



Lutheran World Ministries

USA NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

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M E M O

TO: Standing Committee on World Community/LWM
Staff of LWM
LWF Students from Namibia in the USA
Other Colleagues and Friends

FROM: Edward May

SUBJECT: Namibia's Continuing Crisis

After South Africa sabotaged the Preimplementation Meeting in January there seems to have been an agreement by common consent that the next move was up to "The West". The tacit understanding was that the Frontline States and Nigeria (FLS/N) had "delivered SWAPO" but the Contact Group (CG) had not "delivered South Africa." There is no doubt that SWAPO has made numerous concessions since the initiative of the CG got underway in 1977, and that the FLS/N had considerable influence with SWAPO, but "deliver" is too strong a word. SWAPO continues to be a diplomatically responsible movement committed to negotiation where it is possible to do so without selling out its essential principle of independence for Namibia. It is demeaning to SWAPO to imply that it can "be delivered."

On the other hand, the expectations of the FLS/N for the CG "to deliver" the SAG is a bit extravagant. This is not to imply that the CG used its influence to the limit and still failed, far from it, but it is to say that the CG is up against an intractable, determined, paranoid and ruthless opponent. To make matters worse for Namibia, during the days before the Preimplementation Meeting and continuing to this day, Western governments are in disarray due to elections, campaigning, domestic difficulties and other international priorities such as Poland, El Salvador, the Middle East in general and Lebanon in particular, and Northern Ireland, to name a few. The United States, for example, claims that it is still developing its Africa policy and feels free to deny almost any allegation of where it is going in spite of rather specific remarks by U.S. government officials from the President on down. (See Christian Science Monitor, 5 May 1981, "UN Vote on South Africa Sanctions Could Split US, Europe")

(continued)

These delays have been tragic for Namibians. The war continues on the Angolan border with daily death lists which include Namibian and Angolan citizens. A cease-fire, within the grasp of those attending the Preimplementation Meeting, now seems farther away than ever, judging by the campaign rhetoric of Pieter Botha and the vetoes by the Western troika in the U.N. Security Council recently.

Washington Post Editorial--3 May 1981

The Washington Post editorial of 3 May 1981 is a perceptive analysis of where the situation is today. We may not like it, but it does represent the current picture and the headline is especially pertinent.

The kind of "Zimbabwe-like constitutional guarantees" being suggested by Crocker and Co. are, of course, a major appendage to the original U.N. plan which called for the election of a constituent assembly which would draw up the constitution. Everyone, including South Africa, knows that SWAPO will win the election and so this is now perceived as the only way to guarantee "minority rights", even though SWAPO has said publicly and often that those whites who were born in Namibia or made Namibia their home are Namibians and will have the same rights as all Namibians. Western Allies have agreed to promote such a plan even though no specifics are given. (See Washington Post, 4 May 1981, "Allies Accept a New Plan on Namibia" and Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1981, "Namibia: Will It Look Like Austria, Finland?")

The reference in the editorial about abandoning negotiations if efforts do not seem to promise results appeared in the Washington Post and is attached. (May 1 1981, "Crocker Carried Warning on Namibia Talks")

The final paragraph of the editorial calls for the U.S. government to trust the word of the Angolans that Cuban troops will depart Angola when the South Africans withdraw. That does not seem to be the mood of the U.S. Administration and a New York Times piece bears this out. (See New York Times, 1 May 1981, "U.S. Said to Tie Namibian Freedom To a Cuban Pullout from Angola") It has been the position of LWM that the Clark Amendment must remain in force at this time to guard against destabilizing any further the present government of Angola. The harassment which comes from South Africa directly through its almost daily incursions into Angola's space and indirectly through its support of UNITA is behind the instability now being experienced by Angola.

OTHER ITEMS

Copies of the follows news reports will be of interest to you.

--"U.S. Joins in U.N. Veto on South African Trade Ban" New York Times, 1 May 1981

--"Wide Discontent With Botha Seen in S. Africa Vote" Washington Post, 1 May 1981

--"At the U.N., the 'So-Called Third World' Turns Real" New York Times, 3 May 1981

(continued)

--"It's Now 'Sink or Swim' for UN's Law of the Sea Treaty" Christian Science Monitor, 21 April 1981

--"Zimbabwe: After One Year, Two Nations" Christian Science Monitor, 4 May 1981

--"Namibia Debated in Crocker Confirmation Hearing" Africa News, 4 May 1981

Counsel Sought

Once specifics to the new Western proposal are officially spelled out, Lutheran World Ministries will need to respond. Until that time, our inclinations tend to be negative.

1. Even assuming that this new and rather sweeping innovation has merit, unless it is speedily implemented it will prolong the struggle and take more and more lives.
2. The "Zimbabwe Solution" succeeded largely due to the persistence and skill of Lord Carrington who carried with him the legal position of representing the internationally accepted legitimate government of Southern Rhodesia. Who can do that, especially if the U.N. is downplayed?
3. Namibia's independence is linked to Angola's stability and the Reagan Administration rhetoric before and after the November elections has been favoring UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, the darling of South Africa.
4. While Chester Crocker's sensible statement that Soviet arms supplies to SWAPO do not necessarily make SWAPO a client of the Soviet Union, the Christian Science Monitor reports that this was criticized by the Administration. Alexander Haig had made a similar statement in general terms some time earlier. Those were encouraging remarks by State Department officials, but if the CSM report is true they have no substance in the view of the real policymakers of the Administration.

--Your Comments Are Invited--

Finally, we have on hand a number of copies of "Documentation on U.N. Pre-Implementation Meeting on Namibia, Geneva, January 7-14, 1981." While this publication is dated, if there are those who have not received a copy and desire one, please send a postcard and we will see that you are supplied.

As this was being written, the following telex arrived from LWF/Geneva:

TO LWF RELATED AGENCIES

RE: NAMIBIAN REFUGEES

Urgent appeals have been received from the President of SWAPO to transport food (which is already funded from other sources) from Zimbabwe to Angola as serious food shortage in Southern Angola among the Namibian refugees has occurred.

(continued)

In mutual discussion between LWF and WCC it was agreed that the balance from the WCC appeal be made available for food transport from Zimbabwe to Angola and that LWS/ZCRS in Zambia will implement and organize the transportation of the food.

