

ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS

BULLETIN

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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR


Have you ever felt envious of a monolithic national anti-apartheid movement such as that in the U.K., with a real semblance of organizational unity? If not, you are invited to attempt the next compilation of anti-apartheid resource materials -- organizations, books, literature, films, videos, etc. The American way -- proliferation, one-up-man-ship, with a facade of close networking -- has the advantage of encouraging new innovative local initiatives in the cause, but the attempt might flounder for lack of strategic support and connections.

On the positive side, preparation for this issue has resulted in an even greater respect for the tremendous work underway, through many national and local organizations, utilizing diverse educational resource materials. In fact, there is so much going on, that the original concept of "pulling it all together" has been abandoned, in favor of highlighting some of the most exciting educational opportunities and action options.

Thus, although the central section of this issue does offer a wide variety of resource materials for activists, it is clearly not comprehensive in scope. You are encouraged to utilize the indicated contacts, especially those with regular publications, many of which do an excellent job of listing additional resource materials. Besides, the direct link between you and those organizations will prove useful in other ways -- give and take re: mutual concerns, sharing of the financial burden of anti-apartheid work, etc.

The initial section of this issue, focusing on the continuing struggle in Southern Africa, includes sobering background and current pieces of the complicated puzzle. The harsh realities of apartheid's aggressive acts inside South Africa, in neighboring states, and now worldwide, come very close to home when the victims are so well known to us, e.g., Albie Sachs. Perhaps such reflections lead us all to deeper commitment. Victory is certain!

The third and final section of this issue builds upon previous concerns, ending with a challenge from the ACAS Executive Secretary. Note in passing that the article on the Western Sahara elaborates the major theme of the previous issue of ACAS Bulletin. You may want to write a follow-up piece to anything in this or subsequent issues. Welcome!



MOIR, Sydney (Australia) Morning Herald

Readers can still look forward (probably in the **Fall issue**) to a full updated directory of organizations, currently being compiled by **Bill Minter and Jo Sullivan**. In addition, **Jo Sullivan** is **co-editor** for that issue, to develop a special section on **Liberia**. If you want to help, contact her at African Studies Center, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215. Any other items are to be sent to the editor (**deadline: Sept. 15th**).

THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE

STATE TERRORISM AND ITS ALLIES

by Gail Hovey, Managing Editor, *Christianity and Crisis*;
formerly Research Director, American Committee on Africa

DULCIE SEPTEMBER WAS SHOT in the face at point blank range as she entered her Paris office on March 29. She was the African National Congress (ANC) representative for France, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. The ANC is South Africa's premier liberation organization. The ANC's Nelson Mandela, imprisoned since the 1960s, remains the most respected black leader in the country. September's death, according to a report in *Le Monde* on April 2, can be traced directly to the South African government.

Albie Sachs was gravely injured and lost an arm when a bomb exploded as he tried to unlock his car in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, on April 7. He is a member of the ANC's commission on constitutional change, worked at Eduardo Mondlane University, and was also employed by the Justice Ministry to help formulate a legal system for Mozambique. No one familiar with the region had any real doubt, according to Anthony Lewis, writing in the *New York Times* on April 10, that the bomb was planted by agents of the South African government.

If these were the only incidents, they should be sufficient to convince us that South Africa would prefer to eliminate rather than negotiate with the ANC. But these are not the only incidents.

Godfrey Motsape, the ANC representative in Belgium, escaped injury when he was shot at on February 4, and two days before September's death, Brussels police defused a bomb outside the office where he works.

In January a bomb exploded outside the ANC offices in Lusaka, injuring four people. The victims were Zambians, not the intended ANC members. Just a few hours before September was shot, South African forces raided a house allegedly used by the ANC in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, killing four people and burning the house to the ground. Kidnapings and murder by South African operatives in Swaziland are common with 11 ANC members killed in 1986 alone.

If these were the only incidents, they should be sufficient to convince us that South Africa has stepped up the war against the ANC. But these are not the only incidents.

South Africa has been giving direct support to UNITA, a right-wing guerrilla movement, in Angola and to RENAMO, a rag-tag collection of bandits, in Mozambique. Whether the country is Zimbabwe or Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland or Lesotho, South Africa disregards national boundaries and international law to destabilize and discredit its neighbors, the Front-line States.

South Africa illegally occupies the neighboring territory of Namibia. On April 8, President P.W. Botha gave his representative in Namibia's capital Windhoek increased powers to silence opposition and censor the press. Instead of complying with a UN Security Council resolution that calls for independence, Botha is making it perfectly clear that he has no intention of giving up control of the territory.

If these were the only developments, they should be sufficient to convince us that South Africa has stepped up the war against its neighbors. But these are not the only developments.

Undeclared war

On February 24, South Africa banned the activities of 17 leading anti-apartheid organizations, prohibiting them from "carrying on or performing any acts whatsoever." The groups included the United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of at least 650 groups with a total membership of more than two million. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the country's largest labor federation, had its work curtailed. COSATU is, among other things, forbidden to campaign for disinvestment and sanctions or even to call for the release of its own members from detention. In addition, 18 leaders of the anti-apartheid movement were served with restrictions on their activities.

Press censorship, already formidable, is being tightened. The first victim of emergency laws that allow the government to close publications is *The New Nation*, which lost a complex court case and has been shut down for three months. Founded by the Southern Africa Catholic Bishop's Conference, it was one of the most important opposition papers in South Africa. Its editor Zwelake Sisulu has been detained for 22 of the 27 months the paper has been published.

If these were the only developments, they should be sufficient....

Zwelake Sisulu's mother Albertina Sisulu was one of the 18 leaders restricted in February. Zwelake Sisulu's father, Walter Sisulu, a leader of the ANC, has been in prison since the 1960s.

If these were the only incidents....

South Africa is waging an undeclared war against its own people and the people of the region. Pretoria will continue its campaign of terror until real consequences result from its actions.

To begin, the U.S. and its Western allies must insure the safety and protection of ANC representatives operating in their countries. That protection must be the first step in a fundamental shift. The South African government should no longer be regarded as a Western ally that can, through persuasion and quiet diplomacy, be brought into line. The U.S. and its allies need to recognize that, as Anthony Lewis says, "South Africa is now very likely the prime example of state terrorism in the world."

If that fact were accepted, the next steps would be clear:

- The U.S. and Western governments, South Africa's major trading partners, would impose comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa.
- They would close all air routes between their countries and South Africa.
- They would restrict diplomatic relations with South

Africa and close any facilities that have been connected with terrorist activities.

Of course, such strong measures are unlikely. Although the fight for economic sanctions is being waged in Congress, the Reagan administration is adamant in its opposition to sanctions. Its ideological rigidity prevents the administration from rejecting a racist regime that is deeply anticommunist and strongly linked economically and even militarily with the U.S. and its Western allies, including Japan and Israel.

The consequences of inaction may come to haunt us. It is long past time for our government to condemn publicly the South African government for the murders and maimings, to take strong action to prevent their recurrence. Will the U.S. and its allies act now? Or will they wait until blood is spilled in the streets of New York or Washington, Paris or Bonn?

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Mozambique's misery

The world now knows, inescapably, the magnitude of the destruction unleashed on Mozambique by the South African-backed rebels. The havoc has been described as "the event of the century in Africa."

Word has been out for years that Renamo, Pretoria's puppet force, has been on a rampage in the Mozambican countryside. It wasn't until last week, however, when the State Department went public with its survey of Mozambican refugees, that something like the whole horrifying story was pieced together.

Based on remarkably similar statements from nearly 200 refugees, the report "conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered" by Renamo and that 872,000 have fled the country to escape not only brutal death, but disfigurement, starvation and slavery. (Other sources indicate that there are an additional million or more displaced people still inside the country and 2.5 million "nutritionally at risk" thanks to Renamo activity.)

"It's in a category by itself," a senior State Department official said in commenting on the depredation. "I've never seen anything like it in Africa. We had no idea it was so bad."

No one can any longer explain Mozambican refugees as, like those streaming out of Ethiopia, the victims of famine. Nor can the wholesale atrocities and destruction continue to be blamed either on the Frelimo armed forces or Mozambican economic mismanagement. Renamo did it big and Renamo's friends, including Senators Jesse Helms and Bob Dole, are stuck with it.

Why did State go ahead with the report now and not, say, last year? Some progressive Washington observers suggest that people in the department's Africa bureau, facing the administration's end, may want to have a little something creditable to point to before leaving office. (Some are reportedly already job hunting.)

More importantly, State is probably feeling pressure from other donor countries aiding Mozambique that may have been more sensitive than the U.S. to the Renamo situation. The London Financial Times (April 27) notes, for instance, "the growing commitments to security shown by countries such as Sweden and Canada" and states that Sweden announced at the current donor-coun-

tries' meeting in Maputo that it would reverse policy and provide money to pay for the security of its projects.

Furthermore, the pro-South African forces in the administration have been weakened, for example by the departure of Fred Ikle, the highest-level Renamo supporter, while installation of the sympathetic Melissa Wells as ambassador to Mozambique has strengthened the pro-Maputo contingent. One anti-apartheid Washington-watcher points out that pro-Frelimo "momentum has been building up politically here" since the Renamo massacre in Homoine last July began to create policy splits within the administration.

Useful as State's new report may be, it misses the key point: the root of the problem is not Renamo, of course, but the Botha regime—and the report only lightly touches on Renamo's South African connection. Botha denies that the connection continues.

At a State Department meeting on Mozambique April 26 arranged for Jesse Jackson, Chester Crocker, the department's Southern Africa negotiator, refused to admit the importance of Pretoria's involvement. New evidence, however, makes it clear that over the past year South Africa has been stepping up its resupply operations in line with Renamo's stepped-up attacks in Mozambique.

Crocker and other administration officials may go on talking with South Africa as they've been doing for the past seven years but the anti-apartheid movement understands that Botha will not budge from support of Renamo—or, for that matter, of Unita's bloody efforts in Angola—unless he gets a compelling blow.

Fortunately, the big stick is at hand. The strengthened Dellums sanctions bill, HR 1580 was scheduled for a Foreign Relations Committee vote April 28 and is heading for a vote in the House perhaps as early as May 10. Jesse Jackson has indicated he will intensify the pressure by making Renamo and South African involvement a major campaign issue. Your congressperson and senator also need to hear a strong "Vote 1580!" from you. It's still at best nip-and-tuck in the House, and the sanctions fight in the Senate, which is yet to begin, will be much tougher.

And now, how about a State Department report on U.S.-backed Unita's atrocities in Angola?

RENAMO AND SOUTH AFRICA

**Excerpts from an interview with Eddie Cross, Beira Corridor Group, Zimbabwe
(Cape Times, 10 December 1987)**

We very much suspect that the military in South Africa continues to support Renamo but that it is an unauthorized activity.

Is that possible?

Well, we're not so sure and neither are the Mozambicans. We intercept every radio signal from South Africa to Renamo. The South Africans installed a very sophisticated radio system in Mozambique and maintained that system until 1985 but South Africa still continues to send signals to Renamo. In fact, in one month - I think it was August - we recorded more than 450 intercepts. That's more than 10 a day. But if you talk to Neil van Heerden at Foreign Affairs, they say emphatically it is official government policy to support Chissano.

What are the messages about?

South Africa monitors all the signals over Mozambique, whether Zimbabwean, Soviet or Mozambican. You translate that and I think probably what you do is occasionally you slip a bit of intelligence to Renamo. You tell them what Zimbabwe is going to do next. That's valuable intelligence.

