

* * * * *

In the discussion following Mr. Bissell's talk, the issue of CIA cover was cited as among the more interesting from the perspective of a former State Department appointee. The size of covert operations known to other governments was a continuing embarrassment, and the overseas staff maintained for these purposes and known to host governments was a similar source of embarrassment. From time to time, efforts were made to reduce overseas staff; although agreement in principle was readily forthcoming, the particulars of staff reduction were difficult to obtain.

A former member of the Special Group¹³ (who served eighteen months on that committee) agreed with Mr. Bissell's earlier remarks on control mechanisms, insofar as they applied to review of new projects. These received most careful scrutiny. Insofar as the Special Group considered ongoing projects during this eighteen-month period, it was recalled that there was not any systematic, thorough procedure for such review, the committee finding itself busy with all the new proposals. If it were true that most operations were most useful for short-term goals, then perhaps there should be greater attention to review of ongoing projects, and termination of more projects earlier than in past practice.

A continuing problem which worries one former official was that con-

cerning the "charter" of CIA, the public expression of which, in the National Security Act of 1947, was necessarily vague. CIA's full "charter" has been frequently revised, but it has been, and must remain secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for the charter and to question the Agency's authority to undertake various activities. The problem of a secret "charter" remains as a curse, but the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution.

Another former official remarked on the inadequacy of clandestine intelligence as a means of obtaining enemy intentions. Sherman Kent (former Chairman, Board of National Estimates) distinguishes "the knowable" from "the unknowable," and we should recognize that much remains impossible to know, including, frequently, enemy intentions.

Respecting the reduction of overseas personnel and programs of declining utility, it was noted that the curtailment of over-age and unproductive personnel was a thorny issue. Recognizing the likelihood of appeal to the President and the absence of widespread participation in a manpower review, a former budget official arranged the participation of the Bureau of the Budget, CIA, FIAB¹⁴, and relevant Under Secretaries in considerations of budgetary modifications. What emerged was an inertia, partly the inertia of the cold war. Parenthetically, a couple of much-criticized public media projects (cited by name) had proven of value, as the fall of Novotny in Czechoslovakia suggested¹⁵, but a number of ineffective programs were retained. The problem was to free the budget, to do something new, in the place of old programs, not to reduce the budget, but unfortunately, the chiefs in CIA wanted to control their working capital. If it were only possible to tell these officials not to worry, that we were setting aside \$xxx million for CIA, and merely seeking to encourage better use of the same dollar amounts, then it would have been possible to move around some money. The big "iffy" question was a particular (named) foundation, which received a sizable allocation. Finally, everything was cleared up, and the next big review was scheduled, but never really effected as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis. The review was geared up in 1963 once again.

Another observer, drawing upon work with the "combined cryptologic budget" and private industry, concluded that it was usually impossible to

cut a budget; usually it was only possible to substitute a new project for an old one.

The Chairman suggested a number of questions: What are the effects of covert operations being blown? What can be done to improve the image of the Agency? What can be done to improve relations between the Agency and the press?

It was thought that a journalist's perspective might aid in discussing these questions, but a number of prior issues were thought to require attention:

(1) The matter of size required attention. In any government agency size can become a problem; increasingly there is a realization that the government is too big and "an ever-swelling tumor." At some point there will have to be a fairly sharp cutback in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

(2) One was not overly impressed by the use of CIA in the developing world; in any case, we could have increased confidence in the range of choice in most developing areas. Conversely, it might not be as easy as Mr. Bissell suggested to know the power structure in more developed states, in Western Europe and Japan.

[A query was interjected: Why should we have increasing confidence in the range of choice in developing areas?

Perhaps there are less variations than we earlier thought. "Things are evening out and we can live more comfortably."]

(3) Where do you bury the body? One is not completely convinced by citation of the experience with Frank Wisner's OPC. We could get around the responsibility issue raised by "Beedle" Smith; we could get around conflicting chains of command.

(4) Related to (3). Maybe there is a cost to be paid for having covert operations under CIA. Perhaps we could have intelligence collection under State and covert operations under the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In response to items (3) and (4) some earlier remarks were clarified: one would not claim that the operational side of CIA need be where it is. Rather, one would inveigh against the splitting of covert intelligence collection and covert operations. One could, however, split the opera-

tional side from the analytic side. This is a plausible case, a solution for which could be worked out (though, on balance, the speaker was against it). But to split the operational side -- as the German case, the British case for a time, and our own for a time suggested -- would be disastrous.

Remarking on labor activities, one participant stated that before May 1967 it was common knowledge that there had been some CIA support for labor programs, but first Ramparts and then Tom Braden spelled out this support in public. Those in international labor affairs were dismayed, and certain newspapermen compounded their difficulties by confusing AID with CIA, and claiming that the AFL-CIO's Free Labor Development program was tainted.

Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected. First, there hasn't been any real trouble with international labor programs. Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U.S. labor programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly, these foreign labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help.

Worse yet, Vic Reuther¹⁶, who had been alleging that others were receiving CIA money, and whose brother's receipt of \$50,000 from CIA in old bills was subsequently disclosed by Tom Braden, still goes on with his charges that the AFL-CIO has taken CIA money. Here again, no one seems to listen. "The net result has been as close to zero as possible. We've come to accept CIA, like sin." So, for example, British Guiana's labor unions were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been almost no damage.

A former State Department official offered some remarks on intelligence operations as seen from the field. He concurred in Mr. Bissell's remarks on "cover." The initial agreement between the Agency and State was intended to be "temporary", but "nothing endures like the ephemeral."

How are Agency officials under "official cover" specially equipped to handle covert operations? If the Agency station chief has a "special relationship" with the chief of state, one would submit that it was because the Ambassador wasn't worth a damn. Moreover, such a "special relation-

ship" created the risk that the chief of state, seeing two channels to Washington, could play one off against another. Some foreign statesmen are convinced that an "invisible government" really exists, and this impression shouldn't be allowed.