We have telex assurance from the President of SWAPO that this food will be distributed to civilian refugee population only.

The food transportation will be a combination of airlift and land transport, and LWF/ZCRS director has been authorized to go ahead covering transport costs up to the U.S. dollars 120,000 available from the WCC appeal.

According to information received from the SWAPO Stockholm representative Mr. Hishongwa, who has just returned from Southern Angola, an influx of 1000 additional refugees has taken place, and the need for not only food but also tents, blankets and clothing is great.

Pending further development and assessment it may be necessary to come back to you for additional requests.

Balslev/Kifle

EM:ds

att.

UN vote on S. Africa sanctions could split US, Europe

By Louis Wizenizer

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations

"A monumental rebuff to Africa. A sad moment in the history of the United Nations and of African-Western relations."

This is how African delegates, conservatives as well as moderates and radicals, consider the triple veto passed in the Security Council last week by the United States, Britain, and France to block the imposition of an oil and arms embargo against South Africa.

All the other members of the council, including Spain, Japan, Ireland, China, Tunisia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Panama, voted in favor of sanctions.

France and Britain closed ranks with their American ally in casting vetoes. But a number of diplomats here are concerned that what was perceived as American insensitivity toward both black Africa and the United Nations eventually may lead to a new split between the US and its European friends.

Black African diplomats say they were shocked and saddened by what they saw as a display of "US intransigence." Even Washington's closest friends confess privately to being dismayed. They felt their own images were tarnished in African eyes and their own interests in Africa were sacrificed for little purpose.

Indeed, Western diplomats assert that this confrontation was entirely avoidable. They contend it was brought about largely by the "diplomatic lack of skills" of the new team representing the US at the United Nations.

These Western diplomats say that a form of words could have been worked out to satisfy the Africans, who were described as being prepared to be flexible. These sources say that the Africans had waited for two weeks for the five Western nations that had drafted the UN plan for Namibian independence — the US, Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany — to reaffirm clearly their commitment to their own plan embodied in Security Council Resolution 435.

Well-informed diplomatic sources say that the non-American members of the five, particularly those seated at the council (Britain and France), saw no difficulty with restating their adherence to Resolution 435. According to

senior American "old Namibia hands," there existed in the UN vocabulary enough words to satisfy the Africans, who could then once again postpone the call for sanctions.

But, says one Western diplomat, "Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick sat in silence for three hours while ambassadors from both sides were seeking a compromise formula, as if to signal her lack of concern regarding the whole issue."

A new plan, unofficially submitted to Assistant-Secretary of State-designate Chester Crocker in London April 23 by the four American partners in the Namibia "contact group," apparently did not win favor with the new administration.

This plan goes a long way toward meeting South African fears, even though it keeps the process leading to the independence of mineral-rich Namibia within the UN framework. The plan essentially seeks to complement Resolution 435 by adding to it several UN Charter principles to be included in Namibia's constitution in order to protect the rights of the white minority. It also seeks to give Namibia a neutral status, by way of an international treaty, so as to guarantee that it would not become hostile to any of its neighbors, including South Africa.

The original UN plan for the independence of Namibia, prepared by the five Western nations and accepted in principle by South Africa last fall, calls for a cease-fire to be followed by UN-supervised, free elections and finally by independence. South Africa fears that the South-West Africa People's Organization, which it considers to be "Marxist controlled," would come to power under this plan.

At the Geneva conference in January the five Western nations privately told South Africa they would seek ways by which to protect not only the rights of Namibia's white minority but also South Africa's economic interests there.

But both South Africa and Namibia's South African-backed "Turnhalle" parties rejected these advances. Instead Dirk Mudge, the leader of the Turnhalle group, told a high UN official: "We are for free elections — if we know we shall win them."

After the efforts by the Western "contact group" were thus blocked by South Africa, the Reagan administration sent out signals that it intended to weaken the US commit-

ment to the UN plan. This and other African problems, it made clear, would be viewed in the context of US-Soviet rivalry.

Referring to southern Africa, American officials told high European officials in Washington in February and March, "We will take care of the Angolans." Indeed, the administration requested that Congress lift the Clark amendment, which prohibits the United States from assisting Jonas Savimbi's guerrillas, who are fighting against the Cuban-supported Angolan government.

Even while the Namibian question was before the Security Council last week, Chester Crocker stated in Washington that "for peace to come in Angola, the Savimbi people will have to have a cut of the pie."

By hinting at the same time that Cuban troops would have to leave Angola before consideration could be given to the independence of Namibia, he seemed to indicate that the Reagan administration was preparing to disengage from the Western group's three-year joint mediation effort.

Under these new circumstances, some Cabinet-level Western officials are wondering whether it is still useful for their countries to continue to side publicly with the US. Up to now they had chosen not to break ranks with the Reagan administration because they felt it ought to be given time to get acquainted with a very complex problem and to formulate a realistic policy.

"However, if the US is going to simply side with South Africa and dismiss the United Nations altogether, the Europeans may have to look after their own interests in Africa as they are doing in the Middle East," comments one West European diplomat.

The five Western nations did reach agreement on strategy toward Namibia in Rome May 3 during preparations for the NATO foreign ministers' meeting. They promised new proposals for the territory's future. But this agreement is seen here as likely to contain little more than a papering over of existing differences between the US and its allies.

Meanwhile, there is still hope among moderate Africans that the Reagan administration will see the light and be gently persuaded by its allies, as well as by such friendly governments as Nigeria's and Kenya's, to turn back from the brink and to avoid antagonizing the black continent.

Namibia's Time

IT WAS a foregone conclusion that the United States, with its allies, would veto new U.N. resolutions demanding sanctions against South Africa for dragging out independence for Namibia. Since such sanctions would devastate various African nations with economic links with Pretoria, the call for them had to be seen mostly as a way to dramatize African commitment to a free Namibia. The Reagan administration, having just lifted an old sanction against an adversary, could not have embraced new ones against a state it regards as a friend. The administration believes, moreover, that sanctions will simply stiffen South Africa further in the Namibia negotiations to come.

