


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ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICAN SCHOLARS
 P.O. Box 791, East Lansing, Michigan 48823

October 19, 1979

Dear Friends,

The ACAS Board of Directors, meeting in September, decided that our primary political priority this fall needs to be on Zimbabwe -- expanding educational outreach on the issue and organizing to stop the Congress from prematurely lifting sanctions.

We recognize that it is difficult to interpret the twists and turns of the peach negotiations in London while they are still going on (see over). But, if the negotiations fail, Americans' impressions of who is at fault will be formed immediately by the major media. So we need to get out our interpretation of the negotiations now. And, regardless of what happens in London, November 15 is the deadline for President Carter to make a decision about whether to retain U.S. compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia. We therefore urge you to undertake immediately two actions on Zimbabwe:

(1) Meet with Congressional representatives to urge retention of sanctions. If President Carter decides to retain sanctions on November 15, Congress has 30 legislative days to lift sanctions by simple majority vote on a concurrent resolution. Work is needed to influence both Senators and Representatives, with priority on members of the House. Organize a small delegation to meet Congressional representatives or staff in their local offices. It's not difficult to arrange, and a well-planned visit counts for a lot more than a few post cards. Keep in touch when votes come up; let them know you are watching. If you have a teach-in, include a letter or postcard drive supporting sanctions. Congressional voting records are available from the Washington Office on Africa.

(2) Hold a teach-in on Zimbabwe. Here are some suggested resources: (a) Written material: The Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, NY, NY 10038 (212) 962-1210, has a chronology, speeches by liberation movement leaders, and a good \$10 photo exhibit. Write the Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., NE, Wash. D.C. 20002, phone (202) 546-7961; or TransAfrica, 1325 18th St., N.W., Wash. DC 20036, phone (202) 223-9666 for up-to-date information on U.S. policy toward Rhodesia and sanctions.

(b) Speakers: Liberation movement representatives: ZANU-Patriotic Front, 211 East 43 Street, #902, NY, NY 10017 phone (212) 697-7910. ZAPU-Patriotic Front, 104 East 40th Street, #401, NY, NY 10017, phone (212) 682-8481. Others: Sr. Janice McLaughlin, who was deported from Rhodesia in 1977 and traveled recently to Mozambique and London, (202) 546-7961. Ted Lockwood of the Washington Office on Africa and Randall Robinson of TransAfrica can speak about U.S. policy.

(c) Films: Who Has a Right to Rhodesia? a CBS documentary made in 1977, available from Carousel Films, 1501 Broadway, NY, NY 10036 and Audio-Visual Center, University of Michigan, 416 Fourth St, Ann Arbor, MI 48103. Massacre at Nyadzonia, a silent 30-minute film documents attack on camp in which 600 Zimbabwean refugees were killed. Available from California Newsreel, 630 Natoma St., San Francisco, CA 94103.

You may want to make a material aid drive-- for clothing or medical supplies -- a part or an outgrowth of a teach-in. Ask liberation movement representatives what is most urgently needed. The Africa Fund, American Friends Service Committee (215) 241-7000 and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (212) 754-7602 can help with logistics.

Sincerely,

ACAS Political Education and Action Committee

ZIMBABWE PEACE TALKS REACH HALF-WAY:
TOUGH TRANSITIONAL DISCUSSION STILL LIES AHEAD

October 19, 1979

After five weeks of negotiations, on October 18 the Patriotic Front agreed to the proposed British constitution if agreement is reached on the transition. Lord Carrington had issued an ultimatum: either the Front would agree to the constitution as drafted, or they would be excluded from the critically important transitional talks. Had the Patriotic Front held out, Britain was prepared to reach a transitional agreement with the Muzorewa regime alone, leading to recognition and lifting sanctions.

Crisis has been averted, at least for a time. But the toughest questions, particularly about military arrangements during the transition, have yet to be resolved. In brief, this is where the negotiations stand:

1. The proposed constitution still enshrines major white privileges. Most press reports have said that the blocking power of whites has been eliminated, but this is not so. Key provisions on land and pensions, changed only cosmetically from the constitution adopted by Rhodesia's white voters in January, cannot be altered for ten years without the unanimous vote of Parliament. It is guaranteed that whites will be able to keep their land holdings unless they are compensated for them at market value. Government officials, from Ian Smith and General Walls on down, will get their pensions and can freely transmit them abroad. The new constitution does give whites fewer seats in Parliament -- 20 instead of 28 out of 100 for seven years -- and reduces their influence on the public service and military commissions. The Patriotic Front was forced to make most of the concessions, not only on the entrenchment of land and pension rights for whites, but also on citizenship guarantees for whites who settled in Rhodesia after 1965, and the degree of white control over the military and civil service.
2. The United States and Great Britain put severe pressure on the Patriotic Front and the Front Line states to accept this constitution. The possibility of a multi-donor Zimbabwe aid fund to cover the costs of land compensation and pension payments broke the deadlock over the constitution. The US is also offering a "wider development concept for southern Africa as a whole," which could include training and projects in regional transportation and irrigation. (Both aid proposals would require Congressional approval.) The Rhodesian army has been destroying just such targets. It blew up key bridges on the Tazara railway on October 12, making Zambia totally dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa for transportation. In September it damaged the irrigation system in Mozambique's most important agricultural complex in the Limpopo valley. Prime Minister Botha has threatened to expand South Africa's military backing for the Muzorewa regime if "confusion and civil war" result from the negotiations.
3. The transition plan offered by Britain is unlikely to be acceptable to the Patriotic Front. The Washington Post reported October 18th that "the British plan would, in effect, establish a thin veneer of British authority over the Salisbury government, leaving most institutions of the rebel government, including the military, basically intact." But the Patriotic Front has already indicated that it cannot accept control of the military remaining in the hands of the white Rhodesia Front's generals. The Patriotic Front has agreed to participate in elections, provided that there are sufficient impartial international personnel to administer it and ensure that it is free and fair.