Also, prejudice in favor of covertly obtained intelligence is a troublesome thing.

One way to overcome the misconceptions is to make CIA a truly secret service, and not merely an agency duplicating the Foreign Service. With money shortages CIA has often filled a vacuum, but this does not make it right.

Another questioned the discussion leader's proposal for greater utilization of non-U.S. nationals. How could you get non-nationals to do the job and to develop loyalty to the United States?

One was not sure that it was doable, but it was worth trying. It would be more prone to work if you used a national of country B to work in country C, if what you are asking is neither (1) against the interests of country B, nor (2) nefarious. You do need some cover, and the natural vehicle is an organization with non-American nationals.

Another observer was struck by the lack of interest in the "blowing" of covertly sponsored radio activities. Why has there been so little interest in these activities, in contrast to the immense concern over the CIA-NSA relationship? One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by penetration of U.S. institutions. "The public doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors." Does this suggested expansion in use of private institutions include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?

In response, attention was drawn to the clear jurisdictional boundaries between CIA and the FBI, CIA being proscribed from "internal security functions." CIA was adverse to surveillance of U.S. citizens overseas (even when specifically requested), and adverse to operating against in the United States, excepting against foreigners here as transients. One might want CIA to expand its use of U.S. private corporations, but

for objectives outside the United States. It was recalled that the Agency funding of the National Student Association was, in every case, for activities outside the United States or for activities with overseas objectives.

Why, we might ask, should the U.S. government use nongovernmental institutions more, and why should it deal with them in the United States? If dealings are overseas, then it is necessary to maintain an overseas bureaucracy to deal with the locals. It is also necessary to engage in communications in a possibly hostile environment. If one deals through U.S. corporations with overseas activities, one can keep most of the bureaucratic staff at home and can deal through the corporate headquarters, perhaps using corporate channels for overseas communications (including classified communications). In this opinion, the policy distinction should involve the use to which the private institution is put, not whether or not to use private institutions.

In another view it was desirable for this discussion group to examine different types of institutions. For example, should CIA use educational institutions? Should CIA have influenced the selection of NSA officers?

One was not aware that CIA had influenced the election of NSA officers; if it had, it shouldn't have done so, in one's opinion.

Mightn't it be possible to deal with individuals rather than organizations?

Yes, in many cases this would be preferable. It depended upon skill in the use of our operating capabilities.

As an example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence, a former official noted the clandestine acquisition of Khrushchev's "secret speech" in February 1956. The speech was too long for even Khrushchev to memorize, and over one hundred people had heard it. We targeted it, and by secret means acquired a copy. The State Department released the text and The New York Times printed it in full. The repercussions were felt around the world, and particularly within the Communist bloc. The Soviets felt unable to deny the authenticity of the text we released, and the effects upon many of the satellite states was profound.

It was the beginning of the split in the Communist movement. If you get a precise target, and go after it, you can change history.

Another observer was troubled by the earlier-expressed point about increased use of private institutions. Most demoralizing in the academic community was the sense of uncertainty about institutions with which individuals were associated. There is a profound problem in penetrating institutions within the country when there is a generalized loss of faith, a fear that nothing is what it seems.

It was noted that the next session, on February 15, 1968, would concentrate upon relations with private institutions.

To one observer, part of this solution would be found in the political process, involving extragovernmental contacts in the sphere of political action.

In response to a query, the relative utilities of types of intelligence data were reviewed. Most valuable was reconnaissance, then communications-electronic intelligence, then classical espionage.

We have forgotten, it was noted, the number one over-all source, namely, overt data.


The meeting was adjourned at 9:15 p.m., and participants were reminded of the next meeting on February 15.

William R. Harris
Rapporteur



Footnotes to "Intelligence and Foreign Policy"

1. 'Blown Operation' — an operation is said to be 'blown' when it fails or loses its cover — its secrecy.
2. The Land Committee of the Killian panel — Edwin Land is the President of the Polaroid Corporation. President Kennedy appointed him to serve as one of five members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under the chairmanship of James Killian, the honorary Chairman of M.I.T. and a director at Polaroid. While a member of the Board, Land is credited with helping to develop cameras for use in U-2 spy planes. Land has been in the public spotlight recently when a Black workers movement at Polaroid demanded that he withdraw his company from South Africa. He didn't.
3. USIB — this refers to the United States Intelligence Board. It was set up by a secret order from President Eisenhower in 1956. Its purpose is to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates. Richard Helms is presently e Chairman of the Board which has one representative from each intelligence agency. Together these agencies are called the 'intelligence community.'
4. O.P.C. — this was the Office of Plans Coordination within the CIA which conducted secret operations which were small enough to be plausibly deniable. This office was merged into the Plans Division of the CIA in 1951.
5. Frank Wisner — A WWII intelligence officer, brought to the OPC from the State Department. He quit the CIA in 1962 and shot himself three years later.
6. 'Beedle' Smith — This is the nickname of General Walter Bedell Smith, the second director of the CIA.
7. N.S.A. — This refers to the National Security Agency which conducts electronic surveillance.
8. S&T intelligence collection — This is thought to stand for scientific and technological intelligence collection.
9. Kim Philby was a high ranking member of British intelligence who was a counterspy for the Soviet Union. Philby was consulted for assistance when the CIA was formed.
10. Burgess and McClean — These men were part of the Philby spy ring within the British intelligence service. Several books have been written about their work which constituted counter-intelligence victories for the service.
11. The Berlin Tunnel was a CIA project directed by Richard Helms himself in 1955. It involved a 24 foot deep tunnel running from West to East Berlin. Its purpose was to tap the main Soviet telephone trunk lines connecting Moscow and the East German Government. The operation was "blown".
12. "Cut-Outs" — this expression is used for projects backed by the CIA which cannot be traced back to the CIA.
13. The Special Group — This is a committee within the National Security Council structure which plans policy in crises and reviews proposals for covert action.
14. FIAB — The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is a civilian review board appointed by the President and usually composed of corporate representatives. Such men as Dr. James Killian of IBM, GM, and MIT; Edward Land of Polaroid; and Clark Clifford have served on it.
15. Unfortunately this veiled reference doesn't tell us much about the CIA's role in the fall of Novotony nor exactly what 'public media projects' are. Perhaps someone in the CIA will write in to clarify this matter.
16. Until his recent retirement, Vic Reuther headed up the International Affairs office of the United Auto Workers in Washington. He's the brother of the late Walter Reuther.