Okay. But having vetoed sanctions partly to expedite negotiations, the administration comes under a fresh obligation to perform. The South African government had waited for Mr. Reagan to see if he could win it better terms. He is promising just that, including Zimbabwe-like constitutional guarantees to protect Namibia's white minority against its specter of a SWAPO electoral sweep. Surely the administration will use its full influence to deliver South Africa to terms redrafted for its comfort.

But why, then, has the State Department warned that the United States may abandon its negotiating effort if there are not realistic prospects of success? In one sense this was a call to the "front-line" states to help out. But it could also be read as a veiled invitation to South Africa to resist. That reading should not be allowed to stand.

In this regard, the results of the recent elections

among the ruling white minority in South Africa are relevant. Prime Minister P. W. Botha's governing National Party won reelection but suffered incursions from both right and left. Earlier doubts about South Africa's strength and determination to move toward reform internally and coexistence externally are bound to grow. Inevitably it will be asked if South Africa still meets the test—that it be making "a sincere and honest effort . . . to remove apartheid"—that President Reagan set for American friendship. At the least it means for American diplomacy on Namibia that the United States will have to be very firm in guiding the way.

The United States will also have to take care not to raise an unnecessary barrier in Namibia by demanding a prior departure of Cuban troops from Angola. Those troops are there for two purposes—to protect the Angolan government against South African forces punishing Angola for harboring SWAPO guerrillas, and to protect that government against its own guerrilla challengers. It is necessary that the Cubans depart: No African should accept that 20,000 foreign troops come from across an ocean to aid one side in an internal struggle for power. But all Africans accept that an African government under constant assault by South Africa, as Angola has been, will seek help where it can. Its foreign minister recently affirmed that Angola will send the Cubans home "when Namibia will be independent, and the aggression against Angola from South Africa finished." This is the pledge the United States should try to make come true.

Allies Accept A New Plan On Namibia

U.S. Urges Changes In Present Accord To Reassure S. Africa

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

ROME, May 3—The United States and major allies agreed today to seek resolution of the Namibian conflict by negotiating a constitution and other guarantees intended to persuade South Africa to stop blocking independence for that largely black territory.

The plan, reflecting the views of the Reagan administration, was approved by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. and the foreign ministers of the four other countries that have been acting as the "contact group" seeking to prevent Namibia from becoming a crisis issue between South Africa and black African nations. The other nations involved in the diplomatic effort are Britain, France, West Germany and Canada.

At issue is how to achieve independence for Namibia, a thinly populated but mineral-rich land between South Africa and Angola, in a way that will satisfy black African aspirations while easing South Africa's fears that the new country will come under the domination of forces that it charges are hostile and communist-dominated.

South Africa has controlled the territory since the end of World War I. The U.N. Security Council in 1978 adopted Resolution 435 calling for independence under a U.N. timetable, but South Africa has been blocking progress, saying that the United Nations is too sympathetic to the South-west Africa People's Organization, which has been waging guerrilla war against South African forces in Namibia, also known as South West Africa.

The Reagan administration, which wants to repair the badly frayed U.S. relations with the white-controlled South African government without antagonizing the black African "front-line states" on Namibia's other borders, took the lead in working out the new plan. It evolved from extensive

consultations carried out in Africa and Europe by Chester Crocker, President Reagan's nominee to be assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

The administration hopes the plan will permit a new start on the negotiations, lead to an independence agreement that will ingratiate Washington and its allies with the South Africans and the front-line countries and ease tensions to permit the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet forces from Angola.

Tonight, ministers of the contact group met on the eve of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting here and approved a statement reaffirming that Resolution 435 should be the basis for pursuing Namibian independence. But it also called for "ways to strengthen the existing plan" by adding to it "measures, including constitutional arrangements, with the aim of enhancing prospects."

U.S. officials have said privately that the idea is to work out in advance a constitution and safeguards that will overcome South African fears of a U.N. bias toward SWAPO and convince South Africa that other forces in Namibia will have a fair chance at gaining power when the territory elects its own government.

So far, U.S. and other Western officials have been vague about how this might be done in ways that will gain the cooperation of the black African states and allay their concern that the plan is not a ruse to install a South African puppet government. Tonight's communiqué said that senior officials will meet in late May, probably in Washington, to explore the issue further.

On another matter, State Department spokesman Dean Fischer characterized as "premature" reports today in The Washington Post and other U.S. newspapers that Haig will promise NATO that the United States will begin negotiations with the Soviet Union this year on reducing intermediate-range nuclear missiles based in Europe.

The published reports said a "preliminary commitment" to offer such a promise was decided on by the National Security Council Thursday.

In private, U.S. sources here said Haig has been authorized to make such a commitment if he determines that West European sentiment for an early start on the missile talks is sufficiently strong and if the NATO allies are willing to reciprocate on such issues as renewing their commitments to increased defense spending.

But the sources stressed that the offer is still regarded as tentative by the Reagan administration and dependent on Haig's talks with the other NATO ministers.

Namibia: Will it look like Austria, Finland?

By Louis Wiznitzer

Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N. Y.

Namibia — the mineral-filled but modestly populated territory formerly known as South-West Africa — could become another neutral nation like Austria or Finland.

That is the essence of the latest Western plan for the strategic southern African land.

In an effort to prevent the changeover in Washington from totally derailing the three-year effort to get agreement on Namibian independence, the non-American members of the Western mediating team (West Ger-

many, France, Britain, Canada) are about to present this new proposal to the Reagan administration.

The idea is that an independent Namibia, if patterned after Austria or Finland, might at last be acceptable both to South Africa and to the international community. A constitution drawing from the principles of the United Nations Charter would guarantee the new nation's democracy. An international treaty would guarantee its neutrality, so that it could not play a hostile role toward South Africa nor toward Angola.

The hope is that the new plan might sidetrack growing African anger against the United States for apparently warming toward South Africa; more specifically, that it might persuade black African countries not to press for sanctions against South Africa at the UN Security Council meeting scheduled to convene April 21. (A request for sanctions against South Africa would be met with a US veto and would seriously isolate the US in Africa.)

The negotiations grinding on for the past three years came to an abrupt halt at the Geneva Conference in January when South Africa refused to go ahead with the UN plan it had previously accepted under pressure from the five Western nations, including the US.

