


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**new
perspectives
on
sub-saharan
AFRICA**

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THIS IS AN ELMER DAVIS MEMORIAL PAMPHLET, published as a tribute to a great and penetrating commentator on world events and a staunch believer in putting the widest range of facts and opinions before the American people, so that they can form their own judgments.

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new perspectives on sub-saharan AFRICA

JAMES S. COLEMAN and CARL G. ROSBERG, Jr.

CONTEMPORARY AFRICA confronts the American government and people with a major challenge. The magnitude and gravity of that challenge and the urgency of the policy issues we confront have been made abundantly clear by recent events. The rapid crumbling of European authority, upon which we have depended and with which we are identified, the growing network of ties between the more radical African states and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the ominous intrusion of the East-West struggle into the Congo, the steady drift towards new forms of authoritarianism, the blind determination of dominant white minorities in southern Africa to resist unto death the "winds of change" blowing ever more violently from the north, and the situations of actual and potential fratricidal strife among the African peoples themselves—these are illustrative of the range of urgent and critical problems created by the sudden and massive thrust of Africans towards freedom and full participation in the modern world.

America has been and, in many respects, remains singularly ill-prepared to meet and to deal effectively with these problems. Why? The main reason is that they were not anticipated and their portent not fully appreciated. They were not anticipated because our position on African issues has been based upon a cluster of unrealistic assumptions. We have assumed, for example, that Europe's continued "presence" in Africa—albeit in diminished form—was not only desirable but desired; that early independence for Africans was so manifestly "premature" that Africans themselves recognized this; that we should deal only with "responsible" African leaders (whose "responsibility" was established either by European colonialists or settlers or by their own sycophantic pro-Western declarations); that the preservation of the predominant "guiding role" of tiny European minorities was indispensable not only for stability and progress but also for Western security; that our own racial problem compelled restraint in rendering moral judgment or in exerting moral pressure upon exploitative racist regimes in Africa; and that the strategic importance of our bases in the Azores dictated silence regarding oppressive Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique.

As a consequence, America came to be regarded by many African leaders as conservative and gradualist, as pro-colonialist, as an integral part of that ensemble of Western paternalism and exploitation against which they are revolting. To our dismay, we have found that we are not regarded as the apostle of liberty, equality and progress. Yet any analysis of our African policy must commence with this negative image. It is a grave disability, which elicits from Africans suspicion rather than confidence regarding our intentions, cynicism rather than understanding in evaluating our actions, and hyper-criticism rather than tolerance in judging our weaknesses.

There are two other basic considerations which have a direct bearing upon the formulation of an American policy towards Africa; namely, the unstabilized character of African political forces and the great diversity of political situations we confront. Africa is still midway in the transition between what was a relatively stabilized pattern of pure colonial rule and a new order of sovereign independent states. However—even within and among those states that have achieved their formal independence—national boundaries, political institutions, and political alignments are by no means settled. In many of the new states, it is still not clear which are the political forces that command the greatest legitimacy, actual or potential. Is the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union merely an aspiration, or is it a political reality? Who commands the broadest support, Kasavubu or Gizenga? Who is really the stronger, Emperor Haile Selassie or his inarticulate opposition, the pro-French Senghor

regime in Senegal or its anti-French opposition?

These are the kinds of questions we could and would presumably ask about the state of political forces on any continent; but in Africa our difficulty in assessing the situation is compounded not only by our abysmal ignorance of the nature of these forces, but particularly by the special character of the great transformation now taking place in Africa. Political and social change is occurring in what approximates an institutional vacuum, a void created by the progressive disintegration of traditional native authority systems and the repudiation of colonial authority—the two sets of structures which heretofore have restrained, channelled and conditioned change. Clearly, the task of policy formulation becomes exceedingly difficult when we face a political situation so extremely fluid and indeterminate, and so unlikely to become stabilized in the predictable future.

Africa's diversity complicates the formulation of a single "African policy." True, we confront a single continent inhabited by dark-skinned peoples who have shared a history of recent Western colonial rule. These facts have fostered the assumption of an African unity that does not actually exist, except in the visions of the most passionate Pan-Africanists. Culturally and politically, Africa is as diverse and variegated as Asia. Western Europe superimposed its widely variant patterns of culture and politics upon a pre-colonial mosaic of peoples with their own equally divergent historical experiences and cultural and political institutions. Moreover, during the colonial period and the struggle for independence, the interaction of these two cultural complexes—European and African—took place within territories which (despite the initially artificial character of their boundaries) tended over time to acquire distinctive personalities.

In confronting the new Africa, America must formulate and articulate policy at three levels. For Africa as a whole, we must have a general policy, just as we have a general Asian, European or Latin American policy. For each individual legal entity (sovereign state or colonial territory) we must also have a policy—not only because these are the entities with which we must deal under international law, but also because each has its own distinctive problems.

