



Kader Asmal is quietly performing the miracle of regaining control of the country's water while keeping happy the farmers whom this will affect most, writes **Eddie Koch**

BOET VAN RENSBURG, the owner of a vast Highveld mtleie estate that is irrigated with some of the cheapest water in the world, is quite proud of the fact that farms like his are the main source of jobs and wages that give most people who live in the region of Middelburg the chance to have a decent life.

And it is those prospects, says Van Rensburg, not only his own substantial livelihood, that are at stake in the "quiet revolution" now taking place in the South African countryside: a carefully managed plan by Water and Forestry Minister Kader Asmal to regain ownership and control of the nation's rivers and underground water resources so that these can be controlled and shared out in an equitable way.

There is a fair amount of apprehension on the stoeps of the homesteads around the town of Middelburg, where Van Rensburg and his neighbours gather to drink coffee and discuss the politics of the day, about the fact that Cabinet has just approved Asmal's plans. The talk, though, is not of counter-revolution. It is about how to adapt to an inevitable reality.

"Water nationalisation will create a heavy opposition from the farmers," says the mtleie farmer. "But if the government is going to take our water so it can be shared with others downstream, then it must value that water and pay us for what is taken away. We think the government should concentrate on new methods of irrigation and water consumption that can save water for sharing. Otherwise these changes will destroy the goose that lays the golden egg for the people who live around here."

Van Rensburg's sentiments are phrased in a different language, but they do coincide with the basic premises that have allowed the water minister to proceed with plans to overhaul the country's water laws without the kind of brouhaha that surrounded the announcement of the government's land redistribution measures.

"While there remains an understandable apprehension in many circles about existing rights and other interests, even the farmers realise — and I say this after meeting with both representatives of organised agriculture, irrigation boards and individuals — even farmers realise that the right to take water from a dry river is worthless," said Asmal when he made a discussion document, on which his water coup is based, available earlier this year.

The pragmatism of people like Van Rensburg and his neighbours — an adaptability that has made them into the successful farmers they are — is probably based on an intuitive awareness that, like the air we breathe, water is a common asset that needs to be managed by the state.

Other countries in the Western world, especially semi-arid ones like South Africa, have long recognised this and have nationalised water management systems in place.

The situation in South Africa has for the last 100 years been very different. Farmers have literally been able to dam rivers, pump them dry and use boreholes to pump as much groundwater as they like while further downstream rural women can spend up to six hours a day filling their drums from collective standpipes in their villages.

Big commercial farmers use up more

than 50% of the nation's water when they irrigate their land in this way. At the same time, it is estimated that between 12- and 14-million people in South Africa have inadequate or no water supplies. A further 21-million people have no safe sanitation systems.

A study entitled *South Africa's Rich and Poor: Baseline Household Statistics* published by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (Sal-dru) at the University of Cape Town in 1994 notes that of the total rural population surveyed for the study, 46.4% said they rated piped water as the most important service that the new government should provide.

More than 56% of the population in the Northern Province listed water as their top livelihood priority. And it is estimated currently the average irrigation water required for one hectare of land is enough to meet the domestic needs of almost 900 rural villagers.

"Two primary legal constraints are 'private water' and 'riparian rights'. Private water essentially includes rainfall, soil water and ground water occurring on or underneath private land, together with streams which rise and flow over a single piece of private land," says Simon Forster in a paper on water reform written for the Land and Agriculture Policy Centre.

"The state has little control over what a private land owner does with his private water. South African water law does not recognise the hydrological cycle as an indivisible continuum, nor does it acknowledge water as a national asset ...

"Water flowing in a public stream [any stream which is not deemed to be private] is public water. However, private landowners can and do have rights to divert and use a portion of both the normal and surplus flow of a public stream. Riparian water rights form part of the title deeds of land and were originally granted when river utilisation was negligible.

"Today, with the immense pressure on water resources, riparian land owners are technically and legally capable of pumping many rivers dry, particularly during low flow periods."

Forster estimates that more than 65% of all water currently used in South Africa is either privately owned or used under historically obtained riparian rights. Private water used up by the accelerated pumping of groundwater, dryland and rainfed farming — including forest plantations — and the proliferation of small dams on farms has resulted in a huge decrease in water that reaches our rivers.

He adds: "When viewed in conjunction with the expansion in irrigation that has taken place during the last two decades, the conclusion can be made that a relatively small number of landowners now control the greater portion of the nation's utilisable water."

Last week the Cabinet endorsed a set of principles that, when they are turned into legislation next year, will end all that. The most important is a drastic change to the system which allows private ownership of water. In order to "provide a uniform system of allocation of water rights over which the state has complete control" it says

"there shall be no ownership of water but only a right to its use".

Then principles stress that, after regaining control over all water, the state's highest priority is to ensure that all South Africans receive enough water to meet basic human needs and ensure basic human health, estimated at "25 litres per person per day at a maximum cartage distance of 200m and of a quality which is not injurious to the health of the consumer".

Next on the list of priorities is the need to ensure that the amount of water abstracted from rivers or underground sources — for domestic supply, agriculture or industry — should not prevent aquatic river systems from functioning in a state that maintains their biological richness. "Developments such as dams, abstractions and changes in land-use practice should be planned using integrated environmental management procedures," they say.

The principles list a third urgency as being a sensitivity to the needs of countries which exist downstream of South African rivers. The "ecological reserve", that amount of water set aside to ensure adequate functioning of aquatic ecosystems, should be sufficient and clean enough to meet the environmental needs of neighbouring countries.

"The objective of the review is to achieve greater equity in access to water. It is therefore inevitable that a number of controversial issues are raised," said Asmal. These include suggestions that:

- The current system of riparian rights, which links the right to use water to a specific piece of land, would be abandoned.

- The uncontrolled use of underground water, made possible by its definition as "private water", should end.

- Water supply and sanitation services be regulated to ensure not only that all South Africans have access to

basic services but that the private sector should be harnessed to help provide them.

- Mandatory measures be made to require water suppliers to adopt conservation measures.

- Present controls on forestry, which intercepts a great deal of rainfall before it ever reaches public streams, could be extended to other land-use activities, such as sugar farming, which has similar impacts.

- The price of water would be set at a level which reflects its value — and pricing mechanisms should be the major tool for levering changes in the ways people use water.

The new principles steered through Cabinet last week are well crafted and designed to bring South Africa into line with modern water-management meth-

ods practised in most other parts of the world. But drafting the programme was the easy part. The critical challenge now will be to convert commercial farmers, a lobby that has long benefited from being the power base behind a minority ruling elite, to the new perspectives. Asmal

insists there will be no big grab. Change will come gradually, enforced primarily by changes in pricing policy rather than by edict.

