



ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICAN SCHOLARS  
 P.O. Box 791, East Lansing, MI 48823

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ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICAN SCHOLARS  
 1979 ANNUAL MEETING

The annual membership meeting of ACAS for 1979 will be held from  
 Saturday, MAY 19 to Monday, MAY 21, 1979  
 at  
 HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Please keep this weekend free.

Plan to attend for a full program including:

- Saturday, May 19 . panel sessions on current Southern Africa events and trends
- . address on U.S. Africa policy by prominent Washington spokesperson
- Sunday, May 20 . workshops on ACAS objectives vis-a-vis U.S. policy
- . ACAS business meeting including election of new officers and ratification  
                          of ACAS constitution
- Monday, May 21 . ACAS lobbying on Capitol Hill

Hotel accommodation will be available at Harambee House, adjacent to the Howard University campus.

Membership dues are now due from  
all ACAS members (old and new).

ACAS MEMBERSHIP DUES are based on income:  
 Income under \$10,000 . . . . . \$10.00  
 Between \$10,000 - 20,000 . . . . \$20.00  
 Over \$20,000 . . . . . \$30.00  
 Students/unemployed . . . . . \$ 7.50

Please send dues for 1978/79 to:  
 Tom W. Shick  
 Dept. of Afro-American Studies  
 University of Wisconsin  
 Madison, WI 53706

**join ACAS now!**

MEMBERSHIP REGISTRATION FORM

Name . . . . .  
 Mailing address . . . . .  
 . . . . . (zip) . . . . .  
 Affiliation . . . . .  
 Office phone . . . . . Home phone . . . . .

# ACAS STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA

ADOPTED BY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

April 1978

The Association of Concerned African Scholars supports the struggle of the masses of the South African people to rid themselves of the autocratic and repressive rule of a racist and minority regime. We believe that the issue in South Africa is one of making the state accountable to all the people of that society. Only then is a socially, politically and economically just society possible. We doubt that achieving such fundamental change can be accomplished without considerable violence and turmoil. We are certain that the substantial involvement of the United States government as well as business corporations and private organizations has, over the years, worked to strengthen the regime rather than promote such change.

We see no basic analogy between the struggle of the South African people and the "Civil Rights Movement" of recent years in the U.S. There is not the required recognition of the existence of political rights of citizenship and participation to achieve the implementation of which a civil rights movement might struggle. The group now controlling state power in South Africa will have to be displaced by representatives of the masses. We believe that it is in the U.S. national interest to support and to speed the process of change that is needed in South Africa.

In light of this conception of the situation we reject as irrelevant and ineffective the so-called Sullivan Principles which assume that the U.S. corporations can do more good than harm by remaining active in South Africa and by trying to improve the working conditions of their African workers. The American corporations employ too few Black workers, probably no more than 70,000 out of a work force of at least 5.6 million, to be able to make a substantial difference in the general social and economic patterns. And yet, the continued presence and functioning of these corporations aids the regime very directly, not only in the form of tax revenues, but perhaps more importantly, by providing needed technology, management skills, connections with important external lending sources, prestige, and in light of recent South African government actions, supply of equipment and material of direct utility to the South African military.

We call for the application of economic sanctions against South Africa with the aim of weakening the government and encouraging those individuals and groups which are committed to equal social, political and economic rights for all members of the South African society.

We believe that the campaign for corporate withdrawal from South Africa should be taken up by those in university and college campuses that have so effectively organized "divestment" campaigns and have brought this issue to the attention of the American public. Such institutions should exercise their stockholder rights to have the cor-

porations withdraw from South Africa. For very few of these businesses are their operations there more than a very minor part of their assets, and although such operations may have been much more profitable than those elsewhere, the risk of disruption is rising and threatening their economic performances. More importantly, continued involvement in South Africa may jeopardize access for American firms, if not American people, throughout the rest of the continent, where the opportunities far outweigh those in South Africa. Thus, rather than use stockholder resolutions to support the Sullivan Principles which, although humane in intent, merely put the gloss of good intentions on sordidness, the churches and colleges, etc. should be leading the way for the general citizenry to achieve the legislative and corporate decisions that will eliminate this American support of exploitation and repression.

We also believe that the Congress should prohibit all additional investment in South Africa, and should prohibit loans and credits to the South African government and private institutions. Facilities of the Export-Import Bank should certainly be denied.

The United States should support the relevant United Nations resolutions regarding the economic, diplomatic and military isolation of South Africa, for example, General Assembly Resolution 31/6 of November, 1976.

We believe that the United States can and should support the liberation struggle in South Africa, which is the kingpin for all Southern Africa and the key basis of our policy orientation to the region.