Finally, we must have regional policies. The regions are no longer "French Africa" or "British Africa." Africa is now divided between those countries under the actual or presumptive control of Africans (the 27 independent and emergent African states) and those still under the control of Europeans (Southern Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa, and the Portuguese provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique). This is Africa's "Great Divide." For this reason, the two categories are treated separately in the following analysis.

INDEPENDENT AND EMERGENT AFRICAN STATES

African leaders are endeavoring to achieve three major goals: stabilization and modernization of their societies; development of cooperative relationships and greater unity among African states; and definition of the role of their states in the larger world community. The problems they confront in pursuing these goals are exceedingly difficult and complex. How they are resolved has important implications for American policy.

I. The Building of Modern National Societies

With political independence either secured or assured, the energies of Africa's leaders in the northern two-thirds of the continent are now directed towards the knotty problems of national unification and rapid modernization. They must not only preserve and extend the unity developed during the nationalist struggle: they must also meet the challenge of the revolution of rising expectations, which they have in a large measure helped to launch.

National Unification

Each of the new African states—and all except Liberia and Ethiopia are new—is an artificial creation of European colonialism which embraces within its boundaries a melange of groups among which there has been little assimilation. Historic tribal and cultural fragmentation has been only partially transcended by a thin overlay of "national" groups and associations. In many instances, tensions and differences among groups have been aggravated as a result of the uneven distribution of resources or the uneven impact of modernity. During the colonial

period, some groups and regions within the new states have developed more rapidly than others. The better-endowed, more developed and wealthier groups or regions dislike having their affluence and their actual or potential higher standard of living diluted by remaining united with "depressed areas." The latter—while welcoming the economic advantages of unity—profoundly fear being dominated by the more developed groups. Thus internal tensions and separatist tendencies are based not only upon tribal or ethnic differences but also upon different levels of development. Such situations, of course, are aggravated when an area of greater—or lesser—development is inhabited by a single ethnic group.

Tribal and ethnic parochialism seriously obstructs the development of higher loyalties and a "national" outlook in many of the new states. This is explained in large measure by the comparative brevity of European rule, by the limited impact of modernity, and by the fact that, in British and Belgian areas, the preservation of tribal or ethnic authorities and loyalties was a cardinal feature of colonial policy. The forces that elsewhere have weakened localism and accelerated the involvement of new strata of the population into a larger social, political and economic order have not yet had sufficient intensity or breadth of impact to overcome the forces of parochialism and separatism.

The resulting high potential for civil strife and ethnic or regional separatism is most dramatically illustrated by developments in the Congo since it achieved its independence in June, 1960. Under Belgian rule, the central institutions of the Congo never became the objects of loyalty or respect for the mass of the Congolese people. The same underdevelopment and fragility of central structures of authority has been characteristic, to a lesser degree, of the other new African states. This has provided the basis for a continuous struggle between those leaders who seek to establish highly centralized unitary regimes (for example, Nkrumah in Ghana and the late Lumumba in the Congo) and those who insist upon regional autonomy within a loosely organized federal arrangement (for example, Awolowo and the Sardauna of Sokoto in Nigeria and Tshombe and Kasavubu in the Congo). This conflict between centralization and decentralization or separatism will continue to be one of the chief sources of political tension in the new Africa.

Modernization

African leaders are heavily committed to the goal of rapid modernization. To them, it has both material and psychological components. Materially, it means higher standards of living, widespread literacy, adequate health facilities, and a national economy, educational system

and social structure characteristic of modern industrial countries. Psychologically, it means the extinction of the stigma of primitiveness, the vulnerability of backwardness, and the ignominy of dependence. Above all, it means equality with the rest of mankind. The leaders of the successful nationalist movements are under heavy pressure from their followers for immediate and visible material progress. They have made self-government the symbol not only of emancipation from alien rule but also of "life more abundant." Thus, failure to achieve manifest progress could lead to popular frustration and disenchantment, political instability and authoritarianism.

The wide gap between the strong aspiration for modernization and the limited capacity to achieve it through local resources and local technical and managerial skills accentuates the already heavy dependence of the new states upon the external world, at the very time of their passionate commitment to the consummation of freedom. This painful contradiction, with the pursuit of one goal weakening the capacity to achieve the other, is one of the main explanations for two dominant trends in contemporary Africa—toward "strong" or authoritarian government and toward diversification of dependency relationships (that is, acceptance of technical and economic aid from a number of nations, rather than remaining dependent on the former metropolitan power). There are other explanations for the authoritarian trend, but unquestionably the compulsion to mobilize local human and material resources to further the modernization process is an important element. Again, several factors help to account for the trend toward diversification of foreign involvements, but prominent among them is the desire to reduce the "neo-colonial" implications, if not potentialities, of dependence on a single nation and to maximize the amount of external aid and technical assistance.

