

America's Role in the African Crisis

THE ECONOMICS OF THE JUNGLE

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WHILE THE EYES of Cold-War-conscious America are on Berlin, Laos, the "off-shore" islands, or other locations where a war could start by accident, few are looking seriously at Africa where war is almost inevitable. Africa is moving steadily, if not plunging, toward such an arrangement of forces that their violent clash is highly predictable. When this occurs the United States will be involved, despite its public assurances that the problems of Africa are to be left to Africans and Europeans to resolve. Americans may soon find themselves in Africa using force to support three principles that all their traditions condemn: colonialism, racism, and an irresponsible, non-free-enterprise type of capitalism.

It may be too late to save the situation in Africa, to prevent such a senseless war and the attendant chaos, from which only Communism could benefit. The lines are drawn and they begin to converge. If there is any hope, it lies in understanding the dimensions of the African crisis and in clarifying the American position.

Dimensions of the African Crisis

Three points of contention are at the heart of the problem of Africa: independence for Africans, the

SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE BELGIQUE

dominance of white settlers in Africa, and control of the vast mineral resources. None of these is a new problem, but each is achieving greater importance in the lives of those affected by it. More important for Africa and for the world, the three conflicts, once geographically and politically dispersed, are now coming to a spatial focus and becoming unidimensional in a political sense. Geographically, the focus is on Africa south of the equator, for the African territories to the north have achieved their independent status, have few white settlers, and fewer mineral resources for which European corporations will fight. Politically, the contending forces are aligning as they had not done historically: colonialists (for example, the Portugese) making common cause with racists (for example, the Afrikaaners) making common cause with the important capitalists (for example, owners of corporations in Rhodesia and Katanga). It must be apparent to each of these that, much as his goal differs from the goals of the others, they have become mutually dependent in the *cul de sac* formed by the southern part of Africa. On the other hand, from the African point of view, the more closely capitalist corporations identify themselves with governments of white supremacy and colonialism the more attentive the hundred and fifty million independent Africans will be to voices that urge them to drive all Europeans out of all Africa.

Independence vs. Colonialism

While some observers cite dissension among the newly independent nations in support of the theory that Africans will never unite to "liberate their brothers," it is nonetheless true that no African government, not even the most conservative, will be secure until all Africans are politically independent of European control. Because of the history of the slave trade and colonialism (and we dare not overlook how dark was that period in history), the fear of continued European domination can always be used by any politician in Africa against any government which tends to maintain close ties with European powers. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and other states are committed to the fight to free all Africans, and they will use any means, including subversion, to achieve that goal. Some states (Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroon, for example) tend to put their own economic development above the independence of Africa as a political issue, but the issue of independence is

potentially important in their own lands. If present governments do not use this political weapon, their opposition will.

Angola and Mozambique are controlled by Portugal; South West Africa by the Union of South Africa; the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, though hardly comparable to the other countries, are technically under the jurisdiction of the British Colonial Office. So long as these vast areas of colonialism remain, political tensions will mount. What African nation could have normal relations with Portugal or the Union?

White Supremacy vs. African Domination

The second conflict is closely related to the first: What is to be done about the white settlers in Africa? Apart from the Union, which is a special case, settled populations of European origin are found only in those areas that are not yet independent, a correlation more than coincidental. Kenya, Tanganyika, the Rhodesias, Angola, Mozambique, and South West Africa all have a small white population. The Congo, with something like half-independence, has the problem of white residents. Tanganyika, which became independent in December, and Kenya, which will be independent in a matter of months, both have governments dominated by African majorities. The whites in Rhodesia, in the Portugese territories, and in that bleakest of nations, the Union of South Africa, show no evidence of willingly yielding their power to Africans. In these territories, the Africans will achieve political power only by fighting for it. When this occurs, the four million whites may defend themselves against the thirty million Africans if the Africans have no arms. Those few million



whites will have to be backed by the Portuguese Army, already committed to the fight to keep Angola Portuguese, and by the European mining corporations, which receive their lucrative rights to exploitation from European-controlled governments.