This plan, embodied in Security Council Resolution 435, calls for a cease-fire, then UN-supervised elections, followed by independence. South Africa had raised objections over the manner in which the UN was planning to carry out the plan. It feared the plan would favor the main guerrilla-cum-independence group, SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization), and help turn Namibia into a communist state.

The Reagan administration seemed at first determined to turn its back on the efforts made by previous administrations

on Namibia and to make anticommunism the one outstanding guideline of its African policy. In an interview with newsmen Walter Cronkite, President Reagan said, "Can we abandon a country which is strategically essential to the free world?"

As part of this trend, the administration is trying to get Congress to remove the Clark Amendment which prohibits the US from giving military assistance to guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi, fighting the Soviet-backed regime in next-door Angola. The Angolan government has long supported SWAPO.

Even though a scheduled visit by Mr. Savimbi to Washington was postponed by the Reagan administration, a Washington emissary met with him in Morocco last month. Reportedly several American military experts have recently made clandestine visits to Savimbi's guerrilla bases to assess his military needs.

Meanwhile, the outraged black African reaction to the apparent turnabout in US-African policy, as well as private advice from Western allies, seems to have some effect. In the words of one Western official, the US administration moved "back from the brink," and revised its position.

The Nigerian government was told by US Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. that the administration had decided to pick up the threads of the Carter administration's program of international negotiations to bring about the independence of Namibia. And Chester A. Crocker, designated as assistant secretary of state for African affairs, embarked on a trip to Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Angola, South Africa, Nigeria, and to London where he would meet the other members of the "contact group."

His mission, according to diplomatic sources, was to try to sell the administration's own new formula for the independence of Namibia. That calls for the convening of a constitutional conference, styled after the Lancaster House conference which eventually led to the independence of Zimbabwe. A constitution, providing guarantees for the white minority and for South African interests, would be drawn up even before Namibia becomes independent.

But this plan is unacceptable to SWAPO, to the so-called "frontline states" bordering South Africa, and indeed to all of black Africa. These critics see the US plan as bypassing the UN resolution and cutting the tie between Namibian independence and the United Nations.

Hence Mr. Crocker has been unable to rally black African leaders to this idea. He was snubbed both by Mozambique's President Samora Machel and by South Africa's Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha. According to diplomatic sources, the four Western partners of the US are equally unenthusiastic about the US plan.

Hence the non-American plan, to be submitted to Mr. Crocker in London on April 21, comprises two elements:

- A set of principles to be selected from the UN Charter and from various existing UN texts regarding human rights (political, economic, social) to be imposed on Namibia by the UN as its founding father. These principles would determine that Namibia would be governed democratically and could not become a totalitarian state.

- To reinforce these UN pre-imposed guidelines on Namibia's future constitution, Namibia's existence and neutral role could be spelled out and guaranteed by an international treaty to be signed by the frontline states, and other African and Western nations. Austria and Finland could serve as examples.

Crocker Carried Warning on Namibia Talks

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration has told African nations that it is willing to lead the way toward a negotiated settlement of the Namibian conflict but will abandon the effort unless there are realistic prospects of success.

This message was taken to 12 African countries earlier this month by Chester A. Crocker, who has been nominated to be assistant secretary of state for African affairs, according to a State Department briefing for reporters yesterday.

The possibility that the Reagan administration might "disengage" from an unproductive international effort on Namibia was "not a threat but a reality," said a State Department official intimately familiar with the Crocker trip. He cannot be named under the ground rules of the briefing.

The new U.S. administration has "a limited and finite amount of capital" to expend on foreign affairs and therefore will not continue major ef-

forts in an area likely to produce failure, Crocker is said to have told the Africans.

In the case of Namibia, the thinly populated but mineral-rich land between South Africa and Angola, the administration sees three choices:

- A fruitless attempt to pursue a settlement under the original terms of U.N. Security Council resolution 435, which continues to be strongly backed by African "front-line states" but has been "something of a dead letter" for at least a year, in the view of the Reagan administration.

- A "strengthened and reinforced" resolution 435 involving formal constitutional protections and implementation guarantees for groups within Namibia before an election to choose an independent government there.

This approach would be facilitated by an improved "regional climate" flowing from the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet forces from Angola, in the administration view.

- U.S. disengagement from the Namibia effort if it cannot find a way to work productively with black African states, South Africa and the four other Western nations — Britain, France, West Germany and Canada — that have comprised the "contact group" seeking to arrange a settlement.

The next step toward a solution, after Security Council proceedings this week in New York, is a scheduled meeting Sunday in Rome of foreign ministers of the "contact group" nations, including Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr.

After that, the United States expects an airing of the issues with South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha, who is scheduled to visit Washington May 15, and further detailed discussions by senior officials of the contact group nations who are to gather here in the second half of May.

Crocker, in his recent visit to Angola, told the Luanda government

that the United States will not establish diplomatic relations without a withdrawal of Cuban troops, according to the State Department official.

Crocker was not asked for, nor did he give, assurances that the administration will not support UNITA, an Angolan guerrilla faction led by Jonas Savimbi, who opposes the Luanda government, the State Department official said.

The official said, "There have been no decisions taken to become involved in direct support of Savimbi, nor is there any plan to do so in terms of tangible support."

However, the official called Savimbi "a genuine and legitimate nationalist leader" and said it is "a simple political fact" that "there will be no peace in Angola until [Savimbi's] people have a cut of the pie."

How a political compromise between the Angolan government and Savimbi might be arranged is "not for us to say," the U.S. official said.

U.S. Said to Tie Namibian Freedom To a Cuban Pullout From Angola

By JUAN de ONIS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 30 — A senior State Department official said today that the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was necessary for the resumption of international efforts to end South African control of South-West Africa.

The official, who recently completed a 12-nation tour of Africa, said the idea of linking Cuban withdrawal to progress toward creation of an independent nation of Namibia had been conveyed to Angolan officials.

The official, who visited Angola during his trip, said the four-year-old attempt by the Security Council to hold an election in Namibia under United Nations supervision is "dead in the water." He said General Assembly resolutions, adopted by black African countries and their third world allies, would not solve the Namibian impasse.