Two of the major obstacles to rapid modernization are the character of the African economies and the acute shortage of indigenous managerial and technical staff. Most African economies are based primarily upon the export of one dominant cash crop. The majority of the population continues to be engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture. The supply of skilled manpower is extremely limited. Only a beginning has been made at developing secondary industries. The infrastructure (transport and communications facilities, power sources, etc.) is totally inadequate to support large-scale economic expansion and growth. Ambitious development plans include attacks on all these weaknesses—diversification of agriculture, technical training programs, industrialization, and the expansion of the infrastructure—but, at the present level of resource commitment and capital investment, they are only beginning to scratch

the surface. As manpower is Africa's main capital resource, it is likely that Africa's leaders will be increasingly attracted to "human investment" (i.e., compulsory labor) programs, as in Guinea.

One of the gravest weaknesses of the new states is the extremely small number of Africans who have had training for, or experience in, administrative, technical, and managerial positions. This is unquestionably the consequence of European colonial systems that neither anticipated nor desired their early termination. The systematic training and recruitment of African administrators was initiated only in the final stages of colonial rule. Thus, when Ghana became independent in 1957, only 52% of the higher posts in the public service were held by Africans. In Tanganyika, which now stands on the threshold of independence, Africans occupy no more than 25% of the senior posts in the civil service. The situation was most acute in the Republic of the Congo. At the time of independence, only one African had acquired experience in a position of administrative responsibility above that of a clerk. This pattern is characteristic of all the states of Middle Africa.

African states will continue to be heavily dependent upon external personnel for the next decade, particularly in view of the great expansion of staff requirements created by the launching of ambitious development plans. At the same time, there are extremely strong nationalistic pressures within the society for total Africanization. This has resulted in the accelerated departure of large numbers of trained and experienced European officials. The result in most instances has been a sudden and massive input of untrained, inexperienced, and semi-educated Africans into the public service. This almost certainly means a sharp lowering of standards. Nevertheless, most African leaders feel, quite understandably, that the continued presence in high positions of expatriates from the former imperial country is not only inconsistent with rapid Africanization, but (as a single dependency relationship) is also a painful reminder that independence is not complete.

The foregoing analysis highlights one of the single most pervasive and important forces in contemporary Africa—the determination of African leaders to consummate freedom, to achieve what Sekou Toure of Guinea calls "integral de-colonization." This means the termination of unbalanced external influences in general, and of the European presence in particular, wherever it is found on the African continent. The idea that "I am not free until all Africa is free" commands wide acceptance. Because of continued heavy dependence of Africans upon the external world, and particularly upon the West, with which they have been long associated, there is a general feeling that formal independence has not brought complete freedom to Africa.

II. Towards a New African Community

African leaders also confront the difficult task of defining and establishing effective relationships among the new states. The character of these relationships will be largely determined by three factors—the persistence of the political fragmentation of the colonial period, the drive to transcend the existing fragmentation through various forms of union or association of African states, and the development of intra-African tensions and rivalries.

Political Fragmentation

The general trend in contemporary Africa is for each artificial administrative creation of the colonial period to become a separate sovereign state. Thus far, there have been only four exceptions: the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia, to form the Federation of Ethiopia; the unification of British Somaliland and Somalia to form the Republic of Somalia; the union of British Togoland and the Gold Coast to form the state of Ghana; and the division by plebiscite of the British Cameroons between Nigeria and the Republic of the Cameroun. In the British territories of East Africa (Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar) African leaders have committed themselves to the achievement of independence via some form of East African Federation. Apart from these exceptions, the Africans have been disinclined or (prior to independence) unable to create larger-scale political unions. Their slogan has been "independence first, then union."

After independence has been achieved, however, vested interests have been quickly built into the economic and political structures of each new state. Relations with other states have become increasingly formalized. Newly discovered "national interests" must be protected and advanced. "Friendly" and "enemy" states become identified. Once sovereign states have been created, they acquire a power of self-perpetuation that operates to resist both further fragmentation and the creation of a broader political unity.

Pan-Africanism

Despite these powerful forces operating to preserve Africa's present fragmentation, the impulse towards a broader African unity remains strong and persistent. In many respects, the general opposition towards any further fragmentation of existing territories and states is a reflection of the desire to prevent a reduction in the scale of unity already achieved under colonialism. Most African leaders, for example, opposed on principle the separate independence once threatened by Northern Nigeria and by the Southern Sudan, just as they currently oppose the separation of Katanga Province from the Republic of the Congo and Buganda

Province from Uganda. The corollary to this opposition to further fragmentation is the continued quest for a wider Pan-African unity, looking towards the ultimate establishment of some form of continental political unity ranging from a loose Commonwealth of African States to a United States of Africa.