\* \* \* \* \*

## GETTING OURSELVES TOGETHER

The present ACAS executive feel the need to formalize the organization of the Association of Concerned African Scholars. A constitution and set of by-laws are being drafted under the leadership of Robert Johnson. ACAS members with suggestions on the content of these documents should contact Professor Robert C. Johnson, Jr., University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125.

\* \* \* \* \*

## ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

*THE U.S. AND THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: EVIDENCE, DENIAL AND REFUTATION.* By Sean Gervasi. Southern Africa Pamphlets #2, published by the Fernand Braudel Center, SUNY-Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13901.

*THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, THE RHODESIAN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, AND AMERICAN CHURCHES.* By Gretchen Eick. Available from United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society, 475 Riverside Drive, NY, NY 10027.

## UPDATE ON NAMIBIA

George Shepherd  
University of Denver

The failure of the Western powers to force South African acceptance of the United Nations plan for transition in Namibia is a clear indication that the Western liberal policy of working with the so-called "pragmatic" elements of Afrikaner rule is unviable. The right wing under P.W. Botha has taken full power in South Africa and this must be met directly by external pressures, not concessions.

The ACAS has been skeptical of the Western Contact Group's strategy from the beginning, as indicated by the resolution adopted last June during the height of these negotiations. The latest events bear out our assessment that the Western powers have not seriously intended to call South Africa's bluff over the independence of Namibia but have continuously sought compromise and allowed themselves to be maneuvered into a position where they will ultimately wind up accepting a rigged election and another internal settlement like the Salisbury agreement. (Smith's admission to the U.S. was a "de facto" recognition.)

Prime Minister P.W. Botha has been opposed to any scheme which would permit SWAPO even a chance at taking power peacefully. It was Botha who ordered the attack on the Cassinga base of SWAPO in Angola last May, when the U.N. plan was before the Security Council, and it is he who has carried the day in the Cabinet with the argument that "the Marxist terrorists" must not be permitted to participate. Thus the South African administration in Namibia under Judge Marthinus Steyn has steadily continued to arrest and harass SWAPO leaders. They have permitted only those SWAPO leaders to return who have broken with SWAPO and who have formed a group called SWAPO Democrats, which is aligned with the moderate political coalition, the Namibian National Front. The registration of voters for the forthcoming election has been conducted by the South African administration in such a way as to bring a strong protest, not only from SWAPO, but from major church and tribal leaders.

The liberal myth that an election, under UN auspices, can be held and will be free from South African and Turnhalle manipulation should now be abandoned. The United Nations should not continue to be a party to the perpetuation of this myth. The UN will never be permitted by the present South African government to establish the conditions in Namibia under which a fair election can be held. There are innumerable ways in which an election can be rigged. The control of the medium of communication is one, the stacking of the deck in terms of registration in different areas of the country, and the use of police intimidation to control candidates who are permitted to run, are others. Any emergency can be used as an excuse not to withdraw troops according to the agreement. These and many other devices will be used to control the results of the elections South

Africa has decided to hold.

It will make no difference whether the Turnhalle Democratic Alliance wins the election or the new Namibian National Front (which may not contest this election) wins. Any government they form will be no more independent from South Africa than is the Transkei. It is unfortunate that several former SWAPO leaders such as Andreas Shipanga and Hennie Smith, the editor of the Windhoek *Advertiser*, have joined the NNF. Shipanga's SWAPO Democratic party is a sad example of how African leaders are manipulated by South Africa. If they allow themselves to be used by this new government to give a fringe of nationalistic respectability to the government, it will not change the verdict of Africa and the world of condemnation and opposition to this illegal and destructive move.

The suggestion that such an "elected" government might enter itself into negotiations with the United Nations for another election for the transition of authority is wishful thinking. The Turnhalle Group cannot be trusted. They will not be recognized by the United Nations. U.S. *de facto* recognition of Ian Smith in the name of negotiations must have given a signal to the South Africans that they, too, can hope for similar treatment of the Turnhalle Group.

Botha's action at least clears the air. There should be no more delays for further concessions from the South Africans and whichever party will claim to represent Namibia. The United Nations Security Council should now move to meet force with force and evoke the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Charter that provide for sanctions and other means of dealing forcefully with aggressive and illegal actions. The types of sanctions which would be most effective are selective and should be applied against oil investments and technology supply.

Moreover, member nations of the United Nations should be encouraged to give direct aid to those African states which are facilitating the liberation activities of SWAPO. This assistance should be for military as well as humanitarian purposes. Cuba and the Soviet Union should not be left alone with this task.