Richard M. Bissell, Jr.



ALTSCHUL, Frank

Vice President and secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Board of Directors of the General American Investors Corporation.

AMORY, Robert Jr.

Deputy Director of the CIA from 1952 to 1962. Amory has been, as well, a member of the National Security Council Planning Board and head of the international division of the Bureau of the Budget.

BERNSTEIN, Meyer

Director of the Department of International Labour Affairs of the Steelworkers Union. Bernstein is an expert on the German steel industry.

BISSELL, Richard M.

An economist and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Bissell worked in the CIA from 1954 to 1962, as a Special Assistant to the Director, and then as Deputy Director of Plans. He has, as well, been a professor of economics at MIT, staff member of the Ford Foundation and President of the Institute for Defense Analysis. He is on the board of the Social Science Research Council, and a director of U.S. Steel and Fortune Magazine.

DILLON, C. Douglas

An investment banker. Dillon served as Undersecretary of State from 1959 to 1960, and as Secretary of the Treasury from 1960 to 1965.

DULLES, Allen (deceased)

Former Deputy Director (from 1951 to 1953) and Director (from 1953 to 1961) of the CIA. He was also a director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

FRANKLIN, George S.

Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations. Franklin is trustee of a number of educational institutions, including Roberts College in Istanbul and the International House in New York. He served in the Division of World Trade Intelligence of the State Department during World War II.

FUBINI, Eugene

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, charged with defense and engineering (1961 to 1965). Fubini's work has centered around the development of electronics techniques, for private corporations (such as CBS) and for the government. During World War II he worked on intelligence reconnaissance and radar countermeasures. Following the war, he worked with the Airborne Instruments Lab. In 1961 he was appointed a vice president at I.B.M.

HARRIS, William

An Associate of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Harris has just completed a massive bibliography on intelligence, to be published shortly by Harvard University Press.

HOLMES, Julius C.

Former Ambassador to Iran (appointed by Kennedy in 1961). Holmes served in various diplomatic service posts from 1925 to 1945. In 1955, after an indictment against him for violations of the laws governing the war surplus disposal program was dismissed by the Justice Department, he was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

HUGHES, Thomas L.

Director of intelligence and research for the State Department since 1963 (Deputy Director from 1961 to 1963). Hughes was formerly a professor of political science and international relations. He served as aide to Sen. Hubert Humphrey from 1955 to 1958, and to Rep. Chester Bowles from 1959 to 1960.

KRAFT, Joseph

Syndicated columnist and member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

QUIGG, Philip W.

Former editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

RANSOM, Harry Howe

Professor of Government at Vanderbilt University and the leading academic authority on government intelligence. Ransom is the author of *Central Intelligence and National Security*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1958.) and, most recently, *The Intelligence Establishment*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1969).

SORENSEN, Theodore

Former assistant and special council to John F. Kennedy. Sorenson is presently with Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison, and is editor-at-large and a director of the *Saturday Review*.

TRUMAN, David B.


President of Mt. Holyoke College, appointed in 1969. Truman was formerly Dean (1963 to 1967) and then Vice President and Provost (1967 to 1969) of Columbia College. He is a director of the Social Science Research Council and of the Hudson Institute. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the ACLU.

Note; we have no information about William Barnds, George Agree, Col. Sidney Berry and David MacEachron.



The CIA Wheel

This is How the Money Goes Round



The CIA In Africa

"Intelligence and Foreign Policy" makes clear that the CIA's vision is imperial in scope. But the agency works out the US government's global strategy country by individual country, continent by continent. The following study places the CIA's covert operations in a specific context: Africa in the 1960's.

The document emphasized that there has never been any real distinction between the CIA's intelligence (i.e., information-gathering) and its action functions. In target countries — virtually the entire Third World— the CIA staff is integrated into a coordinated "multi-agency country team," often in leadership positions. Its operatives often direct the overall thrust of US penetration into the target country, seeking to fashion a strategy of "cumulative impact." The idea is simple: create or reinforce pro-Western institutions which individually might not suffice but which cumulatively direct the country's economic and political direction. Towards this end, CIA-funded scholars such as those at M.I.T.

have worked to rationalize foreign aid as a policy weapon. A network of organizations — teachers, students, cultural, trade union, etc. — were founded or covertly subsidized through various conduits. Many of these sought to co-opt important African leaders and acted as channels of US influence.

This article by Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara and David Kolodney was originally titled: "The CIA As An Equal Opportunity Employer." It first appeared in **Ramparts** and was later reprinted in the Black Panther newspaper and elsewhere. It spotlights the way the CIA has promoted black cultural nationalism to reinforce neo-colonialism in Africa. Activists in the black colony **within** the US can easily see its relevance to their own situation, as in many cases the same techniques and occasionally the same individuals are used to control the political implications of Afro-American culture. In sum, the article reveals how reactionary nationalism can serve imperialism when revolutionary nationalism represents a threat to the US empire.

ERRATA: Writing about the CIA is always hazardous; records are unavailable and the CIA deliberately leaks what it calls "disinformation" to cover its tracks and confuse its enemies. The CIA's own attempts at political camouflage are aided inadvertently by many principled liberals and even radicals. The liberals are so preoccupied with the odiousness of the CIA's secrecy that they often entirely miss the "Agency's" political purposes. Radicals have often resorted to unanalytical muckraking or rhetorical CIA-baiting which obscures the real game and, occasionally, assists the CIA in its characteristic strategy of heightening inter-group tensions within radical movements.

