



**ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS**  
P.O. Box 791, East Lansing, Michigan 48823

## NEWSLETTER

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## IN MEMORIAM: RUTH FIRST

Ruth First, the prominent exiled South African political activist, was killed in Maputo by a letter-bomb which Mozambican police said was mailed by South African agents. Ms. First, a long-time supporter of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, was detained by the South African government; her account of this detention appears in her 1965 book 117 Days. She has written on many other aspects of African affairs. Her death was the second by letter-bombing of an African National Congress exile in a year. Ms. First was buried in Maputo alongside members of the ANC who were killed in a direct assault on their homes last year.

The following memorial statement was written by Bereket Habte-Selassie, a longtime friend of Ruth First.

Ruth First is gone, victim of a barbarous attack by the secret police of racist South Africa. But she is only gone in a physical sense; her spirit lives on, and the cause of equality, freedom and peoples' liberation to which she had dedicated her life cannot be turned back by the terrorist attacks of eliminating prominent individuals. On the contrary, it will increase the resolve of those who will carry on the struggle, and it will bring forth more Ruth Firsts, as previous assassinations of South African freedom fighters have seemed to increase the resolve of the freedom fighters.

Ruth belonged to those extraordinary human beings who place the brotherhood and sisterhood of humankind above personal comfort and above the glory of the home and state. She had a home and a state--South Africa. She had a well-to-do family. She was a brilliant woman who could have done very well for herself. She chose to fight for the oppressed and the deprived of the earth.

I mourn her death, as a friend of seventeen years, and as a fellow freedom fighter for the same cause. I stretch my hand of solidarity to her husband and lifetime comrade, Joe Slovo, and her daughters and her mother.

**ACAS ACTIVITIES AT THE AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION MEETING  
WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER 4 - 7, 1982**

The annual meeting of the African Studies Association (ASA) will be held at the Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., from November 4-7, 1982. ACAS will sponsor several panel discussions during the conference.

PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBYING ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES, chaired by Ted Lockwood, will be held Friday, November 5, from 1-3 p.m. Participants include:

- Ted Lockwood "The Nixon-Ford Years and Rhodesian Sanctions"
- Randall Robinson (TransAfrica): "The Carter Years and the Role of Lobbying for Zimbabwe's Independence"
- Jean Sindab (Washington Office on Africa): "The Challenges of Establishing Sanctions against South Africa under the Reagan Administration"
- Steve Weissman (Staff, House Subcommittee on Africa) "Contributions of Public Interest Lobbying in Terms of the Work of the Subcommittee"
- Allen Isaacman (University of Minnesota) "The Role of the Africa Scholar in Lobbying"

SOCIALISM IN AFRICA: CLAIMS AND PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT will be held Saturday, November 6, from 9-11 a.m., and will be chaired by Joel Samoff (Stanford University), head of the ACAS Research Committee. Presentations will be given by:

- James H. Mittleman (CUNY-SUNY): "Retarding and Accelerating the Socialist Transition"
- Joel Samoff (Stanford University): "Socialist Programs and Socialist Struggle"
- John S. Saul (Queens University and Universidade Eduardo Mondlane): "Reforming the Ideological Basis for Socialism in Africa: Problems and Prospects"

Discussants will be:

- Immanuel Wallerstein (SUNY-Binghamton): "The Casablanca States Revisited"
- Stephanie Urdang (New York): "Women and Socialism in Mozambican Development"

ROUND TABLE ON SOCIALISM IN AFRICA will be held at noon, Saturday, November 6 and will be chaired by Joel Samoff. Participants include:

- Michael Bratton (Michigan State University): "Zimbabwe"
- Gerald Bender (University of Southern California): "Angola"
- Joy Hawkins (University of Virginia): "Guinea-Bissau"
- Allen Isaacman (University of Minnesota); "Mozambique"

## THE "MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE"

Paul Fauvet and Alves Gomes

Reprinted from Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique

Supplement to Bulletin No. 69

To ensure its own survival, South Africa's apartheid regime is determined to maintain its grip over all the independent states in the region. Those independent states, working through the mechanism of the SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference), are equally determined to break the ties of dependence that bind them to Pretoria.

South Africa hectors, threatens and attempts to destabilize its neighbors. Outright military attacks alternate with economic pressure, with funding subversive activities, and with the occasional shot at bribery.

This article looks at the main instrument now in use in efforts to destabilize Mozambique -- the so-called "Mozambique National Resistance." When the leaders of the six Front Line states met in Maputo in early March 1982, they stressed in their final communique that the South African regime was resorting to "the preparation, training and financing of armed bandits to destabilize the independent countries of southern Africa."

The Front Line leaders can hardly not have had in mind the group calling itself the "Mozambique National Resistance," and its increased activities in recent months, directed particularly against Mozambique's transport routes, so vital for the whole project of SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference) to break with the region's dependence on South Africa.

The MNR presents itself to the outside world as a heroic nationalist organization struggling against a "communist dictatorship." It speaks of a "second war of national liberation," and even misappropriates familiar Frelimo slogans for its own use. Thus its bulletin, duplicated in Lisbon, bears the title *A Luta Continua* - the struggle continues, the best-known of all Frelimo slogans. This publication is edited by Evo Fernandes, a former agent of the Portuguese fascist secret police, the PIDE. He was a student in Lisbon in the 1950s, where he used to spy on other students from the colonies for the PIDE. Later on, in Mozambique, he was closely linked to one of the most powerful figures in the colonial set-up, Jorge Jardim. Jardim sat on the boards of dozens of companies, owned the newspaper *Noticias da Beira*, set up his own private armies to fight FRELIMO, and had a direct link to the highest government circles through the fact of being a godson of the Portuguese dictator Salazar. Under Jardim's patronage, Fernandes rose to the position of business manager of *Noticias da Beira*. This part of his career came to an abrupt halt in mid-1974, when young journalists on the paper, supporters of FRELIMO, took over and kicked him out.

A further link between the MNR and the PIDE is provided by Casimiro Monteiro. Monteiro was a professional assassin employed by the PIDE. He carried out the murder of Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado in 1965, and there are strong indications that he was involved in the assassination of FRELIMO's first President, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, killed by a PIDE parcel

bomb in February 1969. After the fall of fascism in Portugal, Monteiro disappeared. He was tried in Lisbon in absentia for the murder of Humberto Delgado. Last August the Lisbon courts found him guilty and sentenced him to 18 years imprisonment, but made no attempt to discover his whereabouts. However, an enterprising journalist on the South African *Sunday Times* tracked Monteiro down to a private house in Johannesburg, where he was closely guarded by members of the MNR.

The PIDE agent most involved with the MNR is Jardim's former private secretary, Orlando Cristina. His connection with the foundation and development of the MNR can now be fairly well traced. Much of the murky history of the group has now come to light. Despite the veil of secrecy drawn by the Rhodesian UDI regime, and later by Pretoria, there are now enough sources available for the history of the MNR to be followed with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

Defectors from the MNR have told their story, as have MNR prisoners captured by the Mozambican army (FPLM). Former officials of the Rhodesian Special Branch have now loosened their tongues. Documents captured at the MNR base at Garagua, occupied by the FPLM in December 1981, give fascinating insights into the internal life of the group, and its dependence on South Africa.

Perhaps the most important conclusion about the MNR to be drawn from this evidence is that it has never been a Mozambican organization in anything but name. It has always been a pliant weapon in the hands of foreign interests.

It was set up in 1976 by the Rhodesian secret services, with the knowledge of their South African counterparts. In his book, *Inside BOSS*, the former BOSS agent Gordon Winter gives the credit for forming the MNR to South African military intelligence. This appears to be a substantial exaggeration. Winter's own part in the affair was that of propagandist, writing the articles in the South African government-financed newspaper *The Citizen* in 1976 claiming MNR military successes, before there was any real MNR activity inside Mozambique at all. Fake photos were published, allegedly of "MNR guerrillas inside Mozambique," but in fact of black South African troops in the Transvaal.

The first real sign of MNR activity came when a new radio station started broadcasting in June 1976 from Gwelo, Fort Victoria and Umtali. Calling itself *Voz da Africa Livre* (Voice of Free Africa), it was an obvious reply to the Zimbabwean radio programme *Voice of Zimbabwe*, which was beamed nightly into Rhodesia by Radio Mozambique. *Voz da Africa Livre* broadcast anti-FRELIMO propaganda of a very crude nature in defense of the colonial past.

In its initial broadcasts it even used, as a kind of theme song, the notorious 'Mocambique - Terra Portuguesa' (Mozambique - Portuguese Land) by the colonialist songwriter, Joao Maria Tudela. This song contains the memorable line: "Yesterday it belonged to the blacks - today it's Portuguese territory."

But *Voz da Africa Livre* soon abandoned this approach, and adopted a rather more subtle line. The hand of Orlando Cristina seems evident in the new ploy that *Voz da Africa Livre* and the MNR came to use: they posited an opposition between the original 'real' FRELIMO of Eduardo Mondlane, and the 'communist', 'totalitarian' FRELIMO of Samora Machel, claiming to be the true inheritors of Mondlane's mantle.

In August and September 1976 the first MNR group received military training at Bindura just north of Salisbury. The operation was set up by the Rhodesian Special Branch, whose former head, Ken Flower, candidly admitted as much after Zimbabwean independence. "It was war," he explained to a Mozambican journalist, "and in war all things are allowed." Mozambique had closed its borders with Rhodesia in March, and provided crucial facilities for Zimbabwean guerrillas, who could use the entire length of the border to cross over into Zimbabwe. The illegal Smith regime considered itself at war with Mozambique, and hit back, not simply at guerrillas, but also at Mozambican economic and civilian targets. In this war, the MNR was used as convenient fifth column.

But obviously Flower and his men could not provide the Mozambicans who were needed if the MNR was to take on substance. It was here that Orlando Cristina played a crucial role. His former employer, Jardim, had organized elite military units to fight against FRELIMO, units consisting mainly of black troops, better paid than the regular colonial army, and soon gaining an unenviable reputation for brutality and atrocities. These were known as GEs (Special Groups), GMEs (Very Special Groups - used for clandestine operations in Tanzania and Zambia), and GEPs (Special Paratroop Group.) These units' primary loyalty was to Jardim.