The conflict over control of mineral wealth is the most complicated of the three points of contention in Africa; it is the one least understood and yet it is the most serious as a threat to the peace of the whole world. For it is in defense of the "rights" of private corporations that the United States and Great Britain will commit forces to the African continent—but they will have to defend Salazar and Verwoert at the same time. It is of utmost importance that these "rights" be investigated. In what do they consist? How were they acquired? What is their effect on the lands and people they involve? How do they relate to the ideology of "free enterprise" or "democratic capitalism" or whatever the Western system is called?

The wealth in gold and diamonds of the southern tip of Africa is by now legendary. And the area of southern Katanga and Northern Rhodesia has been called by geologists a "geological monstrosity"—so rich is it in all the most ancient as well as the most modern minerals. The list is long and includes copper, coal, diamonds, tin, zinc, cobalt, cadmium, palladium, gold, and uranium. There are ample water resources to develop hydroelectric power that could make the area one of the world's industrial centers. Though all this wealth is in Africa, it is not regarded as belonging



UNION MINIÈRE

to Africans. Mineral rights in Africa were given to Europeans by Europeans. The company involved was to undertake the administration and control of the African populations in exchange for the rights of exploitation. Whenever contracts have been renegotiated so that the private companies have yielded certain rights to territorial governments the governments concerned have been white governments. Nowhere south of the equator has any control of mineral rights been returned to Africans.

Minerals and Power: the Case of the Congo

The Congo provides an illustrative case that has in it all the elements of the more general conflict in southern Africa. To understand the problem, we must go back to the period immediately following the Berlin Conference of 1885. The International Association of the Congo, a private business venture directed by King Leopold of the Belgians, had been recognized as a government under the title of Congo Independent State. But what were its borders? One of the conditions that had been agreed upon in Berlin was that claims to African territory had to be enforced by effective administration and control. How could Leopold's private business enterprise compete for territory under those conditions against whole nations with armies to enforce control and battalions of bureaucrats to set up administration over vast territories? Undaunted, Leopold devised a scheme. The capital necessary to expand his political control to the whole of the Congo Basin could be obtained from private sources in return for grants of exclusive rights of exploitation. Leopold could do the high-level negotiating from Brussels while some private company could do the work of controlling the natives and exploiting the resources. The profit, of course, would be shared. Thus, to handle the vast area between Lake Tanganyika and the Kasai River, Leopold signed an agreement with the Katanga Company, itself a joint company involving both the *Société Générale de Belgique* and a Rhodes subsidiary, Tanganyika Concessions Limited. Within a few years the copper mining began to pay off, and by 1905, when the *Union Minière* corporation was set up by this combine, the expansion of the enterprise was well underway, using, of course, the labor of Africans, who had to be forced to work.

TANGANYIKA CONCESSIONS LTD.

In 1908, after international investigations had exposed the atrocious way in which Leopold operated his business and government combine, the Belgian government took over its administration. The Congo Independent State became the Belgian Congo. With a responsible government in control—that is, a government responsible to a European nation, though of course still with little responsibility to any African population—the atrocities and the outright slavery were much reduced. Impressed labor was not stopped, however; nor was the fundamental structure of the government or economy of the Congo changed. During the process of expansion of industrial corporations, the government share of profits diminished somewhat, but even up to the end of Belgian control, the Belgian Congo Government owned approximately one-fifth of the capital stock of the mineral-exploiting companies. In 1958, just fifty years after the Belgian assumption of control, Belgian financial interests were reported to be three and a half billion dollars, two hundred and twenty million of that being held in the Belgian Congo Government portfolio. This stock was voted by the Minister of Colonies of Belgium, who had, of course, to have the approval of the King as well as of the Belgian government. Special note should be made of the extent of interaction between government and business in Belgium, and especially in the Congo, for Americans who make much over the separation of powers, especially “keeping government out of business,” sometimes have the impression that American ways are the ways of all mankind. Big Business and Big Government were completely united in the Belgian Congo: Government held stock in private enterprise and guaranteed that those enterprises would have no competition; what was good for Business was good for the Belgian Congo government.

