

FRIENDS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS
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South Africa Violence: Tribal war or Total Strategy?

March, 1992

Report prepared by Dr. David Everatt and Ms. Safoora Sadek on behalf of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry and the Human Rights Commission, South Africa

[Statistics confirmed in other independent reports, including reports by Amnesty International]


In seeking to understand the violence in South Africa, one question should be asked: who benefits from it?

Violence in South Africa is a product of political transition in South Africa. It began in February, 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and peaked (thus far) in July 1990, as the ANC suspended armed struggle, was drawn into negotiations and began to create a legal infrastructure inside South Africa. Since then, the violence has provided a constant shadow to the negotiations process. Its peaks and troughs mirror the waxing and waning fortunes of the ruling National Party government, as it seeks to negotiate a future South Africa which retains minority control of economic and political power.

Clear patterns exist within the violence. These may be disguised by a number of factors: media reports which speak of 'tribalism' or 'black-on-black' violence and seem to retreat into a familiar racism as explanatory cause; the differing types of attacks (on train and taxis, in beer halls and at vigils); the range of actors (hostels, squatter camps, township dwellers, political organizations and the police); the partial behavior of the security forces, the lack of arrests or convictions, and the ineffectiveness of the National Peace Accord; and the sheer scale of the carnage - an average of 6 people are murdered each day on the Reef alone in political violence.

Behind the scale of brutality, however, is clear evidence that the violence erupts at points when it most weakens the ANC and its allies, and dies down dramatically when it would most harm the government of F.W. de Klerk.

This trend has been identified previously, and the figure below illustrates the linkage between violence and unfolding political events during 1990-1992.



The violence appears to be switched on and off at strategic

moments. The highest monthly fatality figures occurred in August 1990, as the ANC signed the Pretoria Minute and thus tied itself into the negotiations process and suspended the armed struggle. When the government was maneuvered into the National Peace Accord, which threatened government control through the use of independent arbitrators (church and business), the violence increased significantly. In contrast, when F.W. de Klerk visited Europe's two staunchest proponents of sanctions (Denmark and Ireland) in October 1990, the death toll dropped from 356 to 56; on his return, it rose again to 157.

The violence is inseparable from the political facts of life in South Africa. In every opinion poll conducted after February, 1990, the ANC has won an average of 70% or more of black political support. This far outstrips its nearest rivals: the PAC averages less than 5% national black support, while Inkatha receives an average of 1%.

In other words, a genuinely democratic general election would see the ANC capturing the vast majority of African votes. The PWV region is both the economic heartland of South Africa, and the most densely populated. The clear political threat posed to the future of all other political movements by the ANC's popularity would appear to explain why the violence began.

Understanding the Violence

The violence appears to represent the domestication of low intensity conflict which the South African government perpetrated in Mozambique, Angola and Namibia. As the formal apparatus of South African repression has been dismantled, its function - to hamstring and cripple political opposition - has been carried out by the violence. It has proved far more internationally palatable; economic sanctions have been widely lifted; diplomatic, sporting and other links have been reestablished. At the same time, the liberation movements and their allies seek to undertake normal political activity in a community that is destabilized by horrific levels of brutality and bloodshed.

The Winners

Two political parties have clearly benefited from the violence. The first is the National Party government, which has benefited in that its major political opponent, the ANC, has been unable to translate black support into an organized membership.

This is compounded by the inability of the ANC to respond to calls from township residents for defense against the onslaught. The ANC's major focus has shifted from political organizing to organizing funerals and assisting refugees. In this situation, the ability of the National Party to (at least intermittently) maintain the political initiative is more than explicable.

The National Party has been able to maintain control of its traditional white support base, as the violence remains almost exclusively concentrated in black areas and is widely reported as an instance of atavistic tribalism. As a result, the upsurge of violence during the recent white referendum remained, as it has since it began, a marginal factor in white politics. While right wing whites may be responsible for initiating more acts of violence during the referendum than previously, the violence served also to emphasize the doomsday scenario elaborated by the National Party; particularly the 'black uprising' which South Africa would face, we were told, in the event

of a 'NO' vote.

Finally, the month of March, 1992 saw a dramatic increase

in train attacks. At least 71 people were killed and 84 injured in a total of 45 attacks. That these attacks were far from random, and were aimed at heightening tensions, is evident from the fact that multiple attacks began occurring on the same day. March 2nd witnessed 4 attacks, followed by 2 on the 3rd, 3 on the 4th and one on the 5th. As polling day approached, so the attacks intensified, with 15 attacks between the 11th and 18th, and 16 attacks between the 19th and 25th of March.

Immediately after the National Party won its landslide 'YES' vote, the government announced a massive clampdown on train attacks by searching people for weapons. After 20 months of attacks, in which hundreds of people have died and been injured, the idea of searching train commuters for weapons is nothing other than appallingly belated. Nonetheless, with front-page media attention, the government presented itself as a 'peacemaker' in black community life. The referendum had a clear political function: to personalize party politics around FW de Klerk, who maintains a high approval rating amongst all ethnic groups while the National Party itself does not. The ANC remains helpless in the face of violence; the National Party appears once again to have benefitted from the loss of black lives.

The second major beneficiary of the violence has been Inkatha. While it has a black support base of 1%, Inkatha nonetheless succeeded in creating the impression that they were one of the 'big three' and an essential part of any political settlement. Inkatha lacks a clear political programme and acts as a 'spoiler'; its *raison d'être* appears to be opposition to any proposals emanating from the ANC or its allies in the Patriotic Front. The continued unravelling of state involvement in funding Inkatha and training its members in hit-squad operations has clearly removed Inkatha's 'most favored ally' status. As a result, the Inkatha leadership appear increasingly desperate in seeking to cling to their political profile and supposed power.

The Losers

There are two clear losers: primarily, the victims of the violence. These have mainly been ordinary township residents killed at random - on trains, in taxis, and so on. On the Reef alone, an average of 6 people die every day in political violence, while thousands have been wounded and left homeless.

In political terms, the ANC is clearly the major loser. As we have seen, the violence makes it extremely difficult for the ANC to translate its support into an organized membership. Being unable to respond to calls for defense, the ANC is in danger of appearing weak and ineffectual in the eyes of township residents. This is compounded by overwhelming evidence of overt and covert support for Inkatha from the security forces. By the same token, concern with national political negotiations, currently the major focus of ANC activity, is far removed from the issue of survival which faces many of its supporters.

Normal political process has been replaced by the abnormalities of the violence and its consequences. In addition, political campaigns initiated by the ANC, such as the call for a Constituent Assembly, are met with a massive upsurge of violence. More pertinently, the attempt by the ANC and its allies to negotiate a solution to the violence which would bind all major actors, i.e. the National Peace Accord, was almost overwhelmed by bloodshed and has proved largely ineffectual.

