

THE APARTHEID ROOTS OF "BLACK-ON-BLACK" VIOLENCE

Surendren Moodliar

It was not the Ted Koppel who quivered, hesitated and was left speechless by his guest, Nelson Mandela, last summer. It was a confident and comfortable Ted Koppel who, after showing footage of a black man thrusting a spear through the chest of another fallen black man and then using his foot as leverage to prize the spear from the dead man's chest, asked his two black

South African guests (African National Congress' Pallo Jordan and Inkatha's Musa Zondi) to debate the problem of traditional weapons and so-called "Black-on-Black" violence. After both responded,

Koppel turned to South Africa's white ambassador to the United States, Harry Schwarz, to find out why the debate had degenerated to the level it did and, more to the point, Koppel asked Schwarz to put the debate "into perspective" for the American audience.

There can be no more satisfactory situation for apartheid's ambassador than having to "frame" the country's major problem as being that of competing black leaderships with murderous followers. Ted Koppel generously provided that situation.

Two ready-made discourses can be employed to aid in the explanation: one can, as Koppel did, resurrect the ethnocentric language of "tribal warfare" from the shallow grave of colonialism and speak of the "Zulu" Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the "Xhosa-led" ANC; or, one can, as Schwarz did, appeal to the traditional American suspicion of political parties and anti-communism, by suggesting that there is a power struggle, moreover, it is not just between two parties, but between the "democratic" Inkatha and the "socialist" ANC.

Both discourses have the advantage of appearing "intuitive" and hence needing few facts in their

elaboration. This intuitive character is not lost on representatives of the South African government and Inkatha.

Most Inkatha representatives choose the democratic-vs-socialist comparison to suggest that the ANC is responsible for the violence. At a Mayday rally, Inkatha Central Committee member, Musa Myeni, fused the explanations: "The communists have declared war and we in the IFP are seen as the first line of defence to be crushed before they take over the country..." He went on to allege that "...two busloads of Transkei-trained [read: "Xhosa"] soldiers armed with sophisticated weapons moved into a squatter camp..."

Later that day the only heavily armed people were Inkatha supporters, and the dead predominantly

non-Inkatha members, most of whom lived in traditionally pro-ANC areas. There was no trace of any ANC soldiers, and neither did the government ever make the claim that there were any. In fact, earlier in the day, civilian



supporters of the ANC were disarmed (of knives and sticks) by the police at ANC rallies, leaving them vulnerable to attack.

The hostile police behavior towards the ANC as compared to their treatment of other groups has led to credible speculation that the apartheid government, or at least segments of it, is involved in supporting, if not instigating, the violence. Afrikaner dissident poet Breyton Breytenbach describes the violence as part of the "planned horrors of the apartheid state in its death throes." ANC and Communist Party leader Joe Slovo suggests that "the government is trying to create the image that it is the only party capable of change..."

"The ANC position is more complex than a simple conspiracy theory about government intentions."

Evidence uncovered by the newspapers Die Vrye Weekblad, The Weekly Mail, and The New Nation shows - that in and around Johannesburg, where some 1,000 people have been killed since August, 1990

(when the Inkatha-sponsored violence first erupted in that region) - a definite pattern of state involvement: Zulu-speaking migrant workers who live in single-sex hostels outside the more settled communities are told that the ANC wants to eradicate the hostels. Then the workers march into the communities, surrounding the hostels. The police, even in areas under emergency control, withdraw after disarming community residents, and then a bloody battle takes place. The newspapers have also documented the involvement of white extremists in arming, training and directing the leaderships of the various hostel-dwellers.

The ANC position is more complex than a simple conspiracy theory about government intentions. It recognized the social causes of the violence; it is not enough to show that the migrant workers are manipulated, one has to show why ordinary migrants get involved in the carnage.

The hostel dwellers are alienated from the surrounding communities because they are usually new arrivals to the city, forced to live together with other migrants, cannot bring their families to live with them and are often the victims of petty crime by township dwellers.

The ANC's set of demands regarding ending the violence includes the transformation of the hostels into more stable housing which is integrated into the surrounding communities to which the migrants can bring their families. The ANC has also called for the abolishing of the migrant labor system by allowing the migrants to live permanently in the cities.