Shortly before Mozambique's independence Cristina disappeared. So did all the files on the special groups. There seems no doubt that these were taken by Cristina to Salisbury, and formed the basis for the initial recruitment to the MNR. People named in these files received letters threatening exposure if they refused to join the MNR.

For the next four years Cristina was to be based in Salisbury as the eminence grise behind *Voz da Africa Livre*.

Figureheads were also needed -- men who were not too blatantly connected with the colonial regime, and could give a veneer of credibility to the claim that the MNR represented the "real" spirit of FRELIMO. So Andre Matsangaiza was elevated to the role of "commander-in-chief" of the MNR. Matsangaiza had been in the FPLM, but after his appointment as a quarter-master in 1975, he had been caught with his hands in the till. Arrested for theft, he was sent to a reeducation centre from which he managed to escape in 1976. The Rhodesians then groomed him as MNR leader.

The man who took over the job after Matsangaiza's death, Afonso Dhlakama, has a similar history. He joined the FPLM only in October 1974, after all the fighting was over. Prior to 1974 he had been a conscript in the Portuguese army. In 1975 he too was found guilty of theft and dishonourably discharged from the Mozambican army. A year later he was with the infant MNR in Rhodesia.

Initially, the MNR acted in the border zones in the Mozambican provinces of Manica, Tete and, to a lesser extent, Gaza. They concentrated on attacking villages and kidnapping civilians, and disrupting commerce. There was never any serious attempt to take on the Mozambican army, much less to bring down the government. The Rhodesians' aims were much less ambitious. They were simply destabilizing the zones used as a rearguard by the Zimbabwean guerrillas.

In 1979, as the war escalated, the Rhodesians ordered the MNR to move deeper into Mozambique and set up permanent bases there. These would be supplied by helicopter from Rhodesia. The most important of these was set up in the thick bush of the remote Gorongosa mountains of Sofala province.

Here Matsangaiza formed an alliance with the local 'feiticeiros' (witch-doctors), who provided him with information on the movement of Mozambican troops (information which Matsangaiza then attributed to supernatural forces.) But the Gorongosa *feiticeiros* became fed up with the MNR, due largely to its undisciplined men abusing local women. They took their revenge by feeding Matsangaiza a piece of fatally false information. They told him the town of Gorongosa itself was unguarded and would easily fall to a surprise attack. So several hundred were swept down to loot Gorongosa in October 1979, only to find not simply a strong contingent of Mozambican troops, but also tanks. When the tanks opened fire on the closely-packed MNR group, Matsangaiza himself was one of the casualties. Mortally wounded, he was evacuated by helicopter, but died on his way back to Rhodesia.

A few days later the Mozambican army launched a major offensive to clear the MNR out of the Gorongosa region. Their main base was seized, and in disarray the survivors fled back to the border.

The death of Matsangaiza provoked an enormous crisis within the MNR. Dhlakama later admitted that the group had been "on the way to total destruction". Lacking any ideology, the MNR had been built round the personality cult of Matsangaiza, and once he had gone it all began to fall apart. A bitter power struggle broke out. The Rhodesians, oblivious to the fact that their own regime was in its death throes, tried to solve the problem by suggesting that the MNR be divided into two commands, one under Dhlakama and one under Matsangaiza's second deputy, Lucas M'lhanga.

This was not at all according to Cristina's liking, and he decided to patronise Dhlakama. Stealing a march on the Smith regime, Cristina had photos of Dhlakama published in the South African press, proclaiming him the sole leader of the MNR. Reverting to his former trade as an assassin, Cristina tried to remove M'lhanga from the scene, but bungled the job.

The conflict came to a head at an MNR camp at Chisumbanje in southern Zimbabwe in June 1980. A gun battle erupted in which Dhlakama's followers overpowered M'lhanga's. M'lhanga himself was probably killed in the shoot-out. His supporters fled to Mozambique where they handed themselves over to the FPLM.

At about the same time, the MNR's 'political commissar', Henrique Siteo, also defected. He had been appointed to the post a few months earlier by Dhlakama despite the fact that, on his own admission, he knew nothing about politics. Siteo deserted with three others, one of whom described himself as a 'company commander.' A second was a skilled radio operator. These represented heavy losses for the MNR. Speaking at a press conference in Maputo, these defectors said they had no idea what they were fighting for. Being in the MNR was just "waiting for death."

Dhlakama himself confirmed this sorry state of affairs in a speech to his men in November 1980. "In the past year," he said, "many fighters, including commanders and chiefs, have been killed." He feared that the same fate awaited him: "Some people," he said, "are preparing drugs to assassinate me so that they can take over my position."

In early 1980, things were looking extremely bleak for the MNR. On top of their internal problems, they were now faced with the likelihood of losing their base. With the Lancaster House agreement and the resumption of British authority in Salisbury, the MNR was forced to adopt a much lower profile. The British ordered *Voz da Africa Livre* to stop broadcasting, and it went off the air in February 1980.

With the overwhelming ZANU victory in the March election, it was clear that the MNR's days in Zimbabwe were numbered. But help was on the way. The Rhodesians had passed Cristina to the South African embassy in Salisbury, and arrangements were quickly made to switch the MNR base from Zimbabwe to the Transvaal.

The South Africans had earlier assisted in training the MNR, and South African personnel had been stationed at the Gorongosa camp in 1979. Now the South Africans took over the entire task of supplying the MNR bands. Boxes of ammunition dropped to the bands in Manica were marked in English and Afrikaans, leaving no room for doubt as to their country of origin.

A transmitter was quickly rigged up in the northern Transvaal, and by the middle of the year *Voz da Africa Livre* was back in business. The evacuation of the MNR from Zimbabwe took a bit longer, but seems to have been completed by October.

Dhlakama's men were accommodated at two camps in the Transvaal, one at Phalaborwa, and the other at Zoabastad. The documents captured at Garagua date from this period of transition. They indicate that a liaison officer from the South African Military Intelligence was allocated to the MNR: he crops up in the documents as 'Colonel Charlie', and on one occasion as 'Colonel van Niekerk'. There is, of course, no way of knowing whether this is his real name. Notes from meetings in October and November contain fulsome praise and gratitude by Dhlakama for his South African patrons. "We can't do anything without you," he is on record as saying, "you are like our parents."

Whereas the Rhodesians had kept *Voz da Africa Livre* organizationally distinct from the MNR, the South Africans preferred to centralize the entire operation. The radio station was integrated in the MNR, and all was subordinate to Dhlakama who now referred to himself as "Supreme Chief."

The MNR had lost their major base inside Mozambique, in the Sibatonga mountains in Manica, close to the Zimbabwe border, in June 1980. Mozambican artillery, moved painstakingly into position over difficult terrain, pounded the hideout into dust. But Sibatonga was soon replaced by a new base, some 300 kilometres further south, at Garagua, near the Save river which forms the boundary between Manica and Gaza provinces.

This base, two kilometres in diameter, included an area set aside for South African 'specialists', and a helicopter landing strip. From the large quantities of aircraft fuel discovered when Mozambican soldiers stormed Garagua in December 1981, it clearly also functioned as a refuelling depot for supply flights to MNR bands further north.

The presence of South African 'specialists' with the MNR inside Mozambique was one of the matters discussed between Dhlakama and 'Colonel Charlie.' The latter promised that South African experts would accompany the MNR to teach the use of heavy weapons and sabotage techniques. These 'specialists' would not simply have a back-seat role, but would participate directly in attacks.

The change in rear base also entailed a change in strategy. The targets to be hit now were no longer those which suited the defunct Smith regime, but ones which fitted in with South Africa's strategy of destabilizing the Front Line states. 'Colonel Charlie' gave Dhlakama a list of targets for the MNR's 1981 campaign. These included the Beira-Umtali pipeline, the railways linking Zimbabwe to Mozambique's ports, and the roads in the centre of the country. The border areas with Zimbabwe had lost their previous importance, and the stress was now laid on disrupting the economies of both Mozambique and Zimbabwe by hitting at their most vulnerable point, their communications.

During 1981 Dhlakama's men did their best to carry out their new instructions. 'Colonel Charlie's' emphasis on sabotage techniques paid off. In October the road and rail bridges over the Pungwe river were blown up, and effectively isolated Beira.

The expertise with which the road bridge was demolished suggests the presence of South African experts in this operation. Remarkably, the pipeline, which is carried on the bridge supports, was scarcely damaged in the explosion. The rail bridge withstood the blast. But one supporting pillar was damaged and had to be replaced, and thus for six weeks rail traffic from Zimbabwe to Beira was interrupted.

The destruction of marker buoys at the port of Beira in early November clearly had the same target -- to disrupt a vital outlet to the sea for the land-locked countries of the region, and to intimate to them that it was unwise to try and break their dependence on South Africa.

Although the MNR immediately claimed the sabotage of the buoys, there is good reason to believe that this was an exclusively South African operation. The high degree of sophistication required makes it more than likely that the job was carried out by a team of South African frogmen.

Emboldened by the unstinting military support received from Pretoria, the MNR started attacking small towns in early 1982. In accordance with lessons on propaganda which 'van Niekerk' had given Dhlakama a year earlier, such raids were trumpeted abroad as major military victories. In fact, of course, looting isolated and undefended towns, holding them for a few hours and then withdrawing when the FPLM shows up, achieves no military objective at all. Nobody has ever won a war that way. But it does keep the name of the MNR in the world's press, and strengthens the suspicion that Mozambique is 'unstable.' This tactic is clearly aimed at scaring off potential Western investment in Mozambique.

Similar publicity-hunting motives were behind the kidnapping of two foreign workers in the Gorongosa National Park in December 1981. According to the Garagua documents, Cristina had advocated this sort of action. Foreign prisoners, he said, could be used to blackmail their countries of origin. In exchange for freeing them the MNR could "demand a particular sum of money, or material assistance." In the case of one of those captured at Gorongosa, the British ecologist John Burlison, the MNR employed this type of blackmail. They implied that Burlison would be released, provided his parents had a letter from Dhlakama published in the British press.

Although this was done, Burlison was not released and fears for his safety have mounted. Two days after the kidnapping, two Portuguese technicians travelling from Chimoio to Tete were taken out of their car and shot at point blank range.