Conclusion

Political violence must be ended. It is clear that those who currently hold political power, and who control the security forces, have little will or seeming desire to do so. This is unsurprising, since they are also the main beneficiaries of the violence. In addition, international opinion is unlikely to be a significant force; black lives have never had the power of whites in generating international outrage. Moreover, the South African government is strongly marketing the country for investment, not without success. Domestic

solutions must be found.

The ultimate solution to the violence lies with rapid political change, a democratic general election and removal from power of the current minority white government. It is only in this way that the channelling of taxes into CCB-type hit squads, or into the purses of small black parties which seek only to attack the liberation movements, can be stopped, or a government genuinely committed to nonracial peace be placed in office.

Before such developments occur, moves can still be made to end the violence. In this regard a number of recommendations can be made:

- * Rapid progress towards instituting an accountable interim government controlling a unitary south Africa;
- * Control of the security forces to be removed from the present government and passed to Codesa and then to an interim government;
- * The speedy integration of the security forces with those of the liberation movements;
- * Accepting the principle of security force accountability;
- * The development of community policing;
- * An enforced ban on the carrying of all weapons in public;
- * The rigorous pursuit and prosecution of all those involved in the violence, including members of the security forces;
- * The establishment of a public judicial enquiry with sufficient scope and power to investigate the causes of violence and to prosecute those found responsible;
- * The abolition of single-sex hostels and their replacement with upgraded family units; and
- * A dramatic increase in development and infrastructural finance for those South Africans at whom apartheid was aimed.

Inkatha/ANC Responsibility for Reef Violence

Community Agency for Social Enquiry Statistics

by Dr. David Everatt
May 1991

In a statistical review of Reef violence from July 1990 to April 1991, it was found that the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and its members and supporters were reported by the South African media as responsible for acts of aggression 10 times more often than the ANC.

In a total of 338 reported instances of violence, responsibility was attributed to a particular organization by the media and monitoring organizations in 146 cases. Inkatha was held responsible for 66% of attributed acts of aggression, while the South African security forces were held responsible for 18% of attributed acts of aggression. The ANC, in contrast, was attributed with responsibility for 6% of acts of aggression.

Figures show that a total of 1,805 people have died as a result of political violence on the Reef in the period studied, 9-1/3 months. This is an average of 194 per month - or 7 people per day.

The figures are the result of a content analysis of hundreds of newspaper reports written by scores of reporters from Johannesburg newspapers across the political spectrum, including English and Afrikaans, 'black' and 'white.' Facts and figures quoted in the newspapers were checked against each other, and against figures published by several monitoring organizations.

It is notable that the attribution of acts to a particular group scarcely conflicted across the different newspapers.

A total of 338 reported instances of violence were analyzed. The role of aggressor was confidently attributed by the media to a particular actor in 146 of these cases. These attributed acts of aggression are broken down in the table below:

Media Attribution of Aggressors in Acts of Violence

Aggressor as Attributed by Media:	Number	Percent
Inkatha Freedom Party	98	66%
SAP	18	13%
ANC	9	6%
SADF	7	5%
Militant youth, community, etc.	8	4%
Violentists (tribus killers, etc.)	5	3%
Other political organisations (AZAPO, PAC, etc.)	3	2%
Criminal elements	1	1%
Total number of acts attributed to the media	148	100%

Train Attacks


The 338 acts of violence include 22 attacks on train commuters. Some 58 people have been killed in train attacks, and at least 387 injured. The victims have been predominantly innocent commuters, including 26 people killed in the 'prayer' coach of a Soweto train.

The media were able to attribute responsibility in 15 of the attacks. In 14 of them, the Inkatha Freedom Party was identified as the aggressor. Criminal elements were blamed for 1 attack; the ANC for none.

Weapons

The furor over the right of Zulu men in particular to carry 'traditional weapons' has grown to the point where it threatens to derail the negotiations process. This has served to obscure the weapons which are actually being used by respective parties in the conflict, according to the media, especially those used by supporters of the IFP.

In the reports of the 338 incidents of violence, there were 183 mentions of specific weapons used. The breakdown is as follows:



On the 82 occasions where the use of weapons was attributed to Inkatha, firearms were used nearly two-thirds (62%) of the time. On the 10 occasions where the use of weapons was attributed to the ANC, firearms were used twice.

In particular, the reported use of AK-47s is entirely restricted to occasions of Inkatha aggression. This seems to contradict their claim that the ANC and the AK are synonymous.

Conclusion

The CASE content analysis of media reports across a broad political range indicates that Inkatha supporters have been reported as the aggressors in the overwhelming majority (66%) of

attributable incidents of violence. They have been described as using AK-47s and other firearms more than twice as often as so-called traditional weapons. The security forces are held responsible in nearly one-fifth (18%) of media reports. The figure for the ANC is 6%.



Grim harvest of donor policies

by Carol Thompson
The Weekly Mail, 4/24/92

Foreign aid donors to southern Africa have contributed to the problems of the region by insisting that controversial agricultural policies be adopted.

Starvation is already apparent in Mozambique, while Malawi and Zambia are increasingly anxious for international food aid.

In Zimbabwe the maize shortages are causing political heat. Influential MP Sabina Mugabe, sister of Robert, canceled meetings in her constituency because she has no answers about the lack of maize deliveries. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has called for the resignation of Agricultural Minister Witness Mangwende.

But one crucial aspect of the debate is being omitted: who is responsible for the agricultural policies which allowed the region's food shortage to reach such a desperate stage? The maize shortage in Zimbabwe, and throughout the region, is not simply due to drought, but also is the result of agricultural policies pushed by donors.

As coordinator for food security in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), why can't Zimbabwe "get its prices right" for maize? Where are the regional grain storage facilities discussed by the SADCC since 1982?

"...who is responsible for the policies which allowed the shortage to reach such a desperate stage?"

Although international food aid will keep many southern Africans alive this year, donors have often compounded the hardships of natural disasters. The United States, for example, pressed the Zimbabwean government to lower the price offered to farmers for maize production, arguing that Zimbabwe's surplus maize was costly to store and that its high grade tobacco could bring in foreign exchange.

Zimbabwe resisted this policy for several years, citing the SADCC goal of regional food security in grain. By the 1990s, however, the price of maize was lowered to encourage commercial and small farmers to shift to tobacco, which they did.

Zimbabwean cereal production fell 21 percent in 1990-91. The 1991/92 producer price was the lowest in real terms since 1970, and farmers responded by planting only 60 percent of the hectareage planted in maize in average years.

"...donors have often compounded the hardships of natural disasters..."

Even in the midst of drought, irrigated maize instead of tobacco would be feeding more people. And because the international demand for maize is high this year, inflated prices will consume the foreign exchange earned by tobacco.