Pan-Africanism—this impulse to establish a wider African unity—is based upon the notion that there is an “African Personality,” a distinctive cultural heritage which all Africans share and of which they can be proud. This notion and the abstract goal of unity command wide acceptance among contemporary African leaders. They are central themes at the many conferences of African political leaders. Yet none of the specific efforts to achieve a wider unity, such as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union or the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, has yet resulted in the formation of a genuine political union involving the actual surrender of sovereignty. The obstacles to such a union are many: differences in language, differing economic and political relationships with the external world, uneven levels of economic potential and development, differing concepts of the way in which unity is to be achieved, personal rivalries, and fears of domination. These and other considerations make it most unlikely that in the predictable future real political unions or federations of existing independent states will be formed by consent.

The need for closer cooperation among Africa's states is so obvious and the desire so strong that African leaders will undoubtedly continue to press for united action in order to protect common interests and to solve mutual problems. A variety of functional arrangements have already been developed, and it can be expected that efforts will be made to expand and to strengthen them. Schemes for an African common market, for an “African Investment Bank,” and for the creation of an organization to handle intra-African disputes all fall into this category. New forms of political association may in time emerge out of this expanding web of economic and social relationships.

Intra-African Rivalries

The characteristic reluctance of states to surrender their sovereignty or to subordinate their “national interests” to the interests of a larger community is not the only obstacle to African unity. African states have their own conflicts and rivalries. These are of two main types. One is the tension that has developed between the more radical states (Ghana, Guinea and Mali) and the more conservative states (Liberia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo, Cameroun, and the remaining ten states of former French Africa). The radical states are more pronouncedly Pan-Africanist, more insistently neutralist,

more willing to develop close relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and more militant about the extinction of residual European influence in Africa. They regard themselves as the vanguard in the unfinished "African Revolution." As such, they constitute a dynamic pole of attraction for the more militant, nationalistic and revolutionary elements in the other states.

In their zeal to assert leadership in the drive for total emancipation of the continent from European influence, the radical states have taken actions that have created tensions with other African states. Thus, for example, the breakup of the Mali Federation is in part due to the more militant orientation of leaders of the former Soudan (now Mali), in contrast to the more conservative pro-French leadership in Senegal, the other constituent member of the abortive Federation. The tension between Ghana and the Ivory Coast is in part the result of a similar difference in attitude between the more militantly Pan-Africanist Nkrumah and the more pro-European Houphuet-Boigny. The continuing tension between the Republic of the Cameroun and the radical states is largely due to the fact that the latter have openly supported militant groups opposed to the present pro-French Camerounian leadership. However, the cleavage between the two groups of states has been most clearly manifested in their contrasting positions in the UN on the question of leadership in the Congo: the radical powers supported Lumumba, whom they believed to be of their persuasion, and the other states either abstained or supported the Kasavubu regime.

The other type of interstate tension involves disagreements over present boundaries, most of which were established haphazardly and without regard for ethnic considerations during the European "scramble" for Africa. Thus, relations are strained between Somalia and Ethiopia as a result of the former's agitation for a Greater Somalia embracing all Somali-speaking peoples, a substantial number of whom inhabit the Haud area of Ethiopia. Tension exists between Ghana and Togo as a result of the recurrent demand by Ghanaian spokesmen that Togo become part of Ghana in order that the Ewe people may be united. Morocco claims Mauritania on historical grounds, but the latter desires to retain its independence. Such situations exist, actually or potentially, all over Africa. Given the artificiality of state boundaries, the comparative brevity of European rule in Africa, and the unstable character of many of the new states, irredentist movements and boundary disputes, precipitated or aggravated by imperialist motives, will continue to complicate intra-African relations.

III. Africa and the World Community

Today, Africa constitutes the world's greatest power vacuum. The same relative weakness that drew the competing powers of Europe into Africa in the mid-nineteenth century has been recreated in the mid-twentieth century as a consequence of the rapid collapse or withdrawal of European power. The dominant impulse that precipitated the mid-nineteenth century scramble for Africa—preclusion of the extension by another great power of its sphere of influence—operates with equal vigor today. Yet, despite these striking similarities, the international situation has changed so radically in other respects that the existence of this vacuum no longer carries the same implications.

The nineteenth century international ethic that rationalized and legitimized imperial rule by white, Christian "civilized" Europe over colored and so-called "backward" peoples has been replaced by a new international ethic that condemns all forms of imperialism and stigmatizes even the most benevolent situations of dependency upon the West as immoral—tolerable only if in the process of rapid liquidation. A United Nations that sought to make European powers subject to international accountability for the administration of their "Non-Self-Governing Territories" has been transformed into a world forum in which the former wards have a substantial vote. Leaders in Africa who supinely accepted (indeed, invited) Western paternal rule and protection have been succeeded by a new generation passionately determined to liquidate what remains of Western imperialism and to forestall any new form of alien rule. Moreover, each of the two great powers competing today to preclude the other from establishing its influence on the continent proclaims an ideology embodying the principles of equality, democracy, and anti-imperialism. Although each attaches very different meanings to these principles, they are powerful weapons which each can employ to appeal to African peoples in order to preclude the influence of the other.