His department has committed itself to help find more efficient irrigation systems, least wasteful cropping methods and more remunerative niche markets for crops that can fetch market prices with increased water costs built in. Without resorting to the old subsidy system, which encouraged the kind of inefficiency that is now being addressed, the government is willing to help the farmers reposition themselves.

Which is probably why, although Asmal and the South African Agricultural Union have yet to see eye-to-eye on the matter, Boet van Rensburg and his mates are talking about how to adapt to the forthcoming laws rather than to fight them.

Tutsis armed by South Africa

TUESDAY 19 NOVEMBER 1996

• THE INDEPENDENT

Exclusive

Michael Ashworth
Johannesburg

The war in central Africa has been fuelled by arms traders - who have links to South African military intelligence - selling weapons to the Zairean rebels.

After revelations that a firm based in Britain had supplied the Rwandan Hutus with weapons, *The Independent* has learnt that the opposing side - the Zairean rebels who are mainly Tutsi - are getting their weapons via both former and serving members of the South African services.

According to sources in the South African intelligence services, Ters Ehlers, a former personal assistant to the former S African state president PW Botha, is co-ordinating one of the operations, using his con-

tacts in South African industry and the armed forces. The United Nations has launched an investigation into his activities.

Mr Ehlers and his associates, who include a former colonel in military intelligence and a retired general from the South African National Defence Force, are using their considerable contacts in the shadowy world of the South African intelligence and arms community to orchestrate an illegal operation that is destabilising Africa.

Sources in the police and national intelligence service say that arms and ammunition are flown by C-130 transport aircraft from Lanseria airport near Johannesburg to the capital of Zaire, Kinshasa. From there the aircraft flies to destinations in Angola and Rwanda supplying weapons to both the Angolan rebel movement, Unita, and the

Zairean Tutsi groups. The arms are shipped as mining equipment by a company known as CMC, an Angolan-based company which is also registered in Zaire, according to the sources.

This allows the arms traders to fly the aircraft on a legitimate flight plan to Kinshasa on the pretext of supplying mining equipment. Once in Kinshasa it refuels and flies to airfields in the south-east of Zaire, Rwanda and Angola. The lack of any adequate air traffic control and

radar in Kinshasa enables the aircraft to fly to its destinations undetected.

A separate investigation is also being conducted by the South African police and the National Intelligence Service into a senior South African National Defence Force general and an ex-special forces officer who are alleged to be providing training to rebel and dissident groups throughout central Africa, including the Zairean Tutsis. The company being in-

vestigated is called Omega Support Ltd and is run by Johan Smith, South Africa's former military attaché in Angola.

Mr Smith also works for a company called Strategic Concepts which is also being investigated by the police. It is run by a former apartheid-era diplomat, Sean Cleary. As well as being an advisor to Jonas Savimbi, the Angolan rebel leader, Mr Cleary has also worked for the South African foreign affairs department and military intelligence.

It has been believed for some time that elements within the South African officialdom were pursuing an agenda outside governmental control. This is a theme that characterised the apartheid years but the aim is now different.

During apartheid, such activities were done primarily to destabilise South Africa's re-

gional neighbours to undermine opposition to the apartheid regime. Now the same policy continues but the rewards are financial rather than political.

Out of the myriad security organisations that evolved during apartheid and which, with minor transformations continue to this day, military intelligence is the "dark horse". It has been the least affected by the change of government and retains individuals in it that were very active in covert operations during apartheid.

According to Stephen Ellis of the African Studies Centre in the Netherlands: "The South African Defence Force and their intelligence organisations virtually escaped scrutiny into their role in covert operations whereas the police operations have been largely exposed and have crumbled."

Apartheid's former strongman lambasts S African witchhunt against Afrikaners

Cape Town (Reuters) - The former South African president P.W. Botha declared yesterday that he would never apologise for apartheid, and denounced what he called an assault on the Afrikaner by the country's new black rulers.

"I am not guilty of any deed for which I should apologise or ask for amnesty. I therefore have no intention of doing this," he said.

Mr Botha, aged 80, one of the last two surviving white apartheid presidents, made his remarks in a written statement after a private meeting with Archbishop Desmond Tutu

at a secret location. No media were allowed to witness the encounter.

Tutu heads a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, intended to heal the wounds of apartheid, which has heard from police officers that Botha almost certainly knew about the torture and murder of black activists.

Mr Botha, who became prime minister in 1978 and president in 1984, said: "I am deeply concerned about the fierce and unforgiving assault which is being launched against the Afrikaner and his language at all levels of society." He had

never associated himself with "blatant murder". But "there might have been instances during the conflict of the past where individuals have exceeded the limits of their authority.

"I cannot be expected to take responsibility for the actions of any such individuals."

He said reconciliation between former enemies could be achieved only by "closing the book on the past and focusing on the challenges of the future in unity.

"In many circles the Afrikaner is being isolated to be punished for all the unfavourable

events in the history of South Africa ... Concern exists that your commission is being abused in this campaign of revenge against the Afrikaner."

He said British colonialists and not Afrikaners had introduced race discrimination into South Africa. "The Afrikaner was a victim of (British) colonial greed ... The recent conflicts in which we were involved were primarily against Soviet imperialism and colonialism."

He asserted it was he who had begun the process of reform which led to Nelson Mandela being released from a life prison sentence in February 1990. He

also claimed responsibility for removing some racist legislation.

"As head of the government of the day - a legally effected government which was internationally recognised - I accept full political responsibility for the policies which were followed," Mr Botha said.

But he added that he and his former cabinet could not be expected to react to every allegation that came up during truth commission hearings.

"Your commission should provide me and the ex-ministers with a document comprehensively detailing all those aspects on which it requires

comment or clarification," he told Archbishop Tutu.

Mr Botha said evidence from a former police general to the commission that he had ordered the bombing of an office block in Johannesburg housing anti-apartheid activists was wrong. "These allegations are based on untested, unconfirmed and unsubstantiated hearsay."

Archbishop Tutu's commission has until the end of 1997 to unravel the human rights record of the war over apartheid, to pardon human rights offenders on both sides of the struggle, and to award limited compensation to victims.

FRIDAY 22 NOVEMBER 1996 • THE INDEPENDENT

Unita concerned for ally as Zaire's military crumbles

The Angolan rebel movement Unita is watching the situation in Zaire with increasing concern as the army of its main regional ally flees rebel advances. Several Unita generals have offered skills and troops to Zaire's ramshackle military, according to reports.

The generals made the offer to the Zairean army chief of staff, Gen. Eluki Monga Aundu, according to the Paris-based *Lettre du Continent*, but Unita officials have denied the report.

Jonas Savimbi's movement has consistently used Zaire as a sanctuary and as a supply route, including for the smuggling of diamonds, now Unita's main resource.

Up until now there are still direct flights between Kinshasa and Bailundo, Savimbi's headquarters in Angola.