To cut the expense of storing grain in a surplus year, as early as 1986 the Zimbabwe government proposed a triangular trade/aid package. Zimbabwe would pay for wheat it imported from the US with exports of white Zimbabwean maize to Mozambique. The Zimbabwean maize would become American food aid to Mozambique.

But in 1986-87 when Zimbabwe had a surplus of two million tons, the US agreed to Zimbabwe transferring only 7,000 tons of maize to Mozambique in exchange for US wheat. By 1988 there were no triangular transactions with the US. The US Department of Agriculture was resisting the policy, explicitly stating that US food aid was to reduce surplus (and highly subsidized) American maize. It did not matter that American yellow maize is considered cattle feed by Mozambicans, explained a US Agency for International Development (US AID) official, for "they will acquire a taste for yellow maize," eventually creating a market for US maize.

This year Zimbabweans have a chance to acquire the same taste. With a Zimbabwe surplus of 1.54 million tons in 1989, Zimbabwe's Commercial Grain Producers Association asked the US to stop dumping maize into Malawi. US AID assured the organization that it was only contemplating shipping maize for relief in Mozambique.

Shortly thereafter, a lorry on its way to Malawi was in an accident in Zimbabwe, spilling yellow American maize all over the road. Another 17,000 tons were still off the coast of South Africa. Not only ignoring the transport corridors refurbished by SADCC, the US was also dismissing any idea of using the stockpile of Zimbabwe maize, which would reduce the costs of storage.

The European Community (EC) also has added to the burden of the drought. The SADCC has planned since 1982 to build regional grain storage silos, so a surplus producer like Zimbabwe could have a guaranteed market and a deficit country like Mozambique would know ready reserves were at hand. The EC agreed to finance the first three years in 1988, but then told the SADCC that it would decide who received the grain and when.

The SADCC refused, with the head of the SADCC Food Security Unit stating: "We cannot allow foreigners to administer our food aid programme...Major donors are using food aid as a weapon to influence policies of governments."

"How can those who have been Western partners of apartheid now simply claim 'donor fatigue'?"

Because the costs are high to build silos and initially store the grain, the project is still not off the ground, yet regional reserves could have greatly reduced costs this year.

Southern Africa's ability to respond to the worst drought this century has been severely constrained by over a decade of apartheid aggression in the region (costing \$65 billion 1980-90 with more than 16 million killed, according to the United Nations International Children's Education Fund). How can those who have been Western partners of apartheid now simply claim "donor fatigue" for southern Africa?

An early report estimates that only one-third of the 10 million tons of grain needed for the region will come in the form of


international aid. The rest will have to be purchased by countries who are already overburdened financially by the past policies imposed on them by the "industrialized" countries, from commercial sources, at full international prices. Although some donors have contributed to successful SADCC projects, upon viewing the drought's devastation, even the least objective of them will have to admit that overall, their agricultural consultancies have proven to be not only inappropriate, but *fatal*, for a drought-prone region.

The Drought in Southern Africa

The 10 nations of Southern Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are in the midst of the worst drought to hit the region in this century.

The UN estimates that **18 million people** are directly at risk of starvation or severe malnutrition. Furthermore, **over 100 million people** will be affected by the loss of crops, livestock, and employment. International relief efforts, including transport support, have prevented a disaster, so far. However, the region's estimated food needs have not been met - at this writing, food aid pledged is only 54% of what is needed, **and only 11% of the food aid pledged has been delivered - this translates into only 5% of the food relief needed having reached the area.** The shortage of water supplies (only 15% of additional water supplies needed have been pledged) are literally forcing the evacuation of entire cities. Moreover, the effects of the drought will continue at least until April, 1993, assuming the rains in November are adequate.

In a region where cyclical droughts are a fact of life (they occur in varying degrees about every ten years), this one is quite unusual. The growing season in this part of the world is from October to April/May. Rains typically fall from mid-October through March. In 1991, unlike the pattern of most droughts, the rains fell abundantly in November and December. This prompted people to plant extensively and a bumper crop was predicted for the region. Suddenly, however, the rains stopped in January, well before the crops could reach maturity. Very little has turned out to be salvageable, with crop failure approaching 70% in countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. Even South Africa, which has always been a food exporter, experienced an overall 60% crop failure and will have to import massive amounts of food for its own consumption.



For over a decade, South Africa has violently resisted the attempts at peaceful change by people in southern Africa. Direct military attacks on Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,

Mozambique and Swaziland were combined with South Africa's military support to anti-government rebels in several countries. In Mozambique and Angola, those rebel forces were most devastating, but South Africa made similar attempts to create anti-government rebel groups in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

The regional grouping of independent southern African countries (South Africa Development Coordination Conference - SADCC) estimates the costs of destabilization at \$60 billion since the mid-1970s. These losses exceed by at least **20 times** all US foreign aid to the region over the past decade. These monetary estimates represent actual losses to infrastructure and transportation, to social service facilities and other direct war damage. They also include the higher costs of transportation, insurance and security. They include the expenses of building up and maintaining security forces by each government. The loss or diversion of resources from industry, manufacturing, and agriculture are included. However, the human costs - over 1.5 million killed, millions of others wounded or forced to flee their homes and livelihoods, the psychological impact to children orphaned by the war and all children caught up in south Africa's wars - are not as easily calculated.

This drought differs from past droughts suffered in Africa by up to a factor of 10. Imagine if no rain fell west of the Mississippi all year. A drought of such magnitude is rare for the world, let alone Africa. The UN estimates that 18 million people are at direct risk of dying because of the drought. Additionally, over 100 million, virtually the population of the entire region, will feel the effects of the drought in one form or another. In the mid-eighties, the Horn of Africa was afflicted by drought in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan. Overall, about 10 million people suffered during that period. This southern African drought will hurt over ten times as many people.

In addition, the amount of food needed to be brought into the region to prevent massive starvation represents a massive logistical challenge. **The SADCC estimate of 12 million metric tons of grain needed represents over five times the amount of food imported into the Horn of Africa during the 1985 famine.** Six of the ten SADC countries are land-locked and to distribute to villages is still another herculean task.

Traditionally, most of the region's agriculture is subsistence farming. This means that people raise enough food for their own needs and consume it on the spot. Little transportation is required. However, with no food available to subsistence farmers, it must all be brought in from outside. Accordingly, the region's transportation network will be required to handle four times the volume of trains and trucks than it normally does. As it is, the region is heavily dependent on rail lines emanating in South Africa which connect with the port cities of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban. While there are port facilities in the Mozambique cities of Maputo and Deira, they are very limited and the rail network to which they are linked is unreliable due to the continued fighting in that country. Thus the region will rely primarily on South Africa's transportation infrastructure to unload food and move it northward. Unfortunately, South Africa will be devoting two of its three ports to its own needs, putting an enormous strain on the region's transportation systems.

Moreover, as the food arrives, it is being warehoused. Bear in mind that even if there are good rains in 1992-1993, people will not be able to harvest that food until April, 1993. Thus to balance the transportation load in the region, food must be stored now which might not be consumed until November or later.

