

The Black American Lobby for Africa and The Caribbean

## THE U.S. AND AFRICA: 1981-1984

As the Reagan administration puts its advisors on U.S. Africa policy in place, TransAfrica's Washington staff is receiving numerous calls from members and others concerned about the likely outlook of the new advisors toward Africa. Commenting on Secretary of State Alexander Haig's first press conference, TransAfrica's Executive Director, Randall Robinson, said "It is already clear that the administration's preoccupation with U.S./Soviet competition for control of resources and political influence will shape the course of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, leaving little room for serious consideration of African objectives." TransAfrica and other black groups, including the Congressional Black Caucus, have maintained that American fortunes in Africa will not suffer from Cuban or Soviet involvement so much as from a lack of a U.S. policy responsive to Africa's priorities of political freedom in southern Africa and economic development throughout Africa.


According to Robinson, "The new cast of foreign policy actors holds little hope for constructive future relations between the U.S. and Africa. Almost across the board they are Globalists in their perspective and biased toward the white minority regime in South Africa."

Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, has wasted no time in establishing a tone of confrontation with the Soviet Union as a basic tenet of future U.S. foreign policy. Haig's limited knowledge of African affairs is one reason TransAfrica fears he will be quick to assign the continent the role of battleground for U.S./Soviet rivalry. Haig served the Nixon/Ford administrations as white house chief of staff after having been a deputy to national security advisor Henry Kissinger. During his tenure at the national security council Haig was a persuasive advocate of the 1972 Christmas bombings of Hanoi. While in the position of NATO Commander from 1975 to 1979, Haig called for


an increased U.S. military deployment throughout the world to act as "deterrent forces" to "illegal intervention" on the part of the Soviets, particularly in the Third World.

On the question of U.S./South Africa relations Haig has suggested that South Africa should be included in a western military alliance against the Soviet Union thus making South Africa an unofficial member of NATO. He believes that possible Soviet activities in mineral rich Southern Africa could trigger a "resource war" which could result in the loss of "90 percent of several key minerals" to the Western world. According to one legislative assistant for TransAfrica, "It is perhaps this concern over access to strategic minerals that allows Haig to elevate the importance of the white minority regime in South Africa well above the world community's concern over political and economic freedom for black South Africans.


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Alexander Haig



Chester Crocker



Richard Allen

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# AFRICA ASKS OF AMERICA: "ARE YOU WITH US OR AGAINST US?"

Excerpts from a speech by Randall Robinson, given at the Department of State, February 3, 1980, on the occasion of Black History Month.

I strongly believe that American relations with Africa will badly deteriorate in the coming years to the mutual detriment of the United States, Africa and the World. I am not yet certain that this course is irreversible. A considerable body of evidence indicates, however, that it may well be. For similar reasons, I believe that race relations within the United States have already begun to deteriorate. By some curious time tested law of socio-political behavior, in periods of economic and strategic trial, those in power, the advantaged, do not listen to outsiders — African outsiders, African-American outsiders, the disadvantaged generally. Outsiders with their grievances left to fester untreated are to be swept from public sight, unseen and unheard, their problems, to the extent that they are described at all, to be described **by those in power, to those in power**, in terms that **comfort those in power**. Such is the stuff of blindness, a formula for sad and costly awakenings.

Already at home, the term **racism** has become unfashionable though the awful social and economic consequences of racism clearly have not. Even blacks speak of it less. The advantaged are tired of it, irritated by the stridency. We have gotten the message. But this pernicious disease continues to erode our cities and rip apart the social fabric of our society. How do the suffering at home and abroad win the constructive attention of those at whose hands in part they suffer? Listen to the voices of America. They seek to salvage us all.

I am often asked if blacks are really interested in foreign policy, "Isn't this a new notion?", they ask. I am always deeply offended by such questions. They demonstrate the extent to which our society has gone to ignore its black holders of a different view. Indeed, this is hardly a new phenomenon. This nation's leaders sought to ignore the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass when he pressed for U.S recognition of the two black independent nations of his time: Haiti and Liberia. American did not heed the urgings of the NAACP Field Secretary, James Weldon Johnson who spared no effort to end

the U.S. military occupation of Haiti in March 1920. Nor were the foreign policy contributions of the Pan-African Congress Movement founder, W.E.B. DuBois, well received in the land of his birth.