But what was good for the Belgian Congo government was not all that good for the Congolese. While great profits were taken by the corporations, even over and beyond internally-financed expansion, the per-capita income of the Congolese was about seventy-five dollars a year. This although the potential growth rate of the Congo economy was tremendous: in the terms employed by W. W. Rostow in his *Stages of Economic Growth*, the Congolese economy was ready for the “take-

off" stage, with a very high rate of capital formation relative to gross national product. With a per-capita income of seventy-five dollars a year, however, there were not many Congolese capitalists in a position to invest in this great private enterprise. Exports in 1958 amounted to four hundred and fifteen million dollars, while the Congo imported only three hundred and fifty-nine million dollars worth of goods. Thus there was not much for the Congolese to consume even if they had the money to buy. Even more noteworthy, from the point of view of development: despite all the mining activity there for seventy years, not a single Congolese was educated as a mining engineer.

One might still have the impression, after what has been said, that there was some degree of free enterprise among the private corporations operating in the Congo. In this connection, it is instructive to look at the corporate structure. We may begin with the tentacles of the *Société Générale de Belgique*, a large Belgian holding company with two major subsidiary holding companies in the Congo, *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie* (C.C.C.I.), and *Profrigo*. The *Société Générale* itself holds the controlling interest in a number of major operating firms, among which are: 1) *Forminière*, which has exclusive rights to diamond mining in the Kasai, and which was the company that backed Albert Kalonji in setting up the so-called "Mining State of South Kasai" as an independent state in secession from the Congo; 2) *Géomines*, which has exclusive tin mining rights in northern Katanga, and whose mines, processing plants, and rail lines at Manona and Kabalo were in the news when they were recaptured for the company in early 1961, when the white mercenary army of Katanga made its drive into northern Katanga burning Baluba villages along the way; 3) *Bécéka*, which owns and operates

**THIS IS
A WHITE
AREA**

most of the railroads in Katanga and Kasai, over which minerals and supplies pass between Elisabethville and anywhere, whether they go out over the Port Franqui line toward Leopoldville or over the Benguela line through Portugese Angola; 4) *Cotonco*, which under Belgian rule was licensed to buy and process the cotton Congolese were forced to grow in a program called "prestation agriculture."

Even this truncated list of subsidiaries gives some indication of the monopolistic structure of the Congo economy. But note has hardly been taken of the one company most people have heard something about—*Union Minière*, mentioned previously as having been founded in 1905 as the copper-mining arm of the combine formed by Leopold's Congo Independent State, the *Société Générale de Belgique*, and Tanganyika Concessions Limited. *Union Minière* has grown to astounding proportions, and has numerous sizeable subsidiaries, among which are: 1) *Metalkat*, operating the coal and zinc mines in Katanga; 2) Sogolec, operating the hydroelectric power system; 3) *Sogechim*, chemical processing; 4) *Sogefor*, operating in the agricultural field; and 5) African Metals Corporation, handling American purchases.

Lest the notion be conveyed that there could be some competition among the three major corporations, *Union Minière*, the *Société Générale*, and Tanganyika Concessions Limited, it must be pointed out that the second and third enjoy substantial overlapping in their boards of directors, including Messrs. E. Van der Straeten, H. Robiliart, and A. de Spirlet, so that neither is likely to harm the other; further, six of the directors of Tanganyika Concession Limited sit on the *Union Minière* board and five directors of the *Société Générale* are also directors of *Union Minière*. There is much more to be said about the interlocking of all the major corporations operating in this part of Africa, but insofar as the Congo is concerned the security of European control over the economy is demonstrated as simply as that. It has been said that some Congolese (from Katanga, of course) have been "elevated" to the board of directors of *Union Minière*—imagine what influence their convictions could have on their "colleagues" from *Société Générale de Belgique* and from Tanganyika Concessions Limited. Knowledge of the financial structure makes ludicrous such reports as that of an American correspondent in Katanga: "Observers here say that it is Mr. Tshombe who runs *Union Minière* in Katanga—

and not vice versa." (Benjamin Welles, *New York Times*, March 19, 1961) Surely the American press cannot claim with a straight face that such financial giants as Charles Waterhouse and Harry Oppenheimer, Britons, and Paul Gillet and P. Bonvoisin, Belgians, would let a little African politician steal a billion-dollar business from them!

What actually happened as the Congo came to independence has never been fully reported. Many of the facts will remain forever secret, but some piecing together of snatches of information reveals a great deal. The Belgian Congo government, it will be recalled, had interest in various ways in all the corporations registered in the Congo (including, of course, the province of Katanga). It held capital stock of the mining companies, including *Union Minière*; it levied corporate income taxes; and it collected royalties on minerals extracted. Thus, a company as large as *Union Minière* contributed significantly to the Treasury of the Belgian Congo: roughly sixty million of the hundred and forty million annual budget.