Some of the money for drought relief is being used to dig wells and build dams. However, as mentioned above, the region will always be prone to droughts. Certain policies of the US government, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have made this drought worse and will continue to do so unless changed.

Most of the countries in the region are under IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which force the elimination of price supports for food products and make commercially grown food almost unaffordable for the average family. These SAPs force the raising of exportable crops such as corn (maize) which are not very drought-resistant. People thus planted a crop which was very weather-sensitive in the name of the SAP. Furthermore, countries

are discouraged from maintaining stockpiles in the case of drought. A bitter irony of the current situation is that Zimbabwe, the country hardest hit by the drought, was forced by the IMF to sell off its surplus just a few weeks before the drought was declared.

For a year now, Zimbabwe's policies have been under the direction of an IMF Structural Adjustment Program. Subsidies on basic foods have been reduced substantially, so that food prices tripled. Subsidies on public transportation also were cut and the price of gas rose. Rural people frequently buy some food from towns with savings set aside for periodic crop failures. However, the price of food and transport has effectively doubled the cost of food to rural consumers. These price rises come on top of increases in school and health service fees - also linked to the structural adjustment program - which further deplete the ability of people to meet their needs. In effect, the SAPs have weakened household and community economies, increased the vulnerability of low income groups to the food shortages associated with the drought, and raised the likelihood of widespread hunger and deprivation across the region.

Somehow Song Survives: Dust and Death in Southern Africa

by Prexy Nesbitt

Throughout June and July this summer, I traveled all over Southern Africa. I was in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland. The primary purpose of my trip was to lead a delegation of 23 church and solidarity activists from the diocese of Vasteras, Sweden on a three-week study tour of various parts of Mozambique. Secondly, I accompanied the Swedish group to South Africa and led a smaller group of US activists to South Africa and the other points mentioned.

I share this "note" with you (I don't intend this to be your normal travelogue type of article) from Central Wisconsin. I've been back two weeks now and I am yet struck with how green it is here and with the presence of water everywhere. The overriding visual one gains these days traveling in Southern Africa is yellow; it is an image of dust and withered-up maize plants and of death.

The latter - death and dying - is today the central reality in Southern Africa. Over 180 million people throughout the region are facing today the worst drought in this century. Headlines in some parts of the world (but not in the US) are screaming about "18 million people in Southern Africa facing death by starvation." The reality that I found is that people are already dying, not facing death.

In the camp for dislocated people at Sussendenga off the Beira Corridor, we watched wagonload after wagonload of women and children arrive at the camp with people who were too weak to get down from the vehicles. They had been found crawling through the bush, having survived for weeks on only roots and berries. One mother, after being helped off the tractor-pulled wagon and carried to the feeding station, tried desperately to get her infant to suckle off her fingers the special paste of oil, Vitamin C and maize which had been given her. She began shaking her child when she realized it was not sucking. Camp workers gently but firmly took the dead child from her.

The drought affects the entire Southern Africa region but Mozambique is the hardest hit, for there the Southern African-backed RENAMO war had already cost a minimum of 1.6 million lives and the loss of countless precious institutions like hospitals and schools and resources like cattle and water wells. Even before the drought hit, Mozambique had over half of its population of fifteen million living daily on the edge of starvation.

How do you convey all this, I keep asking myself, to a US public currently programmed to hear only about white people dying in Serbia and Croatia? Over 3 million people today in Mozambique have no water. I'm not speaking of being rationed - you know, like

watering the lawns only between 5 and 6 AM. Thousands of women throughout Southern Africa spend the entire day walking in search of tiny amounts of water to bring their families. Some people regularly drink salty water. Burned into my mind are entire villages where no one moves, where people sit with huge whitened skin blisters because there is no water.

And that, perhaps, is the most critical point to share. It's the point made by British journalist Victoria Brittain in her recent Race and Class article, "Africa: A Political Audit" (July-September, 1992). It's not just that Southern Africa is hit by all these problems: South African government-sponsored destabilization wars, droughts, debt and World Bank IMF programs of economic restructuring, and AIDS. The crucial point that needs to be conveyed is that southern Africa has lost the ability to defend itself to recuperate from all these "wars of a different sort," as one Zimbabwean called Southern Africa's various problems. Victoria's article describes it in an insightful way as "the collapse of Africa's 'coping' capacity."

There is another fundamental which I promised myself that I would stress when I got home. There are two particularly vicious mythologies which are projected about Mozambique and Southern Africa. These constructs must be confronted and exposed for what they are; i.e., lies. The first is that Mozambique has been having a "civil war." If an untruth is reported often enough, it is then perceived as truth. This is what the US media has done in the case of Mozambique's "civil war." The second is that the violence in South Africa is "black-on-black." That argument goes that the South African case is a kind of tribal violence that's really OK since it's them doing it to each other...like what's happening in their areas in US cities.

The systematic killing in Mozambique and the violence today in South Africa are essentially products of the same machinery. Never for a minute should we forget that the violence in Southern Africa has also derived from specific policies of various US administrations that committed to destroy the Southern African liberation movements (FRELIMO of Mozambique, MPLA of Angola, the ANC of Africa) as inimical to US interests in the region. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first Secretary of State, stated the US government's perspective on Southern Africa very clearly when he said to Time magazine in 1981: "The so-called wars of national liberation are putting in jeopardy our ability to influence world events...and to assure access to raw materials."


Far from being civil wars or mere tribal fighting, the events and dynamics in Mozambique and South Africa are derived from over 13 years of specific campaigns of destabilization and terror conducted by the South African government and its various allies, including US nationals like the Rev. Pat Robertson and Senators Jesse Helms (North Carolina) and Dan Burton (Indiana), who have made a special contribution of providing financing, weaponry and communications equipment to RENAMO (the Mozambique National Resistance Movement).

There is another telling point to the violence in South Africa and Mozambique. In South Africa, an estimated 6,000 people have been killed since the release of Nelson Mandela in February, 1990. In Mozambique an informed approximation of those directly killed by RENAMO or related forces since 1980 would be between 200,000 and 400,000. In both situations, the people killed were not combatants. Far from it. Whether on trains or in taxis, as increasingly faced in South Africa, or on buses or in trains in Mozambique, those killed were usually ordinary people doing everyday things like getting a bus or train, going to school, going to a health post, going to work on a field or in a factory. And this is revealing for it shows that the interest in the violence is not military objectives per se. No, it is more sophisticated. It comes from a more modern mode of warfare. It is to make ordinary people lose faith in their own government, their own organizations. It is to make non-believers out of believers.

"Song" consists of the extraordinary strength and resilience of the Southern African people, especially that of women. Southern Africa is in a crisis. There can be no doubt about that. But it is also important to note that despite that crisis, people yet endure. More than endure, people yet participate and share with one another.