Then as now, the general attitude was that blacks should steer clear of foreign policy and concentrate on domestic affairs. In 1914 blacks were denied passports to attend the Pan African and Versailles Conference in Paris to express their views on the disposition of the German colonies in Africa, yet Armenian Americans were permitted to testify at the Peace Conference on the treatment of Armenians after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. The full weight of the Cointelpro Operation fell on the Late Martin Luther King following his Riverside Church speech in 1965 which strongly criticized U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Today there are indefensibly few blacks working inside this building at serious policy levels and those of us from the outside who express our concerns from time to time I dare say are more tolerated than closely listened to.

This is tragic indeed, not only for those not listened to, but more for a nation proceeding in a troubled world without benefit of counsel from a significant segment of its population.

In the last twenty years the significance of Africa has increased enormously in the economic and strategic calculus of the American foreign policy making apparatus. Thirty-eight percent of the United States imported petroleum comes from Africa. Much of the balance of the oil we import from the Middle East travels sea lanes that Africa rests astride. Growth in United States/Africa trade and investment continues impressively with badly needed benefits for a sagging United States economy. From 1970 to 1976 United States exports to Africa tripled in value. It is projected that exports to Africa will increase ten percent annually by 1987 creating in the process some 780,000 additional jobs in the United States. Added to this is an increasing United States dependency on Africa for supplies of minerals vital to our economy and defenses.

Yet given its doubtless importance, Africa has traditionally been seen by United States policy makers through the fogged lens of Soviet designs on penetration. On issues ranging from South Africa's racial policies to the war in Eritrea, never has the United States focused primarily on understanding the often single-minded course of African political, economic and social development and framed its responses accordingly. As a consequence of this, opportunities have too often been lost, policy reverses too frequently suffered, and potential friends squandered because of an American inability to appreciate legitimate African central objectives and the intensity with which objectives are embraced by broad African constituencies.

No issue galvanizes African opinion as does the fundamental affront of South Africa to the entire continent of Africa, indeed to the entire African World. South Africa is the only country in the world where the right to vote is exclusively reserved to one race. Black South Africans may not own land, move within their own country without passes or enjoy other social and political rights ordinarily associated with citizenship. Indeed, South Africa's program of "Separate Development" or Bantustanization deprives blacks of their fundamental right to citizenship.

There are no peaceful avenues to change within South Africa; political opposition by whites and blacks alike is met with arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without charge, banning orders, torture and often death. Under the Internal Security Act of 1976, the Terrorism Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act and the Unlawful Organization Act, the South African Police State has unlimited capacity to control and destroy dissent by blacks and whites alike.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig has remarked recently that the United States will stand firm against terrorism. African leaders will watch American closely to see how firm the new administration will stand against the state terrorism of South Africa. Last

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# ANGOLA: THE BELEAGUERED NATION

*"Has the U.S. any moral or legal justification for her objection to Cuban military intervention in Africa? . . . In a situation where the soldiers of South Africa keep on attacking Angola, President Neto felt free to seek foreign assistance to cope with the aggression. After all, it is because the West sustains the racist regimes in Southern Africa that the frontline states are threatened and therefore required to strengthen their military power."*

— Lagos International Service,  
Nigeria, January 4, 1978

The United States does not recognize the Angolan Government and has no official presence in Angola. The CIA's intervention in Angola in 1975 was very costly for U.S. policy throughout Africa. It severely tarnished the U.S. Image throughout the continent and allied the U.S. on the side of the white minority regime in South Africa. The American insistence on the removal of Cuban troops from Angola as a prerequisite of recognition further eliminated the possibility of a constructive U.S. role in Angola and thus decreased its influence in the region as a whole. The new administration of Ronald Reagan has hinted at the possibility of renewing CIA activities in Angola. According to most Angola analysts such a policy would only be a repeat of past mistakes resulting in an increase in Soviet/Cuban influence in southern Africa, the exact opposite of U.S. objectives in that region. A review of the situation in Angola might help illuminate a more constructive U.S. policy option toward that country.


At the time of independence from Portugal, in November 1975, foreign intervention in Angola was already well established and had done a great deal to further exacerbate existing internal political and military conflicts between the three rival nationalist movements.

Armed struggle for the liberation of Angola began in earnest in 1961 with the emergence of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola). A third movement UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) began a third guerrilla war against the Portuguese in the late 1960's. Open dissension among these groups was a factor in reducing the effectiveness of Angolan nationalists and created an inviting arena for foreign intervention.

The overthrow of the Salazar regime in Portugal in April 1974 led to the Portuguese decision to grant independence to all their

African territories (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe). In January 1975, the Portuguese worked out a complicated agreement (the Alvor Accord) with the three movements in Angola for a transitional government and elections to lead to independence. This tripartite government collapsed in the summer of 1975.