In the Natal province where the violence claimed more than 4,000 lives between 1986 and July 1990, apartheid social engineering is clearly responsible for the conflicts that have led individuals to violence under the banner of one or the other political party.

In the stable working class townships around the cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, support for the ANC increased dramatically when Inkatha formed its own trade union as an alternative to the independent unions which had long been active in advancing the economic interests of township dwellers. It is interesting to note that many of these workers were members of Inkatha who chose their union over the political party.

A similar process occurred on the youth front when Inkatha brutally suppressed student boycotts protesting apartheid education.

Economic battles over transport costs and rent increases saw the emergence of popular civic organizations in the early 1980s. Clear battle lines emerged: Inkatha, by virtue of its collaboration with the South African government, was responsible for administering the townships (collecting rent) and Inkatha-related interests often owned the bus companies which were in the process of increasing bus fares. The ensuing

rent and transport boycotts pitted the community organizations and unions against the Inkatha-controlled town councils and bus company owners.

The South African government had also begun deregulating the economy in the mid-1980s, increasing pressures for rents and bus fares to rise. Deregulation and the abolition of certain controls on rural-urban migration led to increasing pressures on the shanty-town surrounding the working class communities.

"...apartheid social engineering has made for a class conflict between those whose existence depends on the continuation of apartheid and those whose welfare depends on its eradication."

The desperately poor who live in the exploding shantytowns - Durban has the highest shantytown population in the Southern hemisphere - are policed by Inkatha-affiliated warlords. While the latter distribute the meager rewards of collaboration with the apartheid state to their followers, their ruthless methods of control and discipline have led to fragmentation and battles within their "armies."

The local level conflicts provided the logic for large numbers of people to engage in battle with one another. An alternative anti-apartheid alliance might have been developed to overcome these conflicts and militate for structural change had it not been for the fact that Inkatha leaders would have to give up their monopoly on town councils, lose control over revenues from migrant worker contracts and employment in state and homeland bureaucracies.

"Black-on-Black" violence has complex social and economic roots; more effectively than any conspiracy, apartheid social engineering has made for a class conflict between those whose existence depends on the continuation of apartheid and those whose welfare depends on its eradication. Ted Koppel cannot identify these roots because it could mean a closer examination of what happens in America's ghettos.



REGIONAL SOLIDARITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Warren 'Bud' Day, who recently returned from two months in Southern Africa, teaches Environmental Health at the University of California, Los Angeles.

While much of the "developed" world proliferates into smaller and smaller political units, the trend in Southern Africa is the opposite, as ten nations (perhaps soon to become 11, as South Africa rejoins the human race), work in closer and closer harmony on behalf of 100 million people. Through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), many multi-million dollar consensus projects are assisting in the development of the region, even as ties with apartheid and Western domination have been lessened, including projects in telecommunications, transport, food security, and energy.

In Zimbabwe, the most popular slogan today is "kubutana" (unity), sometimes fostered even at the expense of individual creative dissent. At the grass roots, especially along the arbitrary, European-imposed political boundaries, this sense of togetherness



leads to people-to-people ("povo-a-povo") assistance for those neighbors in difficulty. Most striking are the non-governmental solidarity channels which have developed in the late 1980s, such as ZIMOFA and TAMOFA.

ZIMOFA (Zimbabwe Mozambique Friendship Association) grew out of the long-term cultural identity between the Shangan-speaking people of Mozambique and the Shangan-speakers of Zimbabwe. Where there are no border posts, friends and families have moved freely back and forth, especially as economic hardship dictated. In the late 1970s, a free Mozambique provided asylum and bases for Zimbabwean refugees and guerilla forces, thus strengthening the cultural links. It was only natural that, after Zimbabwean political independence, there would be reciprocal people's action to help Mozambicans attacked by RENAMO (MNR), the South African- and U.S.-backed "contras" of Mozambique.