These radically changed circumstances have several important implications. One is that, although the African states are weak and vulnerable, they are now protected by a variety of new restraints, as well as by a consciousness among their leaders of a capacity to forestall new imperialisms either by mobilizing world opinion in the United Nations or by galvanizing their peoples to active resistance. Another is that influence in Africa can be established (or the extension of influence by other outside powers precluded) only by policies and techniques that are in tune with the new realities. The changed circumstances also mean that the struggle to

influence Africa, as well as the struggle to keep it free, will take place as much outside as within Africa. African issues have already tended to monopolize the United Nations agenda. There is every reason to believe this will continue to be the case.

African states have assumed a posture of neutralism or "nonalignment" in world affairs. Their leaders have stated that they wish to follow an independent course in foreign policy, maintaining normal and friendly relations with all countries. They insist neutralism does not mean isolationism. It is their declared intention to judge international issues on their merits and not to give uncritical support either to Western or to Soviet positions. Neutralism means inscrutability and non-commitment. This endows African leaders with a bargaining power grossly disproportionate to the size and influence of their states.

Although all African states have declared themselves neutral, they differ considerably in the manner in which they have implemented that policy. A distinction must be made between ideological and applied neutralism. All profess neutralism—but (when confronted with the painful realities of economic and military weakness) many may be un-neutral on very practical grounds. Thus, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia and Cameroun have defense agreements with the Western world; Ghana and Nigeria are members of the Commonwealth; and, except for Guinea and Mali, all of the new states of former French Africa have a heavy and singular dependence upon France. Guinea, on the other hand, has a similarly unbalanced dependence upon the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

In appraising Africa's neutralist orientation, it should be recognized that most African states entered the era of independence heavily, if not exclusively, dependent upon one single Western power. As they have moved towards greater neutrality—that is, towards relations with countries in both the East and West—the West has tended to regard such a movement as "going Communist," even if the Western, or at least non-Communist, dependence remains preponderant. African leaders do not look at it this way and do not comprehend Western criticism of their actions. Nor do they share the Western view that assistance from the Eastern bloc constitutes a danger. Their attitude has been strengthened by the fact that the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc have given prompt aid without strings attached and have not, in this or other ways, behaved toward them as Western critics have warned. Indeed, African leaders are inclined to interpret Western warnings and criticism as manifestations of a desire to keep Africa predominantly dependent upon the Western world. ~~over,~~ they resent the implication that they are ~~unable~~ to resist Soviet blandishment or to prevent Soviet aid from turning into ultimate domination. They regard them-

selves first and foremost as African nationalists and are supremely confident that their strong will to remain independent is coupled with an equal capacity to resist any new form of external control.

African leaders have a strong interest in and commitment to the United Nations. They regard it as an institution for the advancement and protection of their interests and as a forum in which they can mobilize world public opinion against all forms of residual colonialism and racial domination. Moreover, the voting strength of the African nations in the General Assembly gives Africa an influence in world affairs it could not otherwise claim or exert. Their strong commitment and their active role in United Nations deliberations have profound implications for the future of that organization, as well as for American policy. The United Nations could become a neutral international instrument for the economic, educational and social development of the African states. If the nations of the world would endow it with major responsibility in these fields and with adequate resources to fulfill it, the problems created by African suspicion regarding our motives and by competition among individual states for influence could be resolved or minimized. The United Nations could also become the forum for conciliation and resolution of intra-African conflicts, as well as the agency for handling explosive and delicate situations like the Congo.

On the other hand, if disputes and tensions among or within African states are brought directly before the United Nations under present circumstances, the result might be a grave weakening of the organization. Because each UN member is forced to take positions on all issues, it could compel East-West involvement in intra-African issues, thereby accelerating the intrusion of the Cold War into Africa. It could dramatize and strengthen the growing identity of interests between the radical powers of Africa and the Sino-Soviet Bloc on a large number of issues beyond those of direct African concern. It could also aggravate the already delicate task we confront in balancing our African interests and obligations with our commitments to Europe, particularly on questions involving residual European interests—fancied or real—in Africa.

These are some of the great opportunities as well as the possibly ominous implications that need to be weighed in framing future American policy regarding the role of the United Nations in African affairs.

WHITE-DOMINATED SOUTHERN AFRICA

The southern one-third of the African continent, comprising Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, constitutes the last bastion of white domination of colored peoples.

In these areas, the dominant European groups have categorically affirmed their determination to maintain permanent political supremacy. Portuguese colonialism, Rhodesian discrimination, and South African "apartheid" are the chief targets of the leaders of all of Africa's new states and are bitterly attacked by Asian leaders as well. They symbolize both the continued domination of a substantial segment of the colored world by a white minority and the racial arrogance and condescending paternalism that psychologically have been the most infuriating and bitterly resented aspect of Western colonialism. African hatred of these systems is all the more intense because they are defended in terms of the need to preserve the supremacy of white Christianity.