Is this possibly "blind eye" stuff?

Well, that's what the Americans believe. You have just this week a marvelous example of South African ambivalence. Renamo took out a big bridge - three spans, just outside Maputo, on the Nkomati road...the second major bridge we've lost...then SATS (South African Transport Services) threw everything they had at it. South African troops went in, swept the area and protected the workmen. SATS worked round the clock, with floodlights, everything, and fixed the bridge in 10 days.

South Africa also protects and repairs the power lines to Maputo.There are no interruptions in the power supply. And now you've got the South Africans negotiating actively to restart drawing power from the Cabora Bassa. The Cabora Bassa power lines are completely non-functional. They've been non-functional now for five years. I'm told there are nearly five hundred pylons down on that route.

Then what are the power lines working then?

It's the power lines from South Africa to Maputo. Because Maputo is supplied by South Africa; ESCOM supplies a hundred megawatts to Maputo - 100% of its power.

**At the same time, Renamo has destroyed the lines from Cabora Bassa
....that just doesn't make sense....**

Yes. And Cabora Bassa is the cheapest possible source of additional power for South Africa.

SUMMARY OF MOZAMBICAN REFUGEE ACCOUNTS
OF PRINCIPALLY CONFLICT-RELATED EXPERIENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE
(excerpts from a report to the U.S. State Department)

by Robert Gersony

Introduction

In December 1987, the author was engaged by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs to undertake an assessment of designated Mozambican refugee matters....The Bureau had witnessed an increase of 300% in the number of Mozambican refugees in Southern Africa over the past year. The Bureau currently estimates that the total number of such refugees is about 870,000. Malawi, for example, has 450,000 - 500,000 refugees -- up from 70,000 just fifteen months ago. Its southern Nsanje District, which has a Malawian population of about 150,000, now provides sanctuary for about 175,000 Mozambican refugees. (In proportion to national population, 500,000 refugees in Malawi would be the equivalent of 17 million refugees in the United States.) Reports from the field continue to indicate that 20,000 - 30,000 Mozambican refugees per month - up to 1,000 each day -- enter Malawi. Many of these refugees arrive in poor health, severely malnourished, without belongings and often naked.

In Swaziland, there were about 8,500 Mozambican refugees at the beginning of 1988; that number has already doubled and, according to one informed estimate, could quadruple by mid-year. Increased flows into Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa combine with Malawi and Swaziland arrivals to suggest that there will be more than one million such refugees by year's end.

Complementing this exodus is a high rate of population displacement within Mozambique. According to the Bureau for Refugee Programs' World Refugee Report to the United States Congress in 1987, more than one million Mozambicans are internally displaced.

The author was engaged by the Bureau for Refugee Programs to shed additional light on such issues as the causes of these refugee flows; the likelihood of continued migrations; refugee protection and assistance; and the possibility of refugee repatriation.....

Renamo's Conduct of the War

Refugee reports suggest three typical types of Renamo operations....

(1) In tax areas....Renamo combatants move freely through such areas and routinely (weekly or monthly) visit the farmers. They demand a contribution of prepared and/or dry food (food grain or flour), chickens and goats, perhaps some clothes, a radio or other possession. They demand at will a young girl or married woman for sex....

(2) In control areas....porters on forced marches....beatings....captive labor....food deprivation.... **There is almost no reported effort to explain the purpose of the insurgents' efforts, the nature of its goals, or to enlist the loyalty -- or even neutrality -- of the population....**

(3) In destruction areas....advance intelligence gathering...."political" visit....Government officials executed....dawn military attack....shooting... burning....looting....destruction of schools and health clinics....killings.

Quantification of Renamo Conduct

The great majority of the total of 196 interviewed refugees whose migration was caused by conflict violence cited Renamo actions as the reason for their flight. Roughly 40% reported personally witnessing the murder of civilians principally by Renamo combatants and Renamo police in the absence of resistance or defense. The 169 refugees who arrived at their current locations in 1987/1988 reported roughly 600 such murders. The refugees provided eyewitness or other credible accounts about these killings which included shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, forced drownings, and random shooting at civilians in villages during attacks....About fifty of the 600 reported Renamo murders were reported to be young children....

For the 1987/1988 arrivals, discounting non-conflict migrants, 91% of the refugees' reports were categorized by the author as "very negative" toward Renamo; 5% as "negative"; 1% as "positive". Three percent offered no report and no complaints....

Summary of Findings

From 48 districts in northern, central and southern Mozambique, in 25 refugee camps in five countries separated by as many as 1,500 miles, nearly 200 Mozambican refugee accounts of their experiences are strikingly similar. If that sample is reasonably representative, their accounts, corroborated in large measure by independent experiences of some religious and relief assistance workers, compel certain unavoidable findings.

First, the level of violence reported to be conducted by Renamo against the civilian population of rural Mozambique is extraordinarily high. Roughly 170 refugees, each representing one family, who arrived in 1987/1988, collectively reported about 600 murders by Renamo of unarmed civilians, in the absence of resistance or defense. (If the population estimates reported in the introduction to this report are correct, there are roughly 200,000-250,000 refugees and displaced families in Mozambique and in the neighboring countries, the majority of whom are conflict victims.) If the refugee reports are generally accurate and the sample reasonably representative, it is conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by Renamo in this manner.

The same 170 refugees report many hundreds of cases of systematic forced portering, beatings, rape, looting, burning of villages, abductions and mutilations. These patterns of systematic abuse represent many hundreds, if not thousands, of individual instances reported by this small sample. Conservative projections based on this data would yield extremely high levels of abuse.

That the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who have fled from northern, central and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents

by undisciplined combatants.

Second, the relationship between Renamo and the civilian population, according to the refugee accounts, revolves almost exclusively around a harsh extraction of labor and food. If these reports are accurate, it appears that **the only reciprocity provided by Renamo for the efforts of the civilians is the possibility of remaining alive.** There are virtually no reports of attempts to win the loyalty -- or even the neutrality -- of the villagers. The refugees report virtually no effort by Renamo to explain to the civilians the purpose of the insurgency, its proposed program or its aspirations. If there is a significant sector of the population which is sympathetic to this organization, it was not reflected in the refugee accounts.

Third, there were serious complaints about abuses by some Frelimo Government soldiers. But in both the murder and non-murder categories, only three to four percent of the complaints were attributed to Frelimo soldiers. They tended to be isolated reports, often from areas of the country most remote from Maputo. It appeared that there is a sustained trend toward improvement overall.

Fourth, the refugees and most independent sources rejected the assertion that much of the violence in Mozambique is attributable to neither Frelimo or Renamo but instead to armed bandits affiliated with neither side. It appears from this field research that violence by "freelance bandits" does not account for more than occasional, isolated instances of the high level of reported violence.

(Note: the complete 43-page report can be obtained free from the Publications Office, U.S. State Department, 202/647-3340).

UNITA EYEWITNESSES

(Editor's note: These testimonies are taken from Angolans who fled UNITA ranks and testified at a tribunal in Luanda, at the beginning of December, 1983. They were videotaped and replayed at hearings in Amsterdam by the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement, December 14-18, 1983. The texts below are translated from Karel L. Roskam et al, Grenzeloze Oorlog: Zuid-Afrika's Agressie Tegen De Buurlanden (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij; Jan Mets, 1984); English translation by William Minter. This translation is also appearing as an appendix in William Minter, ed., Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier, being published by Africa World Press in June, 1988).

Rufino Satumbo

My name is Rufino Satumbo; my nom de guerre is Makarof. I am 26 years old and I was born at the Kuando mission station. I have been to 3rd grade and in 1975 I was a worker. I worked on a Portuguese wharf, in Viana. I have no father and my mother was already quite old in 1975. I have not seen her since then.

On February 4, I was 18 then, I became a UNITA soldier. I don't know how. They sent me first to Huambo, then to Bie and finally to Kuando-Kubango. My work was to give permission for soldiers to hunt game. On these trips we went with a car. I had never had military training, but I did have a weapon.

In 1976 we had to go into the forest on foot; we made huts out of branches. There we didn't do much, just hunt for food. We forced people to give us maize to make porridge. Those who refused were killed. When we went to the villages, sometimes we set fire to them, while the people we knew to sympathize with the MPLA were killed. Sometimes we only went to the villages to steal food.

At our bases there were also civilians, many women and children. The civilians were guarded by the soldiers to prevent them from running away and telling where we could be found. Most of the women were for the leaders, who picked them out in the villages. They chose girls of 12, 13, 14, and 15 years old; those who didn't come by themselves were tied up. The leaders had many women and often changed them.

The women and children were there against their will. The mothers were always concerned to find food for their babies; many starved of hunger because the nourishment was not good. There was no clinic; there were only traditional doctors. The people who died were not buried, they lay in the corners rotting.

I often thought about running away, but we were watched closely. They also said that those who reported themselves to FAPLA would be killed.

In 1977 or 1978 the FAPLA arrived at the base where we were. I got a bullet in my leg and I was taken to the Chivanda clinic in Namibia. The patients in the clinic were all Angolans and the doctors were South Africans. Afterwards they sent me to a school in Chivanda, where I got military training. The instructors were an Angolan, Eugenio Dala, and three South Africans. I stayed seven months at the clinic. They taught me to set mines on roads. The lesson material came from South Africa; it was written in English. I had six months training and afterwards we waited for some months at Delta base in Namibia. Afterwards, they organized a battalion and we were sent to Angola. At our departure they said, "You should destroy bridges, dams and other things." And they pointed out on the map where we should go.

The leaders of the battalion were Francisco Chinhama and Ze Maria. We first stayed near the Cunene. We attacked villages to sabotage things and steal food. We had instructions to sabotage everything. When we went to attack people in villages, we went alone. When we were going to attack the FAPLA, the South Africans went with us because we couldn't manage that alone. The South Africans had the habit of taking vehicles with them to South Africa, as well as tractors and people's cattle. After the South Africans left our platoon we went further inside the country.

We went first in the direction of Elanda base, but we stayed in the bush. There we did many things. Above all, my specialty, planting mines on the road. The first mine I planted, blew up a FAPLA transport with food and other things. The second mine blew up a car with many people, including women and children. We planted the mines at night, at 2 or 3 o'clock, so that the

people from the villages couldn't see us. After planting the mines we lay in ambush. When a car hit the mine, we killed the people or captured them. We stole the food they had; when we couldn't take any more, we set fire to it.

Of the people we captured, the young men stayed with us to become soldiers; the women and children also stayed with us. The somewhat older men were taken to Namibia to go work for the South Africans. The South Africans paid our leaders 20000 escudos (?) apiece. It was the same in recruiting soldiers. The money stayed with the leaders, it didn't go to the workers who were sold.

We attacked mostly not military vehicles but civilian vehicles, of merchants and of ordinary people and even two times a car full of women and children. They all died. Those were the instructions our leaders gave us. I planted many mines, so many I can't count, and I don't know how many people were killed by them.

I had time and again thought of running away, but I was very scared. When the leaders found out that someone wanted to run away, they took him to Namibia to be punished by the South Africans. They tied up soldiers who wanted to run away and set fire to them. The common people also couldn't run away; they were well guarded to prevent them from reporting where we were.

One day in 1982 a major named Carlos wanted to surrender to the FAPLA. The leaders found him out, tied his legs and took him to Namibia. I was scared to death and then I really decided to run away. On September 28 of that year I turned myself in, in Huambo.

Florindo Joaquin Jonatao

My name is Florindo Joaquin Jonatao. I come from Huambo and I am 22 years old.