If negotiations on the transition fail, Great Britain and the United States are almost certain to try to place the blame on the Patriotic Front. But the Front has been eminently reasonable and should not be made the fall guy. The British demanded, and got, more concessions from the Front than from the Muzorewa regime on the constitution. There is reason for concern that the Front will again be asked to make the major concessions on transitional arrangements, or be excluded from a political process designed to create a legitimate, internationally-recognized Zimbabwe but one which differs only slightly from the present internal settlement regime.

THE CONTINUING SANCTIONS SAGA

(Washington Office on Africa)

Two more sanctions skirmishes are expected in the early fall. The Senate version of the Defense Department Authorization Bill contains language that would lift sanctions unconditionally as soon as the bill goes into force. The House hasn't acted on this bill yet. When it comes to the floor, an amendment may be offered that would lift the ban on imports of strategic and critical materials from Rhodesia, similar to the "Byrd Amendment" which was in effect from 1972-77. Then, in conference, conservative members from the Armed Services Committees will reconcile the House and Senate Differences.

In addition, the Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill will be a vehicle for various conservative amendments. Rep. Bill Young is expected to offer an amendment granting \$5 million in direct aid to the government of "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" as an addition to the Economic Support Fund for Southern Africa. (Young is also expected to propose language to prohibit all direct and indirect aid to the Peoples Republic of Angola.)

Telegrams to House members opposing amendments to these bills are urgently needed.

We also need to be gearing up for another big fight in November, since concurrent resolutions can be expected in both the Senate and the House under the language of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. This battle could extend through December, or even into 1980, since the 30 "legislative days" given to Congress to act count only those days when the Congress is in session.

To prepare for this battle, it is important to do much more community education and outreach on Zimbabwe and the sanctions issue. Use the time between now and then to solicit thoughtful letters to Senators and Representatives from community organizations and prominent individuals. Also, try to arrange a personal meeting with your Senators and Representatives for a group of community representatives by mid-November.

Just before leaving for its August recess, Congress acted to lift sanctions against Rhodesia by November 15th unless the President determines that it would not be in the national interest to do so. But, if the President decides to retain sanctions, the Congress has 30 legislative days to overturn the decision by a concurrent resolution--which does not require Presidential approval.

This compromise, reached as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1980, is the latest chapter in the year-long confrontation between the Congress and the President over whether to lift sanctions against Rhodesia as a result of the internal settlement signed on March 3, 1978. The compromise language was pro-

posed by Senator Jacob Javits, ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, who also authored the amendment passed last year which began the slide toward the lifting of sanctions. The so-called Case-Javits amendment, passed in August of 1978, provided that the President would have to lift sanctions against Rhodesia if he determined that the Rhodesian government was willing to negotiate and had held "free and fair" elections.

The Senate Moves First

The Senate has consistently looked more favorably on lifting sanctions than has the House. In May, the Senate preempted the decision that it had demanded of President Carter. If overwhelmingly adopted--by a vote of 74 to 21--an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, based on a resolution by Senator Schweiker (R-PA), expressing the sense of Congress that the President should determine that the Rhodesian government had held free and fair elections and was willing to negotiate, and that sanctions should therefore no longer be enforced.

On June 7, the President held firm. He decided not to lift sanctions. Immediately Senate conservatives rushed to a second attack, following the Rhodesian foreign ministry's strategy of "amending every piece of legislation possible so that the attack on the Carter Administration comes from all sides at once." On June 12th the Department of Defense Authorization bill came to the Senate floor with an amendment already having been agreed to by the Armed Services Committee which would have the effect of lifting sanctions unconditionally on June 30th. A Church-Javits floor amendment, which would have instead lifted sanctions on December 1st unless the President determined it was not in the national interest to do so, was tabled by a vote of 52 to 41. This defeat left the Committee's provision intact. White House spokesmen announced that the President was "quite likely" to veto any bill that would force the immediate lifting of sanctions, and pointed out that 41 votes were sufficient to sustain a veto.

Pragmatic Interests Prevail in the House

In the House of Representatives, the President's June 7th decision to continue sanctions had a greater impact. The shift in sentiment was exemplified by a "Dear Colleague" letter sent out by Illinois conservative Republican John Erlenborn. It said,

"When our constituents are already worried about gasoline shortages this summer, why risk rash action by the Nigerians to interrupt oil supplies or jack up the prices?...We should let the British assume the lead, not take them off the hook...By hastily lifting sanctions, Congress would play right into the hands of the Soviets and Cubans, who could assume the mantle of 'defenders of the case of black majority rule' while painting us as 'agents of continued colonial domination'."

Sanctions, 2.

Buoyed by this rising spirit of pragmatism, African Subcommittee chairman Stephen Solarz fashioned a compromise which might undercut conservatives' amendments to lift sanctions immediately. While House Democratic leaders held up other major foreign policy bills, Solarz brought to the Foreign Relations Committee a separate bill, HR 4439, which gave the President discretion as to whether sanctions should be lifted after October 15th. This operative language was the bottom line the liberals were seeking to maintain, but, to get it, they gave way substantially on the political judgment of the internal settlement. The bill's preamble called the April election "a significant step" and said that US national interest required encouragement of "multi-racial democracy" with "majority rule and protection of minority rights" in Rhodesia. The liberal Africa Subcommittee had adopted language saying sanctions should not be lifted until the Rhodesian government had demonstrated by its actions that it was exercising "genuine majority rule." But this was too partisan for the full Foreign Affairs Committee, and more neutral language was substituted, linking the lifting of sanctions instead to U.S. national interest. The full House adopted the language passed by the Committee by a huge margin of 350 to 37, after defeating an amendment deleting the President's discretion by a 100-vote margin.