It is unlikely that the United States, given its domestic political scene, will undertake direct liberation support. The Conservative Coalition, under Senators Helms and Hayakawa, will obstruct any such policies. Action on the part of the other countries and non-governmental organizations to implement an arms embargo and economic sanctions campaign is the most we can hope for. Non-governmental organizations in the U.S. may find it easier to extend further their voluntary assistance to SWAPO, because this is the only constructive alternative in a country whose leadership is morally and politically paralyzed.

Academics and concerned citizens have a real role to play in developing the parameters of this new policy and urging upon their governments and institutions support for liberation. For this reason, ACAS, in conjunction with several other groups, is planning a conference in the early spring of 1979 to be held at the UN on "THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA."

## NEW RESOURCES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

### SECTION I:

#### U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

- \* Western Massachusetts Assn. of Concerned African Scholars, ed., *U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA*, Boston, South End Press, 1978, \$5 paper, \$12 cloth (from South End Press, Box 68 Astor Station, Boston, MA 02123). Including chapters on Western Strategy in Southern Africa; Sea lanes; Western Strategy and Southern Africa; Covert Operations in Central and Southern Africa; Mercenarization; Breakdown of the U.S. Embargo: How the U.S. Arms South Africa and Rhodesia; U.S. Transnational Corporation Involvement in S. Africa's Military-Industrial Complex; U.S. Policy and Nuclear Proliferation in S. Africa.
- \* James Turner and Sean Gervasi, *THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC FUTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF AN A.I.D. STUDY ON ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA*. In January 1978 *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 1.
- \* E.A. Tarabin, *THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974.
- \* Sandy Feustel, "African Minerals and American Foreign Policy," *Africa Report*, September-October, 1978, pp. 12-17.
- \* Rene Lemarchand, ed. *AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STAKES AND THE STANCE*, Washington: University Press of America, 1978.
- \* Roger Morris, *UNCERTAIN GREATNESS: HENRY KISSINGER AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY*, NY: Harper, 1977.
- \* *THE PENTAGON-CIA ARCHIPELAGO: THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM* by Noam Chomsky and Ed Herman, Boston, South End Press, 1978, \$5.40 paper, \$12 cloth. Describes U.S. role in "sub-fascist" repression in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Analyzes Carter's "human rights" campaign, media propaganda, and U.S. counter-revolutionary violence in southern Africa and elsewhere.
- \* *A SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S INVESTMENT IN AFRICA*, special number of *ISSUE* (African Studies Association, USA), Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3, Summer-Fall 1978 by David L. Duffy (also issued as a monograph under same title by Crossroads Press). Provides a survey of U.S. Africa-related activities in federal departments of agriculture, commerce, defense, HEW, interior, state, AID, transportation, labor, treasury, HUD, PL 480 programs, USIA, Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, NASA, ERDA, NEH, Library of Congress, NEA, Smithsonian, NSC, CIA, NSF, FCC, etc.
- \* *ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN AFRICA*, Foreign Assistance Legislation; for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 3 of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd session, February 7, 8, 14, 28; March 1 and 2, 1978, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

### SECTION II:

#### SOUTH AFRICA

- \* "Special Section on South Africa: How Many will Die for How Long?" *Matchbox* (Amnesty International) Winter 1978, pp. 9-12. (Amnesty, 2112 Broadway, Rm. 405, NY, NY, 10023)

\* Special issues of *NOTES AND DOCUMENTS*, U.N. Center Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs:

- "The Freedom Charter of South Africa" 13/78, June 1978, 78-14771.
- "Activities of Transnational Corporations in South Africa" by Ann W. Seidman and Neva Makgetla, 9/78, May 1978, 78-12442.
- "What Have South Africa's Traditional Suppliers of Arms Done to Abide by the Mandatory Arms Embargo Against Apartheid in South Africa?" by Abdul S. Minty, 26/78, September 1978, 78-20119.
- "U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa in Violation of the United Nations Voluntary Arms Embargo: 1963-1977," by Sean Gervasi, 27/78, September 1978.
- "For an Effective Arms Embargo Against Apartheid South Africa," by H.E. Mr. Abdalla Y. Bishara (Kuwait), Chairman of the Security Council Committee on South Africa.
- "Tribute to Canon Collins," by Christian Action in Africa, 22/78, Aug. 1978, 78-17884.
- "South Africa's Military Build-up and Nuclear Plans: A Serious Threat to Peace," by Leslie O. Harriman (Nigeria), Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid. 24/78, August 1978, 78-19233.
- "The Effects of Apartheid on the Status of Women in South Africa," 7/78, May 1978, 78-10115.
- "Govan Mbeki: South African Political Prisoner Honoured by Amsterdam University," by Rob Bartlema and Johan Kortenaar, 19/78, August 1978, 78-18576.
- "Dr. Dubois, Pan Africanism and the Liberation of Southern Africa," by Prof. Ronald Walters (Howard University), 6/78, March 1978, 78-04818.
- "Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (1924-78): Tributes at a Special Meeting..." 4/78, April 1978, 78-08749.
- "Nordic States and South Africa Initiatives for Action Against Apartheid," by Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway), 5/78, March 1978, 78-04360.
- "Basic Facts on the Republic of South Africa and the Policy of Apartheid," (revised) by Julian R. Friedman, 8/77, April 1977, 72 pp.