Unita officials are particularly concerned that the military commander of the Lunda Sul province, Gen Sisuka, who is a Zairean Katangese, might be tempted to aid the eastern Zaire rebels led by Laurent Kabila. Like Sisuka, Kabila was born in Katanga, now Shaba province.

Gaetan Kakudji, spokesman for Kabila's People's Revolutionary Army, wears the Katangese cross, like the Katangese Gendarmerie and the Congo National Liberation Front. He is also a member of the Overseas Katangese Union, which groups members from all Katangese parties including members of Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza and Jean Nguz Karl-i-Bond's rival wings of the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans.

Unita's concerns are also motivated by the lack of improvement in the security situation in Angola itself. Fighting has been initiated by Luanda's Forças Armadas de Angola (FAA) troops in October in Bie, Huila and the two Lunda provinces, Unita claims.

Unita is showing misgivings on other issues.

•The Unita mouthpiece *Terra Angolana* recently published extracts from Angola's official gazette showing that former FAA chief of staff Gen. Antonio Franca 'N'Dalu' and the current ambassador to the US, Joao Baptista de Matos, have registered a security company called Teleservice, which has hired former recruits from the SA company Executive Outcomes.

•Parliament in Luanda has decided to extend its own mandate for a minimum period of two more years, until conditions are right for new elections.

•The government has at the same time "refused" to return rapid intervention force troops to barracks, says Unita.

All these are being seen by Unita as signs that the government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is unwilling to share power with the opposition.

This is the background reason why Unita is so concerned about its logistical support in Zaire. With the US arms embargo continuing it will need the backing of Zaire again in the event of a resumption of the war.

A report by the UN's military chief in Angola, Phillip Sibanda, accused the former rebels for not handing over all military equipment, but it is now accepted that they will not easily be able to return to conventional warfare, though they do have the capacity to re-launch a guerrilla war. For most of the years of the civil war Unita has held parts of the countryside with guerrilla tactics, while the government has held the towns and cities.

Unita maintains its strongholds in the central Huambo and Bie provinces. It is reluctant to take down military

control posts and has forbidden UN de-mining teams to clear roads through the areas.

At Andulo, another base used by Savimbi, the movement insists that the UN give advance notice of air or road patrols and refuses to allow searches of planes from Zaire.

The government has also been slow to withdraw its forces and confine them to barracks in some areas, especially in the diamond-rich Lunda Norte province, where armed guards watch over mining interests.

'Completely disarmed'

Unita's troops have been completely disarmed and have dismantled their command posts in the regions of Angola that they controlled, Unita leader Jonas Savimbi said on Wednesday.

Speaking on the movement's Radio Vorgan, Savimbi said Unita had implemented all the UN recommendations for demilitarisation by the November 20 deadline.

Almost 64,000 Unita soldiers have been registered in the 15 camps run by a multi-national UN military force, in line with the Lusaka peace accords of November 1994, but since that operation began a year ago, 12,000 of them have deserted.

The UN has asked Unita to help find the missing 12,000 men, but the former rebels have stated that their responsibility for them ended when they went into the camps.

Mercenary company admits approach from crisis region

Executive Outcomes, the SA security company which describes itself as a military consultancy, says it was approached by a government in the Great Lakes region last year for assistance, but refused.

Eeben Barlow, head of EO, said in a radio interview on Wednesday the company did not wish to become involved in an area in which there had been so much 'ethnic cleansing'.

There has been speculation that EO, which has supplied mercenaries to the Angolan government and to private companies in Sierra Leone, is involved in the crisis in the region (*SouthScan* v11/42 p335).

Barlow also told reporters in SA last week that illegal arms shipments to Angola were continuing from South Africa. His company knew of weapons currently being flow into Angola, two years after the signing of the Lusaka peace treaty.

Barlow denied that EO was involved in the arms shipments and he said his company had informed the SA government that the shipments continued.

The lucrative trade is likely to have provoked some commercial rivalry with allegations surfacing of another SA outfit selling arms in Central Africa and Angola. According to the London *Independent* newspaper, the Rwandan government-backed Zairean Tutsi rebels are receiving arms from freelance SA sources. One of the operations is being co-ordinated by Willem Ehlers, who was interviewed by the UN arms probe team which has just issued its report, the newspaper claims (*SouthScan* v11/43 p340). Ehlers told them that he had believed earlier arms sales had been to the Zairean government and had not been destined for Rwandan forces.

Ehlers' associates are reported to include a former colonel in military intelligence and a retired general from the SA National Defence Force. Arms are shipped as mining equipment by an Angolan-based company called CMC which flies them to Kinshasa from where they are transhipped to south-eastern Zaire, Rwanda and Angola.

At the same time the report claims that training for dissident forces throughout Central Africa is being provided through a SA company called Omega Support run by Johan Smith, SA's former military attache in Luanda, who also works for Strategic Concepts, run by former diplomat and Unita adviser Sean Cleary.



truth & reconciliation
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HURT AGAIN: Mandisa Pumeza

Rush of amnesty appeals expected

Several senior KwaZulu-Natal security policemen linked to the assassinations of prominent activists are poised to apply for amnesty.

Their Vlakplaas colleagues, currently appearing at a Johannesburg amnesty hearing, told the **Tribune** the men were monitoring the Johannesburg applications with a view to applying. They named Colonel Andy Taylor and former security chief Brigadier Jan van der Hoven as being among them.

Colonel Taylor was named during this week's special hearing of the Truth Commission on the assassination of trade unionist Rick Turner. Mr Turner's daughter Jann asked the Commission to subpoena Colonel Taylor.

The former security policeman was also named during the Eugene de Kock trial as having been involved in the murder of askari Goodwill Sikhakhane who was shot three times in a remote wooded area near Greytown in 1991.

Colonel Taylor is to appear in court later this year charged with the 1981 mur-

der of human rights lawyer Griffiths Mxenge. Taylor's lawyer, Christo Nel, on Friday denied Taylor intended applying for amnesty. "He is innocent of all charges. Why would he apply for amnesty? We will go to trial," Mr Nel said.

Colonel Taylor and Brigadier van der Hoven are expected to feature prominently during the amnesty application of former Vlakplaas commander Dirk Coetzee when he testifies in Durban on November 5.

Mr Coetzee, who is currently employed by National Intelligence, has also been charged with the Mxenge murder. Mr Coetzee told the Harms Commission that Brigadier van der Hoven ordered him to "get rid of Mxenge and make it look like a robbery".

KwaZulu-Natal Truth Commissioner Richard Lyster said Mr Coetzee was expected to name several former colleagues in his testimony and said he would not be surprised if there was a rush of amnesty applications before Mr Coetzee took the stand.

TONI YOUNGHUSBAND REPORTS

A daughter in search of her father's killer is left deeply hurt and disappointed by a security policeman's confession.

