

# COALITION

For a New Foreign and Military Policy

120 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington D.C., 20002  
(202) 546-8400

Dear friend,

The Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy unites 47 national organizations around the issues of human rights, disarmament and budget priorities.

In response to the Reagan Administration's interventionist foreign policy, we launched a Campaign Against U.S. Intervention. We are writing to you as part of our Campaign to network with key grassroots organizations that work on foreign policy issues. For the present, these include groups that organize around U.S. policy toward Central America and southern Africa.

In the upcoming months we will produce a major critique on Reagan's foreign policy and we will continue to produce our LEGISLATIVE UPDATE which follows any legislative initiatives concerning present and possible areas of intervention. The UPDATE includes information on important House and Senate committee and floor votes and Administration action.

We have included LEGISLATIVE UPDATES # 5,8,12 and Supplement A. The most recent Close-Up, the Coalition's quarterly newsletter, is also included.

If your group would like to receive the LEGISLATIVE UPDATE or any Coalition materials on a regular basis, please send in the enclosed coupon or just write the Coalition. Please include the phone number of the key contact in your organization and complete the enclosed questionnaire.

Sincerely,

*Mark R. Shanahan Bob Stix*

Mark Shanahan  
Field Director

Bob Stix  
South African Program

The following are members of the Coalition: American Friends Service Committee • Americans for Democratic Action • Business Executives Move for New National Priorities • Center for International Policy • Center of Concern • Chile Legislative Center • Church of the Brethren, Washington Office • Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) Department of Church in Society • Church Women United • Clergy and Laity Concerned • Council on Hemispheric Affairs • Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee • Episcopal Peace Fellowship • Fellowship of Reconciliation • Friends Committee on National Legislation • Friends of the Filipino People • Jubilee, Inc./The Other Side • Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Peace Section • Movement for a Free Philippines • National Assembly of Women Religious • National Association of Social Workers • National Council of Churches • National Federation of Priests' Councils, USA • National Gray Panthers • National Office of Jesuit Social Ministries • NETWORK • SANE • Union of American Hebrew Congregations • Unitarian Universalist Association • United Church of Christ, Board for Homeland Ministries • United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society • United Methodist Church, Board of Church and Society, Division of World Peace • United Methodist Church, Board of Global Ministries, Women's Division • United Presbyterian Church, USA, Washington Office • United States Student Association • War Resisters League • Washington Office of the Episcopal Church • Washington Office on Africa • Washington Office on Latin America • Women's International League for Peace and Freedom • Women Strike for Peace • World Federalists Association • World Peacemakers • Young Women's Christian Association of the U.S.A.

# Campaign Against U.S. Intervention

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## Legislative Update

COALITION FOR A NEW FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY  
120 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-8400

June 1, 1981

### Clark Amendment Compromised

#### SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ADOPTS COMPROMISE ON CLARK AMENDMENT

On May 13th, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) voted 12-2 to repeal the Clark Amendment, but set conditions for sending military aid to any group in Angola. The vote came one day after the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 19-5 to retain the Clark Amendment, maintaining Congress' authority over sending military or paramilitary aid to any faction in Angola.

The debate in the Senate committee opened when Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), chairwoman of the Africa Subcommittee, offered an amendment that any expenditure for military or paramilitary operations abroad which are also intelligence activities would have to be reported to the SFRC by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Kassebaum's amendment would have repealed the Clark Amendment and made an existing practice law. By her action, Kassebaum clearly showed she is willing to do the Administration's bidding on issues affecting southern Africa.

Paul Tsongas (D-MA) offered a substitute amendment to retain the Clark Amendment. He made four basic arguments: 1. Paulo Jorge, foreign minister of Angola, recently stated publically that the Cubans will leave Angola when there is a resolution of the Namibian issue; 2. Black African states consider repeal "a message, a signal, that we are going to become interventionist in Angola"; 3. The Angolans are not going to let the Cubans go if a possibility of U.S. support to Savimbi exists; 4. U.S. based corporations such as Gulf, Texaco, Chase Manhattan, and General Tire are arguing for recognition of Angola and against repeal of the Clark Amendment because of their good working relations with that government.

