

THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA
110 Maryland Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-7961

December 21, 1973

Dear friends of Rhodesian freedom,

The Senate has given us cause for extra celebration at this holiday season. It voted Tuesday to bring the United States back into line with United Nations' sanctions against Rhodesia.

But let's not sit back and rest on our laurels. We still have a fight ahead in the House. Realizing that the toughest fight will be in the House, we have already been lobbying there for several months. There has been significant progress but there is still a way to go. Now that the Senate has acted, we should move rapidly to convince the members of Congress who are still uncommitted to vote for H.R. 8005, aiming for a House vote in early March.

Congress will be in recess from now until January 21st. Many Congressional representatives will be home in their districts sounding out citizens on Watergate and other issues. Some are planning to be in Washington but will be home on weekends. The recess is therefore an ideal time to set up a visit with your Representative.

Let's be specific about what visits can do.

Senator Schweiker voted for us on S. 1868; he voted against us last time. That switch would not have happened, we think, if it had not been for the work of several delegations, particularly those from Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Scranton and Lincoln University who came to Washington to visit with Schweiker face to face. Most of these groups also publicized the visit and Schweiker's non-committal attitude through stories in the press. The Lincoln group delivered a petition with 900 names to Schweiker. The Pittsburgh group demonstrated linkage with old-line civil rights' leadership whom Schweiker had voted with before, as well as significant Catholic and Protestant church groups.

The same kind of thing can be done even more effectively with your Representative when he or she is in your district. If you cannot arrange for a visit with the Representative, perhaps you can talk with a staff assistant.

In many places it has also been useful to get groups such as labor unions, churches, civil rights groups, Afro-American groups and public interest organizations to adopt a resolution supporting the sanctions legislation and to present it to Congressional representatives.


If visits cannot be organized, try to supplement and follow up any publicity or public stand-taking with letters or telephone calls from the groups you have been able to get on board. In some places, individuals rather than groups may be the only available resource for letter writing or calling, but it is always better to get corporate strength if possible.

Enclosed please find a legislative update and position paper which we think will make your visit to your Representative more effective. The paper begins with a discussion of conditions in Rhodesia and then moves to why sanctions are important in regard to change in Rhodesia and in regard to the self-interest of the United States. The paper is not meant to be used verbatim as a "spiel" but as a stimulus to your own thought. Use it with discretion. Some arguments will be relevant to your conversation and some will not. Some Representatives will only be interested in the narrow self-interest of the United States and its workers. Please tell us how the conversation went so that our staff can try to overcome the particular obstacles that have been thrown in the way. We will also be glad to help you follow up with the visit in any way that you think would be helpful. We are enclosing a form which we would appreciate your filling out and returning to us as a report on your visits.


We are most grateful to you all for the terrific effort you are putting into this work. The Senate victory proves that a committed intense group, even though small, can make an impact.

If you telephone us, please call (202) 546- 7961. Our other phone 546-7011 has been discontinued.

Freedom and peace in Zimbabwe in 1974,



Edgar Lockwood



Christine Root



BILL TO STRENGTHEN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS
WINS IN THE SENATE

December 18, 1973

Today, the Senate passed S. 1868 to end importation of "strategic and critical materials" from Rhodesia in violation of U.N. sanctions by a margin of 54 to 37, after defeating by 63 to 27 a filibuster by Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia. This is the first significant vote in either house of Congress in support of the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa. The victory was a good one, brought about by real persistence on the part of the bill's proponents, especially Gale McGee. A seven-month effort by national groups and groups of constituents across the country focusing on key Senators also helped in gaining a major victory.

THE LEGISLATIVE STORY

In May, when S. 1868 was introduced, it appeared that it would be fairly easy to gain Senate passage. The defeat of a Byrd Amendment-repealer in 1972 was close, 36 to 40, and it seemed that sanctions supporters could switch the few votes necessary for victory. We who have been working to end this sanctions violation knew all along that the real fight would be in the House. But we thought that even a House victory was possible with sustained effort using arguments about U.S. economic, strategic and political self-interest as well as concern about U.S. policy toward Rhodesia. As we began to make progress in the House and Senate, representatives of the stainless steel industry started lobbying in the House, assuming that Senate passage would be inevitable but relatively insignificant since a minimal effort on their part could ensure House defeat.

Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee on Africa held hearings in September and the full Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously on September 18th to recommend favorable Senate action on S. 1868. Thereafter, Harry Byrd quietly convinced Democratic leaders Mansfield and Robert Byrd to delay Senate action week after week. Finally, on November 20th, Senators McGee and Humphrey succeeded in pressing the leadership to schedule S. 1868 for Senate consideration. At this point, Byrd had to filibuster in the open. Realizing that a strong Senate victory could in fact be very damaging, Byrd's industry supporters turned their attention to persuading at least one-third of the Senate to block a vote by refusing to agree to close debate. In the first vote to cut off debate on December 11th, two-thirds of the Senate failed to invoke cloture by a vote of 59 to 35. In a second attempt on the 13th White House and State Department lobbyists convinced three Senators to change their votes, and the measure lost by only 1½ votes. Finally, cloture was invoked by a vote of 63 to 26 on the 18th.

After the filibuster was defeated, the Senate considered the bill itself. In a last effort to weaken the bill, Harry Byrd offered an amendment to strike from the preamble the words "to restore the United States to its position as a law-abiding member of the international community." Because the change had no substantive effect and to help Byrd save face after an overwhelming defeat, supporters of S. 1868 voted with Byrd on the amendment in a 91 to 0 vote. The Senate then voted 54 to 37 in favor of S. 1868.

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HOW THE VOTE BROKE DOWN

The 54 to 37 victory on S. 1868 represents a substantial gain over the 40 to 36 defeat of the 1972 attempt to end the violation of U.S. compliance with sanctions. Seven Senators actually switched their positions to support sanctions: Mathias (Md.), Weicker (Conn.), Roth (Del.), Pearson (Kans.), Schweiker (Pa.), Long (La.), and Bentsen (Tex.). Also, four freshman Senators whose predecessors had supported Byrd voted for S. 1868: Johnston (La.), Clark (Iowa), Haskell (Colo.), and Abourezk (S.D.). On the other side, Byrd's gains were very small. No Senators switched to oppose sanctions and only two Senators whose predecessors had supported sanctions voted with Byrd this time: Huddleston (Ky.) and Bartlett (Okla.).

Pressure from constituents urging key Senators to support sanctions was important in several states. Perhaps the biggest success was Schweiker of Pennsylvania. He was under intense pressure from the stainless steel industry to oppose the sanctions, but strong efforts by constituents, labor unions and several Senators all paid off. Schweiker's affirmative vote will help a great deal with some Pennsylvania Representatives who are under similar pressure. Pressure from church and civil rights groups also proved important in Kansas and Delaware. In Louisiana Black voters surely had a significant impact on Johnston and Long, showing that members of Congress from the South can no longer afford to ignore Black voters if they want to be re-elected. Although Senators Cook and Huddleston of Kentucky did not vote for the bill itself, they did vote for cloture, and even that break from the South's support for white minority rule would probably not have happened a few years ago.

Notwithstanding lots of pressure from constituents in Ohio, Senator Taft voted against the bill and even spoke out opposing sanctions. He did vote for the third cloture attempt, but that was probably due mainly to internal Senate politics, although he also got a number of telegrams from Ohio. Other Senators who spoke in opposition to S. 1868 were Allen (Ala.), Ervin and Helms (N.C.), Stennis (Miss.), William Scott (Va.), Dominick (Colo.), Curtis (Nebr.), Goldwater (Ariz.), and Cannon (Nev.).