With as many as 20,000 Cubans in Angola, which is just north of Namibia, South Africa and the white minority in Namibia would be resistant to any plan requiring withdrawal of South African forces from the territory, according to the official.

'Lack of Confidence'

"Lack of confidence is a major obstacle to any progress toward a Namibia settlement," he said.

The United States has begun talks with the four other Western nations — Canada, Britain, West Germany and France — that had been trying to arrange a United Nations-supervised cease-fire and election in Namibia.

Chester Crocker, President Reagan's choice to be Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, outlined the Administration's policy toward southern Africa in written answers to questions submitted at his confirmation hearings by Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina. He paid special attention to Namibia, which arouses strong feelings in both black Africa and South Africa.

Asked whether the United States would accept the South-West Africa People's Organization, the major Namibian guerrilla group, Mr. Crocker said:

"We are seeking to bring Namibia to genuine independence under conditions that would assure that an eventual independent government would be democratically elected, recognized internationally

and operating within a framework that guaranteed the rights of Namibians of all races and political persuasions. Within such a framework, it is up to the people of Namibia to decide on the political parties of their choice."

U.S. Withholds Recognition

The United States has withheld diplomatic recognition of Angola's Popular Liberation Movement Government, which came to power in 1976 with Soviet and Cuban support. Rival guerrillas backed by South Africa still control areas of southeastern Angola and wage war on the Luanda regime.

The United States has said that Cuban troops must be withdrawn from Angola before ties are established with the Government in Luanda.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in reply to Senator Helms's questions, Mr. Crocker rejected the Carter Administration's position that the presence of Cuban forces was primarily to deter a South African invasion of Angola, which provides sanctuaries for the Namibian guerrillas.

He said the Cuban forces were helping the Luanda Government "retain power and pursue its internal conflict" with the guerrillas in southeastern Angola.

U.S. Joins in U.N. Veto on South African Trade Ban

By BERNARD D. NOSSITER

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 30 — The United States, Britain and France tonight vetoed four Security Council resolutions to halt all trade with South Africa, widening the gulf between the Reagan Administration and black Africa.

The Council's third-world and Communist members, including the Soviet Union and China, supported the resolutions. Japan, Ireland and Spain either abstained or voted with the majority. But the vetoes were decisive.

The resolutions were designed to bring pressure on South Africa to grant independence to South-West Africa, also known as Namibia, and to force the Reagan Administration to commit itself on the issue.

The resolutions would have required United Nations members to stop all trade, including oil and arms deals, with South Africa, to end travel to the country and to break diplomatic ties with its Government. The resolutions would have also set up machinery to insure that United Nations members comply with the curbs.

Self-Defeating Gesture Seen

The United States and its Western allies regarded the effort to impose sanctions as an empty, self-defeating gesture. They said that independence for Namibia, though thwarted by South Africa up to now, depended on Pretoria's consent and could not be achieved through blunt pressure.

After the balloting, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the American delegate, said that her vote "in no way affects the determination of the United States to make every possible effort to find a way to achieve an early, internationally accepted independence for Namibia."

But she said that sanctions were an ineffective means of influencing policy and that "history supports our view." She cited the failure of the embargoes against Italy in the 1930's and Rhodesia in the 1970's and noted that the United States had just ended its curbs on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union.

The chief spokesman for the Africans,

Olara Otunnu of Uganda, replied, "If sanctions do not work, why would three permanent members of this Council cast the heavy weight of their vote against measures which do not work?"

His sarcasm brought a strong round of applause from the African diplomats who filled the chamber.

The meeting was delayed for four hours while the Council members met privately in an effort to reach a compromise that would have delayed the confrontation and the vote for another month. But the effort, directed by Noel Dorr of Ireland, the Council president, failed. African diplomats said that several countries in their group favored delay but that Algeria, Mexico and other nations grouped as nonaligned pressed successfully for the showdown. Suspicion about the United States commitment to early independence for Namibia was said to be the decisive factor.

The nine nations that voted for all four resolutions were the Soviet Union, East Germany, China, Uganda, Niger, the Philippines, Tunisia, Mexico and Panama. Ireland and Spain voted with them to cut off oil and arms, but abstained on the attempt to halt all economic and diplomatic relations. Japan voted only for the weapons embargo, abstaining on the other measures.

Five Western nations — the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada — want to seek a new solution to ease South African fears about a takeover of Namibia by Marxist guerrillas. The five nations are working on a plan providing guarantees for the political rights and economic holdings of Namibia's white minority as well as some assurance that the territory will remain neutral.

The Africans are expected to respond to the vetoes with a call for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, perhaps in the next few weeks. There, the resolutions will almost certainly be adopted by an overwhelming vote from the third world and the Soviet bloc. There is no veto in the Assembly.

What force, if any, such resolutions have is an open question. In the end, those nations that want to observe an embargo will and those who do not will not. The only sanction that might have a practical effect is the one on oil, since almost all petroleum exporters are in the third world.

But the cost to South Africa could be limited. Pretoria has anticipated an oil boycott and developed coal and other substitutes.

Wide Discontent With Botha Seen In S. Africa Vote

By Caryle Murphy
Washington Post Foreign Service

JOHANNESBURG, April 30 — With both moderates and ultra rightwing white supremacists cutting sharply into his popular support, Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha wrested a costly victory in yesterday's all-white elections that signaled widespread grass-root discontent with his leadership.

The failure to win a straightforward endorsement for his policies of gradual change is reflected in the final result that showed Botha's National Party losing 15 percentage points in the total popular vote compared to the last parliamentary elections in 1977.

More significantly, however, the outcome revealed the beginnings of a potentially serious rightwing backlash among the Afrikaners who comprise the bulk of National Party supporters.

How Botha will respond to the twin challenge will become clearer when Parliament opens July 31.

But given the deeply ingrained desire by Afrikaner leaders for unity among their people and the possible psychological effect within the National Party of the strong rightwing showing, yesterday's outcome does not augur well for those who favor rapid dismantling of racial discrimination at home and urge new bold initiatives abroad.

In his first television interview since the election, Botha tonight said he would continue to seek to "inspire the President's Council to come forward with proper proposals" on constitutional change.

The council is an appointed body set up to look into constitutional reform, but it has no black members to represent the country's largest group.