When former Vlakplaas operative Roelf Venter took the stand at an amnesty committee hearing in Johannesburg this week, Mandisa Pumeza believed she might at last come to know where her father's body lay buried.

The slightly-built, grey-haired man taking the oath in the dreary hearing room promised before God to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

He was applying for amnesty in connection with the 1985 disappearance of Mandisa's father Charles Siphon Hashe, Qaqawuli Godolozzi and Champion Galela. The three prominent Port Elizabeth activists are known as the Pebco Three.

An amnesty application calls for full disclosure but at the end of the colonel's testimony, Mandisa believed he had done nothing but make fools of her family. "I was more than prepared to forgive him but it was clear that he had no respect for our intelligence. All he managed to do was to hurt us more."

Colonel Venter, a retired security policeman and former Vlakplaas operative, told the hearing he had been involved in kidnapping the three men from Port Elizabeth's airport but he had no idea what had happened to them after that.

Askaris he brought down from Vlakplaas had bundled the Pebco Three into a minibus while he had watched from another vehicle.

He saw the three again later while he braaied and drank with colleagues. The activists had balaclavas over their faces but there were no apparent signs of injury and his colleagues told him interrogation had gone well.

Eliminated

"I am not aware of what precisely became of the three and I never heard what had happened but I assumed they had been eliminated because their bakkie had been destroyed" Colonel Venter said.

He had never asked. Newspaper reports at the time said that Siphon Hashe had been killed by a blow to the head with a pickaxe handle, Mr Godolozzi had been shot in the head. Mr Galela survived a day longer than the others because he claimed to be a police informer. When this could not be verified, he too was shot.

To this day, their bodies have never been recovered.

Was it reasonable, the amnesty committee asked Colonel Venter, to think that the three had died at the hands of the police?

"I think it is reasonable," he replied, "because I last saw them in the presence of police."

Mandisa has no doubt her father was killed by security policemen. It is the why and where that remain unan-

swered. "We need to know what happened to his body: we want to give him a decent burial," she told the **Tribune**, her soft voice breaking.

She remembers the last time she spoke to her father: it was shortly after she had been released from her own detention in Johannesburg.

"I was in detention for 15 months for ANC activities. During that time my father came to visit me once. That was the last time I saw him in person. When I was released we spoke on the phone and just three days after my release he disappeared."

It was her father who inspired her to join the struggle. "He was detained when I was three and after a while we came to believe we never had a father. My mother wanted to protect us from what was happening around us and his name was never mentioned.

Exile

"Then he came back shortly before my 14th birthday and he sat me down and explained the struggle to me."

Mandisa's own involvement in the fight for liberation forced her into exile where she remained for 10 years.

Her father visited her while she hid in Lesotho.

"He was a wonderful man. A man of patience and a good listener who gave support," she recalls.

His death brought little relief from persecution by security forces. "The police raided our home constantly. The day after my father disappeared they detained my mother for 30 days under emergency regulations.

The SADF then occupied our house for two weeks. The place was vandalised, the walls were full of bullet holes.

"It was my mother's strength that kept the family together."

Grey-haired Mrs Elizabeth Hashe gave evidence earlier this year at a human rights violations hearing of the Truth Commission and this week she flew up to Johannesburg to hear the policemen speak.

She and her five children will never give up their quest for the truth. The family have been to court three times in pursuit of Siphon Hashe's killers to no avail, but still they go on.

"We are going to sue the State, because it is their duty to reveal the truth."

There is a glimmer of hope in the subpoenas issued by the amnesty committee on Thursday which orders four other policemen linked by Colonel Venter to the Pebco Three to appear before the TRC on Monday.

Colonel Venter's testimony suggested the policemen, including Motherwell bomber Gideon Niewoudt, had more intimate contact with the slain activists, Mandisa is sceptical.

She's also not sure she has the strength to listen to another policeman's testimony. "I just don't want to hurt myself again. I don't know if I have the strength to go to that hearing and go through it all again."

David Beresford in Johannesburg sees little hope of reconciliation as apartheid horrors come out of closet

Whites thrust into heart of darkness

AFTER South African police interrogators had thrust a knife up the nose of suspected African National Congress activist Harold Sefola, he indicated he wanted to say something. When they untied him he sang the anthem of the liberation movement, *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika* (God Save Africa). The police promptly electrocuted him.

The tale of the death of Harold Sefola was one more item in a litany of horror unravelled last week in a shabby little room above Johannesburg's Victorian City Hall. The storytellers, who might have been mistaken for municipal bureaucrats in their glasses and brown and grey suits, were another five of the apartheid state's killers making a desperate bid for clemency before an amnesty committee of Archbishop Desmond Tutu's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

South Africa long had a reputation for the abuse of human rights. It was known the police often used torture to extract confessions and it was presumed they were responsible for the occasional killing — of detainees said to have hurled themselves out of police station windows, to have slipped on a bar of soap in the showers, or suffered other fatal accidents in circumstances that taxed credulity.

Now it has begun to dawn on at least white South Africans — those who have clung to the belief that atrocities committed in their name were the work of rogue members of the security forces — that the apartheid struggle was fought by their side in a state-sponsored cesspit of depravity.

'Prime Evil' — hit squad

He had 'respect' for Sefola 'because of the way he behaved in the process of us killing him'

commander Eugene de Kock, jailed last week for more than two centuries by a Supreme Court judge horrified by the killing machine created in defence of apartheid — began to bring that judgment home to the country. But the characterisation of de Kock as 'apartheid's most efficient killer' tended to individualise the horror of the crimes he admitted, even though he protested he was acting on the orders of security force commanders and the politicians who commanded them.

The confessions in Johannesburg City Hall, however, are putting it beyond doubt that atrocities were performed as part of a strategy that made the National Party government one of the world's most ruthless terrorist organisations.

The five appearing before the truth commission were members of the security branch based in the Northern Transvaal who are applying for amnesty for about 40 murders. Required to 'tell all' if they are to be pardoned, they seem to be holding back some of the more grisly details of their work.

Investigators for the Transvaal Attorney-General's office — frustrated by the amnesty application in their plans to bring the five to trial — are confident they have evidence the torture session leading to

the death of Harold Sefola and two other men was far more ghastly than their testimony allowed.

That testimony was shocking enough, despite Warrant Officer Paul van Vuuren's pious assurances that they treated their victims 'humanely' by giving them food and water before murdering them, and that he had 'great respect' for Sefola 'because of the way he behaved in the process of us killing him'.

Van Vuuren recounted how in 1987 they took the three ANC suspects to a field north of Pretoria and tortured them with a generator used to pump water for cattle. They shocked the other two men to death to frighten Sefola into talking and, after he had sung the ANC anthem, killed him, too. Electrocution was 'cleaner and quieter' than shooting them. The bodies were blown up with limpet mines, to put the blame for the killings on the ANC.