Contrary to the Ford administration's public statements, (which claimed that the American intervention in Angola came after, and in response to, a Soviet initiative) U.S.



covert operations in Angola began in January 1975 when Portugal announced a target date for Angolan independence. The National Security Council's "Forty Committee" on covert intelligence operations decided in January 1975 to provide money and equipment to the FNLA and UNITA. \$300,000 in covert funding was provided to the FNLA that January, although the first reported U.S. assistance for the FNLA was as early as 1962. By mid-summer the U.S. had increased its assistance to the FNLA by \$30 million. The U.S. decision to increase CIA involvement in Angola significantly coincided with a South African plan to intervene militarily. Both the U.S. and South Africa hoped to sustain the FNLA and UNITA and to thwart the growing influence and military strength of the MPLA. While the bulk of U.S. assistance

went to the FNLA by way of Zaire in the north, South Africa was responsible for strengthening UNITA forces in southern Angola, a move also related to South African attempts to thwart and monitor SWAPO movements in the southern Angola region. This U.S./South African strategy was intended to force the MPLA to fight on two fronts simultaneously causing it to relinquish control over areas in the central and southern regions of the country.

Soviet aid to the MPLA increased in March 1975 which was one reason for the U.S./South African expansion of activities that summer. However, it was the South African invasion (beginning in August 1975 and becoming a massive intervention by October 1975) carried out in cooperation with the CIA and UNITA, which precipitated the introduction of large numbers of Cuban troops and Soviet arms into Angola. And it was this "unholy" alliance with South Africa that discredited UNITA and helped the MPLA achieve legitimacy as the sole governing body in Angola. Nothing has more legitimized the Cuban presence in Angola than this South African aggression in 1975 and the continuing attacks that South Africa has systematically launched against Angola with little respite since their supposed withdrawal in March 1976.

The secret war being waged by the U.S. in Angola was not revealed to the Congress until the fall of 1975, whereupon Senator Richard Clark and Congressman Charles Diggs, chairpersons of the respective Congressional Africa subcommittees in the Senate and House of Representatives, held hearings on Angola, publicly airing the details. By January 1976 both chambers of Congress had voted to adopt the Clark Amendment which cut off funding for CIA operations in Angola, and prohibited any CIA activity there without explicit Congressional approval.

By March 1976 the MPLA had defeated  
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# U.S. AID TO AFRICA THREATENED

By Mark Wenner

David Stockman, the Director of OMB, plans to reduce the Carter FY 82 aid budget of \$8 billion to \$5.47 billion, advocating among many things:

- a greater emphasis on direct economic and security assistance to friendly governments.
- revocation of \$3.24 billion pledge to the International Development Association (IDA), a multilateral organization that provides low-interest loans to the poorest countries of the world.
- revocation of a three year pledge to the African Development Bank, an organization strapped for loanable funds.
- cutting the Peace Corp budget by 25%.
- eliminating P.L. 480 Title I, a program that sells surplus grain.
- refusal to support real increases in contributions and eliminate voluntary contributions to a host of U.N. and other multilateral organizations concerned with health, educational, technological and agricultural issues in the Third World.

By stressing short-term political and strategic interests, Stockman is charged with displaying alarming naivete. He has calculated the cost of these reductions and reallocation of funds as the "loss in influence in countries of lesser importance."

As for the probable impact on recipient countries, he has deemed it negligible since much previous aid was "ineffective", unresponsive to "U.S. political priorities", supportive of "state planning efforts" and "income redistribution", instead of market-oriented development. Contrary to Stockman's reasoning the U.S. cannot withdraw and safely pursue selfish goals. His proposals would effectively scuttle aid as a foreign policy tool, consign the poorest countries to a grim future, heighten the possibility of armed conflict in several regions, and destroy U.S. credibility as a responsible world leader. If these proposals are sanctioned, a prominent World Bank official feels the prospects for a stable and prosperous world order are indeed dimmed.

With scrutiny, Stockman's arguments seem specious. U.S. aid programs have not

achieved momentous results yet some progress has been made in improving educational institutions, infrastructure, health care, and agricultural practices despite historically low appropriations. Although the U.S. is the richest country in the world, it ranks thirteenth on a list of seventeen donor countries, devoting .27% of GNP in 1978 to foreign assistance inspite of a pledge to contribute 1% of GNP. In the same year Americans spent more money on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, sports, travel, jewelry, and beauty care than on foreign aid. Moreover, how much fat can be trimmed in programs accounting for less than 1% of the Federal budget? Lastly, while the Carter increases would have largely offset inflation, this budget proposal would entail real decreases.