A further MNR target has been a power line taking electricity from the giant Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Tete province to South Africa. This appears to have been Cristina's idea: in November 1980 he suggested this in order "to disguise the existence of South African support for the MNR". This would not harm their South African employers, he hastened to add, since only seven per cent of South Africa's electricity comes from Cabora Bassa.

This proved to be a miscalculation. South Africa suffered a particularly severe winter in 1981, and, thanks partly to the MNR putting the Cabora Bassa lines out of action, faced a short-fall in electricity supply. The result was widespread power cuts. The MNR is now reported to have promised the South Africans that they will enjoy "a warm winter" in 1982 -- which appears to be a pledge to leave the transmission lines alone.

Throughout the history of the MNR there are certain common features. One is brutality. Wherever the group has been active, it has left behind a trail of death and mutilation. On arrival in an area, an MNR band's first action is

to seek out and murder the local Frelimo Party officials. Those not actually in the Party, but are believed to be sympathizers, suffer the lesser penalty of having their ears, noses, lips or, if women, breasts cut off. Defenceless peasants, their lips sliced off, are told: "Now you can go and smile at Samora". This cannot be shrugged off as the work of a few individual sadists in the MNR. The reports are so consistent, from all areas where the MNR is or has been active, that it is clearly a matter of mutilation as policy, terror as a deliberate weapon to intimidate the local peasantry.

A second common thread is superstition. In his speech to his men at Zoabastad in October 1980, Dhlakama referred several times to the "spirits." A bomb had recently exploded in the car of Domingos Arouca, a right-wing landowner in colonial Mozambique who chose Portuguese nationality after Mozambique's independence. He had incurred Dhlakama's wrath by using the name of the MNR without permission. Dhlakama gloated over the explosion attributing it to "the spirits of the MNR."

Superstition plays an important role inside MNR camps. Recruits are told that if they desert, then "the spirits" will pursue them, in the shape of lions, and will devour them. Before any military operations, religious ceremonies are held which are supposed to make the participants invulnerable to "communist bullets." "The spirits" are also useful vehicles for Dhlakama's own paranoia. Repeatedly people accused of being Frelimo spies are assassinated in the MNR camps -- the information on which these murders are based is given to Dhlakama in his regular interviews with "the spirits."

For the MNR traditional animist superstition replaced political mobilization. Terror takes the place of persuasion. Foodstuffs are acquired through straight-forward looting. The aims of the MNR are not those of a domestic counter-revolutionary organization -- instead they are imposed on it from outside. It serves the strategies of foreign powers, first Rhodesia, now South Africa.

Does the MNR enjoy any support at all? The answer to this question must be a qualified "yes". Those who lost their old power and privileges when FRELIMO came to power are quite prepared to throw in their lot with the MNR. Apart from the "feiticeiros", these include the "regulos" -- tribal chiefs usually appointed to their posts by the Portuguese, and regarded as colonial stooges. The MNR wins their support by promising to restore them to their former positions.

Then there are those who attempted to win positions of influence in the new Mozambique, but failed. Both in the elections to the people's assemblies in 1977 and in the Frelimo Party structuring campaign in 1978, candidates had to be submitted to mass meetings in their villages or workplaces. In this process many were rejected. Some of them, particularly in Inhambane, have now gone over to the MNR.

There have been two main bases for the recruitment to the MNR. One is tribal. The MNR has tried to mobilize the people of Manica on ethnic grounds. Both Matsangaiza and Dhlakama were from that area. The first deputy commander of the MNR, Orlando Macomo, was assassinated by Dhlakama "because he was a southerner." Dhlakama immediately stepped into the murdered man's shoes. The MNR attempts to generate ethnic support by peddling the lie that "Frelimo is controlled by southerners" and discriminates against "the people of the centre and the north".

The other recruitment method is simple coercion. The MNR kidnaps young peasant boys and forces them to undertake military training. They are initiated into banditry at a very early stage, and told that if they surrender to the FPLM, the Mozambican soldiers will slit their throats.

But the attitude of most people in central Mozambique towards the MNR is a mixture of fear, anger and loathing. When, in February 1982, President Samora Machel visited parts of Inhambane province affected by MNR activity, he was

greeted everywhere by crowds demanding "guns to fight the bandits" -- a demand that will be granted.

The South Africans have always denied their involvement in the MNR, but these protests of innocence are fooling very few people. Pretty well every Western diplomat in Maputo will privately admit they are convinced of the South African connection. Now the mask has slipped even further with MNR statements on *Voz da Africa Livre* that they will accept support from any country "including South Africa." How long before South Africa officially admits its ties with the MNR?

In conclusion, we can report that Afonso Dhlakama has made up for his short-lived and ignominious career in the Mozambican army by his rapid rise in the South African one. According to MNR sources, he is now a full colonel in the South African army. This rank was attributed to him at a ceremony at Phalaborwa in 1981, attended by South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan. Addressing Dhlakama, Malan said: "Your army is part of the South African Defence Force."

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### New Resources

#### Journal of African Marxists

The Journal of African Marxists will shortly appear. With an Editorial Board across Africa and support committees in three continents, the Journal will provide comment and analysis on the major political and social issues facing Africa today.

Wholly independent and not associated with any political movements or organised political tendency, the Journal of African Marxists seeks to provide a forum for the development of Marxist thought.

Its aims are:

To provide a forum for the exposition of the fundamentals of Marxism in the conditions of Africa;

To encourage thorough-going analysis of the problems of development in Africa from a Marxist perspective;

To discuss the various versions of Socialism current in Africa and subject them to scientific and constructive criticism;

To facilitate the emergence of a systematic and coherent body of Marxist thought illuminating conditions in Africa.

Subscription rate (two issues per year) is \$10 for individuals or \$18 for institutions.

If you would like to know more about the Journal of African Marxists please contact:

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**DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DOMINANCE?  
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE**

**Carol B. Thompson  
Department of Political Science, University of Southern California**

Political freedom without economic  
liberation is a contradiction in  
terms and is therefore meaningless.

Robert Mugabe  
Salisbury SADCC Summit

Since the first formal conference in Arusha in 1979, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) has inaugurated innovative and daring plans for economic coordination to curtail the dependence of the region on apartheid South Africa. The goal of the nine members of SADCC--Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--is to change their basis of unity from one of mutual poverty and underdevelopment to one of coordinated effort to improve the quality of life in Southern Africa.

During the struggle for Zimbabwe, the Frontline States discussed working together economically to enhance their strengths and to attack their weaknesses on a regional basis. The political cooperation of the Frontline imparted economic lessons, for the interlocking of the economies was made poignantly clear by Rhodesian bombing attacks. Downed bridges in Zambia meant not only less food for the Zambian people but also less rail traffic revenue and jobs for Tanzanians and Mozambicans. The use of food as a weapon was a major impetus for compromise at Lancaster House, as the Rhodesian military assaults threatened vital food supplies. The Frontline political cooperation created the opportunity for economic coordination to reduce such vulnerability.

The potential wealth of Southern Africa is vast and not fully explored. With 60 million people in 5 million square kilometers of land, the combined GDP is \$20 billion (excluding South Africa) even at the present level of underdevelopment. The area is generally not overpopulated and could provide food exports. The vast mineral and energy resources are more than sufficient to sustain industrial development for the region. When compared to the potential wealth, the region's present underdevelopment does not appear so permanent.

It is when the underdevelopment is compared to South African economic power that obstacles loom on the horizon. The combined GNP's of the nine

Southern African states (excluding Namibia) are only one-third of South Africa's alone. Angola, with all the oil production in the region, refines only 4.4 percent, while South Africa with no oil reserves refines 82.3 percent of the region's oil. Zambia sends 50 percent of its mineral cargo, and Zimbabwe transports 70 percent of all its rail cargo, through South Africa. In almost every vital economic sector--agriculture, manufacturing, transport and communication, energy--South Africa has goods ready to export to its neighbors and capital ready to invest in their economies.

#### The South African Constellation of States

On November 11, 1979, South African Prime Minister Botha met with prominent businessmen to discuss economic development plans for the Southern African region. The constellation of states was offered as South Africa's solution to the poverty in the region. Choosing to ignore the contradictory political interests, the constellation policy is promoting South African technology and capital as the key to regional cooperation. However, this call is really not new, but rather is a more sophisticated version of an old strategy. South Africa has had four previous attempts to normalize relations with the rest of Africa without changing the domestic policy of apartheid: 1967 - outward looking policy; 1970-1971 - dialogue; 1974 - detente; 1977 - Muldergate. The constellation, therefore, has a history, but the new offer may be more difficult to resist. South Africa will help build a heavy duty rail link for Botswana to the western Transvaal to export coal through Richard's Bay. It is sharing the financing of the massive Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Even more unprecedented, the South African regime has volunteered to relinquish part of Kwazulu and all of KaNgwane bantustans to Swaziland without a referendum of the people involved. The transfer would provide Swaziland a port on the sea and more than double its population. Such major economic incentives will probably increase as South Africa tries to show Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland that the constellation offers more than the Frontline.

The constellation is one of three elements in a "total strategy" outlined by the South African government: the constellation of states, full implementation of the bantustan policy, and massive military build-up. In other words, while offering technology and trade to the independent African states, South Africa is affirming and rationalizing apartheid. With increased military expenditures, the state is ready to assert its definition of this newest "co-prosperity sphere."

A column in the Johannesburg Star (March 21, 1980) declared the constellation a "dead duck," and the Frontline States share that opinion. As a plan for economic development in the region, it is more like a fast disintegrating comet. It never envisioned a constellation but a solar system with a largest and brightest star. Even if the racism inherent in the model (affirmation of the "independent" bantustans as part of the constellation) were swept aside, the model offers nothing new in development projects. It is the neoclassical design for free trade and for funding the leading sectors to encourage growth through spin-off (trickle down from the "benign" center to the "grateful" periphery).

## SADCC: A Radical Plan for Integration?

The bases for SADCC are older than the Frontline States, although clearly, details could not be formulated until the pivotal state of Zimbabwe was independent under a government not beholden to South Africa. The Frontline established several bilateral trade agreements among themselves, with the Mozambique-Tanzania Permanent Commission of Cooperation as a precursor and model. There are several important similarities between the Commission and SADCC: 1) political experience as a basis of economic accord; 2) transformation of the colonial infrastructure; 3) reduction of competition in the area; 4) rationalization and complementarity of industry; and 5) coordination of national development plans.