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The Senate vote puts us in good stead to go to work in the House in 1974. Don Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations has held hearings jointly with Charles Diggs' Subcommittee on Africa and has unanimously recommended the bill to the full Foreign Affairs Committee. Chairman Thomas Morgan (Pa.) should be pressed

to schedule Committee action as soon as the House reconvenes in January. When the Committee does vote, we can be assured of majority support, but we want to get as strong and wide support as possible in the Committee. Committee members who especially need attention are Zablocki (Wis.), Hays (Ohio), Fountain and Taylor (N.C.), Yatron (Pa.), Wilson (Tex.), and Derwinski (Ill.). If the United States government is to strengthen its compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia we will have to work hard on House members who are still uncommitted to urge them to vote for passage of H.R. 8005.

VOTE ON S. 1868

VOTE ON CLOTURE

YEAS—54		
Abourezk	Hughes	Nelson
Alkire	Humphrey	Packwood
Baker	Inouye	Pastore
Bayh	Jackson	Pearson
Beall	Javits	Pell
Bentsen	Johnston	Percy
Brooke	Kennedy	Proxmire
Burdick	Long	Ribicoff
Byrd, Robert G.	Magnuson	Roth
Case	Mansfield	Schweiker
Chiles	Mathias	Scott, Hugh
Clark	McGee	Stafford
Cook	McGovern	Stevens
Cranston	McIntyre	Stevenson
Dole	Metcalf	Symington
Domenici	Mondale	Tunney
Eastland	Moss	Weicker
Fong	Muskie	Williams
Griffin		
Hart	NAYS—37	
Harke	Cook	McClellan
	Curtis	McClure
	Dole	Nunn
	Domenici	Randolph
	Dominick	Saxbe
	Eastland	Sparkman
	Fannin	Stennis
	Goldwater	Taft
	Gurney	Talmadge
	Hansen	Thurmond
	Helms	Tower
	Hruska	Young
	Huddleston	

YEAS—63		
Abourezk	Haskell	Packwood
Alkire	Hatfield	Pastore
Baker	Hathaway	Pearson
Bayh	Huddleston	Pell
Beall	Hughes	Percy
Bentsen	Humphrey	Proxmire
Brooke	Inouye	Randolph
Burdick	Jackson	Ribicoff
Byrd, Robert G.	Javits	Roth
Case	Johnston	Saxbe
Chiles	Kennedy	Schweiker
Clark	Magnuson	Scott, Hugh
Cook	Mathias	Stafford
Cranston	McGee	Stevens
Dole	McGovern	Stevenson
Domenici	McIntyre	Symington
Eastland	Metcalf	Taft
Fong	Mondale	Tunney
Griffin	Moss	Weicker
Hart	Muskie	Williams
Harke	Nelson	Young
	NAYS—26	
Allen	Curtis	Hruska
Bartlett	Dominick	McClellan
Beilmon	Eastland	McClure
Bible	Ervin	Nunn
Brock	Fannin	Sparkman
Buckley	Goldwater	Stennis
Byrd,	Gurney	Talmadge
Harry F., Jr.	Hansen	Thurmond
Cannon	Helms	Tower

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WHY CONGRESS SHOULD STRENGTHEN U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

On December 18th the Senate passed S. 1868 by a vote of 54 to 37 to strengthen United States compliance with a United Nations sanctions program against Rhodesia. This bill would in effect repeal legislation passed by Congress in 1971 providing that the President may not prohibit or regulate the importation of "strategic and critical materials" from non-Communist countries as long as importation of such materials from Communist countries is not barred by law. Although the legislation mentioned neither trade with Rhodesia nor the U.N. sanctions prohibiting it, the effect of the so-called Byrd Amendment was to permit the open violation of international economic sanctions against Rhodesia which the United States had advocated and supported in the United Nations.

This Senate victory reflects the work of many national organizations, local groups and individuals across the country who have labored for this change in national policy over the last seven months. There is now a good chance that with this kind of effective citizen pressure on the House of Representatives, the identical measure (H.R. 8005) can win House approval and the United States will end this violation of sanctions.