More specifically, these proposals grievously affect sub-Saharan Africa, an area with 27 of the 38 poorest countries. In regard to the IDA, unless Stockman relents, it may either collapse since the European donors would in all likelihood renege as well, or if the rumored compromise is struck (one calling for extending the payment period from 3 to 6 years) the other donor countries will probably follow suit, reducing the paid-in monies 50% below the original pledge. Presuming the latter course of action, lending activities will be sharply curtailed at a most critical time. At present Africa faces growing food deficits, soaring oil import bills, refugee problems, droughts, epidemic diseases, inadequate transportation networks, unsafe water supplies, and a dearth of technical expertise. With the exception of Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Senegal all the other sub-Saharan countries are heavy IDA borrowers. The alternatives for the "least developed" countries of Asia and Africa are stark. First, they are poor credit risks for private commercial banks, Second, The World Bank, customarily a lender to middle-income countries, will also be forced to reduce concessional outlays if U.S. breaches its commitment to double its capital subscription. Denied sources of long-term financial assistance, these countries' planning cycles will be disrupted and be ever more prone to the caprices of external actors and events.

African programs for the Peace Corps and A.I.D. which in recent years have increased the percentage of funds and personnel allocated to the region and focused on basic human needs, especially agricultural development, will be dealt a great setback. Furthermore, of the three major regional development banks, Stockman takes special aim at the African one. His initiative if sustained could jeopardize the future of the bank. The other two, the Asian and the Inter-American, would be slated for sharp reductions two or three years hence. Lastly, the P.L. 480 program despite its spotty history of corruption and discouragement of local production, does provide short term budgetary relief for governments facing grain shortages.

To informed sources Stockman appears to view Africa as having little importance. However, the facts do not support him. Africa has significant economic and diplomatic power. In the U.N., the 45 sub-Saharan countries in concert with other Third World nations constitute an overwhelming majority on the floor of the General Assembly. On the economic front, sub-Saharan Africa is a treasure trove of natural resources — oil, copper, bauxite, diamonds, cobalt, uranium, gold, zinc, phosphates, chrome, and columbium. Africa supplies the U.S. with 40% of its oil imports, accounting in large for the running U.S.-Africa trade deficits dating back to 1972. In 1977 this deficit amounted to \$6.7 billion and in 1978 to \$9.9 billion. Also from 1970 to 1976 U.S. exports to Africa have tripled in value. At present, exports to the continent are increasing at a rate of 10% per annum and by 1987 some 780,000 additional U.S. jobs will be generated in the process. In addition, Stockman overlooks the sizeable dollar infusions into the U.S. economy from foreign assistance whether through multilateral or bilateral channels. For example, A.I.D. in its Congressional Presentation for FY 81 estimated that 70% of its expenditures went for the purchase of American goods and services. Multilateral institutions likewise procure large amounts of U.S. capital goods. When these figures are taken into account the real transfers of

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## RECENT EVENTS

- On Saturday May 30, 1981 at 7:00 PM, TransAfrica will host its Fourth Annual Benefit Dinner at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Bishop Desmond Tutu, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, will be the guest speaker. Bishop Tutu, whose organization represents over 15 million South Africans, has been for years one of South Africa's leading black advocates for freedom. As a consequence, nearly a year ago, the South African government forbade him to travel abroad. Only recently has his passport been returned to him. Over 2000 guests are expected for this year's dinner at \$75 per plate.
- The memberships of the Congressional Subcommittees on Africa for the 97th Congress are as follows:  
**Senate:** Nancy Kassebaum (Chairperson/Rep-KS); Jesse Helms (Rep-NC); S.I. Hayakawa (Rep-CA); Charles Mathias (Rep-MD); Paul Tsongas (Dem-MA); John Glenn (Dem-OH); Chris Dodd (Dem-CT);  
**House of Representatives:** Howard Wolpe (Chairperson/Dem-MI); George Crockett (Dem-MI); Steve Solarz (Dem-NY); Gerry Studds (Dem-MA); Dennis Eckart (Dem-OH); William Goodling (Rep-PA); Arlen Erdahl (Rep-MN); Olympia Snowe (Rep-ME); Robert Dornan (Rep-CA).
- From January 8-12, TransAfrica Executive Director Randall Robinson, attended the African American Institute Conference in Sierra Leone. Mr. Robinson chaired the closed plenary session on Namibia at the conference.
- Mark Wenner has joined the staff of TransAfrica as a legislative assistant for economic affairs. Mr. Wenner is a recent graduate of the University of Notre Dame where he completed his masters in economics.
- In mid-February 25 black churches in major cities across the country received and posted Anti-Apartheid signs in their church yards as part of a national campaign to end U.S. support of South Africa. The cities are: Atlanta, Washington, Gary, St. Louis, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Chicago, Cleveland, Birmingham, Newark, Boston, Norfolk, Nashville, Pittsburgh, Jacksonville, Bridgeport, Detroit, Indianapolis, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Baltimore and Richmond. If you would like to order a sign for your organization or institution please call Dolores Clemons of our staff at 202/223-9666.

## BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS TAKE STAND ON SOUTH AFRICA

In response to a recent TransAfrica request, 70 black mayors and state legislators in twenty-five states have agreed to introduce legislation calling for the divestment of public monies from financial institutions and companies doing business with the Republic of South Africa. This swift and broad response encouragingly exceeds the lobby organization's initial expectations.

TransAfrica officials hope that this national legislation campaign combined with the END U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA sign campaign (see TransAfrica News Report, Fall 1980) will demonstrate clearly to the Reagan administration and to the nation the depth of Afro-American commitment to the cause of freedom in South Africa.

## To the Editor:

Recent news of South African attacks on Mozambique and Angola appall me especially in light of Secretary of State Haig's avowal to make the combat of "international terrorism" a foreign policy priority. So far, I have neither seen nor heard any vehement condemnations of South Africa's brazen terrorist actions by the State Department.

The word terrorist only seems to conjure up images of motley, extremist, underground bands victimizing innocent people. For instance, this label has been given to the PLO and SWAPO. However, when Israel or South Africa attack refugee camps, slaughter women and children, torture suspects, or invade recognized countries such as Lebanon and Angola the Western press and government officials seem strangely timorous and reluctant to criticize.

When will this hypocrisy cease?

Carolyn Lane  
Chicago, IL

TransAfrica welcomes letters from readers. We would like to hear your views on U.S.-Africa/Caribbean issues. Letters to the Editor for publication must include the writer's name, address and telephone number.

## ACTION ALERTS

Write, call or send telegrams to President Ronald Reagan and tell him that:

- The United States must use every measure to pressure South Africa to accept a speedy implementation of the United Nations Security Council plan for the independence of Namibia through democratic elections. At the January all parties Geneva conference in Namibia, South Africa refused SWAPO's offer for a ceasefire preceding elections and has continued its illegal military occupation of Namibia.

NOTE: Please respond immediately. Your involvement may mean the difference between a protracted war and independence for Namibia.

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## U.S./AFRICA: 1981-1984 (cont'd. from page 1)

Or perhaps it is the racial attitude of General Haig that brings him to this ill-fated conclusion." On this point Roger Morris, a former NSC staffer, provides some insight to Haig's character in his book on Henry Kissinger entitled **Uncertain Greatness**, when he reveals that, "To the amusement of Kissinger and his colleagues, Colonel Haig would quietly pretend to beat drums on the table as African affairs were brought up at NSC staff meetings."

Working under Haig as the assistant secretary for Africa at the State Department will be Chester Crocker, the former African Studies Director at Georgetown's Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). Crocker was the author of the State Department transition team's paper on Africa which severely criticized the Carter administration's Africa Bureau for developing policies based on "dubious premises" and for being unwilling to compete with the Soviet Union for influence on the continent.

Haig and Crocker are old acquaintances. Crocker was an NSC staff assistant during Haig's tenure as deputy national security advisor and both men had offices at CSIS during the summer of 1979 when Haig was considering running for the presidency. Georgetown's CSIS was the source of most of President Reagan's foreign and defense advisors during the campaign and transition period. The CSIS is well known for its conservative academics who share the Globalist view of the new administration.

Crocker has written a great deal about Southern Africa and Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa. His favorite themes are; Securing southern Africa from further Soviet penetration; supporting the South Africa backed UNITA movement in Angola; expanding South African economic preponderance throughout the entire Southern African region and increasing western investment in and contact with South Africa ostensibly to "promote attitudinal changes and the opening up of social and economic relations" between white and black South Africans.