Of the five terms of agreement only the objective of reducing competition (#3) is similar to the traditional customs unions. The others create a new approach to regional coordination. The political emphasis means that cost-benefit considerations can overrule profit as a benefit. In addition, coordination is projected for the level of production, not simply exchange.

The first priority of SADCC is the coordination of transport and communications to provide alternatives to the dominant grid which (since the 1930's) runs through South Africa. Substantial progress has been made. By the Blantyre conference of November 1981, donors had committed \$338 million; by August 1982 the commitments had increased to \$870 million. Of the 106 projects under the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC), 3 have been completed, 48 are in progress, 20 are being discussed with potential donors, 10 are ready to be submitted for funding, and 25 are being drawn up.

At the next summit scheduled for Maseru, Lesotho at the end of 1982, industry and agriculture will be designated as targets for funding. A three stage approach to industrialization is proposed. First, surplus manufacturing capacity will produce for regional trade. Second, sixty clusters of products already available will be traded. Third, coordination of production plans will avoid competition and promote trade. In June 1982, the Zimbabwe Justice Minister Simbi Mubako called for a uniform investment code.

In several other programs, cooperation is well underway. A comprehensive energy policy for the nine states was approved in Luanda in February. The severe drought in the region has underlined the necessity for cooperation for food security, since Zimbabwe will be quite constrained in its ability to export food. Several donors, including the Scandinavian countries and the EEC, have expressed satisfaction at the rate of implementation for SADCC, notwithstanding unavoidable diversions such as the severest drought in 30 years.

SADCC seeks fundamental change in the region, with very pragmatic means. It has avoided setting up a large new bureaucracy. Instead, it has assigned specific tasks to national units coordinated by a joint commission with limited staff. There will be no regional marketing board, communications corporation, or railway administration. Each state has specific responsibilities:

Angola	- energy
Botswana	- crop research and animal disease
Lesotho	- soil conservation
Malawi	- fisheries and wildlife
Mozambique	- transport and communications
Swaziland	- humanpower development and health
Tanzania	- industry
Zambia	- Southern African development fund
Zimbabwe	- food security and mining

Although one observer quipped that the members must have an extraordinary sense of humor to allocate responsibility for finance to Zambia, industry to Tanzania, and soil conservation to Lesotho, these assignments do show the commitment not to exclude weaker economies.

### Obstacles to Coordinated Development

The most pressing problem for coordinated plans is the armed aggression of South Africa. As the South African regime is frustrated in its attempt to legitimize apartheid and to succeed in its latest "outward looking" policy, the SADCC countries expect further armed aggression from their neighbor. South Africa has repeatedly conducted armed invasions into Angola, attacking not only SWAPO guerrilla camps, but Angolan villages, and is accused of directing assassinations in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland. The Mozambique National Resistance, financed and supported by South Africa, has disrupted important SADCC transport links; in July 1982 the major Zimbabwe-Malawi road was cut. Zimbabwean shippers avoid sending cargo through Beira. Although the oil pipeline between Beira and Mutare opened on July 2, 1982, it remains vulnerable to attack. In 1981 South Africa deliberately delayed oil and fertilizer shipments to Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana. South Africa is clearly trying to raise the cost of SADCC.

The most fundamental obstacle to SADCC is the contradictions which the coordinated projects themselves create. The cooperation is focused on transforming the forces of production, not simply through reforms in exchange, but through regional production planning. But the plans have not addressed the contradictory social relations of production within and among the participating states: the economies vary from competitive capitalist to centrally planned economies committed to socialist construction. For example, there are fundamental differences in the stratification of workers. In Mozambique and Angola, the stratification of planners, managers and production is under attack. Can the goals and methods of producer-planners in Mozambique be coordinated with those of the more specialized technocrat-managers of Zambia or Malawi? The problem of wage differentials at all levels is illustrated by the appointment of a new executive secretary of SADCC. That position has equivalent rank to a permanent secretary for which the salary ranges from \$8,000 in Tanzania to \$45,000 in Zimbabwe. The new SADCC executive secretary is a Zimbabwean, but his salary will be limited to \$24,000.

The differences in the social relations of production will mean differences in development priorities. Is a primary emphasis on growth to be preferred to immediate attention to social welfare needs? Further, the choices of

technology could affect the degree of local control. Implementation of SADCC goals for national and regional control of production will take different forms, determined in part by whether that "national" control is dependent on foreign technicians and based in foreign capital or is under command of the local workers.

A problem that will soon emerge is disagreement on policy toward transnational corporations. The terms offered the transnationals will attract or discourage their investment in particular states. Is it possible for states with capitalist relations of production and those with a mixed economy moving toward socialism to adopt a uniform policy? If not, plans for industrial complementarity will remain on paper.

Outside observers noted that the initial funding for SADCC at Maputo (\$650 million) in November 1980 was significantly less than that pledged at the ZIMCORD conference in March 1981 (\$1.8 billion.) Some analysts predict that Zimbabwe will soon become the Kenya of SADCC, as the strongest industrial and agricultural producer in the region. Yet SADCC's method of coordination is explicitly designed to avoid that dominance. Zimbabwe government reports after ZIMCORD did not regard the two donor conferences as competitive but rather as complementary. Realizing from the experience of the other economies that no one state can overcome underdevelopment alone, Zimbabwe is trying to coordinate its national development with the regional priorities. Yet the contradictions are severe. For example, the government is trying to redistribute the land to the majority of small farmers. Yet the large commercial farmers produce 94 percent of the marketed agricultural output. They produce important, at times vital, food supplies for Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and others. How does the government promote the reallocation of land when such a transformation may well disrupt commercial food production not only for Zimbabwe but for the region?

#### The U.S. Response

The response of the United States has been mixed. The U.S. originally pledged \$50 million to SADCC, but subsequent A.I.D. allocations make it clear that the government prefers bilateral assistance to a few selected countries, such as Zambia and Botswana. The cut-off of food aid to Mozambique and the refusal to recognize Angola show that the U.S. will be reluctant to contribute to regional projects. (Yet an economically stable Zimbabwe is linked to efficient rail transport in Mozambique.) And even aid to the favored recipients pales in the light of "constructive engagement" with South Africa: reduction of restrictions on the arms embargo, regular exchange of military personnel, nuclear collaboration, increased economic exchanges. American officials were very upset with the Blantyre conference statement (November 1981) condemning South Africa's aggression and policy of economic destabilization. West Germany, Great Britain, the World Bank and the United States tried to get the SADCC members to retract the statement, yet even Malawi joined the protest against their neighbor.

The SADCC countries have rejected flag independence and have implemented new methods of coordination for economic development. It is too early to judge whether the plans will succeed, but the obstacles are severe. The immediate SADCC message to the United States, however, is that the government will find it more difficult to have it both ways: supportive relations with apartheid South Africa and good economic relations with the independent Southern African countries.

## PROPOSED CHANGES IN U.S. EXTRADITION LAW THREATEN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Elizabeth S. Landis

Legislation currently before Congress which proposes changes in the U.S. extradition laws may have far-reaching effects on liberation movement members from South Africa, as well as those from other countries, who are currently in the U.S.

The proposed legislation is now found in separate bills before the House of Representatives (H.R. 6046, introduced by Congressman Hughes of New Jersey) and the Senate (S. 1940, introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond.) Each bill has cleared the Judiciary and Foreign Relations (Affairs) Committees of the house where it was introduced; but because there are some differences between the two bills, they will have to go to Conference Committee. The Conference Committee was to meet after Labor Day, when Congress returns from a late summer recess.

The proposed changes will be exceedingly dangerous to all members of liberation movements in the United States, for they will allow the extradition of any persons demanded in the right way by the government to which they are opposed. The State Department will decide, on foreign policy grounds, who will be extradited and who will not: to all intents and purposes the defense that the crime charged was a political crime will be abolished, and the person whose extradition is sought will not have recourse to the courts. There are also provisions for long term detention without bail while the extradition process is being negotiated by the State Department.

It is essential for all persons who might be affected or who are concerned about persons who might be affected to take immediate action to try to stop the enactment of either of these bills, which so far have gone through committees as mere "technical changes" in the law.

For more information get in touch with SUSAN BENDA, Campaign for Political Rights, 201 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 547-4705.

## REFLECTIONS ON SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE

Gay Seidman

At the independence day celebrations in Harare this April, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe pronounced this, the third year of his country's independence from the illegal white minority regime, the "Year of Transformation." The slogan begs the question: transformation from what, and towards what? The answers are not necessarily immediately apparent.

ZANU (PF), the country's ruling party, appears to be taking a two-stage approach to attaining its self-proclaimed socialist goal. First, it has focused on meeting people's basic needs -- needs made more pressing by a ten-year struggle, in which some 30,000 people were killed and another million made homeless. The long-range transformation to a socialist economic and political system, however, seems to have been given a lower priority, and often looks as far away as ever.

Since independence, the government has greatly expanded access to education and health facilities, and has instituted a minimum wage for the first time in the country's history. Enrollment in schools -- now free at the primary level -- has quadrupled, and health care is free to anyone earning less than Z\$ 150 a month, which includes most of the country's seven million blacks. The floor under wages has given people new power to purchase consumer goods, stimulating an initial expansion of manufacturing production. The government has also embarked on an ambitious program to extend piped water, roads and other amenities into the rural areas, where about half the population lives.

But if education and other social services were important components of the grievances which fueled the guerrilla struggle in Zimbabwe, there was still one more. The colonial regime divided arable land into two parts: the most fertile and well-watered half went to the three per cent of the population that was white, and the rest was set aside as "tribal trustlands" (TTLs) for the blacks. Overcrowded and eroded, the TTLs provided a migrant wage-labor force for white-owned enterprises, and later, they provided much of the manpower with which the Patriotic Front conducted its struggle.

Not surprisingly, land reform was one of the main demands of the guerrilla struggle: peasants scratching out a living on the TTLs could look across to wide expanses of white-owned land -- some sixty per cent of which is still underutilized -- and dream of what they could do with it come the revolution. Although the 1979 Lancaster House settlement put some limits to their dreams by stipulating that government could not expropriate land without "adequate" compensation, it did not completely block chances of a thorough-going land reform.