Knowing that the Democrats were solidly united behind Tsongas, and that an up or down vote would have retained the Clark Amendment, Chairman Charles Percy (R-IL), urged Kassebaum to withdraw her amendment thus dropping the Tsongas substitute along with it.

Percy then offered an amendment to repeal the Clark Amendment with language stating repeal should not be construed as endorsement by Congress of aid to any factions in Angola. The amendment requires that prior to any aid, the President must report to both foreign affairs committees: 1. a detailed statement of reasons for the aid; 2. the amounts and categories of aid and identity of the recipient; and 3. take into account U.S. interests in Angola and in other African countries in determining whether such aid is in the U.S. national interest.

Although Tsongas knew he had the votes to retain the Clark Amendment, he opted to offer an addition to Percy's amendment which would require a Presidential determination that substantial progress, including an effective ceasefire and preparations for internationally supervised elections, has been made in Namibia, and that provision of such assistance will not impair prospects for an internationally acceptable Namibia settlement.

Percy accepted this addition. Those voting for the Percy-Tsongas amendment: Percy, Baker, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those voting against: Kassebaum and Hayakawa. Absent: Helms, Lugar, and Mathias.

Interpretations of the committee action vary. The next day the New York Times headline read: "Senate Panel Softens Ban on Aid to Rebels in Angola," while the Washington Post headline read: "Senators Vote to Help Angolan Anti-Marxists."

Tsongas compromised in order to go to the floor with a united committee decision. However, even though the Democrats won Percy to their side, the Republicans are still divided, with Kassebaum clearly against the amendment. Helms was conspicuously absent from the mark-up so he can operate as a free agent on the floor. Furthermore, the Administration is clearly not satisfied. Alvin Drischler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, stated: "Our position is repeal the Clark Amendment, period."

The vote on the Senate floor is expected sometime in late June or mid-July. Although our attention will be focused mainly on the House to insure that the House Foreign Affairs Committee vote is upheld on the floor, it is also important to support Senate Democrats who will try to preserve the Percy-Tsongas compromise on the Senate floor. The message to the Senate is: do not repeal the Clark Amendment, but at the very least, vote against any amendments to weaken the Percy-Tsongas compromise. It is crucial that the House and Senate go into the conference committee with the strongest possible language against U.S. intervention in Angola.

# Argument & Response

**ARGUMENT:** The Reagan Administration is indeed committed to a political solution to the conflict in El Salvador.

**RESPONSE:** On May 2nd, the State Department issued a statement regarding a "negotiated settlement" for El Salvador which said: "If what is meant by 'negotiation' or 'negotiated settlement' is the establishment of a government in El Salvador by negotiation, we oppose it because it does not allow the people of El Salvador to choose their own leaders in a fair and open election."

This announcement goes hand-in-hand with the United States' unconditional support of Salvadorean Vice-President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Col. Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, in his renunciation - on behalf of the Salvadorean Army High Command - of any offer of outside mediation. A mediation proposal was proffered by the Social Democratic parties of Western Europe and to which Mexico and Venezuela were willing to "lend their good offices", and which had been accepted by the opposition coalition, the Democratic Revolutionary Front; the proposal was rejected by Gutierrez on May 6th.

If the concept of international mediation is rejected and the concept of an "electoral process" is being pursued, the natural question is: Who is going to [be allowed to] run for election? The answer is ominous considering the fact that at the end of March the Salvadorean Armed Forces published a 138-name "traitor's list", the majority of whom, according to Amnesty International, are described as priests, human rights activists, university rectors and former members of the Salvadorean government (since October 15, 1979). This list was never seen by President Duarte prior to being publically published and does not contain one single name of anyone on the so-called extreme right, not even the infamous Major D'Aubuisson, who has twice attempted right-wing coups.

On May 1st, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-OR) sent a letter to Secretary of State Haig stating that the Department of State's lack of concern over this "death list" raises serious questions regarding the Administration's willingness to encourage and facilitate negotiations:

"What does it say of the U.S.'s interest in a negotiable peace in El Salvador if the U.S. fails to protest a list which contains the names of probable negotiators? How does it reflect on the President's admirable anti-terrorist policy when the individuals slated for death reside both in Mexico, a friend and ally of the United States, and the U.S. itself?