Chicago, August, 1992

FRONTLINE FOCUS



Angola - UNITA Rejects Election Results

The much-anticipated elections in Angola, ushering in a long hoped-for peace, were marred as results came in giving the edge to Eduardo Dos Santos and the MPLA. For over 15 years, Jonas Savimbi has worn the jacket of a democrat battling a communist totalitarian foe for international consumption. But his true purpose was written in blood as he sent his troops out to kill when the people spoke for the first time, and the majority voted for the MPLA.

Reports have come almost daily - fighting door-to-door in Luanda, South African troops entering southern Angola to assist UNITA mercenaries, Pik Botha declared 'persona non grata' by the Angolan government, and deaths approaching 10,000.

It has been confirmed that Pik Botha was helping to plan the latest military incursions while posing as a mediator. The "Buffalo Battalion" of Angolans and South Africans has reentered Angola; South African helicopter gunships are supporting UNITA.

Flights from Shaba province into Angola have resumed. President Dos Santos has repeatedly accused Zaire of deploying troops against Cabinda, but Zaire has denied the charges, as has South Africa the charges of its involvement. And the US has never pulled out of Zairean bases used for UNITA supply/training.

After one failed attempt at UN-sponsored peace talks in Addis Ababa, UNITA has refused to return to the negotiating table. Ten UNITA rebels recently agreed to join the Parliament of the newly-formed government, noting that they represent a legitimate faction that opposes the bellicose stand of UNITA leadership, but still the fighting continues.

There is a strong possibility that the US, South Africa and UNITA have the goal of partitioning Angola, with Cabindan oil for the US, the north-west for the MPLA, and the southern/east parts for Savimbi/apartheid South Africa.



Namibia to Throw Open Borders to Fleeing Angolans

No one fleeing the emergency in Angola will be turned back from Namibia's northern border, according to Home Affairs permanent secretary Frieda-Nela Williams.

Williams said a task force made up of line Ministry officials, UNHCR representatives and various NGOs will look closely at the situation all along Namibia's border with Angola.

As the crisis in Angola deepens and the country looks set to renew its 16-year civil war, expectations of an influx of refugees into Ovambo, the Kavango and the Caprivi are growing.

"Angola is our immediate neighbor and it is almost certain that people will come here to escape the war," said Williams.

Some refugees had already crossed into northern Namibia, while others are said to be waiting just over the border.

"There are many Angolans now in Unita-controlled areas north of the Namibian border. But we expect them to move south as MPLA forces head for Unita strongholds."

South Africa Newsbriefs

South Africa Planes Resume Violations of Frontline States Air Space

The Herald, Harare, December, 1992

South African fighter planes have resumed their violations of Zimbabwean air space, reliable government sources reported.

The latest spate of violations coincide with a renewed offensive in northern Angola by Unita. As was the case with the earlier South African violations of Zimbabwe air space, it is assumed that the fighters are providing cover for higher flying South African C-130 transporters taking new supplies to Unita.

The rebel Unita movement, which was defeated in September's multi-party elections in Angola and which has since attacked and seized several provincial capitals and towns, "is trying to take through the barrel of a gun what it could not win through the ballot."

"Many people find it extraordinary that the US is willing to commit 30,000 troops to Somalia while doing nothing to protect democracy in Angola," said one Western diplomat.

Western military intelligence officials have confirmed that South African military advisors and Unita generals planned a coup d'etat in Angola, which included the seizure of the capital, Luanda, before the September elections.

The South Africans, who have supported Unita for 17 years, were convinced that the movement and its leader, Dr. Jonas Savimbi, would not win the elections and that he could only gain power through force.

The latest air space violations follow a formal protest made by Zimbabwe to South Africa on October 22 about more than 20 violations earlier that month. The cabinet in Pretoria had been expected to discuss the protest on Tuesday.

Both Botswana and Namibia have also complained about South African violations of their air space since early October. In the case of those two countries it is assumed that the south African planes are re-supplying Unita in southern Angola.

Between October 30 and November 2, Western intelligence sources say 50 C-130 transporters from South Africa landed men and supplies in Unita controlled areas in Angola. In Zimbabwe's case it is assumed that the supplies are for Unita forces operating in northern Angola or for the air base at Kamina in southern Zaire, which has been used for several years by the US to supply Unita.

Further details of South African involvement in Angola could emerge following the capture by the MPLA of a South African plane on the ground inside Angola a few days ago.

Since August 12, Mozambique, which has much less sophisticated radar equipment than Zimbabwe, has also been recording an increasing number of air space violations. Most of these have been in the border area with South Africa while some have occurred from Malawi. It is not thought that these incidents are related to Angola, but rather to ongoing South African support for the MNR.

During October and November there were constant air space violations, which coincided with a short-lived MNR offensive in breach of the November 4 Rome ceasefire, during which the rebels seized several towns and were later driven out by government forces.

Nationwide Protest

August 3...Millions of African joined one of the largest protest strikes in South African history, shutting down Townships, factories, and business nationwide in an attempt to pressure the white government to end the violence and relinquish power.

Hundreds of thousands filled the streets of Pretoria, and tens of thousands joined in marches in Cape Town, Durban, Bolefontein, Port Elizabeth and Pietermaritzberg. ANC Secretary General Cyril Rhamaphosa said, "The general strike gives voice to the deep-seated anger of millions about DeKlerk's government's refusal to negotiate in good faith...the disenfranchised have unmistakably voted with their feet for democracy and peace now."

A week of protests followed, and were hailed as a "victory by the voteless" by the ANC. The march in Pretoria, the biggest in the organization's month-long campaign of rallies and civil disobedience, resembled a victory parade, with contingent after contingent of ANC chapters marching, singing, and doing the toyi-toyi high-step dance. "We have come to Pretoria to bring South Africa back to the people," went one of the songs; "Mandela must take his claim now."

The government continues to deny participation in killings, and calls on the ANC to resume talks with them. In an obviously biased interview, the McNeil-Lehrer Newshour gave great interest to the views of South African Ambassador to the US Harry Schwarz, who insisted talks resume. ANC deputy chief to the UN Kingsley Makhubela denied a provocative question that the Boipatong massacre was just an excuse the ANC was using to break off the talks because of a CODESA political deadlock.

Nelson Mandela said, "There is no question of the object of mass action being insurrection. The aim of mass action is the immediate transfer of political power to the people of South Africa." This would take the form of an interim government of national unity and free and fair elections to a constitution-making body.

...An ANC comrade of the Friends reported after a trip to South Africa during the CODESA talks that she saw the CODESA delegations on South African television, and that the advisor to Inkatha leader Buthelezi was an American lawyer and member of the Heritage Foundation...

...The Southern African Development and Coordinating Conference (SADCC) changed its name to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) at ceremonies in Windhoek...