Another key person in the development of U.S. Africa policy will be the new head of the NSC, Richard Allen. Allen helped to establish Georgetown's CSIS in the early 1960's. He was also a top Nixon advisor during former President Nixon's first term. In 1973 and 1974 Allen was a lobbyist for the

Overseas Companies of Portugal, representing Portuguese interests in Angola and Mozambique. In this capacity Allen promoted U.S. investment in these two Portuguese colonies. Following the Wiriyamu massacre in Mozambique during this period Allen claimed that it "never did occur" and that it was a "Czech disinformation report". The massacre was fully reported by the British **Sunday Times** and further confirmed by a five-member United Nations team. Allen's demonstrated sympathy to white rule in Southern Africa and his posture as a seasoned Cold Warrior further indicates that the theme of East-West confrontation will be the major, if not exclusive, context in which African issues are evaluated.

The first African item on the new administration's agenda is the question of Namibia. (See TransAfrica News Report, Fall 1980) A recent all-parties conference held in Geneva in mid-January failed to get a South African agreement to a cease-fire in this 14 year old war between the occupying forces of South Africa and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). The Geneva conference, which was convened at the request of South Africa, was intended to allay South African suspicions about the impartiality of the U.N. allowing for a cease-fire after which supervised elections could take place bringing about a peaceful transition to majority rule in Namibia. Both South Africa and SWAPO accepted an international agreement (of which the U.S. and four other western nations were sponsors) to end the conflict in 1978, but South Africa has been stalling on the implementation of that plan ever since. With the collapse of the Geneva conference there is some doubt as to the future of the western settlement plan and most observers view the Reagan administration's response as being a determining factor. Knowledgeable observers see Reagan's choices to be clear. "Continue to support the Western plan which would give a clear signal to South Africa that they have nothing to gain from the west by continuing to stall, or reverse direction and abandon the western plan in favor of a South African designed internal settlement which would undermine all current positive U.S./Africa relations and might invoke a Nigerian oil embargo against the U.S., as well as alienate our western allies who are still seeking an early settle-

ment.

It is interesting to note that Marion Smoak, a registered Washington foreign agent for the existing South African designated government in Namibia, served on Reagan's State Department transition team. As a lobbyist for the South African cause, Smoak has been trying to convince members of Congress that SWAPO is a "Marxist terrorist organization". Whether or not Smoak has any influence with Reagan on this matter is unknown.

Reagan will have to take a stand on Namibia in the very near future. The United States' western allies have already indicated that if South Africa remains intransigent they may be willing to impose a time limit on South Africa and should that deadline expire they would not block a resolution in the U.N. imposing sanctions against South Africa.

The new administration's approach to Angola has thus far been to hold to the well established position that "We won't recognize the Angolan Government so long as there are 20,000 or 18,000 Cuban mercenaries within their borders." Many of Reagan's advisors as well as the President himself have stated publicly that they support Jonas Savimbi's anti-government UNITA forces and would like to see the Clark Amendment repealed which prohibits U.S. covert activities in that country. But it is clear that U.S. support for UNITA would be another source of friction with America's allies. It would also probably disrupt U.S./Nigerian relations and play into Soviet and Cuban hands increasing their involvement there. (For fuller discussion of the situation in Angola, see article on page 3). Informed sources on the Hill indicate that U.S. policy toward South Africa is likely to be very similar to that pursued by Richard Nixon as outlined by Henry Kissinger: Closer ties to South Africa combined with aid policies to the rest of Africa intended to lessen their criticism. In fact, former President Jimmy Carter cannot be said to have ventured far from this course either, despite his human rights rhetoric and condemnation of Apartheid. In a campaign interview with the editors of **Jet** magazine Reagan also condemned Apartheid as "repugnant" but added that he would maintain relations with South Africa "to be of help there." Reagan

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## "WITH US OR AGAINST US?" (cont'd. from page 2)

week South Africa military forces invaded Mozambique marauding to within sight of the capitol Maputo killing a still undetermined number of South African refugees. Has our nation stood firm against this? Last year as African Heads of State met in Freetown, Sierra Leone, South African forces massively invaded Southern Angola. Hundreds of Namibians and Angolans had died at the hands of South Africa before this invasion; many more during it and more still since. South African bombers fly over Southern Angola day and night. In Mungo, every building has been bombed, from the hospital to two schools and a church. The roads of southern Angola are lined with the burned out carcasses of trucks that once carried food to starving people in the South. How firm has our nation stood against this terrorism?

Though it may never be broadly understood across this land, the African question to America is simple. They ask: "Will America stand with Africa for equitable democracy and simple justice in South Africa and Namibia or will America stand with white South Africa in a futile attempt to slam shut the gates to Freedom?" Let us not delude ourselves. It would be foolish to eclipse it with preoccupations about Soviet penetration, Cuban troops and the like. Africa wants to know whether we are with them or against them. Worry less about our susceptibility to communism they tell us, worry more about our request for those universal benefits of freedom so many through history have fought and died for.