\* Regular news on Southern Africa, *LSM NEWS*, \$3 annually; Liberation Support Movement Press, P.O. Box 2077, Oakland, CA 94604.

\* *INVESTMENT IN APARTHEID*, list of 539 companies with investment and interests in South Africa, by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in *Notes and Documents*, Center Against Apartheid, United Nations, New York, NY 10017. Document 13/78, June 1978.

\* "Links with Israel," *South African Panorama*, August 1978.

Digest of South African Events, compiled by the ACAS Research Group at Clark University, Worcester, MA. This booklet uses newspaper clippings from 1974-78 to provide an overview of recent history, to serve as a source for specific research, and to highlight the specific biases of the press as they reflect corporate and/or government interests. Price \$3; sample copies available.

Index to Senator Dick Clark's Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations report on *U.S. Corporate Interests in South Africa*, January 1978, price \$5.00.

New Resources, cont.

- \* "Student Politics in South Africa: Black-White Contrast," *Chronicle for Higher Education*, September 11, 1978, p. 15 ff.
- \* *U.S. BANK LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA: CDE HANDBOOK*. Available from Corporate Data Exchange, 198 Broadway, Room 707, NY, NY 10038; price \$3.00.
- \* *THE NUCLEAR AXIS: THE SECRET COLLABORATION BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA*. By Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenska, New York Times Books, 1978, \$12.50.
- \* *CIC Brief: COMPUTING APARTHEID: THE ROLE OF U.S. COMPUTER COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA*. Available for \$.60 from Corporate Information Center, 475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 566, NY, NY, 10027.
- \* *DIVESTMENT AND APARTHEID*, by Marcia Burdette and Sanford Duman, available from American Committee on Africa, 305 East 46 Street, NY, NY 10017.
- \* "How the IMF Slipped \$464 Million to South Africa," by James Morrell and David Gisselquist, *Special Report, Center for International Policy*, (Washington) January 1978. (120 Maryland Avenue, Washington, DC, 20002.)
- \* *BA YE ZWA: THE PEOPLE LIVE* by Judy Seidman, Boston, South End Press, \$4.50 paper, \$12 cloth, 1978. A portrait of life under apartheid through drawings, poems, songs, newspaper clippings and narrative. A focus on black resistance to white domination. "Memorable, urgent, and important." (Basil Davidson)
- \* Special issues of *Southern Africa Perspectives*, (Africa Fund, 305 East 46 St., NY, NY 10017)
  - "U.S. Business in South Africa: Voices for Withdrawal," May 1978, revised
  - "U.S. Dollars in South Africa: Context and Consequence," by Jennifer Davis, Feb. 1978
  - "General Motors in South Africa: Secret Contingency Plans in the Event of Civil Unrest" by Jennifer Davis, May 1978.
- \* Information on: (1) the successful Michigan State University campaign to seek withdrawal of university funds from banks investing in South Africa, (2) the East Lansing, MI City Council Selective Buying Resolution, or (3) pending Michigan State Legislature Bill 6341 to prohibit Michigan educational institutions from investing in corporations operating in nations which legally discriminate on the basis of race, creed, or sex. Write ACAS Collective, Box 791, East Lansing, MI 48823.
- \* "General Motors in South Africa" *Public Interest Report* (General Motors) May 15, 1978, pp. 39-44.

SECTION III:  
NAMIBIA

- \* James Turner and Sean Gervasi, *THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC FUTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF AN A.I.D. STUDY ON ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA*. In January 1978 *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 1.
- \* Special on Namibia, *AFRICA*, September 1978.

- \* "Issue on Namibia", special issue of *DE-COLONIZATION*, (U.N. Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization) No. 9, Revised edition, December 1977. Detailed summary of history, homelands policy, apartheid in Namibia, economics, labor, legislation, detention, Turnhalle, new developments, mandates, etc.
- \* Special Assembly Session on Namibia, *U.N. Chronicle*, Vol. 15, No. 6, June 1978.
- \* See various issues of *Namibia Bulletin* for articles on Lusaka Declaration of 1978, SWAPO news and speeches, SWAPO war communiques.