ZIMOFA sponsors a fine educational program for hundreds of Mozambican refugee children in Zimbabwe, utilizing the ZIMFEP schools originally founded for returning Zimbabwean freedom fighters. It also carries out an extensive community involvement program. But the most significant ZIMOFA project is a large farm situated along the Beira corridor inside Mozambique. Numerous Zimbabwean volunteers have worked alongside Mozambican counterparts to develop this commercial-style farm of 1,320 hectares. Its prime purpose, beyond that of solidarity, is to help feed the thousands of displaced Mozambicans who have sought the security of the six-kilometer-wide Beira corridor, which is well protected by the Zimbabwean military forces.

Last year's drought meant that most subsistence farms in the Beira corridor produced no food; the ZIMOFA farm, by planting five times, managed a 10% crop, barely sufficient for the immediate neighbors. To be less vulnerable to drought, a major irrigation project was launched, to be fully operative by the October planting season; this would ensure that this season's crop could actually feed thousands of people in the corridor.

Unfortunately, in response to recent RENAMO demands, the Mozambican government asked the Zimbabwean troops to pull back to the narrow corridor. This meant they had to leave

their bunkers on the ZIMOFA farm (10 kilometers from the road-rail-pipeline), as less-equipped and less-trained Mozambican troops moved in. During our visit in mid-August, several Mozambican soldiers accompanied us around the area, ostensibly to ward off any possible RENAMO attack. Three days later, RENAMO did sweep in, burning the village adjacent to the farm, destroying a health clinic, and scaring away the hundreds of displaced Mozambicans who had found refuge and part-time work at the farm.

Nevertheless, even as the fleeing Mozambicans add to the congestion along the narrow corridor, efforts are underway to re-establish the farm community and get on with the job of providing food security. International solidarity is not so easily halted!

TAMOFA (the Tanzania Mozambique Friendship Association) took its cues from ZIMOFA, focusing particularly on assistance to refugees crossing the border from Cabo del Gado province in northern Mozambique to Mtwara region in southern Tanzania. Once again, the language and cultural link helped, as Kiswahili-speakers on both sides of the border joined together in an attempt to help those in need. Unlike Zimbabwe, where early on, government channels took over the task of administering Mozambican refugee camps inside Zimbabwe, in Tanzania TAMOFA was given this task. Thus, a staff of 26 persons facilitates the Tanzanian hospitality for the Mozambican neighbors. Food, medicine, clothing, agriculture, education, etc. are on the daily agenda. Most remarkable is the fact that throughout 1990, TAMOFA managed to carry out its program with no external financial assistance. This year, Scandinavian aid has come to the rescue, so the program is expanding as rapidly as the seven vehicles can move staff to key areas.

Someday (soon???), RENAMO will become history and Mozambique once again will be able to focus on its own development. U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle's announcement in Malawi that he would pray for the Mozambican people may not be the solution, but perhaps Zimbabwean, Tanzanian and other influences will bring this RENAMO nightmare to a halt. And, as Mozambicans return home and become self-sufficient once again, the international solidarity will go with them...and hopefully continue to grow, as regional unity becomes a prime model for the rest of the world.

Postscript: Given the quarter-century track record of extensive regional solidarity against apartheid, in support of numerous national liberation forces (Mozambique's FRELIMO, Angola's MPLA, Zimbabwe's ZANU and ZAPU and, yes, South Africa's PAC and ANC)...and given the reciprocity of such support and assistance, it would seem logical for the anti-apartheid movement inside South Africa to utilize its newly-won leverage to put an end to apartheid's continuing destabilization of the region. This could

mean an end of support to the surrogate RENAMO forces and after 15 years of horrendous conflict and disruption, a chance for improved life for the "povo" of Mozambique.

FRONTLINE **FOCUS**



Shorttakes From Namibia

EXPORT ZONE FOR NAMIBIA

Dateline: 8/91 The first "exporting zone" in Southern Africa may be set up in Namibia. Companies can be offered advantages including duty-free imports of materials and exports of finished goods as well as lower taxes, provided nearly everything they make is exported out of the region.

Incentives for other investors, including local businesses, are being developed by an inter-ministry technical committee which includes the investment center. These could be drafted into definite proposals within the next few months.