The directors of the *Société Générale* could fairly easily call the tune for *Union Minière* so long as the third major bloc of stock (i.e. other than their own and that of Tanganyika Concession Limited) was controlled by Belgians, in the name of the government of the Belgian Congo. That stock, reputed to be approximately one-fifth of that outstanding, would normally have devolved to the government of the Republic of the Congo upon independence. Hoping to get a government friendly to their interests, the Belgians backed Tshombe's Conakat party, which subsequently won only a few seats in the national assembly, where Lumumba's MNC party won more than three times as many as its nearest opponent. Lumumba became the head of the national government, and pressure was put on him to accept one of Tshombe's men as Minister of Economic Affairs—undoubtedly with an eye to the *Union Minière* and other voting stock in the portfolio of the Republic.

Lumumba did grant the Conakat party the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but he hedged somewhat by creating a new ministry parallel to it, the Ministry of Economic Coordination and Planning. It was then, it may be presumed, that the directors of the *Société Générale* decided that the Lumumba government would never have the chance to vote the stock. Within a month, Katanga had seceded, financed with funds that should legally have gone to the Treasury of the Central Government,



through the *Banque Centrale* in Leopoldville. Though this was going on as early as July and August, 1960, not until January, 1961, was it publicly announced that the dividend payments on stock of *Union Minière* had been paid to the Katanga Treasury. Although the necessary information concerning other companies subsidiary to the *Société Générale* is unavailable, it may be assumed that this stock, too, was taken from the Central Government and given to Katanga, or in the case of *Forminière* possibly to the somewhat tenuous government of the "Mining State of South Kasai." However, stock certificates are not effective unless the real property is also controlled. Thus, in February and March, 1961, the Katanga Army, led by white officers recruited from Europe and southern Africa, were sent north from Elisabethville to take over the mines and railways of the *Géomines* Corporation, for these were still held by troops loyal to the Central Government or at least not loyal to Tshombe and the *Société Générale de Belgique*.

The European financiers appear well in command despite all the problems. After several abortive attempts to resolve the Congo situation by some sort of articles of confederation peacefully agreed upon to bring Katanga back into relation with the rest of the Congo, the United Nations, already weakened in a variety of ways, made its vain attempt to force an end to the secession. Again, Katanga forces, well-equipped and financed by the corporation profits that should have been going to the Central Government, went into action.

The result was inconclusive: Some lives were lost, but corporate profits were unaffected. The United Nations lost military positions and it lost prestige; the United Nations lost its Secretary-General and it lost direction. By October the United Nations had agreed that it would not try to stop the Katanga provincial forces from fighting the government forces. On all sides, international law is breaking down. Katanga, though officially recognized as an independent state by no nation in the world, is authorized to equip an army and air force financed by giant private corporations controlled by persons not even resident in Africa, let alone Katanga. The neighboring Federation of Rhodesia, constitutionally prohibited from managing its own foreign affairs, steals out from under British control by publicly supporting the Katanga secession and by condemning the United Nations and all nations supporting its action. Success of the Katanga secession means continued European control in that area, and Prime Minister Roy Welensky of Rhodesia knows full well that he depends upon the same financial sources as those at stake in Katanga. Tanganyika Concessions Limited ties in with Rhodesian Anglo American Limited and with Rhokana Corporation and with Anglo American corporation of South Africa and with De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa and with the British South Africa Company and with the Roan Antelope Copper Mines Limited, and so on. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer is one important man whose portfolio easily includes all these fantastically powerful corporations. So long as jet planes and their pilots can be bought these corporations will have the money to buy them. Just as Verwoerd fears to yield one vote in South Africa and Salazar fears to yield one *hectare* in Portugese Africa, the European corporations fear to yield one dollar, franc, or pound sterling in their realm. This is the stuff of which revolutions are made.

The American Position in Africa

The United States has never in history had a set policy with respect to Africa. Nevertheless, American impact has been felt on an *ad hoc* basis. For example, during the period when the British navy was attempting to halt the slave trade, the United States refused to permit the British to search ships flying the American flag. As a result, slavers of all nations, especially Portugese,

Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd.