SECTION IV:  
ZIMBABWE

- \* *FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE*, a booklet series by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London. Available in the US from The Africa Fund, 305 East 46 St., NY, NY 10017. Titles include:
  - Alternatives to Poverty, by Roger Riddell
  - The Land Question, by Roger Riddell
  - The Unemployment Crisis, by Duncan Clarke
  - Skilled Labor and Future Needs, by Colin Stoneman
  - The Informal Sector: A Solution to Unemployment? by Rob Davies
  - Beyond Community Development, by Michael Bratton(Above titles, \$1.50 each from Africa Fund.) Future booklets include: The Struggle for Health, The Role of Women, Industry, Education, The Media, Transnational Corporations.
- \* *ZIMBABWE IN STRUGGLE*, published by International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138. Excellent photographic and narrative study of white supremacy and African response, and the terrible toll of the liberation war in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and in neighboring countries. In exhibit form of 80 photographs on 12 large posters, \$10 plus \$1.50 postage and handling.
- \* Regular news on Zimbabwe from: *BULLETIN, Zimbabwe Information Group*. Subscriptions \$5 for 5 issues, or \$6 airmail. ZIG, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL, U.K.
- \* *BLACK FIRE! ACCOUNTS OF THE GUERRILLA WAR IN RHODESIA*, by Michael Raeburn with Anthony Wilkinson, London: J. Friedman Publishers, 1978, h 2.95.

SECTION V:  
ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

- \* John Stockwell, *IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES: A CIA STORY*, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1978.
- \* Allen Isaacman, *A LUTA CONTINUA: CREATING A NEW SOCIETY IN MOZAMBIQUE*, No. 1 in a series of Southern Africa pamphlets published by the Fernand Braudel Center at SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13901. 132pp., \$2.00.
- \* Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs*, 57,1, Fall 1978. Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs reveals advice on Angolan non-involvement ignored by Kissinger.

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF ACAS  
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

by Willard Johnson, Co-Chairperson

Seven people, in addition to the Co-Chairpersons, have agreed to serve on the Political Action Committee. The geographic spread of these people allows us to cover most of the country, with the exception of the Southeast, where we need an active contact.

Several of the members of the Committee are connected with organizations that are active against apartheid, and have helped us to establish a list of about 125 individuals who are liaisons with such organizations. We would benefit greatly by having the names of more such people sent to us, or at least, names and addresses of the organizations concerned. We have found that, already, within the last year many of the specific people named have moved and we have lost contact with the respective organizations.

The activities of the Committee have focused on three specific efforts to mobilize public expression and public protest:

1. **SHABA INVASION:** On May 29, mailgrams were sent to all the members of the Political Action Committee to counter the Administration's efforts to use the Shaba Province (Zaire) incidents as a cover for a renewal of American military and paramilitary interventionism. The text of the mailgrams we sent stated:

Emphasis on uncertain Cuban connections with Shaba rebels, actions in Kolwezi suggesting wider geopolitical objectives, and openly expressed administration concern to eliminate Congressional restrictions on covert and military involvement lead us to believe, with Senator Clark, that Carter seeks to reintervene in Angola, and to counter Soviet and Cuban prestige in Africa through military interventionism supporting domination and oppression. Please join the Association of Concerned African Scholars, TransAfrica, Inc., the Washington Office on Africa, African Heritage Studies Association, and others mobilizing protests of these trends.

A follow-up letter was sent to the Committee members requesting information about the actions that were taken. The very few responses we received to this letter indicated that some Committee members had contacted key Congressmen and Senators or their aides and some had also sent out additional mailgrams.

The National Co-Chairpersons sent a letter to President Carter on the Shaba incidents as well.

A telegram was also sent to President Carter on behalf of the Political Action Committee which added to the text of the mailgram mentioned above that the Administration seemed headed, once again, to come into Angola on the wrong side, and stated: "We do not secure a place in African opinion for America by supporting leaders, groups and forces that tend to perpetuate the colonial and alien

settler legacy of domination, privilege and oppression. Jonas Savimbi and UNITA lost whatever little support they had among Africans when they collaborated, first with the Portuguese, and then with invading South Africa. We are sacrificing the good relations of this country with the whole of the continent of Africa in the name of protecting the economic interest of a few in Southern Africa."