His remarks were a reformulation of his past vague statements on his plans for reforms rather than a resounding affirmation that he would not be deterred by the rebuffs he has taken from both the right and the left.

Botha's party was returned to power with a mas-

sive majority of 131 of parliament's 165 seats, but it received only 53 percent of the total popular vote compared to the 68 percent it received in the last elections in 1977.

The ultra-rightwing white supremacist Herstigte (Reconstituted) National Party drew 191,249 votes which was 157,000 more than in 1977 and accounted for 13 percent of the popular vote. It did not win any parliamentary seats but helped to significantly slash the majorities of many National Party candidates.

Andries Treurnicht, a Cabinet minister and the standard-bearer of the hardliners in the National Party, kept his seat by a slim margin of mere 1,461 votes in a hard-fought battle with the Herstigte leader Jaap Marais. In 1977 Treurnicht won his seat by a majority of 4,661 votes.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the moderate Progressive Federal Party won an additional eight seats. One of its candidates defeated Botha's minister of commerce, industry and tourism, Dawie de Villiers. It was the first time a Nationalist Cabinet member was defeated at the polls since 1948.

A major factor in the gains of the Progressive Party is thought to be the appealing and polished performance of its new leader, Afrikaner Frederick van Zyl Slabbert.

Slabbert tonight said that Botha ought to "take hope" from the fact that the official opposition has grown because "what we stand for is the direction we hope he will move toward and that is systematic reform."

Because most National Party politicians believe there is a ceiling on the Progressive Party's support because of its "radical policies" and because they believe it appeals mostly to English-speaking whites, its gains yesterday are not likely to cause as much anxiety as those made by the Herstigte party, whose inroads were among Afrikaners.

This is probably what Marais had in mind when he boasted today: "Do not underestimate the panic that will break out in government circles over these results."

An indication of the tensions aroused was the fact that Botha's first reaction to the election results late last night was to criticize the Herstigte party for waging "the dirtiest campaign I have seen in my life. These people do not belong in a decent community and they must be removed from our public life."

At the U.N., the 'So-Called Third World' Turns Real

By BERNARD D. NOSSITER

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.— The foreign policy chiefs in the Reagan Administration learned last week that the third world is a real phenomenon after all, at least inside the glass and concrete precincts of the United Nations. The lesson was administered in the Security Council, where, despite misgivings by some, the six third world members voted together for a cutoff of economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa. Their ostensible aim was to increase the pressure on Pretoria to grant independence to South-West Africa, or Namibia. But their underlying purpose was to smoke out the Reagan Administration's position.

Had even one of the six abstained — and Tunisia and the Philippines both doubted the wisdom of the direct clash — the United States and its Western allies would have been spared from casting vetoes that will reverberate throughout Africa. Instead, the key resolutions would have fallen of their own weight, lacking the required nine votes for adoption. The ballots of the United States, Britain and France would have been simple "noes" and not counted as vetoes. But Tunisia and the Philippines stuck by the others — Niger, Uganda, Panama and Mexico — and were joined by the three Communist nations, China, the Soviet Union and East Germany. So the collision was assured and African newspapers can say that Washington and its friends saved South Africa from the isolation it deserves for denying independence to Namibia.

In the past, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. has referred disparagingly to the "so-called third world — a misleading term if ever there was one." Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the American chief delegate, has suggested that the third world is not a useful concept. Both can still derive comfort from the fact that, before the Security Council voted, divisions were clear among the Africans. Influential nations, particularly Tanzania and Nigeria, were reluctant to press for a showdown, skeptical that vetoed resolutions would bring Namibian independence closer.

But third world unity was the crucial determinant. So pressure from Uganda, Mexico, Algeria and others produced a situation that cast Washington, London and Paris in the role of defenders of South Africa and its apartheid regime.

On the morning after, Mrs. Kirkpatrick readily conceded that "the third world has reality, inside the U.N." But she insisted, "It has no reality when it is considering problems in a different arena," a context she evidently regards as more meaningful.

Indeed, some Administration officials may have even welcomed the clash. One referred to the vetoes

as a "clearing away of the debris," apparently referring to proposals on Namibia's independence drafted by the Carter Administration and its allies. These were rejected by Pretoria in January. Now the way is clear for Mr. Haig and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, West Germany and Canada to come up with something fresh when they meet tomorrow in Rome.

There is a growing suspicion among Africans that the Reagan team intends to reverse Mr. Carter's scenario for southern Africa. The old Administration believed that if Namibia gained independence, South Africa would no longer have a motive for chasing insurgents across the border into Angola. That, in turn, would enable the Marxist regime in Luanda to send home the 20,000 Cuban soldiers it has used to fight South Africans, as well as Angolan foes. Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, has been urging this line on every American journalist and official he sees.

But Mrs. Kirkpatrick and others in Washington do not hide their skepticism at this approach. The Reaganites doubt that the Cubans would leave Angola once Namibia is free, because, they believe, Jonas Savimbi and his Union for the Total Independence of Angola would remain a threat to the regime, continuing a campaign of sabotage and raids, with support from Pretoria.

Mr. Savimbi, an anti-Communist, has been described by Mrs. Kirkpatrick and other Reagan officials as a charismatic and authentic leader with a legitimate following. Mrs. Kirkpatrick also says Washington would like a negotiated settlement to the Angolan war.

Danger of Deeper Involvement

The new scenario seeks repeal of the Clark amendment, which bars covert American aid to insurgents in Angola. That could provide Mr. Savimbi with enough support so that Angola's rulers would be compelled to negotiate a deal, bringing him into a coalition government. Because he now receives aid from South Africa, Mr. Savimbi is damned in black Africa's eyes. But, the argument runs, force is a compelling fact.

Mr. Jorge regards the coalition idea as a fantasy. But if one is created, believers in the reverse scenario contend, it would surely send the Cubans packing. Then, South African fears of Cubans near their borders would vanish and Pretoria would accept a free Namibia, even one ruled by the guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization or Swapo. Or so goes the theory.

Africans and others warn that by supporting Mr. Savimbi, the United States would provoke a genuine — and not merely a diplomatic — collision with black Africa. And if Mr. Savimbi were given new Western weapons, they add, Angola would become even more dependent on the Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogates.