Blaming atrocities on the ANC was a standard tactic — an ironic one in the light of the Nationalist government's efforts to persuade the West (with considerable success in the case of Margaret Thatcher) that such killings were proof of the 'terrorist' nature of the ANC.

Another victim of the security branch whose death was blamed on the ANC was a troublesome homeland Cabinet Minister, Piet Ntuli. The Minister of Home Affairs in KwaNdebele, Ntuli was running a 'vigilante' organisation. Mbokotho (The Rock That Crushes), which was making it difficult for Pretoria to push the homeland to 'independence' under the 'grand apartheid' master plan.

With the help of the army's special forces, they attached a bomb to Ntuli's car and blew him up by remote control. 'It would have been a serious embarrassment for the government of the day to arrest him,' explained Brigadier Cronje.

Murder was seen as an easy way to overcome the difficulties of arrest and prosecution. Captain Jacques Hechter recalled how, on the orders of the head of the security branch, General Basie Smit, he had attempted to kill a 'troublesome' Roman Catholic priest, Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa — now South Africa's Deputy Minister of Education.

They tried to shoot him at Durban's airport with rifles fitted with special silencers, but gave up after failing to get a clear line of sight. He was then ordered by General Smit to abduct the priest and stuff mandrax tablets down his throat to make it appear he had died of an overdose. Hechter refused, on practical grounds.

But the story that appeared to stun the truth commissioners most was an account by Brigadier Cronje of how in 1986 they 'recruited' 10 young activists to undergo training with the ANC in Botswana. A police undercover agent plied them with beer and drove them in a minibus into an ambush near the border post of Nietverdiend.

These members of the Special Forces dragged the youths out, forced them to lie on the ground and injected them with a chemical — presumed to be a fatal poison. They were loaded back into the vehicle which was pushed over an embankment and blown up with explosives. The intention was to make it appear they were ANC guerrillas carrying a bomb into South

Africa who had crashed and blown themselves up.

Brigadier Cronje and Colonel Roelof Venter disclosed to the commission that the victims of such atrocities were chosen by a high-level unit called Trewits — a counter-revolutionary intelligence target centre. At its monthly meetings, anti-apartheid activists were identified for elimination. Both officers insisted that Trewits operated with the approval of the State Security Council, chaired by the then President of South Africa, P. W. Botha.

But, as horror after horror is dragged out of the closet, questions are being asked about the ability of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to achieve the second of its declared aims.

Harold Sefola's widow, Lizzie, is one who has doubts. She told the amnesty committee: 'We're still feeling the pain. These people never came to ask us for forgiveness. The government is doing this on our behalf... It is people who should forgive each other, not the government.'

The challenge that contemporary scholars face with respect to explaining the complex notion of development in the context of social groups is to isolate and focus upon the linkages that develop between the interacting individuals or parties concerned. In this context, it becomes wrong to assume that just because a particular person represents a specific group or institution, or belongs to a particular social category, he necessarily acts in the interests or on behalf of these others. In the study of development, especially among the more marginalized, the link between representa-

tives and constituencies, with their differentiated membership, needs to be empirically established, and should not be taken for granted.

This article focuses on Basarwa, a marginalized minority ethnic group in Botswana. Basarwa are also known as bushmen, or, sometimes, the San. The first label is used here since this has become favored by the groups discussed. The area of focus is the Gantsi district where Basarwa, who form 20% of the population of this district, are more concentrated than anywhere else in the country. In particular, focus is on the Basarwa in the settlement of

Xade, within the Central Kalahari game reserve (CKGR).

The article shows that the development path taken by Basarwa in Xade is an outcome of struggles between the Basarwa, their representatives, the national government, the representatives of donor organisations as well as the representatives of NGOs that purport to support their cause. What transpires in Xade cannot be explained only by the intervention of public authorities or of powerful outsiders. It is a direct consequence of the interactions, negotiations and social and cognitive struggles that take place among social actors.

At the end of a phase of intervention from different organisations, the Basarwa have experienced some social transformation. Although such transformation re-structures their traditional social organization and conforms it along the lines of the social organization of the dominant non Basarwa groups, it remains debatable if Basarwa can be said to have achieved any improvement in the quality of their lives or to have realized development of the kind they want. Apparently, the end result of the intervention by the benefactors has been an exchange, among the Basarwa, of one form of poverty for another.

The Basarwa Question in Botswana

In order to preserve both the Basarwa and the wildlife, the colonial government decided in 1961 to set up the game reserve (CKGR) which measures 561 square kilometers. Basarwa were to remain inside this game reserve and in it 15 boreholes were to be drilled and equipped for their use and also for use by wildlife.

In 1974, the post-colonial government of Botswana established the post of Bushman Development Officer which eventually became the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in a bid to accommodate non Basarwa who lived in the remote areas along with Basarwa.


The RADP is funded largely by the Norwegian government through its development agency, NORAD. The main concern of the Norwegians is the welfare of Basarwa. There are also NGOs, both local and foreign, which give various types of assistance to RADs in general and to Basarwa in particular. Yet, the different donor organisations, NGOs and the Botswana government all have a different conceptualization of the ideal pattern of development for Basarwa.

It may be necessary to begin with the Botswana government's view, since the other benefactors have emerged with the aim of either complementing it in part, or, in some cases, with the aim of opposing it. Broadly, government's policy is to foster the "integration" of Basarwa into the

mainstream Tswana communities. Government considers this to be the best way to address the question of marginalization of Basarwa. Accordingly, the government took two steps with respect to Basarwa who have been living inside the CKGR since 1961. The first step was to group all of them in one settlement called Xade, inside the game reserve, with the aim of improving services. In 1986, government reversed itself in a second step, which was to relocate them outside the game reserve, so that they could have access to land sufficient for them to carry out such development projects as they were capable of implementing.

Politicization of Basarwa

Meanwhile, Basarwa were gaining social and political consciousness, especially between 1961 and 1986, when many of them experienced rapid social change. Much of the enlightenment began as a corollary to the Tribal Land Act. The Tribal Land Act of 1968



The Basarwa of Botswana

Leadership, Legitimacy and Participation in Development Sites

by Isaac Ncube Mazonde

gave land rights to members of the different tribes and excluded Basarwa who were not recognized by the Act as tribesmen. The inequity of the Tribal Land Act was intensified by the implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) seven years later, in 1975. This policy allowed ranches to be demarcated in communal grazing areas in districts with enough land. Basarwa living on such grazing lands were evicted by the ranchers without compensation because, not being members of any tribe, they were regarded as having no rights to the land they had been occupying.