2. **HELMS AMENDMENT:** In July we again joined with the vigorous efforts of TransAfrica, the new Black American lobby on behalf of African and the Caribbean, and others to mobilize opposition to the effort led by Senator Helms to lift sanctions against Rhodesia. The mailgram that was sent on that occasion stated:

Senator Helms, R-NC, poses serious threats to end sanctions against Rhodesia. S-3075 expected vote Monday. If ever we needed widespread protests it is now. Mailgrams and phone calls to key legislators needed, especially to Griffin (R-Mich.), Bumpers (D-Ark.), Packwood (R-Ore.), Schweiker (R-Pa.), Weiker (R-Conn.) Inform Senator Clark of your actions. Inform Willard Johnson also. Protest amendment which would: 1) lift sanctions, 2) allow funding of military and paramilitary operations in Angola, 3) cut aid to front-line states providing bases for guerrilla forces.

Many more members responded to the mailgram's plea to inform the Committee chairperson of their activities. It was evident from their letters and mailgrams that the key persons named were contacted, some by phone, and many members were able to organize campaigns to have letters and mailgrams sent.

The campaign to counter the Helms Amendment was able to defeat the Helms Amendment in its original form, although a compromise was passed which would permit the U.S. to end sanctions with the only prerequisites being an effort to hold an all-parties conference, and the holding of democratic elections. Without the compromise, we learned from several sources, the Helms Amendment was deemed certain to pass. This would have been a disastrous setback to U.S. opportunities to be accepted as a supporter of any kind of African freedom.

TransAfrica, Inc. was singled out by the *U.S. News and World Report* in a strongly worded editorial attack, as being especially effective in the campaign to counter the Helms Amendment.

3. **SMITH VISIT:** The third campaign concerned the visit by Smith and the "black Smiths" of Rhodesia. Mailgrams were sent to Committee members stating:

The battle to maintain Rhodesian sanctions is not over. Ian Smith is expected to arrive in the U.S. on Wednesday, October 4, unless protests convince U.S. authorities to deny permission. As an illegal government its travel documents would not be lawful, and thus, granting them visas may violate our laws as well as signal U.S. support for the phony internal settlement. Please demonstrate your opposition by organizing direct communication to President Carter and

## NEW FILM RESOURCES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

*Diane Pflugrad, African Media Center,  
Michigan State University*

with picketing of local State Department, Immigration Service, or other Federal offices.

This mailgram was followed by a letter to about thirty of the anti-apartheid organizations around the country, also alerting them to the renewed effort to lift U.S. sanctions and asking for public expression of opposition to the granting of visas.

Finally, a second letter, responding to the Smith visit and including the full text of the Salisbury Agreement of 3 March 1978 (the so-called "internal settlement") was sent to over one hundred anti-apartheid organization representatives so that they could judge for themselves how little the internal settlement accorded with the representations of Smith and how right the African guerrillas would be to reject it as any settlement at all. The letter that accompanied the text also stated, in part:

Incredible claims have been expressed by Ian Smith and his "black smiths" during the present visit...Smith has tried to portray his regime as moderate, trying for a peaceful transition to majority rule, and dedicated to freedom. He carefully refrains from any review of the long history of racial domination and exploitation in Rhodesia...He failed to point out that whites (have) 25 times the amount of land, on the average, as blacks have...(and that) the laws will continue to be made, interpreted, administered and enforced by an establishment that is almost exclusively white.

The so-called "internal settlement" is completely phony...Note that the entrenchment of white control must last at least ten years, in the case of special parliamentary seats, and may last for the lifetime of those who now have positions (almost all of them white) in the civil service, the judiciary, the police and army officer corps. These domains are explicitly removed from the purview of "politics", that is, the parliament...It will mean the continuation of white rule, but in black-face -- a new lease on tyranny.

What is needed is visible protest...

No doubt many unknowledgeable viewers and readers of the American media will be more inclined, after the recent Rhodesian minstrel show, to want to bow to their maneuvers to end sanctions. Such a move must continue to be protested and resisted as vigorously as possible, not only because it would be morally wrong to offer assistance and friendship to a regime based on so much exploitation, oppression and bloodshed as has been white rule in Rhodesia, but also because such assistance can only prolong the guerrilla war, resulting in more killing; it cannot prevent the ultimate victory of the guerrillas, who are now quite close to a full victory (thus the frantic efforts by the Smith people to get outside help) and will threaten to dump us into the dustbin of African history, along with the Smith bunch.

Since the last ACAS Newsletter, the most exciting development in audio-visual materials on Southern Africa has been the creation of the Southern Africa Media Center, a project of California Newsreel. The goal of the Southern Africa Media Center is not only to make the latest quality films on Southern Africa available to large and diverse audiences, but also to improve the effectiveness of the materials used. To achieve these goals, the Center plans to develop "activation kits" which go beyond traditional study guides by providing materials that will not only inform the audience, but initiate specific programs around Southern Africa.