Chester A. Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State-designate for Africa, evidently sees a clear link between withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola and the willingness of South Africa to enter into a serious agreement on Namibia. Mrs. Kirkpatrick says, however, that while "geographical and political realities link" Angola and Namibia, the two countries nevertheless should be dealt with separately.

The Reagan Administration strenuously denies that Namibia will be put on the back burner until the issue of Cubans in Angola is resolved. "We are engaged very actively and seriously" in seeking a new plan to make Namibia a genuinely independent and democratic state," Mrs. Kirkpatrick said. "We are not discussing Angola when we are talking of Namibia."

But in African eyes, the United States and the West are now suspect. These suspicions will not be dispelled unless Washington and its allies succeed soon in producing a scheme that frees Namibia from Pretoria's grasp.

It's now 'sink or swim' for UN's Law of the Sea treaty

By Louis Wiznitzer
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

The Law of the Sea Conference, so close last month to finalizing a treaty to regulate the economic, military, ecological, and legal aspects of the seas, is now at a critical stage.

A treaty could be signed by next year. Or, depending on the conclusions of a broad policy review by the Reagan administration, the UN could lose seven years of negotiation and find itself dealing with two or more conflicting treaties.

Because of the US decision not to engage in negotiations until the review has been concluded, the conference has decided to adjourn until a meeting in Geneva this August.

However, the US has let it be known that even by then its policy review will not be finished and that the coming meeting should limit itself to informal exchanges of views.

The US has changed its position four times within the last three weeks as to when it would really be ready to come up with a new policy. Now it says that this will not happen before the end of the year.

This has not earned much respect among

the 150 participating countries. Many large countries, among them Brazil, Nigeria, Peru, and Canada, are believed to feel that the negotiations should be completed in August even without the United States and that a treaty should be signed anyway.

"It is difficult not to perceive the abrupt manner in which the US has treated the world community as shabby and arrogant," says one conservative Latin American ambassador.

According to well-placed sources, the five leading American firms intent on exploiting the mineral riches on the ocean floor feel that too many concessions have been made to developing nations by previous American negotiators. In particular, they believe the US should not be obligated to transfer its technology to the projected "authority" representing the world community.

They are also reported to feel that the treaty in its present form unreasonably limits the amount of minerals to be exploited. Furthermore some military advisers in Washington are reported to say that US concessions on sea bed mining in exchange for the Navy's global rights which have been largely secured by the treaty, are not really necessary. In their opinion the US could deal bilaterally with the coastal nations involved.

One advantage to the US as well as to the Soviet Union never mentioned in public and looming large in the background is that the treaty would allow their warships to stop, linger, and maneuver at will within the "economic zone" whereas they are only allowed to pass through the territorial seas of individual countries.

Meanwhile there is a growing fear among delegates that if a treaty is not adopted, many countries would territorialize their "economic zone" and severely restrict fishing, off-shore oil, and other rights of the international community in their particular zone.

Tommy Koh, Ambassador of Singapore and president of the conference, says, "We must not assume that at the end of its review the US will conclude that a treaty is not in the national interest." According to many experienced negotiators here, the less developed countries would be willing to renegotiate minor changes such as the amount of mineral exploration allowed. They would not, however, agree to abolish the so called "parallel system" through which they would get a share of what is known as the "common heritage of mankind."

Domestic legislation authorizing unilateral exploitation of deep sea bed riches has been passed in the United States and West Germany and is about to be adopted in Brit-

ain. If these and other industrial nations enact reciprocal rights legislation this would amount to a mini-treaty among rich nations allowing them to go it alone.

"There is little doubt that if that happens the developing nations and the East bloc would finalize their own treaty," says Mr. Koh. "Whether it would be wise to set forth on a confrontational path with the overwhelming majority of nations is debatable" says a Western ambassador. "A treaty without the United States would not have much meaning. But would a treaty signed by only 10 or 12 powerful countries provide the Western firms eager to go "seabed" with the legal and financial environment they need?" asks another Western high official.

Cooler heads among the delegates believe that the Reagan administration should be given time to work out and present its position at the beginning of next year.

"If the US says it has difficulties with the present draft and presents reasonable arguments, postponing by one year the finalization of the treaty will not be the problem. If it continues to signal that 'each man for himself' is now the name of the game, then it is entirely possible that as many as 120 countries will find a separate Law of the Sea Treaty next August if only to remind the United States that it cannot bully the rest of the world," says one senior analyst here.

Zimbabwe: after one year, two nations

By Elaine Windrich

Salisbury, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, after the first year of its long-awaited independence, is still very much two nations. The superficial impression of racial harmony conveyed by the sight of black and whites working together in factories, fields, and shops, invariably with the whites in command, is promptly dispelled at the end of the working day. After hours the two races once again separate, to return to their still largely segregated residential areas or to seek social life or entertainment within their respective communities. Public places may now be legally desegregated, but within them the old divisions by race remain.

Since most whites in Zimbabwe have only known Africans in a master/servant relationship, they remain convinced that a black government is incapable of running the country, at least without their presence and guidance. What they conveniently forget, however, is that not one member of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party had ever served in government when they were elected to office in 1962. The "cabinet of cowboys," as they were then called, were infinitely less qualified, by educational achievement and professional experience, than the talented team of Africans led by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. Nevertheless, a visitor to Zimbabwe today is continually harangued by confiding white settlers voicing their fears about "Kaffirs" ruining what they still regard as *their* country.

The obvious question raised by these complaints is why disgruntled whites continue to live in a country under black rule. Many regard themselves as financial prisoners, prohibited from taking their wealth out of the country by the currency restrictions carried over from the Smith regime. Others are deterred from emigrating by the high unemployment level in most Western countries and also by their inability to compete in an open market where job reservation by race does not apply. But for most of the remaining 200,000 whites, the overriding consideration is that the life of abundance which they enjoy here — the luxurious residences, gardens and swimming pools tended by cheap black servants — is available to them nowhere else in the world except South Africa. But even South Africa, where most white emigrants have gone, offers no real escape for a people

who, having lost one civil war to preserve white minority rule, can scarcely look forward to enduring another one with an equally predictable outcome.