The latest compromise in conference on the Foreign Relations Authorization bill moved the US one step closer to lifting sanctions. While it retained the appearance of Presidential discretion, it actually appropriated for Congress the President's power to veto the sanctions decision. Liberals accepted a further political concession in conference, adding to the preamble a statement that the April election brought a "transfer of power to a black majority government" in Rhodesia.

What to Expect Next

What will happen next in Congress depends to a large extent on what happens in Britain. The one point on which everyone from Jesse Helms to the Black Caucus agreed is that the US should not lift sanctions before the British do. Conservatives like Helms agreed to this on the assumption that Britain's lifting sanctions on November 9th was a foregone conclusion. But Britain's actions are not that predictable. The Thatcher government has to be more attentive to the political realities in Rhodesia and their political fall-out in independent Africa than do members of the US Congress. African nations put maximum pressure on the Thatcher government during the Commonwealth meeting in August. Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum's \$150 million share in the Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, and Zambian President Kaunda opened the Commonwealth meeting with a strong statement condemning Thatcher's support for Muzorewa. As a result, Thatcher has now agreed that a new election as well as constitutional changes are necessary in Rhodesia.

One year ago when the Case-Javits amendment

was adopted in order to avoid a close up-or-down vote on lifting sanctions, the Administration and Congressional liberals were allowing conservatives to set the terms of how the internal settlement would be judged, and under what conditions sanctions should be lifted. Liberals were fighting primarily for time. A State Department official made the surprising admission in response to recent Senate debate that "we made a pact with the devil, and now the devil has come to collect."

American conservatives may not win on the sanctions issue in the end. If the backers of the internal settlement lose, it will be conditions in Rhodesia and independent Africa that defeat them more than the politics of Washington compromise.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONFEREES REJECT IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS

Conferees on the FY 1980 Department of Defense Authorization bill last Friday rejected a Senate-passed provision which would have immediately lifted sanctions. The conferees agreed to a non-binding "sense of Congress" statement that the U.S. "should have unlimited access to strategic and critical materials" and should make "every effort ... to remove all artificial impediments against importation" of such materials. This wording, carefully drafted so as to be germane to the Defense Department Bill, expresses the philosophy contained in the Byrd amendment passed by Congress in 1971 which prohibited the President from enforcing sanctions against strategic and critical materials such as chrome and nickel from Rhodesia.

This compromise is certainly not helpful in that it creates continued pressure for lifting sanctions against Rhodesia, but it does not have any immediate legal effect. However, the result was better than we had anticipated. Senate conservatives surely didn't get what they wanted. John Carbaugh of Sen. Helms' staff had told Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith in London that they should hang tough because the Congress was about to lift sanctions. Carbaugh boasted more than he could deliver.

Though the majority of the Armed Services Committee's conferees support lifting sanctions, they were probably influenced by possible trouble the defense bill might face over a relatively side issue. President Carter had indicated publicly in June and privately to a number of members of Congress last week that he would veto the entire DOD bill if it contained the Senate sanctions language. In addition, House Africa Subcommittee Chairman Solarz had told Armed Services Committee Chairman Price that he would challenge the germaneness of the sanctions language on the floor if the conferees agreed to it. The Washington Office on Africa and TransAfrica coordinated a letter to Chairman Price from twenty religious, union and civil rights leaders urging rejection of the sanctions provision. A common thread of argument in all these letters was the damage which lifting sanctions could cause in the London negotiations for a settlement in Zimbabwe.

What the Congress and the Administration do next on Rhodesian sanctions will depend on a number of events in London. The conference among the British, Abel Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front must still deal with the toughest issues. The broad outlines of a new constitution have been agreed to by all parties; the issues of who will be in control during the transition period and who will control the military will be very difficult to resolve. At the Conservative Party Conference in October, the right wing of the party will try to force a decision in favor of ending compliance with sanctions this year. The British government will make its decision on November 15 in the annual Parliamentary vote on whether or not to renew the sanctions program.

The next battle over sanctions in Washington will come at the same time as the British Parliamentary debate. According to a provision passed by Congress in July as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the President must lift sanctions by November 15 unless he determines that it is not in the national interest to do so. If he does decide to keep sanctions, he must notify the Congress. Within thirty legislative days thereafter, the House and Senate can terminate sanctions by passing a concurrent resolution rejecting the President's determination.

Foreign aid money will probably be used again in FY 1980 for "refugees inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia." On the recommendation of Senators Inouye and Garn, the Subcommittee inserted the same language adopted last year appropriating "up to \$5 million" for displaced people in Rhodesia. During FY 1979, about \$3 million was sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross for relief work in Rhodesia.

TELEPHONE TREE ESTABLISHED

A "telephone tree" of scholars interested in ACAS issues is being established to use to notify people of needed actions. Political Education and Action Committee chairpersons Chris Root, Nzongola-Ntalaja, and Willard Johnson are organizing the telephone tree. Individuals are needed to be responsible for a state, region, or sub-portion of a state. This individual would contact other scholars; for instance, action may be needed in November on Congress to forestall attempts to remove U.S. participation in U.N. sanctions. The contact person for a state would be called by ACAS from Washington. The contact persons then will phone campus contacts, who will be responsible to activate sympathetic individuals on their campus or in the local ACAS chapter to contact the Senator, Representative, State Department, etc.