Our own factual check of the **Ramparts** article has unearthed some minor errors in details which in no way discredit its argument:

1. The height, birth date and facial appearance of James Harris are misrepresented.
2. Harris worked for the N.S.A. and W.U.S. before they received CIA subsidies; he stayed on as consultants to both, however, while they were heavily CIA-backed.
3. The CIA's Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs was not headed by Amory Houghton, President of Corning Glass, but rather by **Arthur Houghton**, a Director of Corning Glass.

—ARG



I. THE CIA AS IMPRESARIO

IT WAS THE SPRING OF 1963, and at first glance it looked like a revolutionary round table in Havana. The list of participants in the conference read like a Who's Who of the Southern African independence movement: Oliver Tambo, acting president of the African National Congress of South Africa; Eduardo Mondlane (recently assassinated), leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front; Jariretundu Kozonguisi, president of the Southwest African National Union; leaders from virtually every other political faction of these countries as well as Zimbabwe, Angola, and Zambia. They were all wanted men at home, engaged in directing armed struggles against hated colonial regimes. But the meeting hadn't been convened by Fidel Castro. In fact, it took place at Howard University in Washington, D.C.

The architects of a Southern Africa liberation movement had agreed to come to Washington because the convening organization was a black group meeting at the nation's leading black university. The American Society for African Culture (AMSAC), composed of important black American scholars, writers, artists and professionals, was the most prestigious and articulate of all black groups interested in advancing African culture and building bonds between U.S. blacks and their African brothers. This conference was AMSAC's fourth international meeting in as many years. It looked like the beginnings of a black revolutionary's dream-come-true, the linking up of African and Afro-American freedom struggles. But what most participants didn't know was that the whole affair had been sponsored by the CIA.

The Howard University meeting provided an ideal opportunity for the CIA to look over the top African revolutionaries while providing an illusion of U.S. concern for their cause. AMSAC itself had begun as a way of keeping an eye on the resurgent African independence movement. It was organized in the aftermath of the first International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists, held in Paris in late 1955. This conference had been convened by a group of African exiles and European intellectuals organized into the Société Africaine de Culture (SAC), which published the journal *Présence Africaine*, featuring men like Camus, Sartre, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire. But giving impetus to an organization like AMSAC was by no means on SAC's agenda.

SAC had asked the late Richard Wright, the black American writer self-exiled in Paris, to invite some American Negroes to the international gathering. Wright did so, although many whom he invited were unable to afford the trip. Those who did show up were among the most influential of America's black bourgeoisie, and many later became influential in AMSAC. Headed by Dr. Horace Mann Bond, a leading black educator and father of Georgia legislator Julian Bond, the American delegation included Mercer Cook, who later received the ambassadorship to Niger during the Johnson Administration; John A. Davis, later to become head of AMSAC; James Ivy, editor of the NAACP magazine, *Crisis*, and eventually AMSAC treasurer; Thurgood Marshall, and Duke Ellington. These were AMSAC's founding fathers.

At the outset of its career, AMSAC shared its New York offices with the Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs, a largely paper organization founded some years earlier by the CIA, specializing in information about and analysis of racial

problems affecting international relations. The council merged formally with AMSAC in 1957, and acted as the major financial conduit to the new group, which was not officially incorporated until February 1960. The CIA conduits reporting contributions to AMSAC over the years included the Pappas Charitable Trust (\$65,000), and these foundations: Marshall (\$25,000); Benjamin Rosenthal (\$26,000); J. Frederick Brown (\$103,000); Colt (\$47,000); C. H. Dodge (\$28,000); Rabb (\$40,000), and Ronthelym (\$20,000). AMSAC's statement of purpose declared an intention "to study the effects of African culture on American life; to examine the cultural contributions of African peoples to their societies; to appraise the conditions affecting the development of ethnic national and universal culture; to cooperate with international organizations with a view to . . . exchange of information on African culture. . . ."

"I joined AMSAC because I thought it would be really pursuing the ideas advocated by the Société Africaine de Culture," Harold Cruse, author of *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, told us, "but I was quickly turned off when they began to move in another political direction. It was composed of a combination of careerists, slick articulate operators with little conviction, and leaders of the integrationist Negro intellectual establishment. They were liberals without a base whose legitimacy came entirely from their association with established groups like AMSAC. I even doubt they were capable of thinking this kind of operation up themselves."

It will never be clear to what extent the "AMSAC Afros," as Cruse calls them, did think up the organization for themselves; but even if they did, they certainly didn't pay for it. That was taken care of by the CIA, which realized that AMSAC's brand of non-radical cultural nationalism could be useful abroad and perhaps eventually at home. The organization's 1962 conference report declared, "American Negroes do not hold important posts in the great corporations doing business in Africa. Nor can it be said that they seek to make or have been given the opportunity of making money in Africa. Mainly they bring service and love to the complex of Afro-American relations." This they indeed did, but often without knowing what and whose ends they were serving.

AMSAC's cultural and educational programs—the frosting on the political cake the CIA was serving up to emerging Africa—involved some of America's most prominent black artists: Odetta, Randy Weston, Nina Simone, Lionel Hampton and Langston Hughes. The organization also sponsored visits to Africa by American Negro scholars, writers, lawyers and intellectuals. AMSAC's representatives included scholar Saunders Redding, the man whom Harold Cruse describes as the chief of intellectual spokesmen for the American Negro establishment; artists Jacob Lawrence and Elton Fax, and former NAACP counsel Robert Carter. Men like these provided the cultural camouflage which not only disguised the political nature of AMSAC's work, but deepened its impact on Africans as well. But the careers of others, far less celebrated, tell more about the real AMSAC enterprise.

II. BLACK CIA AGENT

ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING case studies of AMSAC's use of its Afros centers on the man who was the organization's assistant executive director from its early days through 1961—a tall, frequently goateed,

black CIA agent named James T. ("Ted") Harris.