To help interested citizens in lobbying for the restoration of sanctions, we have gathered a brief collection of information and argumentation which you will need to do an effective job.

1. THE RHODESIA OF TODAY IS BUILT ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DOMINATION BY A FIVE PER CENT WHITE MINORITY OVER THE NINETY-FIVE PER CENT OF THE POPULATION WHO ARE AFRICANS.

The economic foundation on which modern Rhodesia is built is the exploitation of African land and African labor for the benefit of Europeans. Rhodesia's mining, manufacturing and farming economy cannot sustain itself without outside help. If it is to survive, it must earn foreign exchange by selling its minerals and other raw materials abroad so that it can buy the oil, industrial machinery, capital goods, transportation equipment and arms it needs. The purpose of sanctions is to cut off trade with Rhodesia in order to make the Rhodesian regime more vulnerable to pressures for economic and political change from Africans and the small but growing number of whites inside the country who oppose the radically racist politics of the Rhodesian Front regime.

From the beginning of modern Rhodesia, the white minority has employed economic and political exploitation of the land and labor of the African majority to gain quick wealth. Whites invaded the country originally to extract gold and diamonds just before the turn of the century. They stayed on to farm and to discover an incredible wealth of chrome, nickel, asbestos, copper, iron ore, coal and tin. Because they had modern weapons and military tactics at their disposal, a relatively small number of Europeans was able to subdue and subjugate the African majority

and to become masters of the land which had once fostered a culture named Zimbabwe. They allocated to themselves that half of the land which was the most arable and richest in resources. Once having appropriated the land and resources, Europeans destroyed the possibility of a viable self-sustaining African economy. Africans have been increasingly forced to seek work in the European half of the land, where the mines, the industries, the commerce and the better farmlands are.

In order to contain and frustrate the African drive toward full participation in the economic and political power which the whites now possess, the Rhodesian Front has moved toward "provincialization," a concept similar to South African "apartheid." Africans are deemed to be truly citizens and residents only in African areas or tribal trust territories. They can be in white areas only if they are both employed and resident.

But provincialization cannot be made to work without imposing unacceptable political repression. Confining Africans to African areas makes political organizing easier through a sharing of common grievances and a consciousness of solidarity. Thus the government is forced to limit access to African areas by "trouble makers" such as African National Council leaders or missionaries who oppose racial injustice and to conduct surveillance and licensing of all public assemblies. Unemployed Africans, who continue to flood into white areas to seek jobs, scare whites. They cannot be easily accommodated into a capital-intensive industrial process. Whites, rightly or wrongly, picture the unemployed as potential criminals. The presence of idle Africans serves to remind whites that they enjoy wealth and power and privilege which black Rhodesians are bound to want. Thus the white regime is forced to try to control the number and behavior of Africans by licensing their presence through vagrancy laws and pass laws and by massive police harassment. But police-state controls of this sort only strengthen African resistance.

Ever since Europeans invaded Rhodesia, the African inhabitants of the land have resisted white domination in whatever ways they could. The Shona and Ndebele people fought bravely against Cecil Rhodes' mercenary army in the late 1890's, exacting a toll of ten per cent of the white settlers before being conquered. In the 1950s and 1960s when other African nations were gaining independence and majority rule, Rhodesian Africans like Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo formed African political parties in Rhodesia to promote African nationalism. Because these organizations challenged the viability of colonial politics in Rhodesia in which Africans were denied any real share, they were banned and driven underground into extra-legal resistance. In 1971 when the British government and the Rhodesian Front regime attempted to promote a political settlement which would have postponed majority rule indefinitely, Africans joined in forming the African National Council to oppose the proposal.

At the same time that African nationalism was growing, Europeans in Rhodesia moved to growing racial intransigence. In November 1965, the ruling party in Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Front, unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain. It placed leading African nationalists under restriction or detention. It strengthened its police state powers by abolishing the rule of laws and courts in cases affecting security.