In 1976 I was only 14 and I was a student in the fourth grade of the Sarmiento Rodrigues industrial school. On Saturday February 8 of that year, I was playing football with seven of my fellow students, when a major of UNITA, named Bantua, appeared, and forced us to go with him in a Range-Rover. We didn't know where we were going.

We left Huambo at 4 p.m. and came on the next day, the 9th, at 6 a.m. to Kuito Kuanavale. A white captain, Perestrelo, came up to us and said that the MIGs of the FAPLA were coming. We set the vehicles we had come in on fire and we went in the forest. In June or July of that year we met colonel N'zau Puna, Chindondo and others, who joined our leaders. During the nights we stayed spread out in the woods. My fellow students and I carried the luggage of the leaders.

Then there began for me and my football friends the way of suffering: a long trip through the wilderness, without shoes, with cold and hunger.

In March 1977 we came to a base where we met Savimbi. At that moment the FAPLA attacked the base and Savimbi fled to South Africa. We followed our leaders. In October Savimbi came back with a batallion of troops, who accompanied an American journalist who came to film an attack of the UNITA

troops on FAPLA. The soldiers of the battalion carried new weapons, AKs of Chinese manufacture. This was the first of this kind I had seen. They organized a spectacle, with one half of the troops on one side and the other half on the other side. The two groups shot in the air and those who played the role of the FAPLA fell to the ground, let their weapons fall and acted as if they were dead. And that was the 'battle' that the American journalists filmed. After that they went away and I didn't see Savimbi again.

I continued carrying the baggage through the woods and I suffered a lot. After that, when they had seen that I was intelligent, they let me do the planning of the work.

In 1978 I was separated from my fellow students, of whom two had died of hunger. We were quite weak because we ate only fruit of the trees and bushes. Numerous soldiers tried to run away and to link up with the FAPLA.

In the year 1979 we went to another area, in the Kuanza-Sul province, where major Chissango was the leader. We were with about one hundred men and because we were quite weak, we stayed there to strengthen up. I stayed there six months, and because we had better to eat, cassava and game from hunting, my body developed rapidly. They let me do administrative work for about a year.

One night in April 1981 we were called for roll-call. We grouped ourselves in battle formation and began to run without knowing what our destination was. We ran for three days and then we came to the Kangolo plateau, on the border of the Bie, Kuanza-Sul and Huambo provinces. When we arrived, there also came troops and captured people from other areas. We stayed divided into groups, each with its own task, cut down trees, clearing the grass to make an open space. We didn't eat more than a corn cob a day.

Some days later, on a night in April, the commanders gave us instructions to make fires. Because it was raining, the fire didn't catch and the leaders began to beat us. Then we succeeded in starting the fire. At that moment an airplane appeared and we began to run away. The commanders told us not to run away, because these were our allies and not the enemy. The leaders always spoke of "our allies" and they forbade us to use the words "South Africans" or "Carcamanos". After this reconnaissance flight three other airplanes came -- it was about midnight -- which dropped crates with parachutes.

One of the parachutes didn't open and the crates broke open and the preserves they contained got mixed with explosives which were in other crates. People gathered it up and ate everything, food mixed with explosives. By 6 a.m. there were more than 25 dead from eating the explosives.

The following day we began to transport the material which, among other things, contained: AK-47 weapons of South African manufacture, mines including anti-tank mines, 81 and 82 mm mortars, AK-21 weapons, RPG rockets, other AK weapons of Chinese manufacture, weapons of the FAL type from South Africa, G-3 weapons made in Portugal.

There were also some uniforms and blankets for the leaders and small boxes of food. All this material was without any marks of the country of

origin, so that no one could identify it. But we knew that everything came from South Africa. In August 1981, they called me for a course in communications technology which lasted a month. The instructor was lieutenant Fuma and the material that we used was RACAL-radios from South Africa and England. After the course I trained for six months and afterwards I was placed in the southern sector as a radio operator.

In the reports that we had to give one often spoke of the deaths of FAPLA soldiers. But really it was the civilian population that they killed, because when they came back, they had dishes, washbowls, grain and household animals with them. They said that these were from the Department of Military Affairs, the results of thefts from the people. Often they put animal blood on their uniforms so as to say that they had killed FAPLA soldiers.

That was in agreement with the orders of Savimbi in 1980. He had given instructions to all leaders of bases to open a "surprise offensive" against people who refused to work with UNITA. This "surprise offensive" was cutting off of noses, cutting off of breasts, raping women and above all killing those who didn't accept the UNITA policy.

The night of December 31, 1981, the FAPLA came close to our base. Several of us, mainly women and children, tried to run away and about 6 a.m. on January 1, 1981, I was taken prisoner by FAPLA. They brought me to Catchiungo, afterwards to Huambo and to Bie. They have treated me well. In March 1982 I saw my parents again after seven years separation and now they visit me every week.

In all the years that I was in the bush, I saw no school and I never again played football. All family members of the leaders go for six months each year outside the country for military courses. In all these years I never got clothes, not even a pair of shoes and the sandals that I had on when I was captured were quickly broken by so much walking. I had to walk barefoot for kilometers with the food of the leaders on my back. They didn't share the food with us and I had to fend for myself. The leaders disliked us, they disliked intelligent children. Some couldn't even write their names, they were just soldiers.

All the time my only concern was to get enough food. Now I want to study, to do a course in agriculture. I didn't have anything all these years; for me it was lost time.

Luciana Joao Nanga Batista

My name is Luciana Joao Nanga Batista. I am 16 years old and born in Huambo. My mother's name is Amelia Namala. I have two brothers and a sister. I haven't seen them for some time. My father is dead. I cannot read or write.

I lived with my mother in Huambo. One day, I was then 10, I went with my friend Joaquina to Bie to visit some friends of ours. The day we came to Cangulo, we sat talking in the house and then we heard shots. When we went outside, we saw that we were surrounded. They were soldiers of UNITA. When they saw us, they picked a number of us. They blindfolded me and took us with them. We didn't know where. With us the soldiers also took many people; men,

women and children were forced to go with them. We travelled several days and came to Mussende. There they let us work: do washing, cook, carry water and other things. They never let me play. I never again played. We slept in the forest, in the rain and in the cold. The houses were for the leaders and their wives. We were very hungry.

They forced all the women to be naked in order not to escape. One time one of the leaders picked me out to sleep with him and become his wife. I didn't want to because I was still very young. I had not even menstruated yet; I didn't want any man. Moreover, he was very big, strong and old; he had gray hair.

When I said I didn't want to, he threatened to beat me. Then I went with him and lived with him in his house. Each time that he made love with me and I didn't want to, he threatened to beat me and he did beat me. Each time I had to go to bed with him.

I didn't have to live outside anymore and I stayed in the house with the leader. I still had to be naked, but I ate better. Apart from having to sleep with him, I worked in the kitchen, did his washing and at night I had to fetch water from the river.

But I could not help it that I felt how my family must think and my husband hit me. I liked nothing about the life there. My husband often went away at night to attack the people. He stayed away several days and when he came back he said: we have taken much food, pigs, chickens and other things. Who was not with us, we have killed or brought with us. He brought the possessions of the people to the house. My husband often reported what he had done.

One night there came helicopters with white men from South Africa. They brought weapons and food. They went away again.

I have seen many horrible things. The babies which came with their mothers. Some died of hunger. When the children died, the mothers couldn't cry or mourn for they would be killed.

There was no clinic. Those who got sick had to take care of themselves with herbs. Other girls were just like me, wives of the leaders. My friend Joaquina was also with a leader and she had a son.

Because I was suffering a lot, I began to think about running away, even without clothes. I talked about it with my friend, because she had come together with me, but she was afraid because of the baby. I then decided to run away alone. In October of this year, one night when I went to get water, I ran away. I ran a long distance and I came to a village. I met a nurse who was working the land with his wives. They took me with them to N'Dalatando.

SOUTHERN AFRICA CONGRESSIONAL UPDATE

by Christine Root, ACAS Political Action Co-Chair

SUPPORT H.R.1580 / S. 556
The Dellums / Cranston Bill
for
COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

ACAS has expressed strong opposition to apartheid in various ways. Now is the time for **each of us** to take action on what promises to be the most critical item in the Congressional battle to support a free South Africa.

The Washington Office on Africa, sponsored by numerous religious organizations and trade unions, monitors legislative developments re: apartheid and Southern Africa on a day-by-day basis. In conjunction with the nation-wide endeavor, you are asked to **contact your Representatives and Senators immediately in support of HR 1580 / S 556 - the Dellums/ Cranston Bill for Comprehensive Economic Sanctions Against South Africa.**

Recently, the apartheid regime of South Africa again cracked down on anti-apartheid opposition, banning all political activity of 18 national and community groups working for non-violent change in South Africa. This means in South Africa it is illegal to call for the release of any detainee including children, illegal to commemorate the deaths of any people killed by the apartheid regime including victims of police massacres at Sharpeville in 1960 or Soweto in 1976, illegal to organize a campaign to oppose anything the South African government does.

Such organized crimes against humanity must be stopped. In the U.S., we must show support through removal of economic links.

In 1986, Congress passed limited sanctions against South Africa. However, under these current sanctions, the U.S. still carries on business-as-usual in many sectors of the apartheid economy. To put the maximum pressure on apartheid, the U.S. and other Western nations must end all trade with South Africa and U.S. corporations must stop selling their products and services in South Africa.

The Dellums/Cranston bill, among other things, will make U.S. companies leave South Africa, so their business cannot help finance apartheid, and end virtually all trade between the United States and South Africa (except some strategic minerals).

In late April, the relevant sub-committees approved HR 1580 by votes of 6-4 and 7-4. Opponents to the bill delayed the vote of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs until May 3, when HR 1580 was passed overwhelmingly 27-14, with all Democrats and four Republicans in favor. To achieve such support, two compromise amendments resulted in exemption of import commodities produced in South Africa by wholly-black-owned businesses and exemption of export to South Africa of U.S. agricultural commodities and products. Both provisions could prove detrimental to the intent of economic sanctions.

The bill was strengthened (Solarz amendment) to mandate a study by the Secretary of State, to ascertain South Africa's involvement in international terrorism; potentially this could result in the addition of South Africa to the list of designated nations promoting state terrorism. A fourth amendment (Solomon) places harsh limitation on the use of funds offered to help the victims of apartheid. Of a total \$40 million, \$4 million is designated for external refugees, but this amendment precludes its use for any who are residing in areas under the control of ANC or SWAPO. This exclusion can be waived, only in the case of ANC, should the President determine that ANC doesn't support the use of violence against non-military persons.

House floor debate will be scheduled soon, perhaps the week of May 16th. Anti-apartheid forces will hope to retain the Solarz amendment and remove the Solomon amendment. Senate action will begin in June. Therefore, **we need to act now!**

Two other related legislative initiatives need special support:

Angola - S 1474 / HR 3633 calling for open Congressional debate on aid to UNITA. As an initial step toward elimination of all U.S. aid to the apartheid contras in Angola, Senator Bradley and Representative McHugh have introduced a bill requiring public acknowledgement and full Congressional debate of any further funding of military or paramilitary operations in Angola.

Despite U.S. limited sanctions against South Africa, the Reagan administration indirectly funds the South African defense budget through annual military assistance to UNITA amounting to \$15 million (cf. only \$10 million food aid to all of Angola). The result: 22,000 Angolan civilians maimed by landmines, over 600,000 displaced refugees, and the highest infant mortality rate in the world (along with Mozambique, victim of apartheid contras known as Renamo).