I fear that this development can only lead one to conclude that the U.S. is not genuinely committed to pursuing a peaceful settlement to the crisis in El Salvador. Certainly, our allies and our neighbors in the Hemisphere would draw such a conclusion.

I think I can safely speak for a significant number of Senators from both parties in stating that failure to take such actions will make it increasingly difficult for Congress to justify the approval of pending or future requests for military aid to El Salvador."

U.S. policy-makers must be made to understand that there is no political solution to the conflict in El Salvador until the opposition is brought into the process -- and that does not mean accepting terms dictated by the Salvadorean Armed Forces -- and that conditions necessary for achieving peace can only be reached through a process of negotiation.

To deny or thwart even the prospect or attempt at negotiation - as the U.S. has done thus far - is to deny a political solution: it is a policy aimed at prolonging the war, indeed of escalating it, as a military victory - by one side or the other - becomes the only "alternative."

**TIMELINE FOR ACTION:** Mid-to-late June: 1) Floor votes in the House and Senate on the Fiscal Year 1982 Foreign Aid Authorizations Bill. ELIMINATE THE \$26 MILLION IN MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR. MAINTAIN THE CLARK AMENDMENT ON ANGOLA. 2) House Foreign Operations Subcommittee begins mark-up of the FY 82 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill. Eliminate or reduce the \$26 million in military aid for El Salvador.

The Coalition believes that U.S. foreign policy should be built upon the foundation of non-intervention, peaceful resolution of conflict and respect for the right of self-determination. We have launched the Campaign Against U.S. Intervention to help mobilize public opinion against the use of military force, actual or threatened, as a tool of our nation's foreign policy.

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# Campaign Against U.S. Intervention

# #8

## Legislative Update

COALITION FOR A NEW FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY  
120 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-8400

July 13, 1981

### Clark Amendment

U.S. military intervention in Southern Africa is being considered a serious possibility by the Reagan Administration. President Reagan has requested the repeal of the Clark Amendment in the FY 82 Foreign Aid Authorizations Bill. Passed in 1976 following revelations of massive CIA paramilitary involvement in the Angolan civil war, the Clark Amendment prohibits direct or indirect covert military assistance to any party in Angola without Congressional authorization. This summer, the full House and Senate will consider the administration's request. Should Congress decide to repeal the Clark Amendment, it will be giving Reagan a free hand to militarily intervene in Angola.

Repeal of the Clark Amendment would cause serious foreign policy repercussions. It would have devastating consequences for U.S. relations with independent Africa, identify the United States with South African military aggression in Southern Africa, and severely damage prospects for a settlement in Namibia.

Below are some of these arguments in greater detail:

- Repeal of the Clark Amendment will severely damage U.S. relations with independent Africa. African countries have responded quickly and vigorously to oppose the Reagan Administration's policy reversal on Angola. Representatives of African governments at the United Nations issued a statement on March 24 saying that repeal of the Clark Amendment would have "dangerous consequences." President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, whose country is the second largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States, warned that "if the U.S. is willing to support rebels in a sovereign African nation, it would be extremely serious." In a statement on April 15, the group of six Southern African Frontline states—Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, and Angola—called repeal of the Clark Amendment "a flagrant interference" in Angola's internal affairs and "a clear affront and challenge to free Africa." At its summit in Nairobi in late June, the Organization of African Unity issued a declaration calling on the United States not to intervene in Angola.

- Lifting the ban on CIA activity in Angola would identify the United States with the apartheid South African government. In 1975 South Africa openly invaded Angola in support of the UNITA movement, and remained inside the country for six months. The CIA shared intelligence with South Africa and collaborated with South Africa in its invasion. This open U.S. identification with South Africa was very damaging to U.S. relations with Africa at the time, and was one of the main reasons the Congress adopted the Clark Amendment. During the last year, South Africa has significantly expanded its military activity in Angola, killing hundreds of Angolans and Namibian refugees. The Washington Post reported in February: "There can be no more doubt that the broad thrust of Angola's complaints that it is facing South African aggression is true, despite South African denials." It would be impossible for the United States to intervene in Angola to aid UNITA without again collaborating with South Africa in the process, since South African and UNITA military actions are often virtually indistinguishable.