This sparked a land rights movement among Basarwa. Both in communal and commercial areas of Botswana, they protested the treatment they received and took their complaints to district councils and appealed against allocations of land by land boards in their areas. Some of them talked to the media, arguing vociferously that they were not being treated fairly. It was at this time that NGOs, both within Botswana and outside, came into the scene on the side of the Basarwa, who were manifestly being discriminated against by the government and the dominant Tswana groups.

Partly influenced by organisations in Namibia and with the assistance of foreign groups, Basarwa in 1992 established the "First People of the Kalahari." This pressure group promotes the rights of Basarwa, and consists of representatives from the different Basarwa groups within Botswana. The

organization met with government in 1993 to outline important issues to their constituents: land rights, political representation in councils, parliament and the house of chiefs, and the right to education in mother tongue languages for their children. Botswana's official policy is that only Setswana is recognized and used as the vernacular language in schools.

A conspicuous consequence of the association that Basarwa have enjoyed with various organisations and the outside world is the heightening of their understanding of political affairs, manifested clearly in their participation in party politics. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, there had been little evidence of any significant participation of Basarwa in Botswana's politics at national or local levels. There were no Basarwa councilors or Members of Parliament, even in the Gantsi district where they are mostly concentrated. But in 1989, the pattern of the participation of Basarwa in politics changed dramatically in Gantsi district, due to stimulation from the Botswana National Front (BNF), the main opposition political party to the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Out of 20 candidates, seven Basarwa ran for office of councilor. In two cases, there were Basarwa running against Basarwa. Two were elected. Voter registration increased by 67%, due to high participation by Basarwa. The BNF swept all council seats in Gantsi (7 seats) in Basarwa areas.

CKGR and the Legitimacy of Basarwa Spokesmen

The current government position is that Basarwa remain within the game reserve to their own detriment—it is in their own interest to move out. In fact, government has another reason for wanting Basarwa to re-locate outside the game reserve. The country wants to make wildlife-based tourism a major

industry in the next National Development Plan currently under discussion. In other words, government sees moving Basarwa out of the game reserve as something that will also be for the benefit of the entire nation.

Notwithstanding the advance made by Basarwa in terms of their political participation, and particularly in demanding their rights, there is great difference between the position taken by the majority of Basarwa and that by their spokesmen on the issue of moving out of Xade. Many Basarwa appear to see sense in the position of the government. It is Botswana's policy to give Basarwa cattle to live on, in the way common to many Batswana. This cannot be done in a game reserve like Xade where cattle are exposed to predators disease carried by game animals. This has been the reason given for the dis-

trict council's refusal to allocate cattle to Basarwa in Xade. Their desire to get cattle may be one reason why many of them in Xade eventually accepted to move out of the game reserve. The spokesmen, in contrast, are fighting for the right to stay in Xade.

The spokesmen—the leaders of the First People of the Kalahari—were not elected by Basarwa but were brought together by sponsors for conferences funded by aid agencies, particularly NORAD. The position taken by these agencies and the spokesmen of the Basarwa is that the distinct identity of the Basarwa must be maintained and that remaining in a wildlife area—a classic hunting ground—is their right.

Government is capitalizing on the difference of opinion between the Basarwa and their spokesmen, interpreting it as an indication that the Basarwa spokesmen do not represent the views of Basarwa but of themselves and their sponsors, the foreign NGOs. It argues that Basarwa spokesmen are trying to use the plight of the rest of Basarwa for their own economic advantage. The publicity and economically advantageous foreign trips that the spokesmen enjoy can only last as long as the bulk of Basarwa remain backward and isolated. Hence, continues the government, such spokesmen are bent on doing everything in their power to keep other Basarwa in their

current situation of deprivation. A somewhat complementary view, expressed by others apart from the government, is that in insisting that Basarwa be "preserved" in their pristine form, the sponsors of the Basarwa spokesmen refuse to recognize that most Basarwa have long given up "pure" hunting-gathering and are guilty of preserving for Basarwa tourists.

Whatever the case, Basarwa have not gained from the discord between the different parties to this development dispute. For the past 13 years,

since 1986, they have been waiting for developments which have not been forthcoming. This is not to suggest that efforts to change the social organization of Basarwa have failed. Over time, and with the encouragement of the government and certain NGOs, Basarwa in Xade have adopted a Tswana type social structure which is centered around a formally appointed chief. It is unclear how becoming more Tswana-like in their social and political organization fits with the claim made by their spokesmen that their separate identity as a "minority people" should be recognized. One major factor catalyzed their becoming more sedentary. In the drought period of the early to mid 1980s, most Basarwa subsisted on maize meal, oil and powdered milk which they obtained from government drought

relief programmes. Currently, some 80-90% of Basarwa are estimated to depend on government drought aid mechanisms. Such dependence would throw doubt on assuming that adopting certain Tswana ways, such as chiefship, reflects greater political participation by Basarwa.

Conclusion

The current dependence of Basarwa on government for sustenance is an outcome, and hopefully not a culmination, of a long, complex and on-going process in which different forces oppose each other over certain issues whilst supporting each other over others, with limited gains for each, and no outright winner. The Basarwa, in their attempt to wrest the best from every force, are only able to transform their social organization in

line with the structure of the mainstream Tswana social organization. While this may enhance their ability to organize socially and politically, it still proves insufficient for empowering them economically, at least for the time being.

Unfortunately for the Basarwa, the intervention of the government, ostensibly on their behalf, has turned out to be merely an extension of state control over them, and not a gain in development. Apparently, Basarwa realize this, hence their support for an opposition political party which identifies with their cause. Moreover, Basarwa have continued to suffer economic exploitation through low wages, which at P25 (US\$8) per month, are well below the average monthly rural household income, which was P104 (US\$35) in 1991. Basarwa realize they are now economically bonded to the state, with no tangible development benefits for them. Nor do they always discern much help from their spokesmen, who clearly do not represent the majority Basarwa view. In particular, the role played by the spokesmen facilitates the participation of Basarwa in some instances, while interfering with such participation in other instances. Such is the complexity of "development" at a site. ■

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Garden of Eden on edge of disaster

The Observer 17 November 1996

Ruaridh Nicoll in Botswana finds the 'great oasis' of the Okavanga in peril of drying up as new Africa quenches its insatiable thirst

PUSHING gently at the stream's sandy floor, Worm eases the mokoro canoe through the thick reeds that border the banks of the Boro. He stops to point to a distant line of trees that used to mark the banks of a great river and then, as if to prove a point, he knocks past a wrecked mokoro that has become wedged across the channel's new breadth.

The sweltering silence is broken by an elephant, a little to the left, which rips at branches, feeding itself lethargically with its trunk.