If you are interested in participating in this project, please send your name and telephone number to Chris Root, Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

U.S. COAL-TO-OIL TECHNOLOGY TO GO TO SOUTH AFRICA (American Committee on Africa)

At a time of energy crisis, a U.S. corporation has a billion dollar contract to provide critical coal-to-oil technology to a country whose policies our government describes as "abhorrent". The South African government's Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) has contracted with the Fluor Corporation of Los Angeles for \$4.2 billion to oversee construction of two coal-to-oil conversion plants.

Research by The Africa Fund charges that Fluor's contract is "lending direct support to apartheid", South Africa's racial policies of white minority rule.

"Oil is the one key resource which South Africa does not possess" the report notes. This alarming state of affairs for the white minority government was exacerbated by the decision of the new Iranian government to adhere to oil sanctions against South Africa. Iran formerly supplied 90% of South Africa's requirements.

The Fluor Corporation is the major contractor overseeing construction of the largest and most expensive project ever undertaken by South Africa. By 1982, SASOL plants are expected to account for 35% of the country's oil production.

Fluor lobbied heavily a few years ago to receive U.S. government credits to help finance the project. These were rejected in a high-level decision in June 1976 following the Soweto rebellion where hundreds of African schoolchildren were shot by South African police.

The Africa Fund report also reveals that Fluor has worked to support pro-South Africa politicians in the U.S. For example, Fluor-PAC, the company's political fund, gave \$1000 to help defeat Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, the liberal chairman of the Senate African subcommittee. The former information secretary for South Africa, Eschel Rhodie, has charged that Clark was the target of a concerted South African government campaign to unseat him.

Among the top ten shareholders in Fluor identified by the Corporate Data Exchange of New York, are Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., BankAmerica Corp., and the New York City Teachers Retirement System. Other union-related plans with significant holdings include those of Bell Telephone employees, Chrysler and Ford Workers and the International Longshoremen's Association.

Providing oil for South Africa is in violation of resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the UN General Assembly, calling for an oil embargo of South Africa.

The study concludes: "Without oil, the ability of South Africa's economy to function would be considerably impaired. Far more important, without oil the minority regime would be unable to employ the tanks, police vans and airplanes on which it relies to maintain control."

REPORT OF RESEARCH COMMITTEE PANEL DISCUSSION
ACAS GENERAL MEETING, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1979

The Research Committee panel, chaired by Tom Shick (University of Wisconsin), consisted of Joel Samoff (University of Michigan), who spoke on Michigan's experience in organizing research in relation to its community mobilization activities; Mario Nsuwah (University of Maryland, Editor of the Journal of Southern African Affairs), who described the Southern African Research Association's efforts to encourage scholars in the U.S. and Africa to develop research relating to Southern Africa, past and present; and Ann Seidman (Brown University and Co-chair of the ACAS Research Committee) who reported on the earlier meeting of the Research Committee with liberation movement and support group representatives (see p.7 for summary) and the 'research model' used by the Western Mass. branch of ACAS in bringing together scholars and publishing their papers in the book, U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa (Boston: South End Press, 1979, \$5.00; \$3.00 if 10 or more are purchased; the research model is described in the book.)

The office of the Journal of Southern African Affairs agreed to provide a clearinghouse for research related to current Southern African issues. ACAS members are urged to send copies of their current papers to be kept on file at the Journal office so that other scholars interested in the issues may find out about them and, if they desire, obtain copies at cost (publishing rights of course would be retained by the author). (For the address, see point 1, below).

The participants then discussed proposals to organize regional conferences, like that in Western Mass. to bring together research of leading scholars to produce benchmark studies in critical areas where publication of relevant information will contribute to a qualitative deepening of the American public's understanding of the issues at stake in Southern Africa. Four regional conferences were proposed:

1. Future Economic Development in Southern Africa: This conference is already planned by the Southern African Research Association to be held October 4-6, 1979. ACAS members are urged to participate with papers on relevant issues. (For more information, contact the SARA Conference Committee, Journal of Southern African Affairs, 4133 Art/Sociology Building, University of Maryland, College Park, Md. 20742 (301-454-5937/8)).

2. The Energy Crisis and Southern Africa: It was suggested that ACAS members in California might plan a conference focussing on the way U.S. oil firms, like Standard Oil of California (co-owner with Texaco of one of South Africa's biggest refineries) have shipped oil to South Africa and Rhodesia (violating U.N. sanctions) while U.S. customers have confronted shortages. At the same time, the U.S. failure to recognize Angola, where Gulf Oil is producing oil, may

hinder possibilities of increased oil imports to the U.S. Contact: A.Y. Yasane, Afro-American Studies Program, U. Calif, Berkeley, CA 94720.

3. Southern Africa and Economic Stagnation in the U.S.: A group of Midwestern universities could organize a regional conference on the way the changing international division of labor, fostered by transnational corporate investment in regional subcenters like South Africa, have led to stagnation and unemployment in 'mature industrial areas' in the U.S., and why it is in the interests of U.S. working people to support the full liberation of southern Africa.

4. The Implications of Transnational Corporate Investment in South Africa for Affirmative Action: New England universities might arrange a conference to explore the implications of recent court decisions relating to discrimination by corporate subsidiaries for U.S. firms with subsidiaries in South Africa.

The suggestion is that ACAS would work together with the organizers of each conference to arrange for the papers from each conference to be published in book form. Any ACAS member who would like to present a relevant paper at any one of these conferences, or who knows of others who might like to do so, is urged to contact the Research Committee (Chairperson: Ann Seidman, 7 Dartmouth Place, Boston, Mass. 02116).

THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH STRATEGY

A report on the meeting re research with representatives of liberation movements and support groups, sponsored by ACAS, TransAfrica, and the Institute of Policy Studies (New York: April 21, 1979):

The meeting was divided into two parts. In the morning, discussion centered around the kinds of research needed and how existing liberation movements and support groups are working to fulfil those needs. In the afternoon, two working groups considered, respectively, 1) US transnational corporate involvement in southern Africa, and the problems and possibilities of economic development in the region; and 2) U.S. and Western powers' political policies and military involvement in the region. The entire group then drew some tentative conclusions as to how a research network ought to be set up among faculty and students to conduct research along the lines suggested.

Summary of the morning discussion:

Two kinds of research and dissemination of information were suggested:

1. Research and dissemination of information to the local and national communities of the United States to help U.S. citizens to participate effectively in decision-making re U.S. policy on southern Africa. This would include the gathering and dissemination of information on:

- a. The role of white minority governments and their maneuvers in southern Africa;
- b. The nature of U.S. economic and military involvement in the region;
- c. The on-going efforts of independent

Research, 2.

African nations in the region to build their economies to ensure independence of South Africa and balanced, integrated development to meet the needs of their peoples.

2. Research and dissemination of information which might be of help to the independent African governments and the peoples of the region:

- a. The role of U.S. interests and policies as they might affect the region;
- b. The nature and role of international organizations that may influence the region, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank;
- c. Various kinds of service-type activities, like translation of documents; preparation of simple, explanatory materials; etc.

Existing support groups reported on the wide range of research activities they conduct as part of their overall work which could be supplemented and complemented by research on campuses organized through ACAS. (This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but to indicate the scope of existing research activities):

1. American Committee on Africa - research and files re current southern African issues, with recent focus on bank campaign, but includes wide range of current issues.
2. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility - research and files focussed on corporate involvement in southern Africa.
3. Washington Office on Africa - gathers and circulates information re U.S. legislation and government activities re southern Africa as part of lobbying program.
4. Institute of Policy Studies - researches and publishes facts re specific topics re southern Africa; eg. Sullivan Principles.
5. TransAfrica - publishes information as aspect of effort to mobilize Black community re southern African issues.
6. Southern Africa Magazine - monthly reports on current issues in readable style for popular circulation.
7. Journal of Southern African Affairs - scholarly journal containing articles, reviews, etc., re southern Africa.
8. Africa News - weekly news summary of events in Africa.
9. Catalyst - coordinates research among students and publishes reports to facilitate student activities re southern Africa.
10. International Defense and Aid - publishes information relating to conditions prevailing in southern Africa.
11. Various campus-based groups - gathering information to publish in campus and community newspapers, radios, television programs.

Role of ACAS could be to help build a national network to provide a framework for faculty and student research relating to southern Africa.

There is a need for a clearing house to ensure that research needs are met, and to avoid duplication.

Economics Committee - Afternoon Session

The two committees on economic penetration and economic development were combined by the participants. Research priorities were discussed for both of these topics.

Economic Penetration:

There is a need for case studies on specific multi-national corporations in South Africa and in this country so that the links can be made as we talk to people. It would be useful to be able to assess what has been done on one topic and get people together who are doing similar research. People should particularly study the corporations in their own vicinity as well as banks.

Studies on Institutions - The World Bank and IMF were two organizations targeted for study.

Exports and Imports - More research needs to be done and more of it should be better coordinated so that people have information to push for the end of supports to South Africa by U.S. institutions like Ex-Im Bank, oil companies, etc..

Government - U.S. agencies like AID should be studied, also programs like Food for Peace, and PL 480. The role of private voluntary organizations in the U.S.-sponsored development process should also be studied as it is often the policy of AID to work through organizations that are PVO's. A continual review should be done of technologies for development proposed in government reports.

Economic Development:

Countries need to know strategies to reduce their economic relations and dependence on South Africa, how to develop monetary systems to gain control away from international banking, and to learn more from the lessons of failure such as the East African Community.

Maximizing efforts was the second main topic. The problem was put into terms of trying to link researchers across the country working on similar topics. A proposal was made for establishing a clearinghouse of information on research completed and research in progress. This would allow people to know, before they began work on a topic, what has been done before and who is currently studying the same issue. Links could be made between academic organizations and private groups like IPS and ACOA. Each organization would be responsible for sending to the clearinghouse a description of what work is going on. In the long run, this will aid in being able to see an overall picture of what is happening so that we can set research priorities according to the needs expressed by liberation movements. It was also stressed that the idea of working collectively on projects, such as the one done in Western Mass. should be continued and encouraged.

Wider Dissemination of Information:

Research, 3.

The educational system at all levels was discussed as a target for wider dissemination of progressive ideas on Southern Africa. In elementary and secondary schools, libraries and teachers are bombarded with expensively-produced, free and unsolicited information from South Africa. This should be countered with information sent and visits to schools. Information has to be tailored to the level of the students and based on the assumption that both they and the teachers probably do not know very much on the topics. At the university level, students should be encouraged in their divestment activities, but they should also be encouraged in this movement to go beyond divestment as an issue in their educational work on campuses and to go beyond the boundaries of their schools to reach communities on the issues of Southern Africa. In all cases, whether speaking to community organizations, labor unions, churches, etc., the information should be presented in a way tailored for the audience and their interests. New York COBLSA has produced information packages towards this aim, which always tries to make links between activities in Southern Africa and ones in the city of New York. Radio and TV debates are good ways to get involved in community forums, and preparations of packets of information for radio disc jockeys can be useful. In Washington, 1000 short facts on Zimbabwe were prepared on history, politics, etc. for use as part of a Zimbabwe Week project. These could be short 15 to 60 second readings and could be distributed to college radio stations as well. At present, the Catalyst Project does work only for students and there is not a recognized counterpart for other Southern Africa constituencies. Nzongola also brought up the need, as did Southern Africa for more good manuscripts to be sent for review to these magazines. Nzongola also stressed the need for materials to be written for African countries--particularly educational materials at an undergraduate level, to study Southern Africa.