The Reagan Administration will have opportunities soon to begin to answer Africa's question. These responses no doubt will go far to shape the future of U.S./Africa relations. The Namibia diplomacy has failed because South Africa fears that democratic elections conducted under United Nations observation would bring the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization to power. Over the last four years SWAPO, has made every conceivable concession in an attempt to end a long and bloody war and get on with the implementation of the United Nations Security Council's plan for the independence of Namibia. No one disputes that South Africa alone has stalled this carefully crafted process. No one disputes either that South Africa expects the United States to sustain their intransigence. Africa

asks of us: "Are you with us or against us? No dissembling please." I challenge our government today to answer the question. Will the United States commit itself to stand publicly and unequivocally behind essentially what is its own plan for the independence of Namibia?

The United States does not recognize Angola. Virtually every African government has diplomatic relations with Angola. Most of them have encouraged our government to follow suit. Great Britain, France, West Germany — all have established embassies in Luanda. Though American businesses are there and thriving, our nation remains alone in the west in the withholding of recognition. Last May, Candidate Ronald Reagan told the **Wall Street Journal** that he would provide Jonas Savimbi with "weapons" to assist UNITA in its attempt to overthrow the Angolan government. UNITA is allied with South Africa. American support for UNITA means American support for South Africa. We are told that the United States does not recognize Angola because Cuban troops are there. The reasoning here is tortured. Indeed Soviet troops are in the Soviet Union and we recognize the Soviet Union. He can we recognize the sovereign blight of South Africa and withhold it from an Angola being occupied by South Africa? In September testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Gerald Bender asked, "Can any member of our government guarantee this Sub-committee or the Angolans for that matter that if the Cubans were to be withdrawn, South Africa would not greatly increase its attacks against Angola in an attempt to bring down the MPLA government?" Africa asks its question again to us: "On this burning issue of South Africa, are you with us or against us?"

There is growing support in America for those in South Africa who've struggled so long for freedom. A national poll conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on March 16, 1979, found Americans to believe the United States should "Do Something" to get South Africa to change its system, with a plurality favoring a range of activities including trade restrictions. Surely change is inevitable. The very logic and sweep of African history places certain matters beyond dispute: That Black South Africans will settle for nothing less than one person-one vote in a unitary

South Africa and that this objective will be achieved within 30 years with or without American support.

I urge our new national leadership, for the good of America, Africa and the world to listen closely to African voices that tell us where Africa must and will go. Those who counsel that Angola will fall are wrong. Angola will neither fall nor be compromised. Those who counsel that South Africa can hold out in Namibia and at home are wrong. Namibia will achieve an unqualified independence in the near future and South Africa will be transformed in my lifetime.

Listen to African voices that tell us where Africa must and will go. They ask: "Are you with us or against us?" I urge our new leadership to answer rightly. It is the only basis for any future American friendship with Africa.

*Randall Robinson is the Executive Director of TransAfrica.*

## REAGAN (cont'd. from page 6)

further commented that he felt the current problems there "are not so much racial as they are tribal."

The more knowledgeable Crocker is likely to be the chief architect of U.S./South Africa policy. Crocker describes himself as an 'objective moderate' on the issue of South Africa and will probably label U.S. policy toward South Africa as "communications for change." Under such a policy the U.S. will continue and in fact increase economic and strategic collaboration with the white minority regime. Crocker believes that reforms such as those initiated by Prime Minister P.W. Botha should be rewarded by the U.S. and that official anti-apartheid rhetoric should be curtailed. He also feels that domestic groups in the U.S. that are calling for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa should not be allowed to impact upon U.S. policy. Crocker views South Africa as an integral part of the western world and the most important U.S. market in Africa. He is dissatisfied with talk of "full political participation" for blacks in South Africa and also questions the value of the arms embargo against South Africa.

Some possible consequences of the expected U.S. tilt toward South Africa are: the ending of U.S. participation in the arms embargo against South Africa; resumption of

(cont'd. on page 8)

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## AID TO AFRICA (cont'd. from page 4)

resources to the Third World are a pittance.

Many may ask what gravity should be attached to these proposals given this is the first step in a long process with many actors. Many Washington bureaucrats and political pundits interpret Stockman's extreme proposals as a clever maneuver designed to gain superior bargaining strength. So far his stratagem seems to have worked. Stockman is dead serious on reducing government spending and the best the liberal voices can hope for is to restore last years funding levels. To TransAfrica, Stockman's proposals seem to be the first manifestations of an "America First" foreign policy, one animated by Cold War perceptions and blatant strategic and corporate short run interests.