Born in Philadelphia in 1924, Harris won a DAR medal for good scholarship at La Salle College. After service during the war, he returned to La Salle where he built a reputation as a concerned and outspoken liberal. Visible, articulate black collegians were a rarity in those days, and Harris' reputation grew nationally when he became involved in student politics. In 1948, when the newly formed National Student Association elected him president, he quickly won admission to the inner circle, the CIA's "old boy network" which came to dominate NSA activities for almost 20 years.

Early in the '50s, Harris moved to Geneva, where he served as assistant secretary-general for the CIA-supported World University Service. From that post he returned to the U.S. for more training. After receiving a master's degree at Princeton's Public Affairs Institute, where he studied on a CIA Whitney scholarship, he was off to Cairo for field experience, this time on a Ford Foundation Research Fellowship. He returned to the NSA after his stint in Egypt, to run the important CIA-funded Foreign Student Leadership Program to "assist active student leaders in the Third World." Through this job, Harris came to know and befriend many African students in the U.S. His next assignment followed naturally. He moved on to AMSAC.

Harris was active in AMSAC through 1961. In that year, while the U.S. was desperately trying to stabilize a friendly national government in the Congo, Harris went back to the Ford Foundation, which made him secretary-general of a Ford-funded National School for Law and Administration in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). Harris spent two years there, shaping an educational program which, as he was later to tell AMSAC's Howard University conference on Southern Africa, provided a way to instruct the Congolese in Western administrative techniques. Congolese sources strongly suspected that the school also served as a conduit for CIA money which was pumped into the pockets of selected Congolese politicians. As soon as a dependable Congolese was groomed to take over the school, Harris returned to New York to help the Ford Foundation shape its overseas development programs for Africa and the Middle East. In 1964, he left Ford to direct education and training for the Corning Glass Works in New York, working under Amory Houghton, the man who had headed the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs (FYSA), the CIA's principal agency for funding its international student programs. In 1966, while remaining a consultant to Houghton, Harris moved on to join yet another CIA creation, the African-American Institute. At the AAI, he directed field programs, traveling frequently to Africa.

By January 1969, when Harris left AAI and international work, he had compiled an impressive record. He had traveled to all of Western Europe and to the Middle East, to India, Pakistan and 23 countries in northern, eastern, western and central Africa (as well as 49 states of the U.S.), often on speaking tours. His languages included Arabic, French, Italian and Spanish. He was a member of the powerful and prestigious Council on Foreign Relations and the NAACP, and a director of an offshoot of CORE, the Scholarship, Education and Defense Fund for Racial Equality.

The CIA backed AMSAC and supported people like Harris because its strategists had a sophisticated understanding of how a certain brand of African cultural nationalism could be

dangerous to America's international objectives. They realized that cultural radicalism often stimulated political radicalism and that cultural issues, especially in the emerging African states, were often latent with explosive political implications. Maintaining an effective political presence in resurgent Africa thus required an active cultural dimension, and the CIA took an early interest in attempting to control the emerging cultural-political elites and, as much as possible, making sure that their concerns stayed at arm's length from revolution. The Agency saw cultural nationalism and new notions of "negritude" as alternatives to the type of revolutionary culture called for by such radicals as Frantz Fanon, who once said, "It is around the people's struggles that African Negro culture takes on substance and not around songs, poems, and folklore."

The architects of the CIA's covertly-backed cultural program selectively encouraged those black writers most friendly to the West. Through its program of enlightened patronage, these writers found a ready outlet for their work in a whole series of cultural magazines in and about Africa, funded by CIA-backed foundations: Africa Report (African-American Institute); Transition and The New African (Congress of Cultural Freedom); Classic (Farfield Foundation); and others. And finally, AMSAC had its own magazine, African Forum. The writers favored by these publications were not agents, but simply men whose politics were acceptable to the American culture brokers. And what Fanon later called "a charmed circle of mutual admiration at the summit" quickly emerged. Patronage and promotion won international recognition for the CIA's cultural elite while providing a cultural framework important to the directed development of African consciousness.

The CIA did not become the leading international impresario of black culture for the aesthetic pleasure of the experience. The great question during the heyday of AMSAC and similar organizations was what formal African independence would actually mean once it became a reality. And, at some point, the CIA decided that the development of a safe cultural nationalism was critically important to U.S. interests in Africa. It was essential not only as a way of keeping cultural energies in line, but primarily (though the two are intertwined) to channel the explosive force of nationalism itself in directions suitable to the U.S. The tide of decolonization rolling over the continent could open the way for a new American Empire to break the old imperial monopoly of the European order that had controlled Africa. Or it could produce the kind of radical nationalism which would guard the new Open Door with inhospitable vigilance, and might even make accommodations with the communist powers. Thus the CIA made every effort to promote a kind of cultural nationalism in Africa which would be satisfied with the removal of the most obvious forms of foreign domination; one in which concern for cultural integrity did not reinforce, but rather replaced, demands for basic economic and political autonomy.

This was the scope of the enterprise in which American blacks became indispensably involved, through AMSAC and other vehicles. But to appreciate the effect of this misalliance on African development and to see what the alternative of cultural nationalism meant in its social and political context in Africa (and could mean in the United States, if the Nixon Administration is successful), one must also view the operation from the receiving end. A particularly vivid example of America's ideological manipulation of African society in transition

is seen in the role played by the CIA in shaping the nationalist movement in Kenya.

III. THE CIA IN KENYA

THE NIGHTMARE OF PRIMAL BLACK SAVAGERY that pervades white fantasies about Africa has been evoked most vividly by Kenya, scene of the bloodlust and carnage of the Mau Mau. This myth of the Mau Mau (as the Kenya Peace and Land Army was known in the West) is the inverse of the reality. Throughout the entire Mau Mau "Emergency," fewer than 100 whites were killed—including 57 counterinsurgency police; among Africans the toll was greater than 11,000. Colonial security forces, like the American "scalphunters," hunted men for bounty. Tens of thousands of Africans were herded into British detention camps. In one roundup, 35,000 were arrested in a single day.