Notes from meeting of March 24.
Bob Edgar

Research Priorities on Foreign Policy

The group first addressed the question: for whom are we carrying out research on Southern African questions? Who is our constituency and where do we hope to have the most impact? The group stressed that the foremost priority is to coordinate research with the needs of the liberation groups. But it was also emphasized that basic work has to be done in working with various communities in the U.S.--the black community, which has largely been untapped and is a critical source of support, the university community, church organizations and trade unions and working class groups. It was pointed out that too much time has been spent lobbying or educating leaders of these communities and very little time was devoted to working with local groups. Another problem raised was that of language and information. When research or position papers are published, the language or vocabulary used is not geared for a broader community.

The group sketched out some major research areas for immediate investigation.

1. Studies of Foundation research (Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford) and U.S. Government research on Southern African issues. Faculty and students could be extremely helpful in investigating these research projects.
2. Since the dissemination of news on Africa is such a critical factor in shaping the perceptions of most Americans, the groups stressed that a study should be carried out on American news reporting on Southern Africa which would include compiling a guide to news reporters who cover Africa, bibliographies of articles on African news reporting by the Western media (especially in journals and periodicals which are rarely consulted) and studying how news is manufactured on various issues by the American media.
3. A critical area of investigation is American trade unions who are showing an increasing level of interest in African workers throughout Southern Africa. Groups like the African-American Labor Center and the AFL-CIO are regularly sending missions to Southern Africa and their activities should be actively probed.
4. Because of time constraints, the group did not probe extensively into what studies should be made on the American government. However, it was pointed out that useful research can be done by utilizing the Freedom of Information Act. The Institute for Policy Studies is currently conducting a study of bureaucrats in the U.S. government who have input into Southern Africa policy.

UPDATE ON THE DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT

American Committee on Africa

The issue of university and college holdings in corporations and banks that do business with South Africa has rapidly become a major issue on campuses across the country. Many student groups are calling on their schools to divest their funds from corporations which, by their presence in South Africa, support the system of apartheid. Anti-apartheid organizations have been formed on hundreds of campuses and regional coalitions in the West, Mid-West, Southeast, and Northeast are now coordinating activities among schools in their area.

In recent years, a number of universities have recognized the detrimental role of U.S. businesses in South Africa and have voted for either full or partial divestment. Although divestment from only selected corporations and banks is a significant step, it is viewed by many student activists as an attempt by their administrations to appease persistent student demands for full divestment. A number of schools, which are not included in this list, have voted to divest from corporations in the future if the firms do not adhere to guidelines established by the university's board.

The following is a list of universities and colleges that have taken these actions,

Divestment, 2.

with an explanation included, where necessary, regarding the decision.

FULL DIVESTMENT

ANTIOCH COLLEGE MAY 1978
SIX-FIGURE RANGE

HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE OCTOBER 1977
\$200,00

Hampshire College voted to divest in the fall of 1977. During the summer of 1978 it was acknowledged that the school had reinvested in these corporations. The college then divested again fully in March, 1979.

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS OCTOBER 1977
(Amherst) \$620,000

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY DECEMBER 1978
\$9 Million

MSU voted for full divestment, to be carried out gradually. The decision came after a June 1978 bill passed by the Civil Rights Committee of the State House of Representatives which prohibits Michigan schools from investing in corporations which condone "legally required" discrimination.

UNIVERSITY OF OHIO JANUARY 1978
\$38,000

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON NOVEMBER 1977
APPROX. \$6 Million

The Oregon Board of Higher Education voted in the fall of 1977 for the divestment of funds of the state university system from 27 corporations. The State Attorney General declared that the Board could not make such a decision because the university's funds were controlled by the state legislature. Several groups involved then filed suit against the Attorney General's ruling. The case is still being litigated.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN FEBRUARY 1978
APPROX. \$10 Million

The decision to divest in Wisconsin was based on a recommendation by the State Attorney General in accordance with a 1973 law prohibiting investment in corporations that practice or condone racial discrimination. The decision is being contested by the UW Board of Regents.

PARTIAL DIVESTMENT

AMHERST COLLEGE MARCH 1978
- sold \$1 million worth of stock in Blue Bell, Inc.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY APRIL 1979
- divested approximately \$5 million worth of non-voting shares in 10 corporations.

BRANDEIS APRIL 1979
- voted for selected, partial divestment based on a case by case review of corporations.

COLUMBIA MARCH 1979
- divested \$2.7 million worth of stock in three bank corporations following a recent report by a trustee committee.

HARVARD FEBRUARY 1978
- divested \$600,000 from Citicorp and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SPRING 1979
- voted to divest from Black and Decker because of the firm's refusal to sign the Sullivan Principles, and banks that lend to South Africa.

SMITH COLLEGE NOVEMBER 1977
- sold \$687,728 worth of stock in Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.

TUFTS MAY 1979
- voted for partial divestment from corporations in South Africa. Tufts also sold \$300,000 worth of stock in Citicorp and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in early 1978.

VASSAR COLLEGE OCTOBER 1978
- sold 2.5 million in stocks and bonds in 5 banks making loans to South Africa.

YALE APRIL 1979
- divested \$1.6 million from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company because of its policy of lending to South Africa.

OTHER ACTIONS

MIAMI UNIVERSITY OF OHIO
- Miami voted for full divestment in April of 1978. The decision involved \$160,000 in two corporations, Union Carbide and Warner Lambert. However the action was rescinded in June 1978 after being challenged by school officials.