- Repealing the Clark Amendment could have serious negative repercussions for the negotiations for independence in Namibia. The issues of Angola and Namibia are intimately linked, and the United States cannot expect African cooperation on Namibia if it is seen to be intervening in Angola, the key Frontline state involved in the Namibia negotiations. To date, Angola has played a major constructive role in what progress has been made. SWAPO has agreed to participate in United Nations-supervised elections in Namibia, but South Africa has refused to implement the plan. The State Department illogically wants to use the threat of intervention in Angola as a means of coercing the Frontline states into submission. Lifting the ban on CIA activity in Angola, however, is certain to create a chill in relations with the Frontline states and SWAPO, dashing hopes of a negotiated settlement and extending the violence and destruction of the Namibia war.

A vote on the Clark Amendment will be the only opportunity for the Congress to prevent what could become a major foreign policy blunder in Africa.

Thanks to the Washington Office on Africa for developing these arguments.

# EL SALVADOR

## RUMOURS OF NEW ADMINISTRATION STATEMENT ON EL SALVADOR AS AUTHORIZATIONS


### FLOOR VOTES DRAW NEAR

A leak to CBS NEWS on July 5th increased speculation that the Administration is preparing major speeches on El Salvador/Central America. Timed to coincide with the Senate - and perhaps the House - floor votes in July, it is rumoured that Secretary of State Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas O. Enders, will cite the "worsening" situation in El Salvador and U.S. intelligence data reporting increased Soviet military deliveries to Cuba as reason for a renewed, visible emphasis on the region.

Current speculation is that the announcements will be made around or shortly after July 15th. It is assumed that the State Department will not release a second "white paper", but depend on current intelligence information to be presented in the format of a speech or press conference.

It is unknown whether the Administration will be requesting anything more of Congress than to scratch the current conditions to the FY 82 Foreign Aid Authorizations Bill which require the President to certify that the Government of El Salvador is meeting five basic human rights and political conditions before the \$26 million in military aid to El Salvador for Fiscal Year 1982 can be released.

THE WASHINGTON STAR Thursday, June 25, 1981



Anytime After July 14:  
(likely week of 20th)

Senate floor vote on FY 82 Foreign Aid Authorizations Bill, S. 1196 ("International Security & Development Act of 1981"). MAINTAIN THE CLARK AMENDMENT. ELIMINATE THE MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR.

Anytime After July 16:

"Mark-up" of the FY 82 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill in the House Committee on Appropriations (see LEG. UPDATE # 7). ELIMINATE THE \$26 MILLION IN MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR. REINSTATE THE \$20 MILLION IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS FOR NICARAGUA.

August 1 - September 8:

District Work Period. Meet with Senators and Representatives. Discuss above votes (how they voted/how they plan to vote). Invite Members to speak at a public event. Attend other public engagements and raise questions regarding their positions on El Salvador, southern Africa, Central America, U.S. intervention, etc.

September 9 - October 7:

Congress reconvenes. Expect very early House vote on FY 82 Foreign Aid Authorizations Bill, H.R. 3566 ("International Security & Development Act of 1981"). ELIMINATE THE \$26 MILLION IN MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR. MAINTAIN THE CLARK AMENDMENT. Expect immediately following authorizations vote, a House vote on FY 82 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill. ELIMINATE MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR.

October 8 - October 12:

Columbus Day Recess. Members in their home districts.

October 13 - October 23:

Congress in Session.

October 23:

Adjournment Target.