Portuguese rule has been and remains the most oppressive form of alien domination on the African continent. It is characterized by stringent police controls, ruthless and arbitrary punishment and deportations, denial of political liberties, forced recruitment of labor, limited opportunity for educational and economic advancement, and absence of hope for any meaningful change in the existing system. The Portuguese response to the southward sweep of African nationalism, to growing external pressure and criticism, and more recently to developments in the neighboring Congo, has been one of complete defiance in the name of Christianity, Western civilization and anti-communism. Existing controls have been tightened and manifestations of opposi-

tion brutally suppressed; security forces have been greatly expanded; and the number of white settlers from metropolitan Portugal has been vastly increased. There is no evidence that Portugal intends to alter its current policies.

The character of the Portuguese system provides a constant provocation for anti-Western agitation and sentiment. Because Portugal is a NATO power—and, like France in Algeria, uses NATO arms in Africa—the African belief that NATO is an instrument for the maintenance of Western colonialism is reinforced.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in which Southern Rhodesia has a predominant role, has been watched closely and sympathetically in the hope that its official policy of "partnership" would lead to the progressive development of an integrated society in which racial origin would be irrelevant. Events during the past seven years, however, have demonstrated beyond question that the white minority of Southern Rhodesia is determined not to allow any further erosion of its position of supremacy. As a consequence, African nationalist leaders in the two Northern territories—Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland—are determined to break up the Federation and to undermine and ultimately destroy European domination.

In the Union of South Africa, the white minority intends to preserve its dominant economic and political position through restrictive legislation and separate racial development. Despite repeated condemnation by the outside world, there is little evidence to indicate that the governing party, representing mainly the Afrikaner community, will alter its present policy. The government has military and police power and techniques of control that give it fair assurance of maintaining its position for the predictable future. Continued sporadic disorder is likely, but short of military intervention or universally enforced economic sanctions there appears little that the outside world can do. The situation, however, is one which even the most sympathetic observers believe will lead ultimately to disaster. The Union of South Africa confronts the liberal West with an embarrassing and intractable moral problem.

AMERICAN POLICY—PAST AND FUTURE

The foregoing are some of the general features of the contemporary African scene and of the policy problems America confronts. In considering future policy, we must first briefly examine the main strands in our past policy. It is roughly divisible into three periods: 1885-1945, 1945-1958, and 1958 to date. During the sixty years between the commencement of the partition of Africa in 1885 and the end of the Second World War we accepted and supported both the reality and the legitimacy of European colonial rule in Africa. We qualified such support by an insistence upon respect for the principle of the "open door," as well as for the ideas of trusteeship and international accountability. Otherwise, except for Liberia and Ethiopia, we regarded Africa as an extension of Europe.

During the fateful thirteen years following the end of World War II, when an increasing number of African nationalist movements were demanding early independence, we reacted haltingly and negatively. The reasons are obvious. We were burdened with heavy commitments elsewhere. Strategically, Europe's security and economic recovery commanded the highest priority. Africa was on the periphery of world politics and appeared relatively stable. These and other considerations and assumptions, as well as lamentable ignorance at official levels regarding the true state of Africa's social and political forces, resulted in its being accorded low priority in all policy considerations.

It was not until 1952 that Africa was singled out as the subject for an official policy statement. In subsequent years the main lines of our policy found formal expression. We gave only qualified support to the principle of self-determination, stressing such notions as "prema-

ture independence," and the need to demonstrate an "ability to undertake responsibilities." We repeatedly praised, supported and stressed the importance of the European presence in Africa. As new states advanced towards independence, we expressed our hope "that relations between the new African countries and their former metropolises will continue on a constructive, amicable and mutually advantageous basis." We were silent or restrained in our comment on Africa's white oligarchies, on Portuguese colonialism and on the absence of political liberties in the Belgian Congo. Increasingly we tended to stress the danger of Communist subversion. The general image created by the policy of this period was one of American moral neutrality and support of European colonialism.

Commencing in 1958, our policy became progressively more positive. In that year we sided with the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations in supporting a resolution expressing regret over the South African policy of *apartheid*. The growing importance of African issues was recognized that same year by the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Since then, the previous negativism of our policy has been progressively eliminated, but in a manner and at a tempo suggesting a reactive accommodation to events. For example, following the attainment of independence by 16 new African states in 1960, our spokesmen omitted previous qualifying phrases and emphasized our "long-standing belief in self-determination for peoples everywhere." We have subtly shifted from previous paternalistic warnings that African leaders could be easily duped by Communism to the more positive note that "The African nations prize their independence . . . and are unlikely at the decisive moment to mistake the enemies for the friends of freedom." We have recognized African neutralism, stressing that "We do not seek outright political commitment to our side; rather, we hope to re-enforce an existing commitment to the free way of life." We have emphasized the importance of a positive United Nations role in African development, arbitration of disputes and as a "shield against aggression."