Meanwhile, the Center continues its policy of renting films to church, labor and community groups according to their ability to pay. Recently they have acquired the excellent new film on South Africa, SIX DAYS OF SOWETO, and will soon release the film BULLETS ARE BEGINNING TO FLOWER, about the transformation of the Mozambican school system since independence.

For further information on the Southern Africa Media Center, contact their collective at 630 Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA 94103.

Tricontinental Films (333 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10014) has recently announced the release of a film produced by the Cuban Film Institute, ANGOLA: VICTORY OF HOPE, which details Angola's history of colonialism and the liberation struggle, and focuses on Angola's future. Tricontinental has also purchased a copy of SOUTH AFRICA: THE WHITE LAAGER, produced by Peter Davis, which methodically traces the history of Afrikaner nationalism and relates it to the development of apartheid and the explosive political situation in South Africa today. This film is highly recommended and is also available from the Learning Corporation of America and the University of Michigan Audio-Visual Education Center.

For further information on new films about Southern Africa and Africa in general, contact Diane Pflugrad, African Media Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.



"Why, hello, there, Sam! I'm Ian Smith of Rhodesia -- Dick Nixon and Henry Kissinger said I should call by if ever I needed anything!"  
(Oliphant, c. Washington Star, 1978.)

# Congress Restricts Exim Financing to South Africa

(From the Washington Office on Africa)

October 23, 1978

We are delighted to report that the Congress last week enacted the first economic sanction against the government of South Africa in its history.

The conclusion to the long fight to cut financing by the government-run Export-Import Bank to South Africa went completely unnoticed in the press. The House had passed a compromise provision on June 2nd by a vote of 219-116 that would have stopped all loans, guarantees and insurance in support of exports to the South African government and its agencies, and to companies which, in the judgement of the State Department, are not "moving toward implementing the fair employment code drafted by Rev. Leon Sullivan. Senate consideration of the Export-Import Bank authorization bill, to which this provision was amended, was delayed again and again.

But at 2:30 a.m. on Sunday, October 15th, the House inserted the South Africa Eximbank restriction passed in June into HR 14279, a bill on flexible regulation of domestic bank interest rates. That bill came before the Senate later in the day, after it had been meeting through the night. The Senate adopted all of the House amendments, without any debate on the South Africa provision. Only the lateness of the hour and the press of innumerable other bills kept conservatives from challenging the South Africa language. HR 14279 is expected to go to the White House for the President's signature this week.

The State Department and the Export-Import Bank are already preparing a new operational statement on how the legislation will be implemented. The more than one-quarter of Export-Import Bank financing which has gone directly to the government and state-owned businesses should stop immediately. A State Department official speculated that the restriction on financing to private purchasers might significantly reduce Eximbank involvement with South Africa, when taken together with the existing ban on direct loans and a three-and-a-half year limitation on any transaction. Many U.S. exporters may simply decide the delays and possible denial of financing make it not worth their while to apply for Export-Import Bank financing.

Congressional passage of the restriction on Eximbank support to South Africa is a real victory for two reasons. Most importantly, it is the first time ever that the Congress has taken any action against the South African government. Ever since Carter was elected, the South African government has been saying that the Administration is out in front of the American people and the Congress on wanting change in South Africa. This action lays bare South Africa's lie. It is also somewhat ironic that the Congressional action came just as Secretary of State Vance left for Pretoria to deliver a personal letter from President Carter inviting the new Prime Minister, P.W. Botha to come to the United States if he took certain actions on Namibia and Rhodesia. U.S. officials described a "deliberate, high-level choice by the Administration to use more carrot and less tick in dealing with Pretoria," according to a Jim Hoagland article in the October 23rd Washington Post. Not surprisingly, the Administration opposed the Congressional vote, on grounds that it wanted to retain Executive flexibility.

Secondly, the Eximbank restriction will have some real economic effect on the apartheid regime. The level of Export-Import Bank financing in the last few years has not been large, due in part to previously existing limitations on the Eximbank and South Africa's slow economic recovery. Eximbank authorizations to South Africa for FY 78 were \$82.3 million. But as the South African Financial Mail pointed out more than a year ago, pulling out Export-Import Bank financing could have a ripple effect:

### The South Africa Amendment

"In no event shall the Bank guarantee, insure or extend credit or participate in the extension of credit (a) in support of any export which would contribute to enabling the government of the Republic of South Africa to maintain or enforce apartheid; (b) in support of any export to the government of the Republic of South Africa or its agencies unless the President determines that significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid has been made and transmits to the Congress a statement describing and explaining that determination; or (c) in support of any export to other purchasers in the Republic of South Africa unless the United States Secretary of State certifies that the purchaser has endorsed and is proceeding toward the implementation of the following principles: non-segregation of the races in all work facilities; equal and fair employment for all employees; equal pay for equal work for all employees; initiation and development of training programs to prepare non-white South Africans for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; increasing the number of non-whites in management and supervisory positions; a willingness to engage in collective bargaining with labor unions; and improving the quality of life for employees in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities."