In spite of the fact that for most whites emigration is not a viable or attractive proposition, they continually threaten to leave the country whenever the government embarks upon much needed economic or social reforms, such as minimum wages or integrated education and health care. Many employers refuse to pay the established minimum wage (which is still below the poverty line), and many whites have opted for private clinics and schools.

But what they have yet to realize — and their sense of unreality is a product of years of censorship by the Smith regime — is that an African government can succeed in preserving the hard-won peace only if it meets the understandably rising expectations of the African majority. Failure to do so, in deference to white susceptibilities, could provoke a second revolution, in pursuit of the gains denied from the first.

Nevertheless, for the 7.5 million Afri-

white minority (in fact, only 5,000 of them) and with white earnings 10 times greater than those of urban Africans and 100 times greater than those of rural Africans, there is obviously a long way to go. Thus far, priority has been given to resettling over a million refugees displaced by the war. While the overseas aid pledged by the recent Zimcord conference will be used mainly for this purpose, this is still only a fraction of what will be needed to remedy the problems of land hunger and black unemployment inherited from the colonial past.

Inevitably, these problems can be solved only by a shift of resources from the white to the black community. But unless, or until, this is achieved, Zimbabwe will remain two nations, with all the risks that such a situation entails.

Elaine Windrich is the author of "The Rhodesian Problem" (1975) and "Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence" (1978).

Although for most whites emigration is not an attractive proposition, they continually threaten to leave whenever the government embarks upon needed reforms.

cans, the first year of independence has brought real and visible changes. Black ministers head government departments, black representatives are in control of Parliament and, as a result of the reforms introduced by Eddison Zvobgo (who holds an American PhD), black majorities prevail at the local government level. Also visible are the changes in the media brought about by Nathan Shamuyarira (another American PhD), most notably by the removal of South African ownership of the local press and Rhodesian Front control of broadcasting. And now, for the first time, free health care and education are being made available for the African majority.

Less visible, because the needs are so vast, are the efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth. With half the land owned by the

NAMIBIA DEBATED IN CROCKER CONFIRMATION HEARING

WASHINGTON, D.C. [AN] With North Carolina Republican Jesse Helms occupying a good portion of the limelight, the U.S. Senate last week moved closer towards confirmation of Chester Crocker as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. A final vote may come this week.

An anticipated face-off between the two men failed to materialize when Helms absented himself from Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on April 27 in order to preside over a session of the Agriculture Committee he chairs. Helms thus succeeded in achieving his principal goal — nudging the context of the policy debate to his confirmation and subsequently neglected any penetrating questions of their own regarding the recent conservative shift in U.S. policy.

As it turned out, the opportunity for a critical discussion of the administration's emerging approach was seized almost entirely by Helms, who under a compromise worked out with Foreign Relations Committee chairman Charles Percy (R-Ill.) submitted more than 100 questions to Crocker to determine "how closely the nominee's views parallel those of the president." Helms thus succeeded in achieving his principal goal — nudging the context of the policy debate sharply rightward.

While confirmation maneuvering was taking place here, African representatives at the United Nations spoke out against what they termed "a disturbing trend in the U.S. policy towards Africa." They specifically criticized the announced visit of South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha to Washington on May 14 and 15, which they see as especially "provocative considering the announcement of the proposed visit was made at a time when the Security Council is debating the situation in Namibia arising from South Africa's illegal occupation and failure to implement Resolution 435."

That resolution contains the carefully constructed independence plan worked out by the 'Contact Group' of five Western nations, accepted in principle by the South Africans, and adopted by the Council in 1978.

The Reagan administration has decided the South Africans cannot be persuaded to agree to 435 and thus modifications are required.

During a two-week African tour last month, Crocker sought to determine whether a new formula, incorporating "guarantees for minority rights," could find acceptability among the various parties concerned. He also invited South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha to come to the U.S. for further talks with Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

Under the UN plan, Namibia's constitution is to be drawn up by a constituent assembly selected by voters in a UN-supervised (but South African-administered) election. The Reagan administration's proposal is to draw up the consti-

tution in advance of the election. This is the only way to reassure South Africa and certain Namibian elements, Crocker has argued, that the independence movement SWAPO will not gain full control over the territory.

Most observers expect SWAPO to win an election if allowed to participate on an equal basis with other groups.

This departure from the UN plan is seen as decidedly pro-South African and/or dangerously undemocratic by African governments. And last month at a meeting in Algiers, foreign ministers from the Non-Aligned Movement's Coordinating Bureau gave full endorsement to the African group's position.

Faced by almost unanimous international opinion favoring the UN plan, the Reagan administration has tried to set its constitutional guarantees proposal in the context of UN Resolution 435, which contains the independence scheme. And the Contact Group has reiterated its support for 435.

Helms opposes even this limited endorsement of the UN proposals, which, he and South Africa argue, give SWAPO undue advantage. Further, he says the move indicates Crocker's deviation from President Reagan's long-standing position. In a two-part radio commentary broadcast before he officially began his 1980 campaign race, Reagan denounced SWAPO as a "Marxist" and "terrorist" organization whose achievement of power in Namibia would advance Soviet interests, according to a transcript being circulated by the Helms staff.

Helms bases his opposition to Crocker and several other nominees, in part, on the assertion that "Ronald Reagan doesn't know anything about these people." If Helms hears from the president "that he really wants these people," the Senator says he will withdraw his objections.

In answering Helms's queries, Crocker shied away from labelling SWAPO "terrorist." In Africa, where he was intensely questioned about the current direction of U.S. foreign policy, he said of SWAPO that it is Soviet-supported but not necessarily under complete Soviet control. He also drew distinctions between the Soviet Union and groups that use "Marxist Leninist rhetoric."

Two senior State Department officials, Policy Planning director Paul Wolfowitz and UN Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, as well as Helms, were discomfited by those statements. Their feelings were transmitted to Crocker during telephone conversations he had with the State Department during his trip, officials say.

Such conservative pressure from within and outside the administration makes ever more likely a confrontation at the UN. As African diplomats put it in their recent statement, the Reagan administration has been engaging in "fraternization with South Africa," and is not truly interested in achieving a fair, peaceful solution in Namibia. On April 30, the U.S., France and Britain raised the ante by vetoing a sanctions resolution presented to the Security Council by the Africans.