Admiral Alan G. Kirk

flew the Stars and Stripes; and the slave trade was prolonged proportionately.

In 1884, when France, Portugal, England and Germany were in contention over the Congo Basin and adjacent areas, the United States, for reasons still obscure, voluntarily recognized Leopold's International Association of the Congo as a government, thereby forcing the hand of the European nations, who then acceded to Leopold's establishment of what was euphemistically called the Congo Independent State. Even more, the United States had as a consultant to its delegation at the Berlin Conference none other than Henry Morton Stanley, who was clearly working for King Leopold at the very same time.

More recently, national policy could have been expressed in votes in the United Nations. But for many years American governments chose the route of abstention on African issues—on colonialism generally, on Algeria, on South West Africa, on Portugese Africa. Up to a point, this attempt to avoid the issue did no great damage to the American reputation. Africans believed the United States to be ultimately anti-colonial, in favor of liberty and self-determination. African political leaders have frequently cited Jefferson, Paine, Henry, and Lincoln. Also, American missionaries, despite many errors of judgment and understanding, have for the most part left a good impression on Africans among whom they have worked in colonial territories. Certainly this factor helps explain the high regard in which the United States was held by Congolese when they first attained independence.

It was not surprising to those who knew something about the Congo to see Premier Lumumba turn first, and immediately, to the United States for aid when the Belgian paratroopers began streaming back into his country upon the occasion of the riots in July, 1960. When he was rebuffed, the shock he felt must have been the greater because he had had such high expectations. It was then that he turned to the United Nations and, shortly thereafter, to the Russians, to help him keep the Belgians out.

In the many debates and behind-the-scenes maneuvers concerning the Congo in the United Nations organiza-

tion, the American role was frequently to delay and to temper positive action while the situation in the Congo grew more and more critical. Though willing to pay almost the entire cost of the United Nations operation, the United States did not want to take any positive action that would be interpreted as opposition to NATO allies who still had colonies.

The American Embassy in the Congo was always active, however, and it has been reported that Ambassador Timberlake was the very first foreign ambassador to dignify the secession of Katanga by making an official visit—an act reminiscent of America's being the first to recognize Leopold's business corporation as a government in 1884. It has been reported, too, that the American Military Attaché in Leopoldville had had frequent discussions with Colonel Mobutu immediately prior to his *coup d'état* and dissolution of the government and the parliament in early September, 1960. Certainly, it is a fact that within ten days after this military *coup* the United States Government brought eleven of Mobutu's "officers" to the United States for a "tour of the Pentagon and other military establishments." Whatever that meant in terms of military affairs, it had an important political effect: it showed everyone concerned that the United States supported the Mobutu régime. All this while the whole world, America included, continuously opposed unilateral intervention and demanded that the United Nations not take sides, even to support the legitimate government against Mobutu's obviously illegitimate force.

American actions and inactions with regard to the Congo have in general had the effect of permitting the European financial interests to maintain control in a situation where there was for a period some doubt that they would be able to. The case of Tshombe in Katanga is too obvious to need mentioning. During the several months succeeding the secession of Katanga, Belgian interests were represented there by none other than Count Aspremont-Linden, Aide-de-Camp to the King of the Belgians. Mobutu, too, undoubtedly had the support of the financial interests, for while Lumumba's legitimate government had found it impossible to get the money to meet the army payrolls—and hence always had a hungry, rebellious force to control—the

Géomines

Banque Centrale, controlled by Belgians, advanced the necessary money to Mobutu for this purpose. Who was behind the teller's window may never be known. It is possible that it was the *Société Générale de Belgique*, for Mobutu and Tshombe have since proven to be in considerable agreement. Their armies may yet merge to control the whole Congo.

The Kennedy administration has given no evidence of changing American policy on the Congo, but there have been two recent occasions when the United States voted properly on other colonial issues: the vote against the Union of South Africa on the issue of South West Africa, and the mild vote against Portugal on the issue of Angola.

Events in Africa are developing so rapidly toward the kind of horrible prospect suggested earlier, that much more than resolutions of mild disapproval are necessary even to attempt to save the situation. To "save the situation" means, as I see it, to establish conditions in which the Africans and the white settlers and the foreign investors can all benefit, without exploiting African people or lands irresponsibly, without driving all whites out, and without driving all European capital investment out.