"If these government guarantees /such as those from the Export-Import Bank/ were withdrawn, foreign banks would themselves have to bear the risk. In that event they might choose not to grant the credits at all. The consequences could be a further drain on South Africa's reserves, perhaps severe enough to raise question marks over South Africa's ability to service its huge foreign debt obligations."

-- June 10, 1977

Of course, it is largely up to the State Department what the Exim restriction will end up meaning, since that is the agency which will administer the new law.

General Secretariat  
P.O. Box 2591  
Salisbury

THE "REMOVAL" OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The long awaited statement on the removal of racial discrimination is welcome. We do, however, have certain serious reservations about it.

The document appears to stem from an excessive concern to allay European fears rather than to redress the wrongs of the past and to acknowledge true aspirations of the African people. This concern for European fears has to be seen in conjunction with the efforts to entrench European influence that we noted in our analysis of the Salisbury Agreement. The picture we have is that of a small number of comparatively wealthy Africans being cautiously admitted into European preserves on certain specified conditions. This will hardly satisfy the average African or give him any sense of equality.

The official government statement raises a great many questions, not least of which concerns the manner of its production. It does not appear to have been issued by the Ministry of Information, as are most official press statements, but is a cyclostyled document with no indication of the source, and with one prominent mistake. Moreover, it merely states "The following recommendations were considered by the Executive Council this morning (October 10)". This statement in itself causes some surprise since on that day two members of the Executive Council, the Prime Minister Ian Smith and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole were in America. However the current Chairman of the Executive Council, Bishop Muzorewa, subsequently announced that all forms of racial discrimination were being scrapped. He did not say that it is likely to be at least three months before these provisions will be effective.

The actual content of the statement is no less puzzling. Certain provisions are welcome such as the removal of school fees and the provision of freehold title to business stands in the tribal trust lands which latter is likely to create employment opportunities for blacks rather than whites since there will be no residential accommodations for whites there. Other provisions, however, seem to have been introduced to consolidate the existing system rather than to change it. For example, government is proposing to pay the salaries of teachers at all schools, including private schools which at present pay their own teachers. This is likely to lead to an increase in the number of private schools and "community" schools. This money could be better spend on schools which have suffered damage during the war. Yet other provisions are unclear and it is at least possible that they will be interpreted in a manner more favourable to the whites than the blacks. For example, will the per capita grant given to schools be the same for all types of schools and will 'special arrangements' be made for European children whose parents cannot afford the fees at the high-fee paying institutions? How strictly will the regulations concerning one family occupying a property be enforced? Will aged grandparents no longer be able to live with their children and grandchildren? What about a group of people who live in a "mess"? Will these no longer be permitted - or will it, in some

strange way, be permissible for the whites to do these things but not the blacks? How will all the regulations designed to maintain 'the character and standard of the area' be enforced? Will it prove an intolerable invasion of privacy?

Perhaps the most serious defect in the recommendations is that although on paper economic discrimination is replacing racial discrimination, in practice the end result will be the same. The rich/poor division in Rhodesian society almost entirely coincides with the white/black division. The statement is completely silent on the question of wage structures which weigh so heavily against the labourers and unskilled workers - in practice all Africans. There is no indication that any effort will be made to relieve the financial burdens carried by the majority of the population.

The root difficulty about this statement is its lack of relevance. Timid and late, it is not an answer to our problems. What the country needs is peace. Fighting, the breakdown of normal services, the deaths of innocent civilians, martial law, curfews, detention without trial, have become the Rhodesian way of life. Making circumstances a little easier for a handful of Africans is monumentally irrelevant.

In conclusion the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesai would like to reiterate its belief that the main issue is surely the abolition of the present power structure which has been used to deny social justice to the majority of the people and its replacement by a government democratically elected by all the people of this country - one that is now based on race, religion or economic status of the individual but on equal rights.

To this effect the Commission would once more urge that the Transitional Government should play a more positive role in negotiating a ceasefire taking part in an all party conference and finding an acceptable settlement with the leaders of the externally based nationalist movements which would end the bloodshed and suffering of the people.

October 20, 1978.