Progress, however, has been slow. Fearful of prompting a wholesale exodus of white commercial farmers, and insisting that black farmers can only be resettled in areas already provided with a basic infrastructure, the government has moved only 12,000 families in the last two and a half years. At this rate, it will be another 30 years before the goal of about 300,000 resettled families can be achieved -- another generation destined to grow up in the poverty-stricken reserves, now euphemistically called "communal areas." The latest three-year plan would speed up the process, aiming at 162,000 families in the next three years, but

most of the rural population remains land-starved.

Given the high politicization that accompanied the independence struggle, it is hardly surprising that the peasantry has begun to take matters into its own hands. All over Zimbabwe, squatters have begun to move onto unused white land: estimates range from 70,000 to 200,000 squatters. The government's response has been ambiguous, varying in different situations. In general, it has officially tried to ignore the squatter movements, continuing to pay for its official land reform program with western aid, and insisting that secure tenure will be granted only to those moving onto designated resettlement schemes. When commercial farmers have protested on encroachment onto their land, the government has sometimes supported the squatters, buying the land outright, and sometimes evicted them.

The combination of official and unofficial land reform seems likely to lead to a rather contradictory situation. On one hand, black farmers are unlikely to be satisfied either with the snail's pace of the resettlement program, or with the insecurity of squatting. On the other, the white farmers whom the government hopes to retain are looking fearfully at movements on the edges of their land, and are hardly confident about their future.

The land reform problem is in many ways symptomatic of what appears to be a general tendency in Zimbabwe's policies. While the government has moved quickly to provide social services, it has been far more hesitant to challenge the highly dependent, highly monopolistic system of private enterprise it inherited from the UDI regime. Today, transnational corporations own about 70 per cent of assets in the non-farming sector -- all the banks and financial institutions, most of the foreign trade and all the mines, as well as the largest farms in Zimbabwe. Rather than trying to gain control of the country's most profitable enterprises -- and using the surplus to pay for an expanded social service network -- the government has designed a development strategy based on attracting private and foreign investment -- hardly a strategy one would expect to lead to socialism.

The dangers in this approach are perhaps most readily apparent in the 1982-3 budget, released in late July. Since independence, the government has run increasingly on deficit financing, to the tune of some Z\$ 660 million -- a major factor fostering inflationary pressures. At the same time, the government has been reluctant to slap heavy taxes on private or corporate incomes, for fear of frightening off the private investment on which it hopes to rely. The result: a new general sales tax of a whopping 15 per cent, and current negotiations for an IMF loan -- a loan which may lead to reduced social services, and devaluation during the next year.

Nevertheless, there are contradictory indications of Zimbabwe's direction. At the same time that some cabinet members call for more private investment, others emphasize the need for farmers to form producer cooperatives, and speak out against the formation of a black bourgeoisie in place of the old white one. While the government often resolves strikes by siding with employers, it has also set up a mineral marketing board through which private mining companies must sell their ore.

If there are long-term problems inherent in Zimbabwe's economic policies, they are perhaps overshadowed by more immediate political tensions. Zimbabwe remains heavily dependent on South Africa, through which comes some 90 per cent of its imports. Zimbabwe has been exploring the possibility of building stronger

economic ties with other independent southern African countries -- notably Mozambique, but it remains closely linked economically to South Africa, which has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use its economic clout to keep Zimbabwe in line. Zimbabwe's government has not yet officially recognized the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, but a series of incidents in Zimbabwe fit the familiar pattern of South African "destabilization" of neighboring countries which might be tempted to harbor ANC guerrillas. From the murder of an unofficial ANC representative in Harare last year and the bombing of the Harare ZANU (PF) headquarters to the recent destruction of one-quarter of the country's air force, it is not hard to see South Africa's hand in keeping Zimbabwe's attention focused on internal security.

In addition, Zimbabwe has its own internal security problems -- whether or not these have been given added importance from the south. Several white Zimbabweans are currently in preventive detention, on suspicion of trying to overthrow the government. Much more serious, however, is the threat from ZAPU-affiliated "dissidents," who are concentrated in the country's southwestern region. Armed with weapons left over from the long war, these "dissidents" have been robbing stores and buses in the southwest, and in July, they kidnapped six foreign tourists, demanding the release of two ZAPU leaders then held in detention. It is difficult to be sure of the extent to which these dissidents are politically motivated. Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU's president, seems to have little control over their actions, though they regularly announce their ZAPU affiliation when they carry out actions.

The government refuses to negotiate with the "dissidents," and there are well-substantiated reports that the army has harshly treated civilians suspected of aiding them. The government has even gone so far as to deny emergency relief to areas suspected of harboring dissidents -- emergency relief sorely needed in the south-west, which has been badly hit by drought.

The ZANU-ZAPU split -- which appears to be the basis for much though probably not all of the armed robbery -- is exacerbated by a corresponding ethnic difference: while both parties include members from all Zimbabwe's ethnic groups, ZAPU is seen as largely representing the 20 percent Ndebele-speaking minority, while ZANU is seen as a Shona-speaking party. Although Mugabe and other cabinet members have mentioned the possibility of a one-party state, this could not happen until the constitution can be amended in 1990. Meanwhile, such statements merely inflame ZAPU tempers, and perhaps add fuel to the fire in the south-west.

In view of these problems, questions of how to proceed with socialist transformation appear to have been put on the back burner. The Minister of Home Affairs announced recently that, despite the government's intentions, Zimbabweans will have to live with capitalism for a while to come -- leaving his audience in some doubt as to the seriousness of those intentions. Lacking a strong party organization or a clear ideological commitment to socialism, ZANU appears unable to take many steps that could alter the country's economic structure. This raises the question as to whether -- now at least -- it can go much further than changing the color of the ruling class.

## USING FILMS ON SOUTH AFRICA

Cornelius Moore  
Southern Africa Media Center

Film is a powerful medium which, when effectively utilized, can educate the public about important social issues. Supplying otherwise inaccessible information, films also have an emotional impact which can encourage people to take action.

For resources on the situation in South Africa, many groups have looked to the Southern Africa Media Center for films. Since 1976, the Media Center has become nationally recognized and has provided thousands with such films as LAST GRAVE AT DIMBAZA, GENERATIONS OF RESISTANCE, and SIX DAYS IN SOWETO.

The following are brief suggestions for how films can be used to increase public awareness under different circumstances.

### Conferences

Often films are shown at academic conferences such as the African Studies Association conference. We have found that the most effective scheduling of films is to have them screened in conjunction with plenary sessions and workshops to complement a speaker or a topic. This is preferable to having films isolated into a "film room" where conference participants may see them by chance.

### Organizing

When the Southern Africa Media Center began, there was a growing movement in support of divestment on college campuses and in the community. For the past several years, however, there has been a decline in this activity. With the coming of the Reagan administration and its increasingly friendly relations with the apartheid regime, groups and individuals concerned with justice in South Africa have regrouped, often bringing new blood into the anti-apartheid movement. In an effort to educate the newly active and the public at large to the facts of the apartheid system, groups such as TransAfrica and especially student groups have once again begun to sponsor public programs on the issue. A relatively simple and inexpensive method of introducing an anti-apartheid group to the public would be to show a film. For established organizations, films also provide a refreshing change from meetings and generate thoughts and discussions for future directions. Public film screenings are also an opportunity to take advantage of free public service announcements on radio and TV and other publicity, which at least allows the South Africa issue to be raised. A significant number of Southern Africa Media Center films are rented by church and community groups with limited access to information and resource people in their area, particularly groups outside urban centers. There is a way that members of ACAS could be helpful to them. When a group books a film on South Africa from the Southern Africa Media Center, we can ask them if they would be interested in having a resource person from ACAS at their program. If so, we would give them the name of an available resource person in their area, accomplishing a stated task of ACAS's Political Education and Action Committee.

## Political Education

Films have been shown in public campaigns to encourage organizations and local governments to divest. The following is an example of how this was done. In 1978, the Alameda County (Oakland) Board of Supervisors held hearings on a resolution concerning divestment of public employee retirement funds from companies with investments in South Africa. LAST GRAVE AT DIMBAZA (a film produced in 1974, but still the most effective introduction to how apartheid operates) was screened to add validity and emotional power to a speaker's testimony. After seeing such a hard-hitting film, it was hard for anyone to make a credible argument in opposition to divestment. Such techniques could be applied when others testify before government bodies or when trying to convince their organizations to support divestment.

Institutions such as public libraries and universities should be encouraged to buy prints of films on South Africa so that these resources can be more readily available. For instance, public libraries should receive phone calls inquiring about films on South Africa. As they do keep records of what is requested, such inquiries encourage film librarians to seek out films on this subject for previews.

## Recent Film Releases

There are several recent films on South Africa which are excellent resources for teaching and public interest groups.

YOU HAVE STRUCK A ROCK! (by Deborah May, 28 minutes, color). This is an inspiring film on the women's anti-pass campaigns of the 1950's. Featuring archival footage intercut with recent interviews with those active in the movement including Frances Baard, Helen Joseph, Dora Tomana and others, this film is a tribute to a movement that is quite similar to the American Civil Rights Movement.

SOUTH AFRICA BELONGS TO US (by Chris Austin, 35 minutes, color, long version, 60 minutes). Filmed clandestinely inside South Africa, SOUTH AFRICA BELONGS TO US presents portraits of five typical black women. They tell, in their own words, how apartheid affects their daily lives and their families. It features a rare interview with "banned" activist Winnie Mandela. It is a revealing look at how apartheid works.

PORTRAIT OF NELSON MANDELA (by Frank Diamand, 17 minutes, color). A brief introduction to the life of freedom fighter Nelson Mandela who during the 1950's led massive campaigns against the apartheid government. When government repression forced him to go underground, he was later captured and sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island. He was recently moved to a prison in Capetown to prevent him from influencing other prisoners. His daughter is interviewed in the film.

AWAKE FROM MOURNING (by Chris Austin, 50 minutes, color). In an effort to build self-reliance and dignity several black women become active in their Soweto community. This film shows their efforts at the grassroots level. Through the Maggie Magaba Trust, they aid children, old age pensioners, students and the disabled. They are also instrumental in forming a women's self-help group called the Zamani Soweto Sisters Council. The women participated in making the film and they are shown responding to it in a short section at the end.