If this bill is passed, the president would have to determine that support for UNITA is important to U.S. national security...and seek Congressional approval, which could be refused through a joint resolution.

Namibia - H.Res. 131 / S. Res. 254 calling on the President to take important steps to help bring independence for Namibia. Introduced by Representative Mervyn Dymally and Senator Paul Simon, these sense-of-the-Congress resolutions state that the President should urge the South African government to take prompt and effective actions to end its illegal occupation of Namibia and implement United Nations Resolution 435, the internationally accepted peace plan for Namibian independence. In addition, the President is asked to reject the current policy of linking Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from neighboring Angola.

South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia on its own merits constitutes a strong case for comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid regime. The issues - South Africa, Angola, and Namibia - are one.

URGENT! Contact your Representatives and Senators regarding the comprehensive economic sanctions bill....and show your support for the other two initiatives as well.


In addition, copies of your letters or phone messages may also be sent to:

Senator Claiborne Pell, Chair, Senator Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Paul Simon, Chair, Senate Africa Subcommittee
(Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 20510)

Representative Dante Fascell, Chair, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Representative Howard Wolpe, Chair, House Africa Subcommittee
(US House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 20515)

You may phone any Senator or Representative at (202) 224-3121.

For more information, contact: Washington Office on Africa (202) 546-7961.



CAMPAIGN '88**QUESTIONS TO USE IN YOUR DISTRICT FOR CONGRESSIONAL AND
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES**

Several members of ACAS have collaborated to formulate and select the following questions to focus attention on Africa for the campaign. Those who contributed questions in their fields are Jeanne Henn, Anne Lippert, Ahmed Samatar, Eve Sandberg, and Ann Seidman.

At their spring meeting, the Board of the African Studies Association (ASA) endorsed these questions. The ASA Outreach Committee has agreed to help distribute the answers to teachers. Africa News, as well as some black newspapers, are interested in publishing the results. The questions will be sent to the presidential candidates explaining these endorsements and publication. **Please contact either Christine Root (517-332-0333) or Carol Thompson (213-743-4434), Political Action Chairs, if you can submit the answers from the presidential candidates to your local press for publication.**

AFRICAN DEBT

1. What policies would you suggest for the adjustment process to ease the burden of African debt?
2. Commodity prices continue to fall and increased US trade barriers block entry of African goods into the US. Yet African countries must increase exports to repay their debts. What would you propose to resolve this dilemma?

SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS

3. Do you oppose / support comprehensive sanctions against South Africa? Would you oppose / support a US vote in favor of mandatory sanctions in the UN Security Council?
4. Would you oppose / support preventing US banks from participating in the rescheduling of South African bank loans, and if necessary, impose measures to attach South African assets in the US to ensure their repayment?
5. Would you oppose/support ending all intelligence collaboration and exchange between the US and South Africa?

SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

6. Would you oppose / support increasing development assistance aid to the neighboring countries of South Africa in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)?

7. Would you oppose / support special Export-Import Bank incentives to assist the neighboring countries to purchase manufactured items?
8. Do you oppose / support continued CIA aid to UNITA in Angola?
9. Given the report by UNICEF that Angola has one of the highest death rates in the world of children under five because of the war, would you oppose/ support increased humanitarian aid to Angola?
10. Do you oppose / support diplomatic recognition of Angola?
11. Do you oppose / support continuing military aid to the Mobutu government in Zaire?
12. Would you oppose / support halting the expansion of the Kamina air base for use as a transit point for US supplies to UNITA?
13. South Africa just strengthened the white minority government in Namibia and is refusing to implement UN resolution 435 (requiring South African withdrawal from Namibia and UN supervised elections). Would you oppose / support US pressure on South Africa to negotiate an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia?
What kind of pressure?
14. Do you oppose / support US pressure on South Africa to end its support of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR)?
What kind of pressure?

WESTERN SAHARA

15. Do you oppose / support efforts by the UN and the OAU to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara consistent with the principles of international law?
16. The US Arms Export Control Act and the 1960 US/Moroccan Arms Agreement prohibit the use of US military aid outside the internationally recognized borders of Morocco. Morocco has repeatedly violated this condition. What steps should the US take in response to this condition?

THE HORN

17. The Horn of Africa is experiencing continuing military conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan; what proposals do you have to end the conflicts in this region?
18. Do you oppose / support increased a) emergency food aid and b) development aid to Ethiopia?

R E S O U R C E S

(Note: This section -- organizations, written materials, audio-visuals, and book reviews -- is a partial listing; you can help to make future listings more complete, by sharing contacts and resource materials known to you.)

MATERIALS FROM ANTI-APARTHEID ORGANIZATIONS

ACAS members are heavily involved in anti-apartheid actions; see sections on Congressional Update and Campaign 88 as examples. Along with others in grass-roots organizations, we have initiated creative education-and-action campaigns, often including written materials which might well stimulate others across the country. Regional and national organizations produce a greater variety, mostly for use at the local level. Thus, this brief sampling begins with the local scene and covers many of the major sources in the United States. Later compilations may list contacts outside North America. Materials indicated herein are readily available....now!

Southern Africa Resource Project, P.O. Box 5420, Santa Monica, CA, 90405, has focused on making readily available in Southern California, resource materials produced by national organizations. Seek out the equivalent where you are.

Southern African Resource Center, 4182 South Western Ave., Los Angeles, CA, 90062, has focused on a video library, with a topical index covering nations and issues of Southern Africa. Seek out the equivalent in your area.

Southern Africa Support Committee, 2824 South Western, Los Angeles, CA, 90018, organizes house meetings in the community to learn about Southern Africa and action options. Its occasional publication is **News Update**, free.

African Activist Association, African Studies Center, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90024-1310, arranges speakers and films on campus. Their interdisciplinary journal is **Ufahamu**, \$14.00 per year (3 issues), \$6.00 single.

Africa Resource Center, 464 19th Street, Oakland, CA, 94612, provides an extensive array of resource materials for those in the Bay area, including clipping files, periodicals, tapes, etc. Their news-letter is **Source**, free.

National Namibia Concerns, 915 East 9th Ave., Denver, CO, 80218, is an education/advocacy network working with the Namibian churches for a just independence for the people of Namibia. **Namibia Newsletter** is free.

Chicago Committee in Solidarity with South Africa, 343 S. Dearborn #601, Chicago, IL, 60604, operates a full-time office which serves as a resource center and clearinghouse for Southern Africa support work in the Midwest.

Coke Campaign/Boycott, % AFSC, 92 Piedmont Ave. N.E., Atlanta, GA, 30303, as the name implies, focuses on a particular aspect of economic action against apartheid. Available items include T-shirts, buttons, stickers.

Southern Africa Medical Aid Project, PO Box 51362, Durham, NC, 27717, collects and sends selected medicines to the ANC-Holland Solidarity Hospital in Mazimbu, Tanzania. Information available.

Grassroots International, PO Box 312, Cambridge, MA, 02139, is launching the **Southern Africa Information Project**, featuring electronic wire service and a hard copy newsletter; potential user survey is now underway.

D.C. Student Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism, PO Box 18291, Washington, DC, 20036, seeks understanding and struggle against racism at home and abroad. Its newspaper is **SCAR News**, subscription \$10.00.

Bikes, Not Bombs, PO Box 56538, Brightwood Station, Washington, D.C., 20011, provides material aid to Mozambique in the form of new or reconditioned bikes. Information available.

Southern Africa Support Project, PO Box 50103, Washington, DC, 20004, uses a community film mobile, radiothon, and television in its educational program. **Organizing for Action on Southern Africa** is a 20-page nuts-and-bolts handbook for organizers, including networking contacts; available at \$3.50.

Africa Network, PO Box 5366, Evanston, IL, 60204, is currently focusing on a commemoration of Soweto Day, June 16, 1976. It offers reprints (at cost) of **Information Packets** (1 to 5 pages) on a wide variety of anti-apartheid topics, including cultural boycott, divestment, sanctions, and specific campaigns. A March 1988 resource entitled **Directory of Resources on Southern Africa** pulls together diverse information about contacts, videos, books, etc. \$2.50.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA, 19102, sees its main focus on grass-roots organizing, working through nine regional offices across the country. Often local activities are reported along with national and international developments in the **United States Anti-Apartheid Newsletter**, subscription \$10.00. Additional items include: **"End Apartheid; Free the Children" Stamps**, a sheet of 50 for \$2.00, and a **Mini-Guide on Apartheid**, \$1.00 each, reduced rates in quantity.

AFSC's Southern Africa Representative, Carole Collins, prepared in 1987 a 16-page illustrated booklet entitled **Voices From Apartheid's Other War: South Africa's Aggression Against Its Neighbors**, which is "an attempt to bring this war to Americans' attention by way of testimony from some of its witnesses -- to disclose its origins, its instigators, its economic consequences, its effects on development, and, above all, its devastating effect on human life." \$3.00.

TransAfrica, 545 8th Street, S.E., Suite 200, Washington, DC, 20003, has prepared a **Report Card on Presidential Candidates: Positions on Southern Africa Issues**, as a part of a focus on campaign '88. It publishes a quarterly journal, **TransAfrica Forum**. Subscription: \$20.00.

Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 566, New York, NY, 10015, coordinates church divestment actions, shareholders resolutions, negotiations with companies and testimony before Congress and local governments. It publishes **The Corporate Examiner**, subscription \$12.00. **National Council of Churches, Africa Office**, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 612, New York, NY, 10115, has a free brochure entitled **With One Voice: For Mandatory Sanctions Against South Africa**, designed for a lobbying focus.

Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa, 339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY, 10012, publishes a regular **Newsletter**, known especially for its reprints of little-known items from within South Africa.

International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, PO Box 17, Cambridge, MA, 02138, continues to augment educational materials with assistance to the victims of apartheid. **I.D.A.F. News Notes** and **Catalogue** free on request.

Fernand Braudel Center, State University of New York, Binghamton, NY, 13901, publishes an occasional **Research Bulletin**. Many ACAS members have seen the June 1987 issue: **Tribute to Aquino de Braganca**, available upon request.

Africa Fund / American Committee on Africa, 198 Broadway, New York, NY, 10038, is perhaps best known for leadership on divestment and disinvestment, for the recent "Unlock Apartheid's Jails" campaign, for campus organizing, and for its longevity in the struggle against apartheid. It publishes a wide variety of mostly inexpensive items and serves as a source for many more materials. Most recent release: **Cutting "The Wire:" Labor Control and Worker Resistance in Namibia**, by Pippa Green (printed earlier in **ACAS Bulletin** #22); 35 cents each, reduced rates in quantity. In addition to occasional **Action Alerts** and **Action News**, a **Southern Africa Literature List** is available upon request.

Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, DC, 20002, as is well-known to ACAS members, focuses on legislative and related matters. Recent action has centered around sanctions (see section on Congressional Update) and Namibia. It issues timely **Action Alerts**, produces occasional **Fact Sheets** 25 cents each (on SWAPO, Renamo, SADCC, and Trade Unions in Namibia), and publishes the **Washington Notes on Africa** \$1.00. The **Africa Hotline** provides a 3-minute summary update on legislative concerns: 202/546-0408.

Mozambique Support Network, 343 S. Dearborn #601, Chicago, IL, 60604, is a recent addition to the American anti-apartheid movement. Composed of groups and individuals across the nation involved in educational campaigns, fund raisers, medical aid drives and other humanitarian efforts, this network seeks to work in close cooperation with existing structures. It publishes the **Mozambique Support Network Newsletter**. Subscription \$5.00. It also stocks most literature available regarding Mozambique, e.g., UNICEF's **Children on the Front Line**, Frelimo's **The Children of War** and **The Roots of Armed Banditry**, plus numerous books including Magaia's **Dumba Nengue** (refer to book review section). In addition, recent videos are available. Priced listings available.