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**COALITION**

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# **CLOSE-UP**

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Newsletter of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy

July 1981


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# Reagan and Southern Africa

by Kenneth S. Zinn

The Reagan Administration is setting itself up for confrontation in Africa. Washington views its relations with African countries solely in terms of U.S.-Soviet competition for access to precious raw materials. This policy shows no understanding of African struggles to build independent, just and equitable societies after centuries of colonialism. In southern Africa, this world view of "them and us" has led the administration toward a new alliance with racist South Africa. In turn, it has also meant new initiatives by the U.S. to destabilize governments of two key frontline states, Angola and Mozambique. Lastly, because it views all liberation struggles as Soviet-inspired or sponsored, the Reagan Administration has deliberately stalled the negotiations for independence in Namibia. The new policy toward southern Africa, unconcerned with human rights or the rights of sovereign nations, is paving the way for future U.S. intervention in that region. Reagan's foreign policy seriously undermines the prospects for peace and security in the region, by allying itself with racism and colonialism in Africa.



**South Africa has a Friend** Without doubt, the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with "authoritarian" South Africa is the first step towards a full-fledged alliance with that regime. The State Department has made it clear that in deciding U.S. relations with a given country, it is not concerned with the country's domestic policy but rather, whether or not that country is willing to draw the line against "Soviet aggression." In an interview with Walter Cronkite, Reagan said "Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we ever fought? A country that, strategically, is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have?" National Security Adviser Richard Allen added fuel to the fire by stating in a speech that further relations with South Africa should depend on U.S. self-interest and not on U.S. disapproval of apartheid. Other actions by the Administration include: 1) A meeting with South African military officials, including Lt. Gen. P.W. Van Der Westhuizen, chief of staff for intelligence by U.N.

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The meeting was in clear contravention of a 20-year policy forbidding any military contact with South Africa and violated the spirit of the U.N. arms embargo. 2) The "serious consideration" of granting an official visit to Prime Minister P.W. Botha. 3) Consideration of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, recognition of the "homelands," the reservation-like Bantustans where the majority Black population is forced to live and a possible invitation to Bophutatswana "President" Lucas Mangope. 4) The visit of Foreign Minister Roelof F. "Pik" Botha to Washington for consultations. Described by the administration as a "friendly meeting," *Botha's visit was the first by any African official with Reagan in the White House.*



The clearest indication of where the new Africa policy is heading is in a memo, leaked to the *Washington Post*, to Secretary of State Alexander Haig from Assistant Secretary of State-designate for Africa Chester Crocker, in preparation for Botha's visit to the U.S. Crocker stated that after twenty years of worsening relations, "the possibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based upon shared strategic concerns in southern Africa, our recognition that the Government of P.W. Botha represents a unique opportunity for domestic change and willingness of the Reagan Administration to deal realistically with South Africa."

The memo also says that "the problem of Namibia" complicates U.S. relations with European allies and Black Africa, and is "a primary obstacle to the development of a new relationship with South Africa." And, if the South Africans cooperate in achieving an internationally acceptable Namibian solution, it could open the way for "a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests." (Emphasis added.) Although the memo states that the U.S. cannot make "excessive" promises, "We can, however, work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically." (Emphasis added.)

The South Africans, however, want concrete gestures from the U.S. as evidence of its support. Specifically, this includes: 1) an increase in personnel in the defense attache sections of U.S. and South African embassies (there has been only one attache in each embassy since the mutual expulsion of officers in 1979); 2) consent for U.S. Navy ships to make calls at South African ports again; 3) training for South African Coast Guard personnel; 4) a plan to force the Cubans out of Angola; and 5) the U.S. to supply low-enriched uranium to fuel two nuclear power plants under construction in South Africa.\* The options of renewed nuclear cooperation as well as military contacts with South Africa are all under State Department review.

cont. p. 5

\*Under a 1974 U.S. Department of Energy contract, the U.S. agreed to enrich raw uranium supplied by South Africa and send that enriched uranium to France to make fuel rods. France would then send the fuel rods back to South Africa. In 1978, however, Congress held up the export license of the enriched uranium because South Africa refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty "in the interests of its own security," as was stated in a document left with the State Department by the South Africans during Botha's recent trip.

Boxscore cont.

**Simon Amendment** On July 9, Paul Simon (D-IL) offered an amendment to the Hansen-Santini amendment to the DoD Authorization Bill (H.R. 3519), which would require Congress to vote yes or no, on the President's decision as to the type of basing mode for the MX missile. The amendment was defeated 207-201 (see Update).