THE DISCARDED PEOPLE (by Granada TV, 30 minutes, color). Despite propaganda from South African authorities that the apartheid system is changing, this British film powerfully documents how the policy of forced removal of black people to "homelands" is proceeding full force. More than any recent film, it painfully presents the human suffering that such a policy brings -- the hunger and disease and the fundamental reason behind it all -- the issue of who will control the land.

AWAKE FROM MOURNING is available from Villon Films, P.O. Box 14144, Seattle, WA 98144, phone 206-325-8610. The other films are available from the Southern Africa Media Center, 630 Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA 94103, phone 415-621-6196. The Media Center has also prepared a booklet for using films during divestment campaigns entitled, "Using Films on South Africa." The cost of the booklet is \$3, but is sent free with any rental. The Media Center also publishes catalogues of its holdings regularly.

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AVAILABLE FROM THE U.N. CENTRE AGAINST APARTHEID

Intl. Year of Mobilization for sanctions against South Africa, 1982: Programme of Action

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## ANGOLA AND THE UNITED STATES: EVOLUTION OF A POLICY

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(Publication of the ACAS Research Committee; reprinted from TransAfrica Forum)

Conventional wisdom held that the election of Ronald Reagan would lead to a return to the policy of U.S. military intervention in Angola. Practically all of the signs pointed to it. In perhaps his singular reference to Africa during the campaign, Reagan told the *Wall Street Journal* that he favored military support for UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and its leader Jonas Savimbi whom he (erroneously) argued controlled over half of Angola. Alexander Haig, Jr. at State, his Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chester Crocker, Richard Allen and his NSC deputy for Africa Frederick Wettering, CIA Director William Casey and many other key officials had written or made statements prior to the election which could be interpreted to support Reagan's stated goal of providing military aid to UNITA. Savimbi was so convinced of this support that some at State joked that his bags were packed in anticipation of a trip to Washington for the day after Reagan's inauguration.

Given the strong attack on Crocker by Jesse Helms and others on the right, some insiders focused on Wettering at NSC for their clues to the future course of the new Administration's Angolan policy. Wettering began maneuvering almost immediately to develop support for an interventionist policy.

Crocker, however, the first U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa with acknowledged expertise on southern Africa, moved cautiously in the early months of the Administration. In his numerous publications before entering the State Department, Crocker's position on the question of providing aid to Savimbi was ambiguous. In an article entitled "A U.S. Policy for the '80s" published by Freedom House just prior to the 1980 election, he argued that the U.S. should admit publicly "the legitimacy of the UNITA struggle," but he also cautioned that if the U.S. were to back UNITA outright "it is not obvious how this path would lead to reconciliation. ... It could produce an escalation of conflict, and it would probably rule out responding to frequent hints from the MPLA of a desire to reduce sharply its Soviet-Cuban ties." For Crocker, then, the "ultimate goal" should be to "reduce or eliminate the communist combat presence," not provide military support to UNITA which he did not necessarily see as equivalent to that goal.

Crocker's insistence on focusing on his "ultimate goal" has had a salubrious effect on the formulation of the Administration's Angola policy. Too many, both within and outside the Administration, have failed to recognize the critical question about U.S. military support for UNITA: What goal would it serve and how likely could that goal be achieved with such a policy? If the goal is to bloody the Cubans as much as possible, tie them down in an African quagmire, or show the world that Washington will back its "friends", then military support for UNITA makes perfect sense. Savimbi commands a force inside Angola of over 6,000 veteran guerrillas who have demonstrated over the past six years a military capacity to inflict relatively serious military and, more importantly, economic damage in Angola. American support would not enable UNITA to win a military victory but it certainly could enhance Savimbi's capacity to raise the level of

violence and disruption for both the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the Cubans.

If, on the other hand, the goal is to reduce or eliminate the Cuban presence, then aiding UNITA is probably the worst thing the U.S. could do. Enhancing UNITA's military capacity would almost certainly produce an increase not only in the number of Cuban combat troops in Angola but in Cuba's influence over the MPLA. West European diplomats and intelligence analysts have noted a close correlation between the number of Cuban combat troops and the level of external threats either actually faced or perceived by the MPLA. Accordingly, the number of Cuban combat troops in Angola today is less than half the number in 1976 at the end of its civil war and may have dropped to about 10,000 last fall (1981) around the time of South Africa's massive invasion. Since the invasion the number has increased again and is probably closer to 14-15,000. Because of the importance the Administration attaches to the issue of Cuban troops in Angola, it is appropriate to take a closer look at this issue.

### Cuban Troops in Angola

During the past quarter century few, if any, foreign troops stationed in Africa have attracted U.S. attention and condemnation as have the Cubans in Angola. The past three American administrations have made the demand for withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola a top priority. Not only does their presence complicate American relations with Angola and Africa in general but, it is argued, they are also one of the most divisive factors in East-West relations. In fact, many Americans mark the end of detente with the arrival of the Cubans in Angola.

Given the importance which has been attached to the Cuban troops in Angola, it is amazing that six and one-half years after their arrival the level of discussion and debate remains more rhetorical than factual. Evidence is rarely introduced and key questions are usually ignored. What international principles, for example, do the Cuban troops violate? Why does the United States accord the right to any African nation to request French, Moroccan, British and even American troops when their sovereignty is threatened by external aggression but does not grant Angola the same right when she is threatened by South Africa? Is it that French, Moroccan, British and American troops are ipso facto "good" and Cubans are ipso facto "bad"? Does a sovereign nation such as Angola, recognized by all countries in the world except the U.S. and the People's Republic of China, have the right to invite outside assistance to protect itself from outside (i.e. South African) aggression?

Other fundamental questions must also be addressed with facts rather than conjecture and speculation:

1. Was the Cuban arrival in 1975 part of a Soviet blueprint for communist expansion in the Third World or was it more defensive in nature, i.e., to repel the South African, mercenary, Zairean and other outside forces which had invaded Angola to crush the MPLA?
2. Do Angolans view the Cuban troops as "saviors and role models" or as "necessary evils" who will be sent home as soon as the danger from South Africa attenuates?

3. Precisely what is the "danger" that the Cubans in Angola present? They have never crossed an Angolan border to attack a neighboring country. According to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi there has been no military contact between UNITA and Cuban forces during the past three years. Certainly the Reagan Administration does not consider the protection the Cuban troops afford Gulf Oil's operations to be "dangerous."

Finally, if it is truly in our interest that the Cuban military presence in Angola be greatly reduced or eliminated, what is the best way for the United States to achieve this? The two most frequently debated strategies revolve around military vs. diplomatic options. It should be noted here that the endorsement of either military or diplomatic options is greatly influenced by *speculation* over the motives for the Cuban presence. Thus, those who believe that they are there to repel outside aggression endorse diplomatic options designed to greatly reduce or eliminate that external threat. On the other hand, those who believe the Cubans intend to stay permanently to further Soviet expansion back military measures to eliminate them.

After six visits to Angola in the last six years during which I discussed all of these questions with most of the Angolan leadership, I am convinced that the Cuban troops will be sent home as soon as South Africa ceases her aggression against Angola. Moreover, after talks with officials in the Reagan Administration, I am certain that no efficacious plan exists for the U.S. to eliminate the Cubans militarily. In fact, it is clear that any attempt to do so on the part of the U.S. would merely raise the number of Cuban troops in the country. Ultimately, then, diplomacy is the only realistic option for the U.S. to pursue.

Crocker and Haig apparently reached this very conclusion by the end of the first phase of formulating their policy. Despite all the signals associated with the so-called tilt toward South Africa -- especially the push to repeal the Clark Amendment which prohibits U.S. military support to factions in Angola -- the Reagan Administration decided in March 1981 that the "ultimate goal" was the reduction or elimination of Cuban troops from Angola and not military support for UNITA. They appeared to recognize that the ultimate goal could not be achieved if a secondary goal to military support for UNITA was also pursued.

Once there was agreement on the ultimate goal, the question turned to how it could best be accomplished. The immediate answer was to link the withdrawal of the Cuban combat troops in Angola with the removal of South African troops from Namibia as part of an overall settlement of the Namibian question. But this proved to be a sticky and divisive issue for the other four members of the Western Contact Group (Great Britain, France, Germany and Canada), to say nothing about the universally negative response toward this linkage from the African Front Line States (Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania). The U.S. stood alone in its desire to bring the issue of the Cuban withdrawal into the Namibian negotiations.

During Carter's four years in office, Namibia and the Cuban troops were the two issues dominating all U.S.-Angola contacts, but they were *never* linked. The Carter Administration, like the other members of the Contact Group, was convinced that the Cuban troops would not leave Angola until South Africa ceased her attacks in southern Angola against SWAPO and Angolan citizens and that this would not

occur until after Namibian independence. All agreed that it would be a grave mistake to link the two issues as it would almost certainly delay and jeopardize a Namibian settlement. Even Pretoria had never suggested such a linkage. It was only after the initial talks between the Reagan Administration and the Botha regime that both the U.S. and South Africa insisted on this linkage -- over the strong objections of all other parties concerned with the Namibian issue.

#### Namibia and Angola: A Two-Track Policy

Namibia may be the only area in the world where the Reagan Administration is pursuing diplomacy rather than military bluster. Moreover, there is widespread optimism that it is working. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. even predicted that South Africa would end its illegal occupation of the large territory in southwestern Africa and accept its independence in 1982. In fact, the Administration's initial defensiveness over its alleged tilt toward Pretoria has given way to confident, almost self-righteous assertions that the strategy will be successful. But will it?

The Administration's focus on Namibia is part of its overall goal of reducing, if not eliminating, the Soviet and Cuban presence throughout southern Africa. By including Namibia into a larger regional package, the Reagan Administration would like, simultaneously:

- To see an internationally acceptable independence obtained in Namibia.
- To eliminate Cuban combat troops in Angola and promote unity between the ruling MPLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.
- To establish strategic ties with South Africa, which is viewed as impossible without South African cooperation on Namibia and racial reform at home.

In order to accomplish these complex goals, Secretary of State Haig has fashioned a two-track policy. Along one track the U.S. has entered into a dialogue with South Africa and is ready to take those steps necessary to assure South African cooperation in Namibia. On the second track Washington was supposed to have entered into a dialogue with the Angolan government with the aims of assuring their cooperation on Namibia, drastically reducing the number of Cuban combat troops in Angola, and promoting unity between the MPLA and UNITA.