Southern Africa Report, 427 Bloor St. West, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1X7, is now in its third year of publication, seeking to provide analyses of events in Southern Africa itself and of late developments within the anti-apartheid network. Subscription (5 issues) \$15.00.

Africa News, PO Box 3851, Durham, NC, 27702, retains its role as the bi-weekly news publication with the best direct coverage of Africa from mostly African sources. Subscription \$30.00.

Embassy of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1990 M St., N.W., Suite 570, Washington, DC, 20036, publishes **Mozambique Update**. Free. Also available: information about subscriptions to **AIM Bulletin** and **Tempo**.

Fenton Communications, Inc., 250 W. 57th St., #1730, New York, NY, 10107, publishes on behalf of the **Government of Angola**, an **Angolan Update**. Free.

African National Congress of South Africa, 801 Second Ave., Room 405, New York, NY, 10017, receives subscriptions for **Sechaba** (\$10.00) and **ANC Weekly News Briefing** (\$15.00).

VIDEOS AND FILMS

California Newsreel's Southern Africa Media Center, 630 Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA, 94103, announces availability of four new videos (\$195 each). For further video and film rental rates, including offer of six earlier videos for \$595, request a free catalogue.

Biko: Breaking the Silence (52 minutes) reveals the life Richard Attenborough's **Cry Freedom** only hints at. The Zimbabwean documentary team filmed extensively on the set and employed scenes from **Cry Freedom** to supplement interviews with Biko's colleagues and archival footage. They explore Biko's intellectual development, why he became such a galvanizing figure, the circumstances of his murder, and his impact on the development of the freedom movement in the decade since his death.

The Cry of Reason (58 minutes) chronicles Rev. Beyers Naude's long odyssey from a trusted member of the Afrikaner elite to a staunch supporter of the freedom movement. Rejecting the values and privileges he was brought up with, Naude was branded a traitor by shocked whites and banned for eight years by the apartheid regime. Yet, by living his values, by standing in solidarity with the victims of oppression, he was embraced by blacks and found a fulfillment he never thought possible.

Children of Apartheid (49 minutes) introduces the audience to the youth of South Africa under the State of Emergency. They talk with Walter Cronkite about prison, politics, insurrection, revolution. Sicelo Godfrey Dlomo, one of 10,000 children under 18 detained by police, had been arrested four times, beaten and threatened; shortly after the CBS broadcast, he was found murdered. Contrasted in the film: P.W.Botha's daughter Roxanne and Nelson Mandela's daughter Zinzi.

Girls Apart (40 minutes) is the story of two 16-year-old schoolgirls, one black, one white, who inhabit separate worlds prescribed by apartheid. They both live outside Johannesburg: Sylvia in the sprawling black township of Soweto, Sisca in an exclusively white suburb. Their views, like their worlds, are poles apart, but both are being prepared for war.

Advanced Media Communications, 591 Vanderbilt Avenue, Suite 181, Brooklyn, NY, 11238-3512, announces two new videos (\$159 each or \$249 for both):

"Bopha!" (58 minutes), written by Percy Mtwa, produced for PBS, and narrated by Sidney Poitier, reveals the agony of black policemen caught between apartheid and their own communities.

"Asinamali!" (65 minutes) recalls through word, song, and dance the events which have brought the five characters to a South African jail. They have been victimized by racist laws, police brutality, unemployment - in short - the humiliation of apartheid. Commissioned by the BBC, this video was made in Johannesburg's Market Theatre before a live audience.

Office of Communication, Christian Board of Publication, PO Box 179, St. Louis, MO, 63166, announces a new video **We Have Seen Him!** (27 minutes), featuring Rev. Allan Boesak - President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, and Rev. Frank Chikane - General Secretary of the South Africa Council of Churches. They speak of torture, death threats, the murder of children, and how one forgives and loves one's enemies under such oppression.

Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, NY, 10038, announces the availability of a powerful 5 minute record (\$5.00) and video (\$12.00) entitled **A.F.R.I.C.A.**, by the famed rap group Stetsasonic. It also features Nigerian musician Olatunji and the Drums of Passion, as well as the Rev. Jesse Jackson. The **A.F.R.I.C.A. Teaching Guide** (\$3.00) combines the record and video into a dynamic teaching tool. The theme is apartheid South Africa's wars against the Frontline States, as well as South Africa's occupation of Namibia.

VIDEO REVIEW: "BITTER HARVEST"

by Stephen Commins, Development Institute, UCLA

In the on-going debate about the struggle for change in South Africa, too often attention is narrowly focused on "political" rights. The U.S. media tends to provide little information on the existing economic structures that perpetuate the poverty and fragmentation of black communities.

"Bitter Harvest" is a slide show produced by South African churches and transferred to a video format. It presents the life of several black laborers who live on large white farms. The video provides an insight into the frustration and bitterness of the blacks whose livelihoods, including housing, are dependent upon white employers. It is a good introduction for audiences who have little awareness of the economic dependence forced upon blacks by South Africa's economic system.

The value of "Bitter Harvest" is that it raises important questions about the meaning of liberation and change in South Africa. Struggle over ownership of land was part of resistance movements in such countries as Kenya and Zimbabwe, yet after independence the land tenure patterns were not changed to the extent anticipated by landless laborers. In reviewing the present struggle in South Africa, the situation of the farm laborers is an important reminder that they are both outside of urban organizations and vulnerable to expulsion to the homelands.

The twenty-minute video "Bitter Harvest" is owned by the Development Institute at the UCLA African Studies Center and is available for use by any interested organizations, upon request. It was provided to UCLA by colleagues working in South Africa and could be copied from the existing tape by anyone with access to copying facilities. We have found it to be a good educational tool and discussion starter for university and community groups.

BOOK REVIEWS

Dumba Nengue: Run For Your Life - Peasant Tales of Tragedy in Mozambique.
Lina Magaia. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1988. \$6.95.

reviewed by Robert Mazur, Sociology Department, Iowa State University.

Statistics on the extent of the MNR's destruction of "soft targets", i.e., post-independence successes in education, health, housing, peasant production, and popular mobilization in Mozambique, are slowly becoming known in the world outside. They are an essential complement - indeed, a necessary starting point - for Magaia's recounting of people's experiences with bandidos armados (armed bandits). The framework for assessing the meaning of those numbers is provided by Allen Isaacman's "Historical Introduction", which details the origins and "goals" of South Africa's surrogate terrorists during the most intense period of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Yet it is Magaia's transmission of these stories that conveys the absolute depth of the Mozambican people's suffering and the government's humiliation. Throughout, it is impossible to discern any "positive" political statement produced by the MNR's activities.

While this book was compiled primarily for those who do not read the Portuguese-language weekly Tempo and have not visited Mozambique, even those who have spoken with its deslocados (internally displaced persons) and refugees know that people affected by the destruction and atrocities speak reluctantly, resurrecting few of the horrid details, if able and willing to speak at all. Magaia's work is an invaluable contribution that gives voice to those who are affected by the currently fashionable "low intensity conflicts" masquerading as "civil wars" throughout the globe.

The methods the MNR uses to steal animals, food and goods, and to kidnap people are documented, as are the destruction of those not taken away. But the author's concluding perception of individual captured or surrendered bandidos armados as aggressive and filled with hatred and cynicism is not shocking after the reader's exposure to the MNR treating people like animals (slaughtered like a goat) and vegetables (crushed like peanuts). The MNR's ritual murders and mutilations, and the people's being forced to witness and even participate in them, parallel the methods of recruitment, initiation and retention in various religious cults.

Despite the power of these stories to move the reader to conclude that human conscience and hope have been abandoned along with people's fields, homes and ancestral burial grounds, Magaia inter-weaves accounts of the peasants' active armed resistance to the terrorists, replacement of their goods, rebuilding of their infrastructure, undying efforts to maintain their well-organized way of life and culture and jubilation upon the return of former captives.

That "you have to trust your feet", the meaning of Dumba Nengue, applies to us all. The challenge to the reader is to walk and work with the Mozambican people, to aid in their struggle to continue to dream and organize themselves to realize those dreams. That, of course, requires not only that the struggle against apartheid must continue, but that victory must be won. A luta continue. A vitoria e certa!

Turning A Blind Eye? Medical Accountability and the Prevention of Torture in South Africa. Mary Rayner. American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1333 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005. 1987. Free.

reviewed by Judith Robb, graduate student in African Area Studies, U.C.L.A.

This booklet is a succinct account of the glaring reality of apartheid with specific emphasis on the torture and maltreatment of political detainees. Based on a one-year investigation carried out within South Africa, under the auspices of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Mary Rayner examines allegations of torture and ill treatment of detainees in light of the international and domestic medical community's response and their ethical responsibility for those in police custody. Specific attention is given to the inquest regarding the death of activist Steve Biko while in police custody and the efforts of medical organizations and private physicians to discipline two state-employed district surgeons for "serious professional misconduct" while treating Biko during detention. Despite the outrage of the international medical community, Rayner reports that the principal regulatory bodies within South Africa proved entirely ineffective in confronting the issue of torture and maltreatment.

Rayner further presents the case of Dr. Wendy Orr, a general surgeon who made an urgent appeal to the Supreme Court in an effort to stop the police from ill-treating hundreds of detainees under her care. Although Orr's actions focused public attention on the problem of torture in South Africa's prisons, the overwhelming response at the state level was unconcern and virtual apathy. The report goes on to say that while some sectors of the medical community are attacking the crisis, the sweeping powers of the police and military, their authority to hold people incommunicado for indefinite periods and their right to refuse a detainee medical examination are paramount obstacles in the fight against torture.

Turning A Blind Eye? provides insight into the reality of torture and the complex apparatus protecting the rights of the Security Forces to continue their abuse and maltreatment of political detainees. Unfortunately, one is left with an uneasy feeling as Ms. Rayner points to the very people who have continuously turned a blind eye to the situation--the state-employed district surgeons--as those responsible for preventive action against torture. Her further reference to the "crucial importance of a strong medical association" and the actions taken by medical doctors (in positions comparable to South Africa's district surgeons) to end torture and ill treatment of detainees in Northern Ireland and Chile does illustrate the potential power of the medical profession. Yet, in the case of South Africa and the depth to which apartheid extends and the apathy with which the entire situation has been handled by district surgeons, it hardly seems feasible that a major change will occur until apartheid has been dismantled.

Herein lies a valuable aspect of this report. Despite negligence on the part of the domestic medical community, the international medical community has responded dramatically to the torture and abuse of political detainees within South Africa. This report provides valuable information to the non-medical activist as well as medical activists. It sheds light on a brutal situation and adds fuel to the fires against apartheid. Mary Rayner and the A.A.A.S. must be applauded for opening their eyes.

South Africa's Moment of Truth. Edgar Lockwood. New York: Friendship Press, 1988. Available: Friendship Press, PO Box 37844, Cincinnati, OH 45237. \$5.95.

reviewed by Warren Day, Southern Africa Resource Project, Los Angeles.

Yet another book about apartheid? Indeed, an outstanding one, very useful for education and action. Moment of Truth provides a succinct review of historical background and current reality. Its reference section alone (contacts, books, action options), is an effective tool in the hands of those who work in solidarity with Southern Africans. The author brings to this work an extraordinary background of grass-roots experience throughout Southern Africa (especially with the American Friends Service Committee) and on capitol hill (as director of the Washington Office on Africa for nearly a decade).