ACCESS COMMITTED TO NON-RACIAL SPORT

South Africa claims its sports are integrated in a \$400,000 per year advertising campaign funded by the South African Ministry of Information. Inside South Africa, however, there is no mixed sport at the club level where 99% of all Africans compete. It is for this reason that South Africa has remained excluded from the Olympic Movement since 1970 and has not competed in the Olympic Games since 1960. It is because of its racist sports policies that South Africa has been expelled from or not admitted to the following international sports federations: athletics, basketball, boxing, cycling, soccer, handball, ice hockey, judo, skiing, swimming, volleyball, weightlifting and wrestling. Although a member of the international body, South Africa is banned from international championship competition in fencing, hockey, rowing and tennis.

ACCESS, the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society, is a coalition of 27 national civil rights, religious, political and sports groups that came together in 1976 in an attempt to end all sports contact between the U.S. and South Africa until apartheid is eradicated.

ACCESS encourages concerned citizens to participate in its massive letter-writing campaigns to sports bodies competing with South Africa, individual sportsmen who compete with South Africa, promoters and advertisers of sport with South Africa, and the Administration in Washington.

Further information can be obtained from ACCESS, P.O. Box 518, New York, NY 10025.

REPORT OF COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO
ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES IN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION

The following is excerpted from the "Erasmus Commission" Report, published by the Republic of South Africa.

CHAPTER X

THE STAR PROJECT, DR. MULDER AND THE OUTCOME

A. THE STAR PROJECT

(a) Mr. John McGoff

10.1 Mr. John McGoff, hereinafter referred to as McGoff, a publisher of about 40 medium-sized newspapers in Michigan and a friend of several American politicians, visited South Africa in 1968 at the suggestion of De Villiers. De Villiers described him to the Commission as an Irish American who feels intensely and strongly about the things he believes in. And one of the things in which he believed, according to De Villiers, was that the RSA had a role to play together with the USA, and that as a Western power South Africa should be preserved for the USA. It was these views that prompted McGoff to come to South Africa in 1968 on invitation.

10.2 It was said that during this visit he discovered an affinity with South Africa and her people, which he cultivated further. After that he was regularly in touch with the RSA and did things for South Africa without being paid for them. For instance, when De Villiers requested him to get a message across to the Americans in an article about the Republic, he would simply send the article through to all his editors and say: "Look, this article has to be published" and it would be done.

10.3 In May 1971 Dr. Mulder and Barrie visited the USA (see Barrie's evidence). McGoff was said to have arranged numerous interviews and meetings with important Americans for them without receiving any remuneration. According to De Villiers, McGoff was on very friendly terms with the Jordanian Royal Family and with Israel. He knew President Nixon well and was a personal friend of the then Vice President Ford, to whom he introduced Dr. Mulder in the USA. On occasion, according to the witness, he was invited to the White House by President Carter. He was also a keen supporter of the Republican Party in the USA.

10.4 De Villiers testified that the Arabs had offered McGoff a certain sum of money to buy them a newspaper in the USA. He did not accept it, however, because he did not share their ideologies and would not be able to work with them. According to the witness, McGoff, as a newspaperman, had the gift of turning a newspaper in financial straits into a profitable proposition.

(b) *The RSA decides to buy the Washington Star and shares*

10.5 This is how it came about that in 1974 McGoff indicated that the Washington Star was in financial difficulties and that it could be bought. With his acumen he would be able to turn the newspaper into a more profitable enterprise.

10.6 For understandable reasons such a newspaper in the heart of Washington could, according to De Villiers, do a great deal for South Africa if it had a positive attitude toward the Republic.

10.7 According to the witness, the influence of the Washington Star was not confined to Washington, but extended countrywide. In Washington itself there is another big newspaper, viz The Washington Post, which is very unsympathetic towards the RSA. The New York Times, which is also in circulation in Washington is, according to him, also basically anti-South Africa.

10.8 After the approach by McGoff, the Star project began. De Villiers informed Dr. Rhodie of the circumstances. Dr. Rhodie is said then to have discussed the matter with Dr. Mulder. The witness was told that Dr. Mulder, in his turn, had discussed it with Mr. Vorster (then the Prime Minister) and Dr. Diederichs.

10.9 Mr. Gerald Browne, the then Secretary for Finance, hereinafter referred to as Browne, also testified that Dr. Diederichs had told him that the project had been initiated by Mr. Vorster and Dr. Mulder.

10.10 On 27 April 1979 Mr. Vorster testified that he was aware of the transfer of \$10,000,000 but that he had had nothing to do with it. He stated that Drs. Diederichs and Mulder had discussed the matter with him at the time and that he had then told them that he was completely against it. They had asked him not to stand in the way of their buying the newspaper, and he had promised not to do so, but he had said that they were not to involve ("bemoei") him. He later learned that the purchase of the Washington Star had fallen through.

10.11 The idea of buying the newspaper met with the approval of the Department, and it was initially decided to negotiate with the Union Bank of Switzerland with a view to getting the bank to make a loan to the RSA for that purpose. The late Dr. Diederichs first discussed the possibility of such a loan with the bank in Zurich and later sent De Villiers, Browne and Dr. D.O. Rhodie to Zurich to follow up the matter of a loan.

10.12 The reason why a loan was considered in the first place, was that McGoff told De Villiers he needed about \$25,000,000 for the transaction. He himself could put up about \$15,000,000 and asked that the RSA should contribute the other \$10,000,000.