- Although recent policy statements reflect a progressive accommodation to the rapidly unfolding African scene, there are strong arguments for a dramatization at this time of a new era in America's relations with Africa. There is a widespread expectation throughout Africa that the Kennedy Administration will take a fresh and vigorous approach to African questions. Moreover our European commitments, which have immobilized us over the past 15 years, need no longer do so. The rapid withdrawal of France, Britain and Belgium has liberated us as well as the Africans they ruled. Only the Portuguese remain, and support for them is patently both

unrealistic and morally intolerable. We can and must move forward without inhibition to the articulation of a policy based upon the mutual needs and interests of America and Africa.

What should be the elements of a new policy for Africa? First, there must be a positive declaration of our guiding principles. There are two basic principles under which all other aspects of our new policy can be subsumed: the principle of self-determination and the principle of sovereignty. Trite and worn though these words may be, and subject as they are to multiple interpretations, we would be tragically blind to the power they still wield if we were to deny them to the new Africa. They must be affirmed; they must also be spelled out.

The principle of self-determination means that we condemn all forms of alien rule that are not in the process of being progressively terminated. It means also that we recognize the right of all peoples freely to determine their own foreign policy, their own form of government, the extent to which they will cooperate, amalgamate or federate, and their economic and other relationships with other peoples. As a free country, we demand these rights for ourselves and we respect them as rights for all other peoples.

Sovereignty is the principle that operates to guarantee the right of self-determination. It does not preclude international cooperation, nor the creation of larger unions. It does preclude intervention, imperialism and aggression.

Africans will remain unimpressed by our declaration of these principles unless they are reflected in our policies and actions on specific African issues. In the light of current problems, what specific policies are consonant with these general principles? The following are suggested:

(1) Acceptance of African Neutralism. The declaration of a state's foreign policy is an act of sovereignty and must be respected as such. Our government has already accepted African neutralism; this should be reaffirmed. Given the general political trends in Africa, it would be unrealistic to press any African state to align itself publicly with the West. Indeed, it is to the advantage of Africa and the West in particular and of the world in general that, at this stage, Africa follow a neutralist course. If it is genuine, it constitutes a bulwark against undue Sino-Soviet influence. It also helps to minimize African involvement in the Cold War. Historically, great powers have agreed to the neutralization of buffer areas and power vacuums; today such an East-West agreement about Africa, formal or tacit, would be a step towards disengagement and relaxation of tensions. Although the Sino-Soviet bloc may not co-

operate, we should not by our actions intensify East-West rivalries in this vulnerable area.

Furthermore, if an African state pursues a genuine neutralist policy its leaders are less vulnerable to extremist nationalist opposition.

In accepting Africa's neutralist orientation, we must recognize that on many international issues Africa's new states will not support our position; indeed, they may from time to time vote with the Soviet Bloc. Some of the new states, for example, strongly support the admission of Red China into the United Nations, not necessarily because of any pro-Communist leaning on their part, but because its exclusion appears to them to be unwarranted and detrimental to the achievement of such objectives as disarmament and international control of the atom. Neutralism does not mean their abstention on Cold War issues; it simply means an independent foreign policy. If we respect their sovereignty, we must respect their right to differ with us. Above all, consistent support for us on all issues should not be a condition for friendly relations and equality of treatment in foreign aid.

(2) *Acceptance of Diversified Dependency.* The tendency for African leaders to move from a state of dependence on a single foreign power to one of dispersion of their foreign involvements has been previously described. The diversification of dependency relationships is, of course, the logical consequence of a policy of neutralism. It enhances their security and maximizes their external aid; it also serves to provide a sense of psychological independence. We should accept, and in appropriate cases support, their impulse to diversity, hoping that the Western sector in their spectrum of involvements always remains an adequate counterbalance to the Eastern. Above all, however, we should cease stressing officially the importance of preserving the European connection. As sovereign states they must be allowed the right to assess their own interests and determine their own involvements.

(3) *Tolerance of Variant Forms of Government and Economy.* The general trend in African states is towards one-party regimes and state-controlled economies. There is also a general leftward drift in ideology, and a near-universal support for the concept of a socialist state. There are many explanations for this orientation, but one that stands out above all others is that strong government during the transitional period is regarded as a requisite for nation-building and rapid modernization. The similarities to communist regimes are obvious, but African leaders rationalize and defend their use of authoritarian forms and techniques in terms of a peculiarly African pattern of development. Whatever the causes or explanations may be, however, these are the

governments with which we must deal. We must also remember that each sovereign state has the right to determine its own form of government and economy.