Downriver the water ends in a large pool which tumbles to emerging hippos. Worm treats the place with respect; he believes a large snake lives in its depths drinking the river dry. Around about, the land lies lazily like pottery glazing in a kiln, creatures emerging and departing on hazy, washed-out backgrounds. Overhead the Kalahari sun burns deep, claiming the once great waters of the Okavanga back for itself. Quietly poling, Worm says that he has never seen the water so low; that he fears for his job.

Fifty or so miles to the south, Dr Karen Ross, holding her straw hat down against the grey dust wind, leaves her office. She has just seen a letter published in one of Botswana's national newspapers accusing her of spreading 'the sort of careless propaganda that may encourage green activists to take up arms, go ballistic or even ignite the water bomb waiting to explode on [Botswana's] northern border'. Ross, head of Conservation International's Okavanga project, is angry.

Beyond her a Cessna lifts off from Maun's runway. It banks and heads north, ferrying tourists to the camps in the delta beyond.

The greatest oasis on the planet, it supports 164 species of mammals, 540 types of bird

and enough plants, fish, insects and amphibians to employ David Attenborough for a lifetime. Larger than Wales, the delta is the shattered remains of a river which empties into the Kalahari, a river which winds back through Namibia and up to its source in the Angolan heights.

On its way it passes a place called Rundu where Botswana's neighbouring state of Namibia plans to draw off water in an effort to quench the drought that threatens its capital city.

Windhoek's reservoirs have fallen to 10 per cent of capacity; nearly 40,000 livestock have died so far. The only answer, the Namibians say, is to build a 155-mile pipeline from the Okavanga river. 'If we don't build the pipeline and the rains fail again ...' says Peter Heyns, the senior Namibian water engineer. 'To put it bluntly, we'll be in the shit.'

Many of the residents of Maun, not least Ross, are deeply concerned by this plan. They themselves are suffering badly from the lack of water. For the first time in memory the river did not reach the town during the annual flood. Much of the town's water is drawn from boreholes, but now the water table is dropping fast.

Ross sees the pipeline as not only unimaginative but also as a dangerous precedent. And she is not alone. For the white population of the area, demanding responsibility from the Namibians is a matter

of saving the delta. For the black communities, it means saving themselves.

Kehemetswe Saozo sits on an animal skin chair in the shade of his house in Ditshepi, a village in the heart of the delta itself. His clothes are stone-washed by the abrasive Kalahari sands and his face looks weary. 'If the water dries up it will be the end of our lives,' he says quietly. 'All the things of our lives are solely dependent on it.'

The Okavanga problem is precursor of things to come. As peace comes to the whole southern African region and development booms, rivers are being used to their maximum. South Africa itself expects to run out of fresh water in the first quarter of the next century and its engineers are already looking north.

The various governments are signing deals to avoid the inevitable confrontations. The Okavanga, however, is different: it is unique and development could cost the world, and more importantly Botswana, one of its greatest natural assets.

Two weeks ago, the Namibian team flew to Maun to pacify the residents. Heyns found himself facing the white population, a mish-mash of safari operators, hunters and frontier flotsam. He argued that the Namibian pipeline would extract only a small percentage of the Okavanga's water and that, given the situation in his country, he had no choice but to go ahead.

He pointed out that it is war-torn Angola that the people of the delta needed to worry about. There was one man notably absent from the meeting, the author of the letter to Ross. Peter Smith knows more about the water of the delta than any other living soul. Sitting on his porch, set amid a 12-acre plot on the edge of the dry bed of yet another offshoot of the Okavanga, he explains why he agrees with Heyns.

'Angola is still in a very poor state, but this is where the greatest threat to the delta lies. Once the country becomes peaceful, people will start settling beside the river. You can't tell them, "OK, you can live there, but don't drink any water".'

Both Smith and Heyns make pessimistic noises about the delta's future. 'The delta's going to shrink,' says Smith. 'In the past we have never had it so good, but people don't realise those days have gone.'

In Maun that view is not acceptable. The whites, many of whom have spent more than a decade building up businesses, know they can still move off if all goes wrong, but local people have no such option. Tawana Moremi, the young paramount chief of the delta, is taking six months off from his duties. Energetic, intelligent and bitter from the pressures he faces, he sits drinking in one of the safari camps that dot the edge of Maun's dry river. 'I don't like this pipeline very much,' he says, morose from alcohol. 'We should buy more planes and bomb it.'

Although far-fetched — Botswana has no history of violence towards its neighbours

— confrontation between Namibia and Botswana is an idea often raised. Botswana recently tried to buy tanks from Europe but the deal has been scotched, most think by a plea from Namibia. 'There has been the suggestion that the Botswana want to buy tanks to shoot at the Namibians because they want to steal water

from the Okavanga,' said Heyns. 'That is nonsense, the two things are not connected.'

'We were told in June that Namibia had a serious drought problem,' said Mmemei Sekwale, leader of Botswana's delegation to Okacom, a commission set up by Namibia, Botswana and Angola to ensure prudent use

of the river. If Sekwale is angry that Namibia has superseded Okacom, he does not show it: 'The position of Botswana is that we cannot oppose a feasibility study; under the circumstances we can only ask to be kept informed.'

But that does not go so far as to allow the pipeline to be built. In recent years the Bo-

swana government wanted to dredge an area of the delta but, realising that the effects might prove disastrous, it ditched the plan. It may not view others' irresponsibility charitably.

That people are paranoid about the delta is hardly surprising. Beyond the staggering array of wildlife is a place


filled with a diversity of strange people living cheek-by-jowl with a world that occasionally devours them — 'Don't become a meal,' is a common motto.

Ross points out the work her organisation carries out in its attempt to bring prosperity to the area, arguing that she has to get involved in politics.

'If we don't fight policy decisions that could kill the delta then all this is worth nothing,' she says pointing to her organisation's achievements.

The delta itself is robust enough to survive anything — except the water being turned off. If that happens then a garden of Eden returns to Kalahari dust.

'If the water dries up it will be the end of our lives. Our lives are solely dependent on it'



The train to Zimbabwe is helping revive Mozambique's ravaged economy, writes **Mary Braid**

In the bad old days of the bush war between Mozambique's Frelimo government and the dreaded, South-African backed Renamo guerrillas, the day-long train trip from the port of Beira to Mutare (formerly Umtali), just inside the Zimbabwean border, required the protection of 9,000 Zimbabwean troops.

The foreign force patrolled every mile of the line, routing Renamo saboteurs. Guns clutched ready, its soldiers also rode in the carriages, a reassuring presence for those who still braved the line.

Four years of peace make a difference. Today, as we pull out from Beira station - an enormous, soulless building left behind by the Portuguese - and chug across the endless miles of mangrove, the only would-be terrorists are tiny boys who run from villages of thatched huts to level imaginary machine guns and spears at the passing train.

With the 16-year civil war over, the track, which was laid a century ago by the British to

link land-locked Rhodesia to the sea, is no longer a military target. Once again it carries the hope of prosperity. This time Mozambicans - not their colonisers - may gain.