## REAGAN (cont'd. from page 7)

U.S. exports of nuclear fuel to South Africa; closer U.S./South Africa intelligence collaboration and the recognition of Bantustans (the so-called independent homelands for ethnic groupings of black South Africans made up of 13% of the least productive land).

Such a tilt toward South Africa would be an open repudiation of concerns expressed repeatedly by Africans, Afro-Americans and others about the rightward direction of U.S. policy.

## ANGOLA (cont'd. from page 3)

the FNLA and UNITA/South African armies in conventional combat and established control over most of Angola.

Several African countries had recognized the MPLA government in Angola as early as November and December of 1975, and by the end of February 1976 the majority of the OAU's member-states, the EEC countries, Portugal and some 50 other countries had recognized the MPLA government. In November 1976 Angola was admitted to the United Nations after the U.S. finally backed down from its threat to veto Angola's application for membership.

Over the past four years, since the confirmation of the MPLA government in Angola, the United States has pursued an opposite course toward Angola than that of its European allies. The U.S. still speaks of "the removal of all Cuban troops" as a precondition for diplomatic recognition, while Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and others

have established embassies in Luanda and are happily expanding their economic ties with the government there.

Last fall the sub-committee on Africa of the House of Representatives held a series of hearings to examine "the current political and economic situation in Angola and its implications for American foreign policy." The hearings included testimony from a broad range of businesses, government agencies and private individuals concerned with U.S. policy toward Angola. The business community as well as academic specialists on Angola supported normalization of relations with Luanda on the grounds of lucrative investment opportunities with a government that "has generally been responsive and supportive as a business partner", and because normalization would enhance the U.S. position as an "honest broker" in negotiations on the question of Namibia as well as any possible negotiations on the current civil strife in Angola itself.

There is good reason to believe that the Carter administration would have recognized the MPLA government had it not feared the domestic political repercussions of being seen to accommodate a Soviet/Cuban fait accompli. Thus the Cuban presence issue was emphasized and continues to be emphasized by the Reagan administration as the real obstacle to normalization.

Angola has hardly any trade with the Eastern bloc countries and has refused to join the trade group of the Soviet Union and its satellites, Comecon. It is clear that the Angolan government wants increased trade with the west as well as improved political relations. The Angolan government has supported the "Western Five's" efforts to achieve an internationally acceptable solution in Namibia, and has publicly stated that such a solution would facilitate the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. It is Angola's support of Namibian nationalists that continues to make them the victim of massive South African assaults, severely damaging the infrastructure in southern Angola and tying up resources badly needed for Angola's economic reconstruction, an undertaking delayed largely because of the near war footing into which South Africa has forced the Luanda Government.

According to a recent TransAfrica study on U.S./Angola relations, "If President Reagan wishes to see the Cuban military presence in

southern Africa decreased or ended, he should make every attempt to ensure an early settlement is reached on Namibian independence." The report further argues that, "If (Reagan) would like to see Angola move further from Soviet influence he would be wise to normalize relations with Luanda and help Angolans decrease their dependence on the eastern bloc.

In conclusion the Angola study recommends that, "The administration's development of a coherent and realistic southern Africa policy should try to avoid a blinding preoccupation with what the Soviets are doing in the area and respond more forthrightly to clear African priorities. Though the U.S. has publicly condemned apartheid for a long time, it has more steadfastly refused to take any meaningful steps either to compel change or to disengage itself from profitable trading relations in South Africa and Namibia, thereby strengthening the oppressive capacity of the South African regime. President Reagan must choose the side of South Africa or the side of the Africans. Recognition of the established government in Angola and expansion of trade relations with Angola as well as continued and increased economic assistance to Zimbabwe and Mozambique would be the positive way to ensure U.S. influence in the region. It would further enable America to secure its economic and strategic interests, maintain good relations throughout the continent and gain some legitimacy in the region on the issue of change within South Africa. These actions, coupled with a successful resolution of the Namibia conflict, would help assure the U.S. of good relations with the black majority in South Africa that will inevitably come to power."

The Angolans, in any case, have continued to send signals to the U.S. indicating their willingness to normalize relations and to continue to support the western plan for a settlement in Namibia despite South African obstinance.

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*EDITOR'S NOTE: South African aggression against Angola in the last three years has left 3,000 dead, 3,000 injured and 7,000 million dollars worth of damage. Between 1978 and 1980 South Africa had carried out 1,400 reconnaissance flights over Angolan territory, 290 bombardments, and 50 troop landings.*

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