Peaceful resolution of these conflicts demands that the United States, as the Giant of the West, apply great pressure on Portugal and on the Union of South Africa and on the international corporations operating in the Congo. We are far from ready to do this. The *Wall Street Journal* and other influential newspapers have been highly critical of the present administration for such slight evidences of "pro-African" positions as recent American votes in the United Nations. Far from America's applying any sort of pressure on the Union of South Africa for its extremely unfair and brutal *apartheid* policy, American business relations with that nation have been increasing. Business with all of Africa increased in the past year, but over half of the increase was in trade with the Union. And one reads with horror that gasoline bombs with which the Portugese levelled Angolan villages were stamped "Property of United States Air Force." Still, American jingoists, now "gung-ho NATO," continuously berate African neutrals for not rallying to support the West—in Berlin, of all places!

It is highly doubtful that the American public will awaken in time to support the right principles in the

African conflict. While the racist propaganda of the South African government finds relatively few receptive ears in America, the rich voices of the European corporations are beginning to come through. "Stand by the great corporations," they call, "and we will save Africans from Communism." Even the Katanga secession is being portrayed as a legitimate search on the part of Africans for self-determination. The white mercenaries and the white board of directors belie that claim.

Harry Oppenheimer has recently been purchasing sizeable advertising space to represent himself and his companies as honest, free-enterprising liberals who believe in equal opportunity for people of all colors. However full of compassion he may be, one must wonder how a man who is on the board of directors of the British South Africa Company, Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Rhodesian Anglo-American Limited, Rhokana Corporation Limited, Tanganyika Concessions Limited, and so on, can possibly have gone on these many years permitting the ruthless exploiting of African lands and peoples when he could have forced the hand of any government to adopt a more liberal policy. Imagine what the history of Angola would have been if Oppenheimer and his colleagues had used their ownership of Angola's main source of revenue, the Benguela Railway, to get the Portugese to relax their oppression. Rhodesia might have been an independent, multi-racial, highly-developed nation had Oppenheimer and his colleagues used their power in that direction. Instead they tried to insure continued white control, politically and economically, and to get the United States government to help them keep it that way. The U. S. Export-Import Bank recently made a twenty-million-dollar loan to their Rhodesia-Congo Border Power Company. Some notion of how much all this corporate development helps the African may be seen in the following statistics of De Beers Consolidated Mines: In 1959, with assets of a hundred and ninety-one million pounds sterling, the company employed only 4,508 Africans. What do they do for humanity? How do they deserve the right, *preemptive right*, to all diamonds on lands of the South West Africa Company and in all of Northern Rhodesia? How do they deserve the American loan of twenty million dollars to build a power project when they could build one with the small change they get from the diamonds?

The Belgian corporations have been adding their voices to the call for American support. For years they have

been trying to keep American businessmen out of their private Congo preserve; now the *Société Générale de Belgique* wants to attract Americans to the Congo in order to enhance American interests there and ensure American support when it is needed, as needed it will be. In June, 1961, a new corporation was established in the United States—the Belgian-American Development Corporation—whose chairman and president is Alan G. Kirk, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, former Ambassador to Belgium. Admiral Kirk is also on the board of directors of the Belgian-American Banking Corporation and the Belgian-American Bank and Trust Company, both of which are affiliated with the *Société Générale de Belgique*. Undoubtedly, it takes considerable administrative skill to develop in the halls of the government of the United States spokesmen for foreign corporations. Katanga seems to be doing fairly well in the Senate, but the effort will be intensified.

This examination of the African crisis suggests that Africa is moving rapidly toward a climax, a violent conflict between Africans who want freedom and Europeans who want to maintain control. This means chaos, from which only the Communists are likely to gain. America cannot remain on the sidelines longer, but it is now late for Americans to come to understand the African issue. The net of international finance is drawing the United States toward a commitment to defend European interests in Africa South, and those are diametrically opposed to African interests in an Africa



Independent. Every African leader who tries to free his people from the political and economic bondage in which they are now held will be portrayed in the United States as a "Moscow-trained Marxist," while the monopolistic business structure of that part of Africa will be portrayed as a model of free enterprise. War may start in Berlin or in Laos; it can hardly be avoided in Africa.

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