...Peace negotiations set for Mozambique in Rome are frustrated at this point because the signing is being ignored by Alfonso Dhlakama. Dhlakama went to South Africa to get instructions from Pik Botha, then had an American attorney as advisor accompanying him to the talks, days late....

Why is the US Building an Airbase in Botswana?

Facts and Reports, 9/4/92

Construction of an airbase estimated to cost P2 billion (US \$1 billion, about 20 percent of Botswana's Gross Domestic Product) has reached an advanced stage. It is located 105 kilometers northeast of the Botswana capital, Gaborone, near the small town of Molepole, and is scheduled to be completed in two years. During this construction phase, the percentage of the Botswanan budget spent on defense has increased by 2 points. The government intends to cover the costs of building the airbase by leasing it to the US Air Force. The contract for the scheme, code-named "Project Eagle," was won by a French company, Spie Batignolles, with a South African company, LTA, as its main subcontractor.

Although the whole project is shrouded in secrecy, it is understood that French military companies are expected to supply military aircraft and equipment to the Botswana Defence Force as part of the deal with the government.

Since 1987, the US has carefully courted Botswana, offering military training and advice. Botswana forces held joint military manoeuvres with the US in January last year, and this form of cooperation is a cause for concern for the people in the subregion.

Analysts say that the US military presence in Botswana will provide a base from which to operate in all of Southern Africa, especially if South Africa "goes the wrong way." With Zaire and Kenya remaining unstable, Botswana is becoming the new US military post.

Mozambique Newsbrief

December, 1992 - As Dhlakama was signing the peace accord in Rome, new RENAMO troops were entering Mozambique from Malawi, trained and armed in Kenya. They took the port towns of Angoche and Lunga, trying to allow supplies to come in from the sea. Mozambican troops have retaken the towns, including several others RENAMO briefly seized.

While Presidents Chissano, Masire, and Mugabe were waiting for Dhlakama in Rome, Pik Botha was trying to convince him not to sign the cease-fire. Reports from Natal confirm RENAMO elements are now operating with Inkatha.

The UN barely has a presence in vast Mozambique. Zimbabwe is staying in the Beira and Maputo Corridors until the end of February.

If one considers that Dhlakama cannot possibly win elections and that destabilization is still an active policy of apartheid in Mozambique and Natal, then the prospects for peace in Mozambique are bleak. Continuing to destabilize Mozambique aids apartheid: weapons and trained killers can flow into South Africa; Zimbabwe continues to spend too much on the military; development projects which could lift the region out of drought (e.g. Cahora Bassa among many) cannot be pursued; the drought of investment remains.

Namibia Newsbriefs

Namibia Accused of "Cultural Genocide"

Seemingly prompted by fears the "West European culture" will be wiped out in Namibia, a formal complaint has been lodged by the International Centre for the Protection of European cultures in Africa (ICPECA), which also accuses the Namibian government of "muzzling the private education system."

Some of the listed trustees are from an organization called "Cultura 2000," which received large amounts of Namibian transitional government money shortly before independence to promote white culture. Many of the Namibians listed denied that they had agreed to be trustees of any such organizations.

The ICPECA includes members of Cultura 2000 as well as members of South Africa's Inkatha Freedom Party. Also on the list are Dr. Piet Koomhof, a former South Africa cabinet minister and Ambassador to the US, and Dr. Eschel Rhoodie of Info scandal fame.

Walvis Bay

Walvis Bay, which should really be a part of Namibia, is still held by South Africa. Namibia did not make an issue over Walvis Bay at the time of its independence because its independence was much too important to lose over the issue of Walvis Bay, and the knowledge that Walvis Bay would



eventually be in Namibian hands. Recently President Sam Nujoma said, "My government will not accept any attempt by the South African government to create a new linkage, this time between Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands negotiations, and the current political and constitutional developments in that country." It would appear the rest of the world agrees, as demonstrated by the European Community's recent endorsement of Namibian sovereignty over Walvis Bay.

Until now it has been widely understood in Namibia that the South African government was holding out on the settlement of the Walvis Bay dispute for a decision by a more representative South African dispensation, such as an interim government. More than half of Walvis Bay residents are in favor of incorporation into Namibia - most South African citizens in the enclave are opposed. As noted in the following article, Walvis Bay is critical to southern African survival during this current drought.

Maize Imports

Tons of maize are being brought into Walvis Bay. Agra Mills and Namibia Mills want to ensure the country does not experience a maize shortfall after 71% of the cereal crop failed. Agra Mills at Otavi is able to process and bag up to 1,500 tons per day, and Van Zyl says the company is experiencing no problems in dealing with the massive amounts of grain being railed in from Walvis.

The international community must, in its efforts to help the famine-ravaged countries, not destroy the businesses of Namibia or any of the frontline states.

Overall cereal imports passing through Walvis Bay in the next year should rise to 200,000 tons, which the well-equipped port is expected to handle without any major problems.

Tanzania Newsbriefs...

All geared up, with nowhere to drive

by Carol Thompson

From *The Weekly Mail*, 8/7/92

For several years Tanzanians have been able to buy luxury items - from chocolates to expensive cheese and videos - but its capital, Dar es Salaam, still does not have potable water.

Six years after the Structural Adjustment Program required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began, its contradictions impinge on Tanzanians' daily life and pose serious questions for other southern African countries accepting or contemplating the IMF's policy.

Opening up the economy stimulated a huge increase in imported vehicles, for example, but the power of the posh cars cannot be tested because the potholes in Dar es Salaam's streets make acceleration risky. Commuting just 3 km through the city takes almost an hour.

The government does not have the revenue to rebuild the roads. According to the June budget speech by Minister of Finance KA Malima, the government can finance only one-third of its operational requirements; with external aid, it can finance only 50 percent.

In a gesture that was mostly symbolic, the new budget raised petrol taxes for road repairs. Japan is helping to repair the streets of Dar es Salaam and a consortium of donors has been working on the main roads outside the country's main cities, but progress is as slow as the traffic.

The lack of government revenue is also affecting sanitation and health services. Garbage is piling up as businesses dump their refuse on street corners and in alleys. Government regulation and oversight are fundamental to environmental conservation, but that takes a stronger - not a weaker - state.

The entrance to Muhimbili Medical Centre has literally been reduced to one lane. Inside, medicines are not available. The IMF's Structural Adjustment Program for Tanzania has required a reduction in government expenditure on health services. The once-exemplary primary health-care system shows the results, with increasing deaths from preventable diseases.

Unlike Zimbabwe and Mozambique, Tanzania resisted the IMF's requirement of "cost recovery" for primary education. Tanzania has the highest literacy rate in Africa and the government refused to dismantle the primary school system, as the IMF policy would have necessitated.