As whites put African nationalists in prison and under house arrest, some Africans crossed the borders in order to train and organize for political and military resistance. Because of this growing threat to its security, the Rhodesian Front regime has had to internationalize the conflict to gain support from other white minority - controlled governments. Rhodesia has welcomed South African troops inside the country to assist in suppressing the guerilla activities which have become increasingly active and effective. The regime has also sent troops into Mozambique to aid Portuguese troops and into Zambia to conduct hit and run attacks.

It was inevitable that the severe repression of the entire African population by an illegitimate white regime would lead to strong African resistance born of the same political urgency toward majority rule that he swept the continent from north to south. Therefore, it was only natural that the United Nations Security Council in 1966 and again in 1968 should have deemed the situation a threat to international peace justifying the imposition of sanctions.

Many Africans who are working for majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe feel that economic sanctions, even though they were not an instant success when first imposed, can play a continuing vital role in their struggle. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, President of the African National Council (A.N.C.), has said, "Economic sanctions provide us with the only tool we have in our non-violent struggle for a free Rhodesia."

2. U. S. BREAKING OF SANCTIONS GAVE STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE WHITE MINORITY REGIME; RE-IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WILL MAKE THE REGIME MORE VULNERABLE TO THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF THE AFRICAN MAJORITY.

The Byrd Amendment's open legislative repudiation of the sanctions program was a major political victory for the Rhodesian minority regime. South Africa and Portugal had never voted for sanctions in the first place. Other countries had winked at sanctions - violations by their nationals. But the U.S. had advocated sanctions and had proclaimed its strict adherence to their implementation. No other country had openly switched position.

The economic benefits to the Rhodesian Front have become increasingly significant. Since the law went into effect on January 1, 1972, U.S. imports of Rhodesian minerals have added \$36 million in foreign exchange to the Rhodesian economy. Without foreign exchange, Rhodesia cannot buy the transportation equipment, industrial machinery and armaments it requires for self-sufficiency. Although the economic benefits to Rhodesia have been minimized by Byrd and his corporate allies, imports of the specific strategic and critical materials such as ferrochrome and nickel cathodes allowed by the Byrd Amendment fit into Rhodesia's game plan. By moving from exports of minerals in raw form to exports of processed minerals, Rhodesia hopes to add enough new foreign exchange to make it immune from international and internal pressures for change.

If the United States strengthens its compliance with sanctions at this time, it could increase the possibilities of non-violent change in Rhodesia. In mid-July of this year "Prime Minister" Ian Smith met for the first time with A.N.C. President Abel Muzorewa. These talks have so far been without tangible fruit because Smith has continued to insist that the 1971 settlement, which was overwhelmingly rejected by the African population, represents a fair and final offer. And, within three weeks of the talks, the Rhodesian Front regime imprisoned over thirty A.N.C. leaders without trial. Clearly, Ian Smith is not prepared to negotiate seriously with Africans without additional pressure. Re-imposition of sanctions by the United States at this critical juncture might play a key role in forcing Smith to take seriously African demands for majority rule in their country.

3. THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT REQUIRE THE BREAKING OF SANCTIONS.

Many members of Congress voted to break sanctions because they were sincerely persuaded that we needed to supplement the U.S. stockpile reserves for defense purposes by importing Rhodesian chrome ore. Further, it was argued that to rely on a potential enemy, the Soviet Union, for supplies of chrome ore was dangerous.

Recent careful evaluation, however, shows that the U.S. stockpile contains an abundance of chrome ore far in excess of any foreseeable military requirements. On July 20th, Deputy Secretary of Defense W.P. Clements, Jr., wrote to Congressman Donald Fraser:

... the metallurgical grade chromite needed by industry to support the Defense Department's steel requirement during the first year of a war amounts to 128,300 short tons, or 2.3% of the quantity held in the (stockpile) inventory as of 31 December, 1972.

In other words, the U.S. has enough chrome ore in the stockpile to supply the military for more than 40 years of war. Because the stockpile is so far in excess of what is really needed for defense, the President proposed on April 16th that 4,662,000 tons of chrome ore and 768,000 tons of ferrochrome be disposed of as surplus.