The Mau Mau myth and similar racist inventions still hold firm in the popular mind, but responsible agencies of the U.S. government cannot afford to hamper their own effectiveness with such unsophisticated views. Thus, in the decade preceding Kenyan independence and since that time, the CIA has provided carefully selective support to elements of the same independence movement which most Americans could think of only with revulsion and horror.

The United States may seem in any case to be an unlikely supporter of national liberation struggles in the Third World. But the fact is that U.S. policy has never stopped at sponsoring black militancy, whether of the Mau Mau or of CORE, when it served the right purpose. As Vice President, Nixon reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following his 1957 African tour: "American interests in the future are so great as to justify us in not hesitating even to assist the departure of the colonial powers from Africa. If we can win native opinion in this process the future of America in Africa will be assured." The trouble with old style colonialism in Africa, Nixon perceived, was that it was so un-American.

The CIA's program in Kenya could be summed up as one of selective liberation. The chief beneficiary was Tom Mboya, who in 1953 became general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor. During the "Emergency," when all other African political organizations were banned, the KFL was the leading vehicle for the independence movement. It was harassed, its offices were ransacked, and many of its leaders were detained. But it survived and Mboya became a hero. Both a credible nationalist and an economic conservative, Mboya was ideal for the CIA's purposes—the main nationalist hero and eventual chief of state, Jomo Kenyatta, not being considered sufficiently safe. Mboya even propounded a brand of African socialism which favored "free" (i.e. anticommunist) trade unions and encouraged foreign investment, foreign banking, and foreign land ownership. African socialism, he said, meant "those proven codes of conduct in the African societies which have over the ages conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity, which characterizes our societies, and I refer to the African thought processes and cosmological ideas, which regard men not as a social means, but as an end and entity in society."

Like America's black capitalism today, this prescription hardly struck the strategists of white America as a threat. Mboya's cultural socialism was seen as something which

could inoculate against the actual disease of revolution; it clearly deserved support. Mboya soon joined the CIA jet set, traveling the world from Oxford to Calcutta on funds from such conduits as the Africa Bureau and from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. (ICFTU, which played a key role in Kenya, is an aggregation of international trade union secretariats set up in 1949 to counter an upsurge of left-wing trade unionism outside the communist bloc. Its extensive international operations in Africa and elsewhere were funded and manipulated by the CIA through various of its U.S.-based affiliated secretariats. Recently, however, there has been a split with U.S. labor organizations.)

Mboya later became ICFTU representative in the region. His articles were published by other CIA recipients, including the International Union of Socialist Youth, the International Student Conference, and the World Assembly of Youth. Meanwhile the American press was touting him as a future leader of East Africa. Even the Wall Street Journal's article on Mboya was headed: "Businessmen Favorably Impressed."

The ICFTU also supported Mboya and his African socialism through his KFL, a model "free trade union"—aid which reached £1000 a month in outright grants during the early '60s. In addition, the CIA-supported Fund for International Social and Economic Education contributed more than \$25,000 to the Federation's coffers. One of the directors of this Fund, George Cabot Lodge (Henry's son), explained the importance of this aid in *Spearheads of Democracy*, a book which grew out of a Council on Foreign Relations study group which brought labor experts together with Cord Meyer Jr., the chief of the CIA's covert funding program. Speaking for the group, Lodge wrote: "The obscure trade unionist of today may well be the president or prime minister of tomorrow. In many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, trade unions are almost the only organized force in direct contact with the people and they are frequently among the most important influences on the people." Aid to Mboya, he added, "has not only strengthened [ICFTU] but the whole cause of freedom and democracy in Africa."

The British were uncomfortably aware of what their "special ally" was doing in Kenya. In a British Cabinet Annex marked for "UK EYES ONLY," dated December 21, 1959, they complained: "The aim seems to be to take advantage of the difficult situation in which the United Kingdom and other European powers find themselves and to replace their influence and interests by direct U.S. machinery of the ICFTU and American contacts that have been built up with American leaders for this purpose." The document concluded that "Americans are not interested in the creation of genuine African trade unions as we know them. America has no Labour Party. . . . As a result, the American trade union leaders such as Meany, Reuther, and Dubinsky can afford directly and openly to execute governmental and particularly State Department and CIA policy."

The ICFTU often works through the mainly U.S.-based international union secretariats. In Africa, where unionization has been concentrated in government employment, the most important secretariat—and accordingly the main CIA instrument—has been the Public Services International (which was also instrumental in the overthrow of the Cheddi Jagan government in British Guiana). W. C. Lawrence, a PSI representative in East Africa, laconically expressed the organization's role

in a February 15, 1962 letter to his superior, Paul Tofahrn: "It seems to me that it is up to us to see that they [East African unionists] know what is right."

In 1963, just after Mboya left his post with the Kenya Federation of Labor, it looked as if the Federation might be losing sight of "what is right." Strikes threatened throughout the economy, and PSI feared some kind of class polarization of the society during the critical transition to independence, perhaps leading to the wrong kind of independence entirely. PSI records reveal how it stepped in. General Secretary Tofahrn sent a "Dear Tom" letter to Mboya on January 29, 1963, reading in part: "Perhaps the Government can do nothing else but say 'no' to their claims, but then the question arises how to say 'no' in a manner so convincing that the people concerned accept 'no' for an answer." He added that he was sending a special representative, T. Nynan, to Nairobi "to seek to avoid a strike," and he concluded with the comment that "this letter is written in order to urge you to drop hints in the appropriate quarter."

Mboya's hints were right on target, and on February 13, Nynan was able to report that the situation was in hand. "I was very lucky," he wrote, "getting the support of Brother Tom Mboya in my tries to avoid the strike."

IV. PEACE WITH FREEDOM



David Rockefeller (L); president of Chase Manhattan Bank; Tom Mboya (R), Economic Minister of Kenya.