It has been more than a decade since Louise Stack and Don Morton wrote Torment to Triumph in Southern Africa, a basic adult study book for church groups across the US; Friendship Press has rightly published an update on the continuing struggle. Introduced through summer seminars, Moment of Truth with its companion study guide Until We Are Free (by John and Patricia de Beer-\$3.95, ready in June) will become a major source book for serious study in many churches during the coming year.

In the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, some South African church leaders gathered at the Cottesloe Conference to disavow any theological and biblical bases for apartheid. The Christian Institute's awareness program, the World Council of Churches' assistance to liberation movements, the Kairos Document -- all set the stage for extensive implementation of liberation theology. The South African church leaders who in 1985 recognized the crisis in South Africa as "kairos" -- a moment of truth, a moment of opportunity -- could not have foretold the critical role of the churches in 1988, after the apartheid regime again banned activities of anti-apartheid organizations across the board. Recent public clashes between Tutu and Botha highlight what may be one of the major arenas of struggle in coming months.

This current work is extremely timely, as it situates the church's struggle for its soul in the context of oppressive apartheid policy. Insights of well-known figures are amply quoted -- Beyers Naude, Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, etc. But the unsung heroes of the grass-roots struggle also have their say, as Lockwood introduces the reader to a 16 year old girl involved in student protests, a worker in a textile factory, an Afrikaner nationalist and a host of others -- symbolic of a society divided against itself...and of struggles within the religious communities.

The author focuses inside South Africa, but does not neglect the regional wars and the total strategy of the apartheid regime. One by one, the independent neighboring states are considered -- both as victims of apartheid aggression and as hope for the future, as the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference furthers economic development in the region.

For those involved in local religious organizations, the challenge is clear: make full use of this excellent resource. For all, Moment of Truth offers in less than 200 pages a very carefully prepared insight into issues of liberation theology in relation to apartheid and an outline for action. This book is a must for anti-apartheid activists in the US.

Can the "Free Market" Solve Africa's Food Crisis? Kevin Danaher. Geneva: International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations, 1987. Distributed by Food First, 145 Ninth Street, San Francisco, CA 94103.

reviewed by Carol B. Thompson, Political Science, University of Southern California.

"Africa's 'food crisis' is not just a crisis for Africa, but for humanity." Giving a useful summary of critiques of the prevailing ideology of privatization, this analysis argues that forcing privatization on African governments increases suffering and delays development for the people. For anyone teaching, doing research, or concerned about the contemporary African debt crisis--in short, all ACAS members--this booklet (47 pp) is a necessity.

Danaher--looking at production, marketing, distribution processes--raises basic questions which expose the real purposes of US, IMF and World Bank aid: to sustain dominant class interests or the "transnational class interests." For example, after a decade of force-feeding the policy, the "private sector" still has not been defined and includes both transnational agribusinesses and the family farmer. Private production can emphasize either cash or food crops, a choice with severe consequences and one perhaps better not to leave to the profit motive.

Increased agricultural prices, used as the primary incentive, do not increase production or reduce hunger. Instead, production recommendations must also address family politics: increased incomes for rural mothers is what really reduces malnutrition, which now causes the death of 5 million African children per year and cripples for life another 5 million each year.

Offering important summary statistics, the book can also provide data for classroom lectures or as a baseline for other complementary data in research. For example, the average annual percent change in real prices for agricultural commodities, 1950-1984, was -1.03. For wheat, corn, coffee, cocoa, tea and pineapple, three to six corporations control over 80 percent of the world market. Just these two statistics of many reveal the contradictions of a "free market" solving Africa's problems.

While failing to address the prior political questions of power and accountability, privatization reforms ignore several key points:

- 1) Economic growth cannot solve basic problems such as poverty and hunger. "A high tide floats all boats" is a fallacy if your boat is full of holes.
- 2) Expanding exports will not bring about broad economic development.
- 3) Transferring control of economic activity from government to business will not itself increase benefits to the entire society: in much of Africa **it's the customers who are missing. They, not the market, need to be promoted.** (pp. 32-33)

Danaher's solution is a call for an international alliance of workers and peasants. How to achieve that is left for other analyses...and for all of us in our own research and practice.

(Note: the editor welcomes suggestions for further books to be reviewed and volunteers to do the reviewing).

A PLEBISCITE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA ?

by Anthony G. Pazzanita, Attorney, Boston

This past February 27, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic celebrated the 12th anniversary of its founding, albeit still without having established complete control over its territory, Western Sahara, and with many of its inhabitants obliged to live displaced from their homeland. This will no doubt be an occasion for much justifiable satisfaction at what the SADR, led by the Frente Polisario, has so far accomplished in the human and diplomatic realms. However, against this lies the most formidable obstacle to a settlement of the conflict--the continued massive military and administrative presence of Morocco in the territory, which invaded and occupied the land in 1975-1976. Morocco has consistently refused to withdraw this presence even temporarily. To this day, it insists, despite all the evidence, that the Frente Polisario is controlled by Algeria and is thus not an independent party to the conflict.¹

Any perspective on this situation, therefore, that looks to a resolution of the problems of Western Sahara and the forced exile of the Sahrawis must confront the problem of somehow dislodging the Moroccan presence so that the inhabitants of Western Sahara can realize their right to self-determination. This can come about either through military means, abrupt changes in the political scene in Morocco, or through a free, fair, and internationally-supervised referendum (plebiscite) to ascertain the wishes of the people regarding their future status and desired government. This last alternative offers real possibilities for a settlement of this tragic conflict, resting as it does upon a solid foundation of international law and practice. It also faces considerable obstacles, as any survey of the Western Sahara referendum idea will illustrate.

Historically, the use of referenda to decide the status of territories has its roots in Europe.² It spread, as a matter of standard international practice, to Africa at the beginning of the post-colonial era a generation ago. Significantly, referenda were used in Africa (and elsewhere in the developing world) when the wishes of the inhabitants were the subject of disagreement in the international community. In such cases, the United Nations would supervise a plebiscite, binding on all concerned, to ascertain the desires of the indigenous population. The referendum would be conducted peacefully and in consonance with the world body's position that decolonization should be consummated without violence.³ The cases in which this has been done are instances that bear some resemblance to the situation in Western Sahara, namely, where uncertainty exists regarding the wishes of the people of a country and in which competing claims exist to the same territory--in the Western Sahara case, between Morocco and the SADR.⁴

Of all the methods by which national groups attain self-determination --not all of them peaceful--⁵ the referendum offers the advantage of being separate and distinct from internal democratic processes in the countries affected which often use the same voting arrangements found in a UN-sponsored plebiscite.⁶ Not only does this fact make the referendum idea fully in accord with international law (as only relations between states were traditionally cognizable), but it does not diminish the substantive right to self-determination for peoples involved in the decolonization process. But, as

will become apparent, the plebiscite concept has a rather serious drawback: any internationally-sponsored voting process in a contested territory is contingent upon the creation and maintenance of a climate of safety for the population and of cooperation among the various parties to a dispute. This factor, unfortunately, assumes decisive importance in Western Sahara, as a survey of the historical and political aspects of the Saharan referendum proposals are examined.

The United Nations was the first organization to take cognizance of Western Sahara. Continuously from 1965 onwards, the UN General Assembly passed resolutions with a view to terminating the Spanish colonial presence, and beginning the following year articulated the referendum idea in a fairly detailed manner.⁷ While these resolutions--all passed by large majorities--did focus international attention on the continued dependency of "Spanish Sahara", they did not produce a referendum. Despite lip service for the concept from Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain, it is probably correct to conclude that "...Madrid's support for a referendum in the Sahara can be seen as a tactic for perpetuating Spain's presence in the territory,"⁸ and that Morocco and Mauritania were using the referendum idea to advance their own claims to the territory. At any rate, Spain, by its intransigent posture and continued presence in the Sahara, was able to block a plebiscite. This remained the basic situation with regard to the referendum proposals at the time of the withdrawal of Spain, the illegal division of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, and proclamation of the SADR on 27 February 1976.

After a period of diplomatic inactivity, the Organization of African Unity took up the Western Sahara referendum problem as an integral component of a settlement of the overall conflict. This effort almost splintered the OAU at various stages, and the actual referendum plans, while detailed, could not be implemented due to Morocco's continued refusal to enter into talks with the Frente Polisario, claiming, then as now, that it was not an independent party to the conflict.⁹ Morocco also demonstrated a rigid position with regard to international supervision of any vote in Western Sahara, and refused to countenance any withdrawal of its extensive presence in the territory, a step always demanded by the Frente Polisario.¹⁰ In essence, Morocco placed a differing interpretation upon the plebiscite process than the rest of the OAU and the international community--it only wanted a vote by the Sahrawis if it could somehow be made to legitimize its continued military and administrative presence in Western Sahara. This phase ended with the definitive seating of the SADR as a full member state of the OAU and Morocco's consequent pullout from the Organization, leaving a solution to the Sahara war no nearer. To date, renewed efforts by the United Nations to advance plebiscite proposals through contacts with the parties, facilitation of indirect discussion amongst the two protagonists, and the sending of a Technical Mission to the region, have been notably unsuccessful as well.¹¹

Looking at the referendum modalities themselves, we encounter a series of problems that need to be overcome before any confidence can be had in its conduct and outcome. While there are many such concerns, such as the precise voting arrangements, the composition, functions, and deployment of the Interim Administration of the territory, and other regulatory matters, they have--at least in the abstract--already been addressed by the UN and the OAU, drawing upon prior experience in similar such operations.¹² A close look at the two

main stumbling blocks to the conduct of any vote, however, will lead one to conclude that the above referendum components are actually only secondary in importance--they cannot even have a chance of success if certain primary problems are not given attention or are imperfectly resolved.

The first major concern must be overcome first--a general and complete cease-fire in the territory must be instituted and a climate of cooperation must exist between Morocco and the Frente Polisario. This will ensure the safety of the Sahrawis during the plebiscite and will generate confidence in its result. This state of affairs is contingent upon as-yet unrealized direct negotiations between the two warring parties to facilitate such a cease-fire. Of course, the inflexible attitude of Morocco has been the main impediment, since it refuses to see the Polisario as an entity separate from Algeria.

If and when this hurdle is passed successfully, there will still remain the thorny problem of determining the population of Western Sahara for the purposes of voter eligibility. The actual number of Sahrawis is the subject of much dispute and the last census in the territory was conducted by Spain in 1974. It counted 73,497 native inhabitants, but was riddled with shortcomings.¹³ It is almost universally believed that the real number of Sahrawis is far higher, with up to 165,000 in Polisario's Tindouf-area camps alone.¹⁴ The process of deciding precisely who is a Sahrawi and therefore eligible to vote will be a formidable one for a variety of reasons: the sharp divergences in the estimated numbers of inhabitants on the part of the parties, the probable high rate of population growth among the Sahrawis,¹⁵ the massive introduction of Moroccan citizens into the occupied territory of the SADR,¹⁶ and the severe imperfections in the 1974 Spanish census. The resulting task handed to the Interim Administration will be an arduous one, secondly only, in the writer's opinion, to the cease-fire arrangements and the establishment of a good referendum environment among the parties in the first instance. In this connection, as with the Interim Administration itself, it will be imperative for a competent and impartial dispute-resolution process to function well and to be respected by all parties concerned.