Secretary Haig believes the second track to be imperative in order to realign Pretoria's cooperation, despite the objections of the other Contact Group members. Their concern is that tying or connecting the two withdrawals (the Administration is reticent to say they are "linked") will eventually abort the Namibian negotiations. In essence they do not believe that the Angolan government can (or should) agree to sending the Cubans home before Namibian independence rather than after, as Luanda has promised. As a result they have disassociated themselves from the Administration's second track, believing that if negotiations break down over this issue, it will then be Washington's fault, not theirs.

Interestingly, while the Administration propounded its two-track policy, during 1981 it was actually active along only one track. A series of almost monthly meetings were held between high level American and South African officials to spell out the terms of the quid pro quo which Washington is offering Pretoria. That is, what kind of cooperation will South Africa provide in Namibia in exchange for what kind of new relationship with the U.S. The exact terms of these talks remain a subject of great speculation but apparently Haig is convinced that they are enough to have secured South Africa's cooperation.

The train on the second track, however, did not even leave the station during the entire first year of Reagan's Administration. By late September, when the Contact Group foreign ministers met at the U.N. to discuss Namibia, only one extremely brief and superficial conversation had occurred between senior American and Angolan officials.

An excellent opportunity for discussions was lost in early September when Angolan Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues (Kito) spent ten days in New York as head of the Angolan delegation during the U.N. debate on Namibia. Colonel Rodrigues, considered to be among the top three Angolan leaders and the Angolan representative at the last OAU heads of state meeting in Nairobi, has been Angola's chief Namibian negotiator in recent years. Yet Haig gave strict orders that no one from the Administration was to meet with him. The same order went out when Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge replaced Rodrigues as head of the delegation.

These and other refusals to meet with the Angolans not only raised concern but some anger among the other Contact Group foreign ministers at their September meeting. The American Secretary of State was strongly admonished by his counterparts and warned that his attitude threatened to sabotage the entire Namibian settlement. As a result Haig hastily arranged a meeting with Jorge as he was packing his bags to return to Angola. Although both sides reported that the meeting went well, the second track was not even broached. Nor was it brought up by Chester Crocker when he returned to Luanda in November to meet Jorge and President José Eduardo dos Santos with delegations from the other Contact Group countries.

The contrast in the way Secretary of State Haig pursued both tracks of the Namibian policy during 1981 was startling. The frequent and substantive talks between Washington and Pretoria were justified on the grounds that "we believe that the chance for influencing governments is better if we have reasonably good relations with them." Why this logic was limited to South Africa and not extended to Angola was never made clear. To many it appeared that the Reagan Administration had different principles for white- and black-ruled states in Africa.

One of the most highly touted and controversial elements in the Administration's approach toward southern Africa has been its insistence on taking into account "South Africa's legitimate security concerns and needs." Pretoria's concerns are indeed numerous, ranging from the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and alleged Soviet influence on SWAPO to minimizing the African component of any U.N. (UNTAG) peace-keeping force during the transition period in Namibia. The Administration argues that you can't expect South Africa to make concessions which she believes will greatly jeopardize her security. On this point there is broad agreement because to ignore these concerns is to invite failure.

Once again, however, the same logic or strategy has not been applied to the African (i.e. Angolan) side of the equation. Not only did the Administration refuse to discuss Angola's "legitimate security concerns and needs" during 1981 but, on the contrary, it went out of its way to exacerbate unnecessarily Luanda's fears. The concerted (but ultimately futile) attempts to repeal the Clark Amendment (which prohibits U.S. military aid to any factions--e.g. UNITA--in Angola), the refusal to condemn South Africa's massive invasion of Angola, CIA meetings with anti-MPLA leaders, and the highly publicized December visit of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi are only some of the ways in which the Administration

has increased, not decreased, Luanda's security concerns. The Administration justified each of these actions on the basis of "principle," ignoring the ultimately negative impact on Angola or her perceptions of them as threatening gestures.

Following the Haig-Jorge meeting at the U.N. in late September, the American Secretary of State became anxious to get the train moving along the second track but did not know quite how to get it out of the station. An opportunity arose on December 10th when Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos chose to mark the important 25th anniversary of the founding of the MPLA with a speech in Cabinda (with Gulf Oil officials present). While attacking the ongoing visit of Mr. Savimbi to the U.S., dos Santos nevertheless reaffirmed "our readiness to hold talks with the United States at any time on problems of common interest that would lead to the normalization of relations between our two countries." The State Department responded immediately and the first talks were held a month later.

The U.S. and Angola held talks in Paris twice in early 1982: on January 15-16, for a total of fifteen hours; and on March 4-5, for a total of seven hours. The Angolan delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge and included Angola's Ambassador to France, Luis De Almeida and (during the March 4-5 visit) Ms. Olga Lima, the third-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The American delegation was headed by Chester Crocker and included his (then) deputy Lannon Walker and an assortment of lower ranking officers.<sup>2</sup>

During both talks each side carefully spelled out its maximum position; there were no breakthroughs nor even minor changes in their respective fundamental positions. The bottom line is that the U.S. would like the Angolans to consider starting the process of sending Cuban combat troops home *now* as a way of facilitating the move toward Namibian independence (i.e., at least partially satisfying a South African demand). The Angolans want the U.S. to consider that it cannot begin sending the Cubans home while it is threatened by outsiders, including South Africa and the United States itself. If there is room for compromise here, it may lie in the area of lessening external threats to Angola's security, thereby enabling her to begin the dispatch of Cuban troops before, rather than after, Namibian independence. High State Department officials privately admit that they are prepared to discuss concretely how the U.S. might assist Angola in the security area but this subject was not seriously broached during the first two rounds of talks.

What is required now is some imaginative thinking in both Washington and Luanda on the question of addressing Angola's (as well as South Africa's) security needs. Success in Namibia may ultimately depend on a satisfactory answer to the question of Angola's security concerns. (Certainly positive relations between the U.S. and Angola do!) How many Cubans must be withdrawn now, for example, and does this include both military and civilian personnel? If it applies only to the military, does it include both combat and non-combat troops and those in Cabinda helping to protect Gulf Oil's operations? These and many other sensitive and difficult questions must be resolved before there can be any progress along the Administrations's second track.

#### NOTES

1. Parts of this section appeared in an article published early this year, "Why Optimism About a Namibian Settlement," *New York Times*, January 8, 1982.
2. A reputedly accurate version of the first round of talks was leaked in *Afrique-Asie*: see Simon Malley (1982) "Angola-Etats-Unis: Les Secrets de la Rencontre de Paris," No. 258, pp. 7-10.

## ACAS EXPANDS ITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY

### Report of the ACAS Political Education Committee

These are tough times to be politically active on Africa, as Reagan has shamelessly expanded U.S. political and economic support for South Africa, and South Africa, in turn, has intensified its attacks on the surrounding states. Nevertheless, ACAS has responded to several important issues this year. This report is intended to outline the results of campaigns in which we asked ACAS members to participate and of actions ACAS officers have taken. In addition, it is meant to solicit members' ideas of how we can become more effective.

ACAS has become an active participant in the Southern Africa Working Group, a network co-ordinated by the Washington Office on Africa and TransAfrica to lobby on U.S. Southern African policy. Taking the lead from this group, we asked members to lobby against the loosening of export controls on South Africa when Congressional liberals were challenging new regulations promulgated in March. The gate to increased computer and aircraft sales to South Africa remains open, however, since the Congress has limited influence over such trade regulations which by statute must come under yearly administrative review. This summer the House Foreign Affairs Committee wrote language into the foreign aid authorization bill that would return to the pre-March tighter restrictions, but only until the next review on December 31, 1982. Two subcommittees passed a separate bill to the same effect. However, the House probably will now act on the foreign aid bill before the November elections and it surely will not take up the separate bill this session. So it is more important now to look toward December and January, when export controls on South Africa could be loosened even further.

In another action on South Africa, ACAS members joined in a massive international campaign for the commutation of the death sentences of three African National Congress members. Our effort was directed at Secretary of State Haig, asking for pressure from the U.S. government. On June 3rd, South African President Viljoen did commute the death sentences of Johnson Lubisi, Petrus Mashigo and Naphthali Manana. Now the ANC is appealing against the death sentences of three other militants -- Johannes Shabangu, David Moise, and Anthony Tsotsobe -- who have been convicted under the Treason Act. The date for their appeal is September 3rd, after which it could again be up to the State President to commute their sentences. If their death sentences are upheld on appeal, please write to Secretary Schulz, again requesting that the U.S. government intervene to save the lives of these ANC fighters.

Our focus on U.S. policy has not been limited to Southern Africa. In August we wrote to the State Department expressing concern about seven detained political figures in Somalia, a country which is receiving increased U.S. aid.

ACAS has played a special role in the defense of African scholars and students. We worked closely with the Dennis Brutus Defense Fund, maintaining Brutus' right to remain in the United States. ACAS also protested plans to expel Ethiopian students. Looking to Africa, we collected more than 500 signed

petitions demanding the release of Zairian Professor Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, which we sent with a covering letter to President Mobutu. Nzongola-Ntalaja also delivered a letter to the State Department urging U.S. expressions of concern about Wamba's status, and provided Elaine Wamba, the professor's American-born wife, an opportunity to meet with State Department officials. Wamba remains under country arrest and police surveillance in Kinshasa, and continues to need international support.

ACAS members have also responded to the recent murder of Ruth First, long-time South African activist and scholar, by expressing solidarity with the Mozambican government in the face of continued attacks from South Africa and by participating in a memorial service for Ms. First at Howard University.

We would appreciate hearing from you about actions you are taking locally on these and other issues. In addition, we welcome your suggestions on how we can make ACAS more politically effective. For example, several people felt that the telephone network messages were too open to confusion and misinterpretation, so we will distribute written action alerts whenever possible in the future. More importantly, we depend on you to help identify issues on which ACAS should take a political initiative.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA CELEBRATES TENTH ANNIVERSARY**

**The Washington Office on Africa will celebrate its tenth anniversary on Saturday, November 6, 1982 with a reception at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The reception will include a cultural and political program.**

**ALL ACAS MEMBERS ARE INVITED TO ATTEND**

**Saturday, November 6, 1982**

**7:30 p.m.**

**Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.**

**Donation: \$15.00**

## AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

John Dommissie, M.D.