Furthermore, the 1971 legislation did not in fact reduce U.S. reliance on Soviet chrome ore imports. After the legislation became effective, Soviet chrome ore imports advanced to 45 per cent of all chrome imported. In the first seven months of 1973, Soviet metallurgical grade chrome ore was 54 percent of all such chrome ore imported, about in line with the average share of the market the U.S.S.R. enjoyed in the previous five years. Rhodesian chrome imports, on the other hand, were less than 10 per cent of all chrome ore imports in 1972 and only ½ of 1 per cent in the first seven months of 1973.

Although predicated on the United States defense need for chrome ore, the Byrd Amendment opened the door to the importation of other minerals, which, while technically "strategic and critical", were not even in short supply. Nickel, for example, is not stockpiled because we have access to abundant supplies in Canada, Norway and New Caledonia. Yet, in 1972 and 1973, purchases by U.S. companies supplied the illegal Rhodesian regime with \$11 million in badly needed foreign exchange by purchasing Rhodesian nickel.

Both Secretary of State Kissinger and Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, have recently stated that imports of Rhodesian chrome and nickel are not necessary for U.S. security or strategy.

4. THE BYRD AMENDMENT HAS NOT SAVED U.S. JOBS: IT THREATENS TO ELIMINATE JOBS IN THE DOMESTIC FERROCHROME INDUSTRY.

Since the passage of the Byrd Amendment, Rhodesian and South African ferrochrome, both made with Rhodesian chrome ore, have flooded the American market at prices lower than the American cost of production in some instances. In 1972, the U.S. imported almost as much ferrochrome from these two apartheid countries as imported from the entire world in 1966-71. By the end of July, 1973, Rhodesian and South African imports had already climbed to 83 per cent of the 1972 full-year volume.

Because these materials are mined and processed by underpaid, forced black labor and because they enjoy the advantage of governmentally subsidized freight and power rates, they can be sold profitably for bargain prices. African workers in Rhodesia and South Africa cannot strike or bargain collectively; strikes that do occur are regarded as "political" and have been repressed by police power, sometimes, as in the recent Carletonville incidents, with bloodshed and loss of life. Rhodesian African miners are paid one-thirteenth of wages which other Rhodesian laborers receive. They receive 25 per cent of what black Zambian miners receive. Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, has a free trade union movement which has won important improvements through political rights and collective bargaining.

The impact of these low-priced imports has been devastating to the domestic ferrochrome industry. In December, 1972, Foote Mineral Co. and Ohio Ferroalloys announced that they were closing their plants in Ohio. So serious had the situation become by May that the industry petitioned for relief from excessive imports, warning that South Africa and Rhodesia "may soon dominate and control the world supply of chromium products" and that it would be only a matter of time before all domestic ferrochrome production ceased. While the petition was later withdrawn without prejudice because of the current boom in the steel industry, the condition of the ferrochrome industry continues to be precarious.

5. RESTORATION OF SANCTIONS WILL NOT LEAD TO HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STAINLESS STEEL INDUSTRY.

The price of ferrochrome may advance if sanctions are reimposed but any advance in price will be modest. We estimate that the cost of ferrochrome is presently about five per cent of the total cost of producing stainless steel. The cheaper price of high-carbon ferrochrome imported from Rhodesia and South Africa in 1972 represented at most a saving of 3 cents a pound, less than one per cent of the total cost of production. By comparison, stainless steel benefited from devaluation of the dollar by ten per cent in this year alone. Voluntary restraint agreements now protect the industry from much previous foreign penetration of the American market. Furthermore, the stainless steel producers and Allegheny Ludlum in particular have shown no hesitation in passing on costs to the consumer by raising prices 5 to 7 per cent this year.

Contrary to claims made by stainless steel producers, ferrochrome is not in short supply. In fact, the industry has been plagued by excess capacity. The U.S. Ferroalloys Association pointed out in its petition for relief in May 1973:

It is estimated that the current free world capacity for ferrochrome production outside the United States may be as much as twice the free world demand outside the U.S.