Yet IMF adjustment policies have cut education expenditure from 14 percent in 1977 to 6.5 percent of the government budget today. Because salaries are so low, the number of teacher vacancies is more than 16,000. Tanzanians are well educated and should easily be able to fill the vacancies; perhaps some from among the country's 80,000 civil servants will consider becoming teachers.

In response to the revenue crisis, Tanzania has drastically reformed its tax system. The new budget reduced the highest individual income tax from 40 to 30 percent; for corporations, from 45 to 35 percent. Customs duties are now limited to 30 percent, from a previous high of 60 percent. Excise duties were abolished for locally produced sugar, soap, textiles, matches, mattresses and cement. Taxes were also abolished on raw materials imported for local production.

Principal Secretary for Planning FM Kazura stated that the government lowered taxes to increase the confidence of businesses, so that they would voluntarily pay the taxes. Government revenue departments would also receive hefty bonuses if they surpassed the estimated tax revenue in collection, he said.

The IMF's Structural Adjustment policy recommends that revenue shortages be resolved by reducing the size and role of government, but Tanzanians are finding that effective regulation and enforcement are fundamental to the functioning of private enterprise. The government is also central to providing education and primary

health care. Tanzanian officials point out that such costs represent an investment in production, and should not be counted as the "consumption expense" the IMF would have the government impose on individual families, the majority of whom remain desperately poor.

Only time will tell whether the imposition of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program will benefit Tanzania over the long term. Unfortunately, present conditions do not point to a healthy future.

Zimbabwe Newsbriefs

Zimbabwe is fast becoming an aid-dependent country. The drought is bringing an estimated fall of 9-11% in GDP. Estimates are that several of the industries (sugar for ethanol, textiles, food processing) will take 3-4 years to recover from the drought; unemployment and inflation, key reasons for agreeing to the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), are soaring.

The World Bank/IMF have only offered new loans to deal with the drought; children are dropping out of school and health clinics are empty because the people cannot afford the "cost recovery" of SAPs. Cholera has killed over 600 in Zambia.

To enforce the IMF/WB SAPs in the midst of war and drought to pay back loans is worse than debtor prison; SAPs are capital punishment of women and children.



Sowing Seeds of Hope in Southern Africa

by Bud Day, Southern Africa Director, SADCC

"Suicide month," the old-timers call October in Zimbabwe, referring to the hot, parched days before the rainy season. Although November has brought isolated storms, peasant farmers will delay planting until normal rains are underway. Last year, the rains began, but soon failed, resulting in the worst drought in living memory. Should that happen again, this crisis could become the worst disaster of the century. After initial distribution of seed, the central depot has declared "stock out" for all staples (corn, sorghum, millet, peanuts, and sunflower); there will be no second chance this season.

For drought-resistant sorghum and millet, the Southern Africa Development Community produced emergency seed in the Zambezi valley during recent winter months. IVS partners ZWB

(Zimbabwe Women's Bureau) are involved in seed multiplication for next year. IVS volunteers, with their focus on food and water security, are assisting communal land farmers (mostly women) to obtain relief corn, find adequate water sources, and plant with hope.

Thirty-year-old Zithobeni Mangoye (nicknamed "Z"), is a national IVS volunteer, one of 13 ORAP fieldworkers. "Z"'s father died in September a year ago, not realizing it was the beginning of the worst drought in the region in recorded history. "Z" told IVS volunteer trainer Barney Jones that he has had no experience with such a drought, in which "the cattle are dying from lack of grass and water, there is no grain left nor was there even grain to buy for several months, and children are too weak from lack of food to walk to school, 5 to 10 kilometers." "Z" is certain that his 65- year-old father would have known what to do because he was such a good farmer and planner.

Many of the harsh problems faced by communal farmers like "Z" were partly solved in the past by traditional techniques of food storage and communal distribution of resources. The present drought has provided a great lesson to many who depend on cash crops to support their families. "Z" is now seeking indigenous sorghum seed to supplement hybrid maize seed he will plant this year. He is also working with the village elders in the construction of traditional grain storage units. Meanwhile, everyone is looking anxiously at the skies, waiting for the rains needed so badly this year.

Across the border in war-torn Mozambique, which has the highest level of human suffering in the world, IVS has begun work with ZIMOFA (Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association) volunteers and local farmers to help them feed thousands of displaced and drought-affected persons who fled to the more secure Beira corridor, a rural over-populated slum resulting from continuing famine and destabilization. As the peace accord takes effect and refugees are able to return home, IVS volunteers will engage in agricultural extension and health education. Thus, a one-nation IVS program begins its expansion into the Southern Africa Regional Program.

SEPTEMBER 7

Once again, the TV screen flashes the pictures from CNN - another massacre. This time, a peaceful march of between 50,000 - 80,000 supporters of the African National Congress at a border post between the South African-recognized bantustan-homeland of Ciskei and land recognized as part of the Republic. And while RSA soldiers, claiming helplessness, watched, the Ciskei Police opened fire, killing 28 outright in a moment of terror and pandemonium, and leaving over 200 wounded. Later reports indicated South Africa government complicity in the direction of the march, the operation itself, and the timing of the massacre. The British Independent reported that "a cabal of South African army officers working with the Ciskei military, and either answerable to Pretoria or having close ties with it, ran the operation." The march had been granted permission, but during the march the crowd found a fence which had been taken down and, when they started to go through it, were fired upon. Soldiers were hiding in the grass nearby and rose up to start firing at the unarmed marchers.

As to the timing of the massacre, independent sources reported to us from Zimbabwe that a meeting to restart the United Front was scheduled in that Frontline State between the PanAfricanist Congress and the African National Congress and was canceled as each organization held emergency meetings to respond to the killings. There is a consistent historical pattern of massacres occurring during negotiations between South Africa and Frontline State liberation movements, and a particularly bloody pattern of this kind since the release of Nelson Mandela (see graphic in previous article on South Africa violence).

Ciskei military leader Brigadier Oupa Gqozo had traveled to Europe in July denouncing the ANC and blaming it for the Boipatong Massacre of June. Eyewitnesses to that outrage told reporters of seeing Inkatha warriors assisted by South African police rampage through Boipatong townships and slaughter 42 people, the youngest being under 2 years. About 30 reporters fanned out through the township immediately following the carnage, and everybody interviewed gave a similar version of the event. Word had been



out all day that an attack was imminent from Inkatha-supporting hostel residents. Youth known as "comrades" had erected barricades and taken positions to protect the community. About 9 PM that evening, police arrived in armored vehicles and began firing pellets and tear gas, dispersing the youth. Shortly before 10 PM, with the streets cleared, the Inkatha warriors arrived, armed with spears, knives, axes and automatic rifles. Several were delivered to the townships inside police armored vehicles called Casspirs.

In a section of the township called "Slovo Camp" several eyewitnesses reported having seen white men among the attackers. A special constable policeman who lives in Boipatong was quoted: "This is wrong. Its wrong. I don't understand it. The police brought the Inkatha people here and then stayed all night as all this happened. They killed without asking questions. I don't, I can't, understand it..."