UNDERWRITING MBOYA AND HIS Labor Federation was a natural strategy for the U.S. in Kenya during the '50s and early '60s. It advanced responsible nationalism; and it was painless, because the employers faced with higher wage demands were British, not American. By 1964, however, American investments, which would reach \$100 million by 1967, were becoming significant, and some of the Kenyan union demands began to lose their charm. But even more important, 1964 also brought dangers of "political instability" serious enough to make radio communications with the Nairobi Embassy eighth highest on the State Department roster for the year. Zanzibar revolted and Tanzania's Nyerere was nearly overthrown. Rebellion was spreading through the Northeast Congo, and Kenya lay astride the natural supply route. The CIA decided that a new approach was in order.

Mboya had long been supported as a force to the right of Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, but an accommodation with Kenyatta was now seen as necessary, particularly to insure that he did not support the Congolese rebels, and more generally to get him to close ranks against the agitating Kenyan left. It was a strategy which has since become familiar enough: utilize the credibility of the appropriate flexible militants to crush the rest.

In June 1964, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya William Attwood met with Kenyatta and agreed that Western labor groups would stop subsidizing Mboya and the KFL; for balance, Kenyatta assured him that Russian and Chinese aid to the leftist leader, Vice President Odinga, would also end. Simultaneously, the CIA was making appropriate shifts in its operations, throwing its resources into a new kind of vehicle which would embrace the whole Kenyan political mainstream, while isolating the left and setting it up for destruction by Kenyatta. To this end the CIA shifted its emphasis to an organization by the name of "Peace With Freedom."

Incorporated in 1960 as International Features Service, a press agency bringing the thoughts of Hubert Humphrey to the people of the Third World, Peace With Freedom went nonprofit and reorganized in 1962 under the direction of Murray Baron, vice president of New York's Liberal Party. To insure a credible operation, Baron brought in NAACP head Roy Wilkins, who in turn convinced the United Auto Workers' Walter Reuther to come aboard. The CIA, of course, came up with the cash to help bring the combined forces of American civil rights and liberalism to Africa. PWF's income for 1963 consisted of \$27,826 from the International Development Foundation, a conduit, and \$130,799.78 from the dummy Price Fund. A mere \$765.75 accrued from "other sources." Funding in the following years was the same story, all CIA sources—though the total had more than doubled by 1966.

By 1965, the original press agency operation had grown by leaps and bounds; it maintained 24 representatives around the world and published in 22 languages. Among the most popular writers, along with Humphrey, were Tom Mboya and Roy Wilkins.

Mboya had not been forgotten in the shift to PWF. The new organization contributed \$40,000 to the KFL for publication of its weekly newspaper, Mfanyi Kasi (Worker Solidarity), in English and Swahili. But this support now figured in a far broader context than it had in the past. PWF created and financed a whole string of East African organizations including

the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, the East African Publishing House (now reorganized as Afro-Press), the Jomo Kenyatta Educational Institute, the Kenneth Kuanda Foundation and the Milton Obote Foundation in Uganda.

It was an entire prefabricated cultural and intellectual infrastructure, reaching from the elite academic setting to the mass media of radio and pamphleteering. It aimed, in the favored phrase, at "nation building," shaping a social infrastructure, an elite and an ideological base. In Kenya, Peace With Freedom's operation was practically all-encompassing. The principal exception was the Lumumba Institute, opened on December 13, 1964 (Independence Day). Although Kenyatta himself was the nominal patron, real control lay in the hands of Vice President Odinga and the left, whose cadres it trained.

In the following year, Kenyatta was encouraged to move against Odinga, cementing the deal he had negotiated with Attwood. The Constitution was revised to strip Odinga's vice presidential office of its power; his post in Kenyatta's political party was eliminated, his trade union base (competitive with the KFL) reorganized out of existence. When he resigned the vice presidency in protest, Odinga was successfully shut out of effective campaigning in the subsequent election. And the Lumumba Institute was dissolved by executive decree when its students objected to the government's formulation of "African Socialism." While the left was being destroyed, PWF's cultural-political complex was operating to keep the nation on an even keel, providing stable mechanisms for what could be misinterpreted as constructive dissent and in effect defining the limits of legitimate social and political debate. One man working with PWF in Kenya, Heinz Berger, described the significance of his program to us, saying its "existence means there is no gap which some other country or ideology could fill."

When Ambassador Attwood departed from Kenya in 1966, he expressed satisfaction with what had been accomplished

there: "White fears of blacks in power in Kenya had proved to be unfounded; a white Kenyan was still minister of agriculture and 1700 Englishmen still worked in various branches of the Kenyan government. . . . Odinga and the demagogues were out of office. The men moving up . . . were unemotional, hardworking and practical minded. When they talked about Kenya's agricultural revolution they sounded like Walt Rostow; they spoke of available credit, fair prices, technical assistance and the cash purchase of tools and consumer goods." U.S. exports had grown from \$13.5 million in 1963 to \$31.6 million three years later when Attwood left. It was quite a record for Attwood. But then, as he himself has modestly observed: "...an Ambassador who treats his CIA chief as an integral member of his Country Team will generally find him a useful and cooperative associate. I know I did."

There have been setbacks since, however—four of PWF's top men were refused entry in February 1968 by pro-British Home Minister Daniel Moi who alleged they were connected with the CIA, after which PWF's New York office shut down and the organization disappeared. And the problem of Kenyatta's successor may prove dangerous since discontent is widespread and growing and the economy is in trouble. But these difficulties notwithstanding, Attwood's enthusiastic recounting of how "Black Power in Kenya" had avoided demagogues and had ceased to be something to be feared is impressive. It could almost serve as an expression of the current devout and determined wish for just such a development of Black Power in the United States. Certainly the lessons of Africa have not been lost on those who have consecrated their wishes with coins in the fountain of black capitalism and cultural nationalism. But the carry-over to the present case goes beyond mere tactical experience taken to heart by the manipulators of black destiny. The CIA may no longer be the vanguard agency, but the momentum in the ideology that was set in motion continues strong, and there is continuity in the very personnel. People who provided the racial cover are still proving remarkably serviceable in that same role today.