Zinn cont.



**Frontline States Under Attack** South Africa has been buoyed by the Reagan policy. On January 30, two days after Haig announced that "international terrorism" rather than "human rights" would be the primary focus of the new administration's foreign policy, South African commandos invaded Mozambique to raid the facilities of the African National Congress, the South African opposition group, in Maputo. The South African military chief, Constand Viljoen, justified the raid by saying the facilities were being used as a "spring-board for terror against South Africa." In March, Reagan suspended the entire U.S. food assistance program to Mozambique in retaliation for the expulsion of four U.S. diplomats charged with participation in a CIA spy ring. The State Department accused Cuban intelligence of instigating the expulsion. The cut off, which showed that the U.S. is willing to use food as a diplomatic weapon, came two days after another clash between South African and Mozambican armed forces.

South Africa has also continued its "secret war" against Angola. Military incursions into southern Angola from occupied Namibia continue on a regular basis, killing hundreds of Angolans and Namibian refugees. The U.S. government has supported South Africa by requesting that Congress repeal the Clark Amendment which effectively prohibits CIA military or paramilitary assistance to the South Africa-backed UNITA forces in southern Angola. The leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, has already met with Lannon Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, in North Africa. Savimbi is expected to visit Washington to meet further with administration officials.

The primary focus of Reagan's Angola policy is the Cuban troop presence in that country. The Cubans entered Angola during the 1975 civil war at the request of the newly-formed Angolan government to fight back the invading South African military forces. As evidenced by South Africa's current military attacks on Angola, that threat to Angolan sovereignty continues to this day. The Administration insists, however, that it is the Cuban presence in Angola, and not the South African occupation of Namibia and South Africa attacks on Mozambique and Angola, that is the greatest threat to the security of the region.

The State Department has laid out two options for itself in dealing with Angola. First, the military option is to give Savimbi whatever military backing he needs to destabilize the Angolan

government. Second, the diplomatic option is to force a reconciliation between UNITA and the Angolan government. The diplomatic option could succeed, the State Department explains, only if the U.S. threatens to use the *military* option. *Both options, therefore, require repeal of the Clark Amendment.* The arrogance of this posture was revealed in a February 7, 1981, memo to Reagan from Crocker reprinted in the *New York Times*. It states that Angola would be told that Moscow could not help it economically, that Washington could, that "recognition is out unless the Cubans leave and they cut a deal with Savimbi," (the U.S. is one of four countries in the world that has yet to recognize the Angolan government), and that "*if they won't play, we have other options.*" [Emphasis added.]

**Namibia Settlement Stalled** The main focus of attention lately, however, has been on the fate of the Namibia negotiations. South Africa has been illegally occupying Namibia since 1966, when the United Nations revoked its League of Nations mandate and declared the region International Territory. Since 1978, the negotiations have centered around United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 proposed by the Western Contact Group—France, West Germany, Canada, Great Britain and the U.S.—and accepted in principle by South Africa, the Namibian liberation movement, the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), and the frontline states—Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania. Resolution 435 calls for a ceasefire and internationally-supervised elections in Namibia.



At a January, 1981, meeting in Geneva, however, South Africa refused to comply with a ceasefire proposal offered by SWAPO. The apartheid regime and its puppet in Namibia, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), were clearly waiting for a better deal from the soon-to-be inaugurated Reagan Administration.

Washington wasted no time in bolstering South Africa's position. In April, the Administration (along with Great Britain and France) vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution to impose economic sanctions against South Africa because of its policy in Namibia. During Pik Botha's recent visit to Washington, a new U.S.-sponsored framework was worked out. That framework, as interpreted by South African sources, includes: 1) a non-aligned Namibia; 2) a declaration of minority rights; 3) "a U.S. pledge not to pressure South Africa to accept solutions it believes are counter to its interests"; and 4) a "declaration by Haig that no


cont. p. 6

\*After the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1974, three factions fought a civil war to fill the power vacuum in Angola: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) backed by the Soviet Union, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) backed by Zaire, and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) backed by South Africa. In 1975, President Ford provided massive covert paramilitary assistance to UNITA and FNLA in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the MPLA from coming to power. The Clark Amendment, passed in 1976, stopped such assistance. The FNLA was totally defeated in that war, the MPLA formed a national government, and remnants of UNITA still exist in the south.