"This is wrong. I don't understand it. The police brought the Inkatha people here...they killed without asking questions..."

The following day State President F.W. DeKlerk attempted to visit the townships, but was met by thousands of angry, stone-throwing residents who shouted that he was responsible for the massacre. Police killed 3 people as DeKlerk retreated. He established a commission under a "respected" Judge Goldstone. Called the Goldstone Commission, their investigation reported that the allegations of involvement by top government and security officials were unfounded. The President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, announced the suspension of talks, known as CODESA, following the massacre. "I can no longer explain to our people why we continue to talk to a regime that is murdering our people and conducting a war against us," Mandela said.

In a separate report, the nation's most prominent pathologist, Dr. Jonathan Gluckman, reported from Johannesburg that after examining about 200 victims of police torture, he concluded that the South African Police are "totally out of control. The killing goes on and on," averaging at least one black suspect a week. "I don't know how to stop it. I don't think the government knows how to stop it."

Glossary

ANC: African National Congress
 FANC: Friends of the African National Congress and Frontline States
 FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
 IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party
 MMD: Movement for MultiParty Democracy
 MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
 PAC: Pan Africanist Congress
 RENAMO: Mozambique National Resistance
 SADCC: Southern African Development Coordination Conference
 SWAPO: South West African People's Organization
 UNIP: United Independence Party
 UNITA: Union for the Total Liberation of Angola

The FANC wishes to thank the following people for their contributions to this newsletter: Bud Day, Barbara King, Nancy Lawrence, Mim Lewis, Prexy Nesbitt, Marjorie Raymond, Mabie Settlage, Carol Thompson, and Michael Zinzun. *A Luta Continua!*

Information for the articles in the FANC Newsletter was drawn from a variety of sources, including US and African journals such as *The Economist, Time, New African, African Business, Africa Events, and Facts and Reports*; and local sources such as *The Los Angeles Times and The Sentinel*.

FRIENDS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND FRONTLINE STATES

The situation for the African People in South Africa is still at a critical stage. Although negotiations toward majority rule continue, Africans still do not have the right to vote, and little has been done to ease the suffering of those forced to live in the most primitive conditions in the townships and bantustans. Write your representatives and urge them to keep the pressure on South Africa's apartheid regime until one-person, one-vote is a reality for everyone in South Africa.

- I will write my Representative.
 I have enclosed a donation of \$_____.

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
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“April 29, 1992”

By Mabie Settlege

It finally started at first
 Slow simmering as outrage
 Stacked on anger piled up on
 Rage of time after time
 Time after time
 Face down arms back
 Eyes red
 Black and whites running ruffshod
 Rage and hatred fanned
 By judges and juries and jury reversals
 Unrepentant perpetrators of racism
 Crushing, criminalizing
 Dusting a crust of unwanted
 Renegades unteachable untrainable
 Outcast we-do-not-want-you bound for prison
 Gangbanger dope fiend beyond redemption
 Needs to be put away for life dangerous
 Criminals
 On a generation
 Shot down by storekeepers and swaggering
 foulmouth police
 Bit by K9 unit dogs for their reward
 Pushed down to underemployed, unemployed
 unemployable standards set by someone who
 Wants you dead

Finally it started
 An answer back as deep and hurt as the
 Years it took to call it
 An answer ugly
 Yes
 Unfocused
 Perhaps
 But after the stacking and piling the lies
 The withheld opportunities
 The dreams forever unfulfilled
 The thing was on
 In rage and elation
 The streets were filled
 With those abused and those denied
 And as commerce took flight through broken
 glass
 By hands by chance by nerve
 flames searing the night sky
 Police fleeing in fear of retaliation for all
 their kindling
 Fires swept Los Angeles
 Smoke burning purifying
 The crackling breaking red and yellow
 Hands reaching up and across the city
 The smoke the attitude the air
 Smelled sweet.

• • • • •

SORRA Somali Relief & Rehabilitation Association

SORRA is a non-profit, non-political organization formed to assist Somalis devastated by protracted civil war, drought and famine.

SORRA was formed primarily to serve the displaced and pastoral populations, estimated at over 1.5 million.

SORRA is a field organization which works within its target populations. The majority of its staff are native to the affected areas and enjoy the trust and cooperation of the people they serve. We also have voluntary representatives in many parts of the world, including the USA, Germany, UK, Canada and Ethiopia.

What are the goals of SORRA?

- * To extend short term assistance to displaced and pastoral Somali populations.
- * To advocate ways in which the International community can help relieve the suffering of these populations as well as those in UNHCR-registered refugee camps in Ethiopia.
- * To alleviate the shortages of medical supplies and equipment which contribute to high mortality rates from diseases (cholera, hepatitis, malaria and other childhood diseases).
- * To mobilize emergency relief supplies to the regions affected by drought and famine.
- * To repatriate/rehabilitate these populations.



SORRA

**3434 W.Sixth Street Suite 250
Los Angeles, CA 90020 USA
(213) 736-1238 Phone
(213) 736-6745 Fax**

In May, 1988, there was a serious escalation of war between the Somali regime and an insurgent opposition movement in Northern Somalia.

Subsequent government retaliation against civilian populations forced nearly 400,000 Somalis into refugee camps in northeastern Ethiopia.

More than 600,000 others became displaced within Somali among an already impoverished nomadic populations. The principal cities of Northern Somalia (Now the Republic of Somaliland) were largely destroyed.

Why was SORRA founded?

SORRA was founded to fill this void and to provide the population with emergency assistance in health care, food distribution, education and animal husbandry.

SORRA was founded by veterans of self-help projects in Somalia and draws its workers from skilled civil servants from within the displaced population. The core working group are professionals (physicians, veterinarians, teachers, administrators) already engaged in similar endeavors in Somalia.

On behalf of uprooted citizens, SORRA serves as liaison for:

- * The International Community
- * Non-governmental agencies
- * Philanthropic foundations/organizations
- * The expatriate Somali community to donate funds, food, medical supplies and other materials.

SORRA counsels the affected population, devises ways in which they can cope with difficult circumstances, and promotes self-help skills.

SORRA monitors the conditions of the displaced, pastoral and refugee populations and publicizes prevailing conditions.

Where does SORRA work?


SORRA has local and national offices, with the majority of its staff working in East Africa.

SORRA plans to establish clinics and dispensaries to provide emergency and primary health care, and open elementary schools for a large number of children.

SORRA conducts fact-finding and feasibility tours for international organizations and assists them in establishing their operations.

Tax deductible donations may be sent to the above address.

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Here is my tax-deductible donation to SORRA Somali Relief & Rehabilitation Association

\$25 \$50 \$100 \$500 Other

I have entered SORRA into my company's matching gift program

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