More Information About The CIA

The CIA is a secret body, yet it is one which has been widely written about. Much of what has been written is inaccurate, sensationalist, or deliberately misleading. Most exposés in the established press tend to enjoy "leaks" from the CIA. These may be calculated to give the impression that more is known about the Agency than actually is. Sometimes the CIA is eager to publicize its successes (particularly around appropriations time); sometimes it wants to undermine other agencies and sometimes it actually wants some of its programs exposed so that they can be promptly ended. Ironically, overexposure has actually reinforced public acceptance and the Agency's legitimacy.

Sadly, the radical press has more often than not slipped into reporting every bit of gossip about the CIA as fact. Shoddy reporting and CIA-baiting has tended to substitute for analysis. The effect has been to reinforce the crude conspiratorial theories about world affairs, and to feed a paranoia within the radical movement.

It is difficult to study precisely how the CIA operates. But there is plenty of material available. The following is a list of some of the sources, with an evaluation of their worth.

1. Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B.

The Invisible Government. (Bantam edition)
1965.

The Espionage Establishment. (Random House.)
New York. 1967.

These are the best known and most popular titles about the CIA. Wise and Ross are establishment journalists with an eye for detail, a flair for story telling and a pronounced liberal bias. **The Invisible Government** is misleading in that it overemphasizes the CIA's invisibility. It has as its central issue the CIA's lack of accountability rather than its actual service to United States imperialism. Wise and Ross were almost certainly privy to "leaks" from the CIA. For example, they knew about the CIA's program of subsidies to non-profit organizations hinted at in **The Invisible Government**, but did not spell it out. This was two years before the **Ramparts'** exposures.

2. **Ramparts.** This radical magazine has published a number of important and useful exposés of CIA activities. They include

articles on the CIA's role in the early Vietnam lobby (1965); Michigan State University (1966); the exposés of the National Student Association (1967); the CIA and Labor Unions (1967); the CIA and Black nationalism (1969); and the CIA and the opium trade in South East Asia (1971). The more recent **Ramparts** articles have much more political depth. David Horowitz's series of articles, also in **Ramparts**, on the foundations and the Council of Foreign Relations are important for understanding that the CIA does not operate in isolation.



3. Mader, Julius. **Who's Who in the CIA.** (Berlin) 1968

Mader's book is thought to be the product of East German or Soviet intelligence. It is a listing which he acknowledges (even if the book's title does not) of foreign service personnel believed to work in various U.S. intelligence activities. It is neither up-to-date, nor very accurate. For example, he throws together CIA operatives, former World War II intelligence men and various liberal politicians like Eugene McCarthy.

4. Tully, Andrew. **CIA. The Inside Story.** (Fawcett publications) 1968

The Super Spies. (William Morrow and Co.) New York 1969.

Tully is a journalist who writes sensationalist books about Government agencies. In the past he has enjoyed the cooperation of the FBI and probably had the same relationship with the CIA. The books are useful background but very limited.

5. **The New York Times.** From time to time the **New York Times** has carried long reports on the CIA. Consult the annual **Times** index for a full listing. The **Times** is well known for covering-up CIA projects in the national interest. The most celebrated instance of this was in 1961 when **The Times** knew about the projected invasion of Cuba but said nothing at the request of Arthur Schlesinger Jr. More recently, in 1967, **The Times** carried a five part series on the CIA, which a former **Times** editor has now admitted was submitted to the then Director of the CIA, John McCone, who suggested "modifications" which the paper adopted.

6. Copeland, Miles. **The Game of Nations** (Simon and Schuster) 1969.

Copeland helped set up the CIA and operated on its behalf in the Middle East. His book, and subsequent newspaper articles penetrate the myths of the Middle East and offer frank, if sometimes overly flippant, approaches.


7. Ransom, Harry Howe, **The Intelligence Establishment** (Harvard) 1970. Ransom is one of the establishment critics of the CIA who remains part of the club. He was present at the CFR discussion group on which the 'Bissell document' is based. His book grew out of Harvard's Defense Studies programs. The book has useful historical detail, but agonizes about the CIA's accountability in a respectable way.

8. **Movement Research Groups.** Some of the best work about imperialist strategy has

been published by a number of anti-imperialist research collectives. They often include details about the CIA. See for example, **The Extended Family** on the role of intelligence related research about Africa (Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass 02138): **Subliminal Warfare**, by the North American Congress on Latin America about the role of the U.S. in Latin America. (NACL.v. box 57, Cathedral Station, New York 10025). Also see the NACLA newsletter monthly.


9. **The Academics.** The CIA has subsidized many academic studies about foreign problems. Yet the academic community have turned out very few studies of intelligence agencies. If you can penetrate the jargon some of the more interesting are: Richard Cottam, **Competitive Interference and 20th Century Policy** (Pittsburgh) 1967. This is essentially a critique of CIA practice which argues that the CIA's methods are not sophisticated enough. Paul Blackstock. **The Strategy of Subersion** (Quadrangle) 1964. This book includes some histories of case studies of covert actions. William R. Harris of Harvard's Center for International Affairs is or will be publishing a massive bibliography on hundreds of other academic and popular sources of information.

10. **The CIA Itself.** CIA officials are often prolific writers. Even though their books are usually carefully censored, the memoirs and writings of CIA officialdom often have interesting tidbits. Among the more interesting are: Allan Dulles, **The Craft of Intelligence**; Kirkpatrick, **The Real CIA**; Sherman Kent **Strategic Intelligence.**



C.I.A.-Planned Drive of Vietcong Is Said to

U.S. JURY FREES 2 IN LISBON FLIGHTS
Defendants Charged C.I.A. Backed Sale of B-26's
DOUGLAS ROBINSON
Special to The New York Times
BUFFALO, Oct. 13—A Federal jury acquitted a British pilot and a French nobleman tonight in a case involving the sale of seven World War II B-26 bombers to Portugal last year.



How C.I.A. Put 'Instant

Air Force' Into Congo



CIA & Business Intelligence Agency's Requests Pose Problems For Some Global Firms