Ferrochrome is available from the following sources:

a. Domestic industry. In the period 1967-71 American ferrochrome producers supplied about 87 per cent of high carbon ferrochrome and about 72 per cent of low carbon ferrochrome consumed in this country. U.S. higher costs reflect our insistence on control of pollution and fair labor standards as well as a reluctance to spend money on modern technological improvements in view of world-wide over-building of capacity. In view of its strategic importance, however, consideration might be given to subsidizing the industry as the Finns have done to enable the use of low-grade material and high technology.

b. Foreign producers. Japan was operating in 1970 at less than 50 per cent of capacity. Brazil, Turkey, West Germany, Yugoslavia, France, Norway and Sweden are all exporters of ferrochromes. Not all are higher than Rhodesian and South African material in price; Finnish ferrochrome sells at 20 per cent less.

c. Stockpile. As proposed by the General Services Administration in May, carefully timed releases from our stockpile can supply 20 to 25 per cent of our ferrochrome needs for as much as ten years.

If we allow Rhodesian and South African ferrochrome imports to undercut and eliminate the U.S. domestic ferrochrome industry, will be encouraging concentration of monopolistic power in the hands of these two apartheid states. Cut-throat competition will probably be followed by an era of higher prices when other producers have been driven out of business.

6. BREAKING SANCTIONS MAY MEAN THAT INDEPENDENT BLACK - RULED AFRICAN COUNTRIES WILL DENY THEIR TRADE AND RESOURCES TO THE UNITED STATE.

Black - ruled independent countries in Africa with whom the United States does far more trading and in which we have far more investment than in Rhodesia, such as Nigeria, are becoming increasingly insistent that the U.S. government cease supporting minority rule in the countries of southern Africa by our trade and investment there.

Washington Post writer David Ottoway reported from Nigeria on December 10, 1973:

...There is little appreciation here for what Nigerians regard as an American policy of strong support for white-ruled southern Africa and Portugal's colonial African wars.

With Nigeria now taking on a leadership role, the chances for a more open clash between /the United States and Nigeria / seem good and Nigeria is not without the means to pressure Washington over its African policy.

American business has a \$1 billion investment here already, mainly in the oil industry. The amount is likely to double over the next few years, making Nigeria more important to U.S. investors than South Africa.

Majority rule will eventually come to Rhodesia. When it comes, U.S. businesses will have to negotiate for access to chrome and nickel with a government representing the African people. If the United States continues to break sanctions, such negotiations may be blocked by African memories of our obstruction of their access to political rights.

QUESTIONNAIRE ON CONVERSATION WITH REPRESENTATIVE
ON RHODESIAN SANCTIONS LEGISLATION

Representative:

State:

District:

Visit or phone conversation?

With whom did you speak, the Representative or a staff aide? (Please give name.)

1. How do you perceive your Representative's current position on H.R. 8005 to renew full U.S. compliance with U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia?

2. What was your general feeling about the conversation? Did your Representative appear friendly, indifferent or hostile? Did he or she seem to be open, inattentive or fixed in his or her position?

If your Representative is still undecided?

3. What are the specific reasons your Representative gives for not coming out in support for the bill?

Do you need any additional information on these issues to follow up on your visit?

4. Do you have any other indications of how your Representative is likely to vote on H.R. 8005 (i.e., letter from him or her on this issue; how she or he voted recently on related issues)? Please enclose copy of any correspondence.

5. What additional work do you think needs to be done to influence your Representative to vote for H.R. 8005?

Are there particular people or groups in the district who you think would be likely to influence him or her?

6. Is he or she under pressure now from groups or individuals hostile to H.R. 8005? Who?

7. Do you have any recommendations for our lobbyists in Washington?

8. Who participated in the visit or call to your Representative?

Name: _____ Date of visit: _____

Address: _____

Phone number: _____

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