Zinn cont.

deadline will be set in connection with the Namibia negotiations." In addition, South Africa has now insisted that a U.N. military force is no longer acceptance as a means of policing the transition to independence. (South Africa was previously granted a huge concession by SWAPO when it was agreed that South Africa would administer the elections.) Instead of pressuring South Africa to comply with the U.N. settlement plan, the Administration has given South Africa rewards in the hope that it will negotiate in good faith and cease its illegal occupation of Namibia.

The February memo leaked to the *New York Times* reveals other key elements in the administration strategy for Namibia: 1) Meet South Africa's "major concerns," including improving relations with Washington, as an inducement to give up control of Namibia. 2) Use the prospect of removing South African troops from Namibia as leverage on Angola. 3) Demand from Angola a withdrawal of Cuban troops from its territory and a sharing of power with Savimbi. 4) Obtain the backing from Black African states for such a solution. Although Crocker insists that Resolution 435 is still the "basis" of any Namibian settlement, the added stipulations have effectively delayed reaching any solution. As the *Washington Post* reported on May 14, "[B]y sending the U.N. plan for a Namibian settlement back to the drawing board, Washington has given South Africa what it most wanted, more time."



**The New Realpolitik** Reagan's policy of "giving South Africa more time" can only postpone the inevitable in Namibia (South African intelligence admits that SWAPO will win handily in any election); in South Africa, revolutionary change cannot be halted. Myopically, the new administration hopes to maintain the status quo in the region. That is, by using the Cubans in Angola as a pretext, Reagan can support militarily "anti-communist" forces (i.e., South Africa) in the region and continue reaping huge corporate profits and importing strategic minerals from Namibia and South Africa. This policy is carried out behind the public relations facade of supporting "reform" in South Africa and working towards a settlement in Namibia in order to placate Black African countries and insure a continued supply of minerals and oil from those states.

This policy was, in part, the policy pursued by the Carter Administration. By adding a fresh dose of anti-Sovietism, Reagan and Haig are leading the U.S. into a full-fledged military alliance with South Africa. The carrot-and-stick approach being implemented by the U.S. in the Namibia negotiations (that is, use

the stick against the frontline states, and feed South Africa as many carrots as it wants, even if it will not soften its position or make any concessions), points in this direction. This short-sighted policy is not only totally oblivious to the needs of the African people in the region; practically speaking, it places the U.S. on the losing side of the struggle. In this way, the new *realpolitik* policies emanating from the White House are eerily reminiscent of Kissinger's "the whites are here to stay" policies of a decade ago. Both Kissinger's and Reagan's policies are blatantly wrong because they are blind to the forces of change while narrowly addressing geopolitical concerns. By actively siding with apartheid, the U.S. is once again on the wrong side of history.

# UPDATE

**Military Truck Sale to Guatemala** The Reagan Administration, in a maneuver circumventing the human rights considerations imposed by U.S. law, approved the sale of 100 jeeps and 50 2½-ton military trucks to the government of Guatemala.

The \$3.2 million sale, approved without public announcement on June 5, is the first step in Reagan's controversial move to improve U.S. military and political ties with the brutal Lucas Garcia regime as part of the U.S.'s campaign to counter the "growing communist threat in Central America."

Renewing military supplies to Guatemala involves some sensitive human rights questions because Congress has barred the sale of most military equipment to governments whose records on human rights cannot pass scrutiny. In the case of the truck and jeep sale, the State Department sidestepped that problem by getting the equipment reclassified in a way that avoids that provision of the law.

Specifically, the administration, prior to approving the sale, removed vehicles of that type from the "crime control detection list." Under rules decreed by Congress in 1978, items on that list cannot be sold to governments "engaged in consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

After being taken off the "crime control" list, the trucks and jeeps were reclassified on another list of controlled military-type