(c) *Transfer of \$10,000,000*

10.13 In the RSA it was decided that the \$10,000,000 for the purchase of the Washington Star would provisionally come out of the Special Defence Account of the Department of Defence. The project was regarded as top secret, and so large a sum of money could not be provided from the Department's Vote without revealing the existence of the project. Browne was accordingly instructed by the Minister of Finance to make the transfer through the Department of Defence. The amount was transferred to the above-mentioned bank in Zurich at the end of September 1974 and from there it was invested in McGoff's account in the USA.

10.16 According to the deposit agreement, the principal (the Government of the RSA) instructed the agent (Thesaurus) to transfer a sum of \$10,000,000 in the name of the agent "but for the account and at the risk of the principal" to the Star Newspaper Company, Wilmington, Delaware. Later on 30 September 1976, the name of the Star Newspaper Company was changed to Global Communication, and the deposit agreement was amended accordingly.

10.17 Because the project was so sensitive, however, the idea was to channel the funds from Thesaurus to McGoff in such a way that it would appear to be a legal foreign loan. McGoff therefore obtained what may be described as "an interest-free loan" from Thesaurus for \$10 million so that, if it should be required of him, he could furnish proof that he had obtained the "loan" in Switzerland and not from the RSA.

(e) The takeover of the Washington Star falls through

10.20 According to De Villiers's evidence, McGoff informed them from time to time during the first six months about the progress made with the takeover of the newspaper. It appeared that a banker from Texas, a certain Joe Aubritton, was also interested in the newspaper. However, he did not want to buy only the Washington Star, but also the owners' two television stations. The owners were inclined to sell to the banker.

10.21 According to the witness, McGoff alleged that the banker was setting up a monopoly in Washington in contravention of the American law relating to news media, and instituted an action against him with the Federal Communication Commission in Washington to prevent him from achieving his object and purchasing the newspaper together with the television stations. This action was prosecuted with the assistance of a public relations company, Messrs Hill and Nolton. It failed, the banker bought the newspaper, and McGoff had to pay the costs.

(f) McGoff buys the Sacramento Union as a result of a verbal agreement with Dr. Rhoodie

10.23 About a year after it had been decided to buy the Washington Star, and while McGoff was waiting for the outcome of his application for an interdict against Joe Aubritton, he and his legal adviser, Jones, visited Dr. Rhoodie in the Republic.

10.24 At a meeting in the RSA McGoff mooted the possibility of using the interest on the \$10 million and a part of the capital to buy another newspaper, the Sacramento Union, in the capital of California. The purchase price of the Sacramento Union was \$6 million.

10.27 De Villiers testified further that he, Dr. Mulder, Dr. Rhoodie, McGoff and Jones later had discussions on the matter in Montreal on about 30 September 1976. Dr. Rhoodie again made the point that he had never given McGoff approval for the six million dollars or any part of the capital amount of 10 million dollars to be used for the purchase of the Sacramento Union. McGoff thereupon revealed that he had already bought the Sacramento Union and that the entire balance of the 10 million dollars had been invested in the running of the Sacramento Union.

10.32 According to De Villiers, McGoff's actions did not meet with the approval of Dr. Mulder and Dr. Rhoodie, and at the meeting in Montreal it was said that McGoff should sell the Sacramento Union and repay the money. He said that McGoff argued that it could not be done immediately, and asked to be given time to repay the money.

10.34 Several months after the agreement had been reached on 30 September 1976, it was felt that the money was being repaid too slowly. Dr. Rhoodie needed money for other projects, e.g. Annemarie. McGoff, in turn, was involved in a lawsuit which required him to give a full statement of his assets and liabilities. The existence of a foreign loan such as the one with Thesaurus would destroy him politically if it became known. He therefore wanted to sever his financial ties with the RSA.

10.35 McGoff and Dr. Rhoodie then agreed that the former would repay a further \$4,590,000 in cash at that stage. A total of \$4,970,000 was therefore repaid and Dr. Rhoodie and McGoff further agreed, without Treasury approval, to reduce the balance of the loan to \$1,000,000, that is, according to De Villiers, \$5,380,000 of the debt was written off.

10.36 In March 1978 this debt of \$1,000,000 was sold to McGoff's partner, one Zeipprandt, for \$30,000 under a further agreement.

C. THE OUTCOME

(a) A loss

10.54 The outcome of the Star project was that the Department showed a loss of \$6,350,000 on an investment of \$11,350,000, to which must be added:

- i. a further R 400,000 paid over to McGoff for the purchase of UPITV which was not included in the Thesaurus loan agreement;
- ii. costs incurred in the process of purchasing or attempting to sell the Washington Star and UPITV; and
- iii. administrative expenses charged by Thesaurus which, according to calculations, amounted to \$25,000 per annum.

(b) Findings

10.55 The Commission finds it incredible:

- i. that officials of the Department could leave so much money in the hands of McGoff without themselves keeping proper and effective control over the spending of the money;
- ii. that Dr. Rhoodie could agree with McGoff verbally, without the approval of a higher authority, to purchase the Sacramento Union -- a transaction involving upwards of \$6,000,000;
- iii. that the arrangements between the parties were made in such a lax and negligent way that there is no proper documentation describing the transactions in legally correct terms, or clearly showing the circumstances in which it was decided to write off funds;
- iv. that no one knows what happened to the \$6,350,000 that was lost; and
- v. that McGoff as a shareholder is sitting with the Sacramento Union and the UPITV, while there is no clarity as to whether the RSA has any right to these assets.

Membership dues are now due from all ACAS members (old and new)

ACAS membership dues are based on income:

Income under \$10,000 \$10.00
Between \$10,000 - 20,000 \$20.00
Over \$20,000 \$30.00
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Please send dues for 1979/80 to:

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