The Beira Corridor project is almost complete and aims to revive the fortunes of the line, the port and the region. The war left Mozambique bankrupt and wholly dependent on foreign aid, with Beira and its hinterland particularly badly hit. European donors have financed the dredging of the harbour, the overhaul of the dilapidated port and the building of an oil terminal. Beira, with bags of spare capacity, is now struggling to lure trade from Durban and lucrative Zimbabwean freight. Progress is slow.

Passengers are delighted with investment in the line, and travel to and fro inland villages to buy fresh produce which then finds its way back to market. Some travel all the way to the border to buy cheap Zimbabwean sugar and butter which they sell at a profit at home.

Peace means the journey is

taken with a lighter heart. But in the packed, chocolate brown carriages used since the days of the Portuguese, war still haunts the psyche.

The locals gossip about a famous female Renamo guerrilla leader, made immune to bullets by a traditional healer. Before leading her men into battle she would strip naked and her troops would take turns to crawl through her legs. This ritual apparently spread her invincibility.

That peasants still believe in the power of medicine men is not surprising.

One man whispers that their magic is so potent they can make a woman menstruate for a solid 12 months. But the carriage's urban professionals are believers too. A hush falls over the carriage as a teacher, a devout Muslim, talks of a terrorist attack in which carriages were derailed and passengers killed. The carriages, he says, still lie by the track.

"At night you can still hear people talking and the train moves," he says. I laugh, con-

vinced he is joking. He shakes his head gravely. "Maria you should believe. Such things happen here."

From the start the line took lives. When it was laid, hundreds died from dysentery, malaria and attacks by wild animals.

Today Joaquim Lucio, 45, is a passenger. But for 20 years he has driven trains from Beira to Zimbabwe. Before it was defended by Zimbabwean troops, he remembers the line was a target for Smith's Rhodesian

regime. When Renamo stepped in as chief saboteurs every journey Mr Lucio made might have been his last. At certain points, he tells fellow passengers, his hair stood on end and the blood raced. The medicine man was about all there was left to turn to. If Renamo did not get you, the government surely would.

"You were scared even to be sick," he says. "If you had to stay off work Frelimo would think you were a Renamo supporter and come and take you to jail.

"Then there was always a chance that Renamo would ...

kidnap you to stop you operating the trains. That happened to some friends." Five of them died.

And he remembers the time before the war when the white Rhodesians came down to Beira in their thousands to lie on the beaches, eat the famous prawns and have sex with the prostitutes.

But Mr Lucio never took the Rhodesians to the coast. "Only white Portuguese engine drivers were allowed to work on those trains," he says. "They said that we Mozambicans lacked skills but even the ticket collectors had to be white."

The Portuguese bought the line in 1949 and showered luxuries such as fridges and stoves upon train drivers. The trains ran twice the speed they can today, for the track and rolling stock were in good repair. Today carriages are filled to bursting and people spill over into corridors; poor tracks make journeys tortuously slow.

There is much for a train enthusiast like Mr Lucio to miss as Beira struggles to rise from

Having rich South Africa as a neighbour is a mixed blessing, writes **Mary Braid**

Maputo - "I've come to dance for the Kafirs," revealed the skinny-hipped stripper on the short flight from Johannesburg to Maputo, her first trip out of South Africa.

Convinced that Maputo was a South African-style, tribal homeland, she gasped at the Mozambican capital's high-rise buildings and the miles and miles of deserted golden beaches to the north and south.

Looking forward to the "Kafir" audience - less crude than the fat Boers she danced for back home - she was in for another surprise. In Maputo these days, and particularly on a holiday weekend, white South Africans are just as likely as Mozambicans to be ogling.

Before Mozambique's devastating 16-year civil war, Lourenco Marques, as Maputo was known, was where South Africans came to escape the corset-tight morality of home

and experience racially-mixed thrills. Now the war is over, ordinary South Africans are returning. They are coming not just to play, but to set up shop. Living next door to Africa's economic giant is a mixed blessing for Mozambique, one of the world's poorest countries and one left bankrupt by war.

The old South Africa, whose policy of destabilising its neighbours included backing Mozambique's Renamo rebels, regularly mounted military raids across the border.

In Maputo, the post-apartheid South African invasion is expedited not by tanks but by Land Rover Discovery four-wheel drives.

As the city takes its first faltering steps on the road to recovery, it is the Land Rover owners who are opening restaurants and starting businesses.

The Polana hotel, recently refurbished, is the jewel in the in-

vestors' crown. At weekends it is stuffed with South African tourists and on weekdays it operates like a luxury base camp for South African investors.


Some welcome their rich neighbour. At the Costa do Sol restaurant, on the coast, 200 Polana guests are being unloaded. It creates a peculiarly Mozambican tourist scene; the white South African army marching towards white-clothed tables, watched by poor Mozambicans who live on the beach. Nearby is a local bride, all white satin and tiara, swigging Fanta from a can during a break from seaside wedding pictures.

South African visitors have already paid for the Costa do Sol's first refurbishment in years, delighting its owner. But some mutter darkly about colonisation. They complain that the majority of South Africans come up for the weekend in their 4x4s, laden with provisions. "They buy nothing from us and use us like a play-

ground," said one local man. "They destroy the sands with their vehicles and shoo locals off the beach."

While much is made of Mozambique's potential to develop into one of the world's premier eco-tourist locations, further up the coast South African entrepreneurs are reportedly taking advantage of the post-war administrative vacuum and setting up illegal tourist enterprises. "Few politicians will say it in public but South Africa is going to eat us up," one Mozambican warned.

This resentment may increase. For this is just a vanguard. The new \$6 trillion Maputo Corridor Development, in which South Africa and Mozambique are partners, aims to boost trade between the two countries by improving road, rail and communications links between Johannesburg and Maputo and breathing life into the moribund Maputo port, which operates at a tenth of its pre-war capacity. In the next three years,



The aim is to increase traffic from 25,000 to 100,000 containers, offering South Africa, as well as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, as an alternative to the congested port of Durban.

Economic enslavement to a stronger neighbour is a legitimate fear. But South Africa has many reasons to help Mozambique. A more prosperous Mozambique may stem the flood of illegal immigrants. The ANC is also grateful for its support during the apartheid years. President Nelson Mandela is even believed to have lobbied for Mozambique to join the Commonwealth.

Some investors want to do more than make a quick buck. The previous South African regime may have helped devastate the country, but many young South Africans are caught up in the romance of rebuilding it.

Tourism could aid Mozambique's recovery but until the infrastructure improves, further economic expansion is impos-

sible. Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano recently complained that South Africa is making inroads into neighbours' markets without opening up its own. But Mozambique, the poorest and weakest kid on the block, is in no position to shout too loudly.