Africans bitterly resent the West's hypercritical and purist attitude regarding their efforts to carry out what they feel to be a heroic "bootstrap operation." Our criticism and "holier-than-thou" attitude is all the more irritating because of certain right-wing authoritarian regimes we uncritically support.

Emergent Africa is still in the process of sorting itself out, of setting up and testing new institutions, and of seeking forms of government appropriate to the circumstances it confronts. Without foregoing our right to render moral judgment on authoritarian excesses, we must at this stage demonstrate tolerance and understanding regarding these trends in Africa. We must above all refrain from making premature judgments. Our contribution should be positive—to help African leaders to create conditions which will facilitate the growth of free institutions and public liberties.

(4) *Support for Full Participation in the United Nations.* The new African states are not fully represented, in proportion to their number, in several aspects of United Nations activities: the United Nations Secretariat; the secretariats and technical staffs of the specialized agencies, the International Court of Justice, and the Security Council. Such under-participation is due in part to their recent admission as members, and in part to the extremely limited number of Africans technically qualified to perform many of the specialized tasks involved.

African confidence in the United Nations is particularly important because of the expanded role the latter is destined to assume both in African development and in handling critical African political issues. For these efforts to be effective, African leaders must be genuinely convinced of the integrity and neutrality of the United Nations apparatus, as the Congo crisis has so vividly demonstrated. The Soviet bloc is likely to continue to stigmatize the United Nations as an instrument of the West in general and of the Department of State in particular. Many African leaders have a strong predisposition to believe charges of Western duplicity and manipulation. This is strengthened by the fact that the United Nations Secretariat is predominantly, or at least disproportionately, Western. Thus, if African confidence in the United Nations is to be preserved, the United States should take the initiative to ensure greater African participation in all agencies and organs. Regularized African representation on the Security Council and International Court of Justice should be sought, and specialized training programs should be inaugurated to increase African representation in the secretariats.

(5) *Official Criticism of Residual Colonialism.* Adjusting and developing our policies along the foregoing lines will do much to improve our relations with the new African states and to convince their leaders of our genuine respect for their sovereign equality as members of the world community. However, this will all be of no avail if we do not consistently oppose residual European colonialism and racialism in Africa. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's dramatic vote in the UN Security Council for investigation of the disorders in Portuguese Angola was a good beginning, but we must follow it up. The problems of transition in these colonial systems are complex and delicate, and we should help in every way possible to facilitate the needed adjustments—but we should also declare our moral position in unequivocal terms.

The strongest possible private diplomatic pressure should be exerted upon Portugal to take positive steps toward the ultimate emancipation of her territories in Africa.

We should take a reserved and non-committal position regarding the future of the Central African Federation, affirming our support of the principles of self-determination and majority rule. Through diplomatic channels, we should inform the government of the Federation and of Southern Rhodesia that we will not support the Federation unless it is reconstituted along lines that clearly have the support of the African peoples, and that we would look with profound disfavor upon any attempted union, under any form, between Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. These warnings should be accompanied by a firm assurance of our support for economic development of the area and for the protection of minority rights. Regarding the Union of South Africa, we should take an emphatically stronger position in the United Nations against *apartheid* and insist that Southwest Africa be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations.

We must also make a far heavier commitment of our resources to African educational and economic development. During 1959, all of Africa received only three percent of our total foreign aid. New programs of assistance have been launched, and larger-scale forms of assistance are now being planned, but the needs are both great and urgent. A greatly expanded effort is required.

In allocating aid and in developing collaborative development programs with African states, we are confronted with the question whether we should give preferential treatment to the more conservative pro-Western states as opposed to the more radical states, with which our relations have at times been strained. This raises, of course, the more general question whether we should choose sides at this time among the several competing African groups. The consensus of

most sensitive and informed observers is that a policy of differential treatment would be most unwise. It would not only deepen the cleavages among these groups but would inevitably push the more radical states into closer alliance with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, there is evidence that the radical states represent the "wave of the future" in Africa and that other new states will join their ranks. Thus, rather than censuring and opposing them, we should seek to identify ourselves with the dynamism of which they are the principal carriers.

The promotion of African unity should be one of our major objectives. We should continue to give strong encouragement to interstate economic cooperation, to wider political associations, and to the development of regional machinery, such as an Organization of African States, for the resolution of intra-African disputes. The latter should be made primarily an African responsibility. Every effort should be made to bring about a reduction in intra-African tensions and the formation of a broader consensus among Africa's leaders.

America stands at a crossroads in its relations with the new Africa. Wise and imaginative policies, generous aid, patience and forbearance, and a new spirit of associating ourselves positively with Africa's goals and needs can be the decisive factor in Africa's peaceful adjustment to the modern world. The opportunity to play a creative and constructive role is a fleeting one. Developments in Africa are rapidly moving beyond control. Will we respond in time, and adequately? The answer does not depend solely upon the actions of our government; indeed, in a large measure, it will ultimately be determined by the American people.