Given this rather clouded picture, a concluding question must be asked: when shall the situation in Western Sahara evolve beyond threshold concerns to a point where a cease-fire and a UN-OAU Interim Administration in the territory is imminent, leading to an actual plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Sahrawis? If any one theme can emerge from a study of the political situation in Western Sahara, it is that Morocco, by its continued occupation of the territory, is able to block or at least to influence any substantive steps towards a plebiscite without intimidation of the Sahrawi people. The enforcement powers of contemporary international law and international organizations are simply not strong enough to overcome this, and it is for that reason if for no other that a referendum in Western Sahara is unlikely in the immediate future. At the same time, an analysis of the steps taken by international bodies to attempt to settle the conflict will reveal that referendum modalities are already well-developed and possible obstacles are at least recognized. The situation waits only for some evolution in Morocco's heretofore intransigent stance and the emergence of the political will to solve one of the most drawn-out conflicts in post-colonial African history.

1. For examples of the Moroccan attitude in this regard, see, inter alia, New York Times, 10 February 1982, p.A-3, col.2, West Africa, 12 December 1983, p.2861, and Letter to Editor, Africa Report, November-December 1987, p.4.
2. Benjamin Neuberger, National Self-Determination in Postcolonial Africa (1986), p. 64.
3. For a summary of this practice in the African context, see Thomas M. Franck and Paul Hoffman, "The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.8, No.4 (Winter 1976), pp. 336-337.
4. Neuberger, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
5. Ibid., pp. 64-67.
6. Ibid., pp. 13-18.
7. Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, (1983), pp.104-107.
8. John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute, (1983), p. 47.
9. Hodges, op. cit., pp. 275-276, 309-310.
10. As an example, see UN Document A/42/601, "Question of Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General," 1 October 1987, paras. 13-14, pp. 5-6.
11. See West Africa, 14 April 1986, p. 797, New York Times, 1 November 1985, p. A-4, col. 1, and West Africa, 14 April 1986, p. 854 and West Africa 28 December 1987/4 January 1988, p. 2560.
12. See, for example, the detailed referendum plans formulated by the OAU's Implementation Committee and its "Nairobi II" and "Nairobi III" meetings in 1981 and 1982, in John Damis, "The OAU and Western Sahara," in Yassin el-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, The OAU After Twenty Years (1984), pp. 286-294.
13. Hodges, op. cit., pp. 131-132.
14. James Firebrace, "The Sahrawi Refugees: Lessons and Prospects," in Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan, War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict (1987), p. 168.
15. Hodges, op. cit., p. 344.
16. See, for example, the discussion of this phenomenon in Teresa K. Smith, "Human Rights and the Western Sahara War," Africa Today, Vol. 34, No. 3, February 1988.

TRADE CREDITS
ECONOMIC PRESSURE POINTS ON SOUTH AFRICA*

by John E. Lind, Caniccor Research, San Francisco

Calls have come from South Africa to apply economic pressure on South Africa in order to end apartheid. The economy of South Africa can be depressed by preventing South Africa from receiving the imported commodities and services it needs to keep its dependent economy going. This process can be affected in several ways:

(1) Countries can refuse to permit the sale to South Africa of those necessary commodities and services,

(2) Sanctions can be invoked to prevent the purchase of South Africa's exports, which provide the foreign currency to import the necessary foreign commodities and services mentioned in (1), and

(3) The financing of these trade flows can be prevented by ceasing all lending, trade finance, etc.

The direct approach of preventing all imports and exports is most effective. However, such sanctions are slow to materialize, because the cut off of exports to South Africa threatens jobs in the exporting country. The cutting off of financial credits then becomes the other option, which is the subject of this paper.

The cutting off of financial credits and flows is not as comprehensive as sanctions against all trade, but it can be swift and effective. The barter trade required to take its place is slow and difficult to arrange. The hope is that the economy is so threatened in the short run that political concession will be made to avert the crisis.

An example of such a crisis was the pull out of short-term credit by U.S. banks in the summer of 1985. This pull out caused South Africa to impose a moratorium on the payment of most bank debt in September 1985. The announcement of the moratorium brought all transactions to a standstill for several days until the finance could be sorted out and guarantees made. At present the agreement on this standstill permits repayment of less than \$500 million per year on principal and repayment of only trade credits, foreign government guaranteed credits and South African bonds. Thus the primary financial flow at present is trade credit.

Before discussing trade credit further, let us look at the industrialized countries' exports to South Africa which keep the South African economy going and the imports which provide the foreign currency for their payment. The economy of South Africa is very similar to that of less developed countries because it imports most of its capital machinery and large amounts of manufactured goods while paying for them by the sale of gold and other raw materials from the mining sector. Two-fifths of South Africa's export earnings are from gold, another fifth from other mining sector exports.


* a paper presented at the conference on South Africa and Sanctions, Howard University, October 30-31, 1987. (Refer ACAS Bulletin No. 21 for details).

Exports to South Africa for the Maintenance of the South African Economy.

The analysis will begin with an over-view of the 1985 trade, since it is the last full year for which there are data in complete detail at hand. Then changes that have occurred in the picture during 1986 and 1987 will be sketched.

In 1985 goods amounting to \$10.356 billion were exported from various countries throughout the world to South Africa, as shown in figure 1. Some 70% were exported from the industrialized countries in the group called the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), which includes the countries of North America, Europe and Japan.

Figure 1. Exports by Country to South Africa in 1985. Shaded areas represent exports of machinery (SITC 7_).



Indeed the six major trading partners - Germany, Japan, U.K., U.S., Italy and France - supplied almost three-fifths of these exports to South Africa. These exports by the OECD countries are predominantly manufactured articles, chemicals and machinery. The category of machinery (SITC 7_) contains the larger capital equipment, which requires long-term trade credits (5 years or more), and motor vehicles and some consumer durables, which require medium-term trade credits of 1 to 5 years. The shaded regions in figure 1 show this machinery category, which makes up 54% of the total OECD exports to South Africa. Thus we can say that exporters of the major trade partners supply most of the capital goods to keep South Africa's industry going and this trade, which requires trade credits with a maturity of a year or more, will dominate these countries' trade financing.


A careful analysis of 1986 exports of the major trade partners shows an increase of OECD exports to South Africa of \$540 million over 1985. This increase is almost completely caused by the increase in the cost of machinery (SITC 7_ or equivalent), \$375 million of which is attributable to increases in dollar amounts of exports from Germany and Japan. However, if the exports from these two countries are expressed in their own currencies, which have appreciated against the U.S. dollar, there is a decrease in the tons exported and deutsche mark amounts from Germany and only a slight rise in the yen amounts from Japan. The U.S. exports did decrease in 1986 by 11%.

The same phenomenon appears to be happening in 1987, with some slight increase in the actual amounts exported. Thus the demands for foreign exports to South Africa were relatively stable between 1985 and 1986, but may rise in the second half of 1987.

Imports From South Africa.

Figure 2 shows imports of various countries from South Africa, with gold amounting to two-fifths of these imports shown as the shaded portion of the figure. The three main purchasers of gold are Switzerland, the U.K. and Italy. The exact proportion of gold purchases between Switzerland and the U.K. is uncertain, but in this figure the ratio was assumed to be 60:40, respectively. However, the sum of these two countries' gold purchases is known with good accuracy. Thus in the pie chart the sum of adjacent sectors for the two countries is accurate and the uncertainty lies in where the radius separating the two sectors should be placed. In the U.K. and Switzerland, the gold is immediately resold on the London and Zurich gold markets and re-exported. Thus these sales may even be done on open account with the Reserve Bank of South Africa, making financing minimal. The gold bought by Italy is for jewelry manufacture and is probably financed short-term by Italian banks, primarily in Milan.

Figure 2. Imports from South Africa by Country 1985. Shaded portion represents imports of gold.



Imports by Country to South Africa	Gold	Total
	Millions of US Dollars	
Germany	76	1006
United Kingdom	2122	3420
Switzerland	3194	3264
U.S.	1	2239
Japan	221	1852
Italy	1235	1842
France	16	644
Other OECD	-	1441
Other	-	671
Total	6864	16573

Less than 10% of the imports from South Africa is machinery (SITC 7) and thus financing is almost entirely short-term with some bulk items financed up to one year.

U.S. sanctions have proved effective with U.S. imports from South Africa for the first half of 1987 at 54% of the imports of the first half of 1986. South Africa's coal sales have also been decimated by Denmark's sanctions and France's cutting of purchases.

Financing Trade.

Financing of capital projects, like electric power stations, has become more difficult since the September 1985 debt standstill. Only trade

credits, credits insured or guaranteed by foreign governments and bonds have been exempt from this standstill.

However, the exemption of trade credits by both the South African standstill agreement and the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, together with the active insuring of credits by European and Japanese governments, provides for continued exports from these countries to South Africa. In terms of exports of capital goods to South Africa, Larry Harper of South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) states: "If we place orders with overseas institutions we can still fund at least 85% of our import requirements. There has been no indication that that sort of finance will be withdrawn." (Financial Mail, 24 July 1987). Formerly, ESCOM raised money for many of its projects through bonds and syndicated loans. Now that these avenues are closed off, their source of funding is shifting to insured trade credits.

First let us look more carefully at the major ways that export trade can be financed:

(1) A domestic bank can loan directly to a foreign buyer who then repays the bank directly.

(2) A domestic bank can provide credits to the domestic supplier to finance production and export. The foreign purchaser pays the supplier who then repays the bank. This is a form of bank supplier credit and is presumably the most common form for Japanese exports to South Africa, since Japanese banks are technically forbidden to loan directly to South Africa.

(3) The supplier can provide the credit. One way is to sell an open account with the buyer paying at a later date after the receipt of the goods. This method is presumably used by a company like IBM to ship goods to its distributor in South Africa.

The OECD reports the total amount of government guarantees and insurance provided by OECD member countries for trade with South Africa, and this "cover" is divided into bank credits and supplier credits. These amounts are but a small fraction of total trade but presumably almost all of the large capital items are covered by government guarantees and insurance because of the large amounts of each transaction and the long-term duration of the financing agreement. Table I below shows the amounts of guarantees together with the amounts of machinery exports to South Africa.

	1985	1986
Guarantees and Insurance:	(Million U.S.Dollars)	
Bank Credits	1966	1778
Supplier Credits	1076	1397
Total	<u>3072</u>	<u>3175</u>
OECD exports to South Africa		
Machinery (SITC 7_)	3894	est:4400
Total	7296	7836

(Source: Statistics on External Indebtedness: Bank and Trade Related Non-bank External Claims on Individual Borrowing Countries and Territories, semi-annual, BIS/OECD, Paris and Basle.)

Of the guaranteed credits of banks of \$1778 million at the end of 1986, over \$800 million were probably insured by the British Export Credit Guarantee Department (EGGD), since the Bank of England reports \$834 million of claims by U.K. banks guaranteed outside of South Africa. Germany and Japan would be the other largest guarantors, followed by France and Italy. U.S. banks can not obtain U.S. guarantees or insurance except with special approval. Thus U.S. guarantees are almost zero.

The total amount of trade credits is difficult to estimate for they are not separated out from loans in the reporting by banks and the reporting of data by suppliers is spotty at best. However, a rough estimate of total export finance can be made as follows. The short-term credits are no more than 180 days with a few exceptions and thus the short-term finance would be less than half the annual total exports less machinery exports. For 1985 the short-term finance would be less than \$3083 million. If the financing term for machinery, which is mostly medium- and long-term finance, averaged about 2 years, then that financing would equal twice the total of machinery exports or \$8380 million in 1985. The total financing would thus have been about \$12.5 billion in 1985. At that time much of the capital expenditure for machinery would have been provided by bond issues, loans and the precarious practice by South African banks of on-lending. Today the \$12.5 billion, less long-term commitments from 1985, would have to be supplied by South African funds or by foreign trade credits. These trade credits would be both bank and supplier, including supplier credits on open account.