The World Medical Association is an association of the medical associations of approximately 25 'Western' nations. The exceptions to this are that it also includes the medical associations of 'Free Cuba' (Cubans in exile) and of the 'Transkei', a region not accepted as an independent nation by any country in the world except South Africa.

The Medical Association of South Africa resigned from the WMA in 1976 under political pressure from several different sources around the world which, it said, made its position untenable in the organization, and which it said was due to the WMA violating its own principles. However, it seems that very soon thereafter some lobbying and politicking of its own was done, especially with the help of the American Medical Association. During this interim the voting system of WMA was changed so that there was not a one-medical-association/one-vote system but a weighted system whereby voting was on a proportional basis according to the number of doctors in each country. By this system the United States held 35 votes, all the European countries together held 30 votes, and all the African countries together held 11 (that was excluding South Africa at that time.)

During 1978 a visit by the Executive of the American Medical Association to South African medical institutions was arranged and this visit took place in January 1979. It followed by a few months the visit of a panel of four American psychiatrists, two white male past-presidents of the American Psychiatric Association, one black male and one black female, each renowned in their field. Their visit was prompted by World Health Organization reports of shocking conditions in the mental health system in South Africa. Their report, which was published in May 1979, essentially confirmed most of the previous reports except those reports which said that psychiatry was used to indoctrinate or subdue political dissidents in South Africa. It did find 'grossly inferior' medical and psychiatric care for black psychiatric patients, as opposed to whites. It also found a large number of needless deaths among these same black patients due to inadequate medical attention and a lack of basic essentials of habilitation. It found that the use of psychiatry for political purposes was unnecessary as there were so many laws, institutions and practices to take care of those matters, without involving the direct use of fraudulent psychiatric treatment. It also alluded to the psychological effects of the system of apartheid which demeans and humiliates black people on a daily basis.

The AMA did not publish a report until December 1981, which was 2½ months after South Africa's re-admission had become a *fait accompli*. During the interim period much lobbying, correspondence and political work was done on both sides of the issue and on both sides of the Atlantic. The British Medical

Association was persuaded by the Anti-Apartheid Movement and others in Britain and elsewhere, including many expatriate South Africans who knew the situation at first-hand; that they should not support the re-admission of the Medical Association of South Africa (MASA) or the admission of the 'Transkei' Medical Association, an organization of one of South Africa's 'independent' nations, actually African reserves, 'Bantustans', or 'homelands'. Some work was also done in the United States by individuals and by the American Committee on Africa in an attempt to dissuade the AMA from its chosen path but to no avail. It must be added that throughout this whole process the American Medical Association's membership was not consulted or informed of the moves afoot to re-admit South Africa and to admit the 'Transkei' Medical Association.

With the African and several other countries' votes counting for so little, the admission of these two bodies was achieved with the help of the United States and certain other countries such as Belgium, Japan, Australia, Chile, El Salvador, 'Free Cuba', Taiwan, etc. In fact they may also have attained a majority of one even if countries' votes had been counted as one each, since 9 countries voted for their admission, 8 against and the rest (about 10) abstained. But that may have been contributed to by a sense of resignation to the weighted-vote system by which the U.S. and allied medical associations held the majority.

In November 1981 the African regional meeting of the World Health Organization took place in Brazzaville, Congo. It devoted all the five days of this conference to the issue of the effects of apartheid on health care in South Africa. Delegates were present from both the main liberation groups of South Africa, several African countries, the U.S., Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, India, Sri Lanka, in addition to the staff of WHO from Geneva. By now the WHO had compiled voluminous information on the shocking inequities in the health care systems for whites and blacks in South Africa. One of the main recommendations coming out of that Conference was that the WHO should break off the affiliation of the World Medical Association with the WHO because of the WMA's re-admission of South Africa and the admission of the 'Transkei' Medical Association. That recommendation was carried out by the World Assembly of WHO on January 24, 1982.

The AMA position on this action, as communicated in a letter by its Executive Vice-President on August 13, 1982 is that "the principle of professional integrity and the rights of private voluntary organizations are being violated by the actions of the WHO. Furthermore, the MASA does not practice apartheid and includes members of all races, color and creed. In fact it should be emphasized that instead of condemning the MASA, the groups opposing MASA should be commending and supporting its policy of racial integration in its membership and for the battle it has fought and has won equal pay for equal work for physicians of all races in South Africa." He also referred to a paragraph in his previous letter of February 23, 1981 when he stated "political consideration should not be permitted to interfere with opportunity and need for the exchange of ideas which can lead to better health care for the people of all nations."

In April 1982 the seven African countries' medical associations announced their resignations from WMA at a meeting of the U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid. The next month the South African Medical Association announced the breaking off of its 36-year association with the British Medical Association

after it had become an equal partner in that relationship -- because of the BMA's position against South Africa's re-admission. It remains to be seen now whether the African nations may form their own separate organization or whether they will be able to join with other nations around the world who oppose racism in health care and whether perhaps many others will form a rival international medical association, which will more closely uphold the principles of adequate health care for all, regardless of race or socio-economic status.

Throughout all this there has been a curious line taken by both AMA and the South African Medical Association and also by people such as the Secretary-General of WMA from Belgium, that the forces opposing South Africa and 'Transkei' are 'political' whereas the obviously-at-least-as-political forces condoning South Africa's preferential health care for whites, brutal disruption of family life, disregard for starving children when it is the world's sixth largest food exporter, etc., is not seen as political at all. Readers are encouraged to compare the documentation of the AMA and of the South African authorities to that of WHO and other bodies around the world who have found a very different situation in South Africa to that portrayed by both the MASA in its editorials and now also by the AMA Executive. The general membership of AMA has not been informed of the repercussions in the world medical and health care establishment of its sponsorship of MASA in its successful bid for re-admission to the WMA (as of this writing, August 27, 1982).

Anyone interested in pursuing this issue is encouraged to write to, or call, the author of this article:

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AFRICA: OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SIX AFRICAN COUNTRIES. Report of a Congressional Study Mission to Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Somalia, Angola, and Nigeria, August 4-22, 1981. House Of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. March 30, 1982.

## HARASSMENT OF CONGOLESE ABROAD LINKED TO CIA-TRAINED ZAIREAN POLICE

African Solidarity Committee  
3543 18th Street, Box 22, San Francisco, CA 94110

Over a hundred disappearances of Congolese "Zaireans" in Belgium, France and Switzerland have been linked to the CIA-trained CNDI (Zairean secret police), according to Serge Mukendi, the US representative of the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC). Mr. Mukendi himself was the subject of an unsuccessful CNDI kidnap attempt on June 21 in New York City.

Reached by phone, Mr. Mukendi gave this statement: "These attacks are the result of the deterioration of the situation inside the Congo. Since February the numerous strikes by teachers, students and workers, all demanding an end to the Mobutu regime, and the simultaneous advances of the FLNC's armed struggle have been responded to with heavy repression. Mobutu's secret police are just like Israel's MOSSAD and Chile's DINAs. The CNDI works closely with the secret police of the NATO powers and under the leadership of their trainers, the CIA. Together, they are attempting to smash the growing support for the Congolese National Liberation Front, both internally and internationally, in order to shore up the corrupt regime."

The Congo, renamed "Zaire" by its current western-backed leader, Mobutu, is one of the richest countries in Africa. Yet its economy is a total shambles, with over 80% unemployment. Real wages are one tenth what they were 10 years ago. No new hospitals or schools have been built in almost 2 decades of Mobutu's rule, and poverty is such that one half the children die before the age of two.

Mobutu, on the other hand, is the richest head of state in the world. Twenty thousand NATO troops and 10,000 mercenaries help to keep him in power in the face of repeated armed uprisings.

In response to the growing popular resistance, the Congolese secret police, the CNDI, have been arresting and "disappearing" hundreds throughout the country.

In Belgium, France and Switzerland, Congolese have been very active in mobilizing demonstrations in support of the FLNC, including occupations of Zairean embassies. Monthly demonstrations in Belgium have received support from over 40 organizations.

Now more than 50 Congolese in Belgium, 30 in France, and 20 in Switzerland have "disappeared." Government officials have refused to say where these people are being held, whether they are being tortured, who or how many have been deported to "Zaire," or any other information.

The FLNC representative in West Germany reports being chased by CNDI agents for two weeks. He escaped several attempts on his life, including shots fired into his home during the last week of June.

Mr. Mukendi escaped an attempt on his life in mid-February, as well as the June 21st kidnapping. In February two cars without license plates moved, one in front, one behind the car he was driving on the New Jersey turnpike. They then both rammmed his car simultaneously, causing a serious accident in which Mr. Mukendi suffered several broken bones. He has since found his apartment ransacked twice.

On June 21st he was walking down Second Avenue between 44th and 45th Streets in New York when four men in a car with no license plates pulled up. Two men, both Congolese, attempted to drag him into the waiting car. Mr. Mukendi argued loudly and fought them, and an ambulance siren in the background made them think the police were on the way. They let go of him and sped off.

When he arrived at his apartment, they were waiting for him. However, Mr. Mukendi was then with a group of people and the would-be kidnappers again had to back off.

Such covert CNDI operations in this country closely resemble the Chilean secret police (DINA) 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, U.S. representative of the Chilean resistance.

On June 30th, the 22nd anniversary of Congolese independence, demonstrations were held in New York, Washington DC, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco denouncing US intervention in the Congo and the recent wave of attacks on the FLNC. These demonstrations were sponsored by a coalition of fifteen organizations.

In New York, police charged the picket line at the Zairean mission, arresting three women and spraining one woman's arm. Misdemeanor charges were later dropped for lack of evidence.

In San Francisco, about 50 people marched through downtown traffic to the CIA offices in the Customs House on Battery St. A representative of Freedom Rising Africa Solidarity Committee, Ralph Levy, said; "We hold the CIA responsible for the crimes of its lackeys - the Zairean CNDI, the DINA in Chile - the secret police forces throughout the world that it trains to torture, kidnap, and assassinate to further the interests of the U.S. and its allies."

He called on people to send telegrams to Chester Crocker, Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, denouncing CIA activity in the Congo and demanding an end to attacks on the FLNC.