With such a large volume of trade credit necessary for the maintenance of the South African economy, trade credits are a crucial pressure point on that economy.

Recommendations on Trade Credits.

(1) The OECD member governments should eliminate all trade credit guarantees and insurance for trade with South Africa by common agreement. Especially important is the elimination of cover by the British EGGD. The U.S. should take the lead in urging this policy since it has already eliminated such cover.

(2) The U.S. should eliminate the exemption, permitting trade credits for South Africa, from the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and urge other OECD member nations similarly to prohibit trade credits.

(3) In lieu of the above, banks of the major trading partners should be pressured to cease their trade lending through a coordinated campaign.

PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE

Amnesty International has supplied the following listing of African university professors and other university staff who are prisoners of conscience, imprisoned for their non-violent opinions. Originally published in November 1987, this list was updated in April 1988, with the reminder that it is not a complete list, but only a sample. Amnesty International is an independent worldwide movement working impartially for the release of all prisoners of conscience, fair and prompt trials for political prisoners and an end to torture and executions. For further listings or information regarding international public pressure campaigns, contact Amnesty International USA, 608 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., 20002. Phone: 202/544-0200.

Benin

Eugene Azatassou, lecturer in mathematics, University of Benin; arrested April 1985, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Thomas Houedete, lecturer in economics, University of Benin; arrested April 1985, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Ghana

Kwame Karikari, lecturer in the School of Broadcasting and Mass Communications, University of Ghana, former director general of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, chairman of the New Democratic Movement; arrested July 1987, detained indefinitely without trial.

Kenya

Kariuki Gathitu, lecturer in computer science, University of Nairobi; arrested March 1986, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Ngotho Kariuki, lecturer at the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute in Arusha, Tanzania; arrested March 1986, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Maina wa Kinyatti, lecturer in history, Kenyatto University College; arrested June 1982, serving a 6-year prison sentence for alleged possession of a seditious publication.

Joseph Kamonye Manje, lecturer at Kenya Science Teachers College; arrested March 1986, serving a 5-year sentence for alleged possession of a seditious publication.

Katama Mkangi, lecturer in sociology, University of Nairobi; arrested May 1986, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Mukaru Ng'ang'a, former history lecturer at the University of Nairobi and research fellow at the Institute of African Studies, Nairobi; arrested April 1986, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Malawi

Vera Chirwa, lecturer in law at the University of Zambia; arrested December 1981 with her husband Orton Chirwa, a prominent exile (they were allegedly abducted from Zambia), both were sentenced to death after an unfair trial-sentences commuted to life imprisonment.

Jack Mapanje, head of Department of Language and Literature, University of Malawi, and poet; arrested September 1987, detained indefinitely without charge or trial.

Somalia

Mohamed Aden Sheikh, president of the Somali Academy of Sciences, member of Parliament and former minister, medical doctor; arrested June 1982, due to be tried for treason (which carries a mandatory death penalty) in early 1988.

Abdi Ismail Yunis, research fellow at the Somali Academy of Sciences, director of planning at the Ministry of Higher Education, former head of education at Lafole College, Somali National University; arrested November 1982, sentenced to death by the National Security Court in Mogadishu in February 1988-sentence commuted to a 24-year prison term.

South Africa

Vusi Khanyile, special assistant to the vice-chancellor of the University of Capetown, chairman of the National Education Crisis Committee; arrested December 1986, detained indefinitely without trial.

Raymond Suttner, lecturer in law, University of Witwatersrand, member of the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (an affiliate of the United Democratic Front), former prisoner of conscience 1975-1983; arrested June 1986, detained indefinitely without trial.

As an example of additional information available from Amnesty International, here are excerpts from the October 1987 detail sheet about Jack Mapanje:

Malawian police arrested Jack Mapanje, the country's best known poet, on 25 September 1987 in the southern city of Zomba - since when he has been held incommunicado and apparently without charge. The precise reason for his imprisonment has not been disclosed but it followed the recent banning of his collection of poems, Of Chameleons and Gods, by the...Censorship Board....

In recent years his poetry has increasingly dealt with political themes, though he is not believed to have been politically active or to be connected with any opposition group. Freedom of speech and artistic expression is very limited in Malawi....

Detention without trial is lawful in Malawi under the Public Security Regulations, 1965. The President may, "if he considers it to be necessary for the preservation of public order so to do, make an order against any person directing that he be detained"....There is no obligation on the government to publish details of the detention. The same regulations make it an offence "to undermine the authority of, or public confidence in the government"....

RODNEY ASSASSINATED A SECOND TIME

Readers of the ACAS Bulletin will recall that we reported in the Summer 1987 issue that the alleged assassin of Dr. Walter Rodney, author of How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, was tracked down by Mrs. Patricia Rodney in Cayenne, French Guiana, after a six-and-a-half year search.

Patricia Rodney reported this news to President Desmond Hoyte of Guyana with the request for an inquest into her husband's assassination and a demand that Gregory Smith, the alleged assassin, be extradited to stand trial in Georgetown, Guyana, where Walter Rodney was murdered in June 1980.

Readers of the ACAS Bulletin were encouraged to write to President Hoyte to support Patricia Rodney's appeal. Immanuel Wallerstein wrote on behalf of ACAS (reproduced in the Summer 1987 ACAS Bulletin). Broad international response for an inquest and trial forced the Guyanese government to respond, but in a manner that was a parody of justice.

The following account of the inquest appeared in the February 1987 issue of Friends for Jamaica Caribbean Newsletter (available for \$10/year from Friends for Jamaica, Box 20392, Cathedral Finance Station, New York, NY 10025). It was written by the Working Peoples Alliance, the party to which Walter Rodney belonged at the time of his death in Guyana.

A coroner's jury, on Feb. 15th, found that Dr. Walter Rodney, world-renowned historian and co-leader of the Working People's Alliance of Guyana, died on June 13, 1980 by accident or mis-adventure. This decision in the two-week-old inquest came hours after the defense team, headed by Senior Counsel Doodnauth Singh, withdrew from the proceedings.

The defense team, representing the interests of the Rodney family and the WPA, withdrew after Coroner Pratt refused to grant more time for Donald Rodney to appear and after he rejected submissions that the court should facilitate the return of other witnesses from abroad.

The defense team had repeatedly asked the court for a list of witnesses summoned. This was never furnished by the coroner.

The decision to hold an inquest was made public in mid-1987. The WPA in October 1987 called on the Regime to fix a date in order to allow for time so that witnesses who are outside of Guyana could attend and to give the family and colleagues of Rodney time to prepare.

There was no response. Suddenly, on Jan. 18th, the Regime announced that the inquest would begin on Feb. 1, giving the family and the WPA only 72 hours to prepare. None of the main witnesses were properly summoned, nor were

any arrangements made to get them to testify.

Donald Rodney, living in exile in London, had repeatedly indicated his willingness to testify. At the time the inquest ended, he was still making arrangements to travel.

Gregory Smith, Sgt. of the Guyana Defence Force in June 1980, the man who Donald Rodney claims planted the explosive device on Walter Rodney, who now lives in Cayenne (French Guyana), was not summoned. Smith, who the WPA claims was at that time an agent of the Regime, disappeared on the night of June 13, 1980. It is widely believed that agents of the PNC helped him to escape. Smith's whereabouts became known early in 1987 after Walter's widow, Pat Rodney, located him and pointed the press in his direction.

In interviews with the Guyanese and Caribbean press and radio, Smith spoke of his involvement and said he was willing to testify.

Over the 7 years since the assassination, no attempt was made to charge Smith for murder and no serious attempt was made to find him. WPA co-leader Eusi Kwayana in repeated attempts tried to bring charges against Smith for murder in the Guyana Courts. The Regime, despite public knowledge of the whereabouts of Smith, refused to move for an extradition order to bring him back to Guyana.

The other witnesses not summoned were the British forensic specialists brought specially from London to assist in determining the nature of the explosive device.

The Working People's Alliance, in a statement soon after the decision, said, "The inquest has turned out to be a demonstration inquest to get it out of the way and for the record." The WPA statement further stated that it has verbatim records of proceedings at the inquest, and promised to turn over these records to a competent panel for evaluation. "The WPA will take care to see that those who compile the (US) State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights are furnished with the full transcripts," added the WPA in their statement.

The conduct and arrangements for the Rodney inquest demonstrates that the Hoyte-Green dictatorship will stop at nothing in their quest to look democratic, but at the same time laying the basis to deepen their control over the country and establishing their brand of a "civilian" form of dictatorship.

It is widely accepted in Guyana that they were out to assassinate Walter Rodney a second time.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY'S CORNER

by David Groff, ACAS Executive Secretary

As Executive Secretary of the Association, I receive a steady stream of mail, most of it consisting of notices, inquiries or appeals from individuals or groups sharing our commitment to African self-determination and development. Recently, however, I received something of a rather different orientation: a copy of the spring edition of "The Aida Parker Newsletter," published in Johannesburg and distributed in the US by the "Restore a More Benevolent Order Coalition" (RAMBOC) of Costa Mesa, California.

The newsletter, which carries the sub-title, "Perspectives on Southern Africa," consists of a series of articles purporting to present "What the News Media Won't Tell You about Southern Africa." Most of the present issue is devoted to a series of exposes of African failure and incompetence. A sample of the titles will convey some of the flavor of Aida Parker's message to America's befuddled masses: "The Cuban Threat," "Tanzania: Experiment that Failed," "Socialism: Africa's Cancer," "Why Tutu Hates the Hand that Feeds Him," "Zambia: A Future Thrown Wildly Away," "Angola: Switched-Off Powerhouse," and "Zimbabwe: Uhuru's Glitter Tarnished."

After this sweep through black ruled Africa, the newsletter gets down to its central message: "...and now, the facts on South Africa--Africa's best - perhaps only - chance." The "facts" consist, for the most part, of the familiar litany concerning South Africa's economic strength and the high physical quality of life it allegedly accords to its black population.

Scattered throughout the newsletter are frequent allusions to the soft-headedness and/or sinister machinations of persons critical of South Africa. A favorite way of conveying this part of the message is by presenting quotes from black neo-conservatives such as Walter Williams of George Mason University and George Ayittey of Bloomsberg University in Pennsylvania, and Alan Keyes of the American Enterprise Institute. But other sources are also tapped. My favorite is this gem exhumed from the writings of Ludwig von Mises: "The psychology of people disappointed with their own performance will tend to be anti-capitalistic. Unless you understand that, you will underestimate the popular hostility to capitalism and possibly ineffectually support it."

Perusal of "The Aida Parker Newsletter" recalls the need for ACAS to pay more attention to the ways in which South Africa seeks to sell apartheid in the great American emporium of ideas. A couple of years ago members of the executive committee proposed that an ASA panel be organized on rightwing lobbying groups interested in Africa. At the time nothing much came of this proposal. Can we revive this project? I would invite any of you with an interest in this topic to get in touch with me. Perhaps we can organize a panel for the 1989 ASA Meeting. It seems the least we can do.

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Editor: Bud Day, 3218 Cheviot Vista Place #2, Los Angeles, CA, 90034.

Memberships and subscriptions: Ed Ferguson, History Department, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, 97331.

Executive Secretary: David Groff, 4205 SE Ramona, Portland, OR, 97206.