Some Far Eastern businesses are showing interest in Namibia as a base to reach European markets. Sources say some South Africans are interested in starting because Namibia makes a comfortable base from which to deal with markets in Angola and other countries. Others have said they are worried about safety of their investments in what some business people view as "an explosive situation" in South Africa.

The export processing zone, if agreed by the government, would be the first in Southern Africa. Companies operating there would have to export at least four-fifths of their products. Goods sold in South Africa Customs Union countries would pay normal duties. Strict controls would have to be kept to ensure

they did not use their special advantages to compete with companies manufacturing for local markets.

Much of the country's development strategy depends on increasing investment both from abroad and from local investors to establish new industries.

SOUTH AFRICA FUNDS SWAPO FOES

Foreign Minister R.F. Botha disclosed that South Africa had provided "considerably well over" \$35 million in secret funds to support seven parties opposing the South West People's Organization (SWAPO) in the 1989 independence elections in Namibia.

He said, "Yes, the South African government provided funds to a number of Namibian parties in the election campaign. The cabinet approved it." He further stated that "We were against SWAPO...at times we were at war with SWAPO." Botha declined to specify which Namibian parties the government provided funds to.

Other covert funding to groups included the Inkatha Freedom Party of Chief Buthelezi. It was also disclosed that over the past five years South Africa had allocated \$28 million to persuade foreign governments to lift sanctions against South Africa.

(Frontline Focus continues on Page 7)

SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT

Carol Thompson teaches Political Economy at the University of Southern California. She is the author of the recently published Harvest Under Fire: Regional Cooperation for Food Security in Southern Africa, a Zed publication.

FANC: Would you briefly describe the result of military destabilization in Southern Africa?

CT: Sanctions by South Africa on its neighbors resulted in over 1.5 million people killed in the 1980s, over 6 million people forcibly removed by war from their homes, the majority of free schools and health clinics destroyed, and the prevention of the people of Southern Africa from enjoying or even tasting their independence from colonialism. People have faced not only 100 years of outright colonialism, that they fought

against and won, but have also suffered more than a decade of South African and U.S.-backed wars.

FANC: It is suggested that the military destabilization of the 1980s has now been replaced by economic destabilization in the 1990s. Can you tell us about this?

CT: The Northern industrialized countries still want to control the rich natural resources of the region, and to maintain cheap labor. Therefore they are requiring "structural adjustments," such as charging for health care and education when in the past they were free, by governments to keep their economies open to Western technology and surplus commodities.

FANC: The rationale of colonialism was white supremacy, the excuse for the military destabilization of the 1980s was anti-communism. With the decline of communism, will the excuses return to racist or white supremacist rationales for this re-colonization?

CT: Yes.

FANC: Are there lessons in the experience in Southern Africa to help us solve problems in the Northern industrialized countries?

CT: Yes. There are several lessons. The first one is the importance of working together toward development in community. This can be at the village level, in cooperatives, all the way to the regional level with different countries cooperating together. No single African country will develop alone, and Southern Africa is successfully overcoming national boundaries by working together politically and economically. For example, Zimbabwe has assisted Mozambique militarily in its defense against South African aggression since 1981, but has also shared its success in agricultural production. Zimbabwe spends approximately \$3 million per week assisting Mozambique.

A second lesson is related to this cooperation, in that Southern Africans respect not only individual human rights (similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights), but also social or collective rights. Therefore, personal individual land rights are subordinate to the rights of communities to land use.

FANC: What effect will change in Eastern Europe have on Southern Africa?

CT: While Eastern Europe is breaking up into white-on-white violence and tribalism, Southern Africa is dramatically moving in the opposite direction. They are overcoming narrow national allegiances and becoming Southern Africans, instead of Mozambicans or Zimbabweans, let alone Shona or Shangan. Southern

Africans believe they will develop their economies only through regional collective cooperation.

Therefore in the 1990s Southern Africa stands out as unique in the world in overcoming chauvinism and ethnic competition. This may be the greatest gift Southern Africa has to offer the world.

FANC: What is the role of the U.S. in movements toward greater democracy?

CT: Southern Africans have been practicing democracy for centuries, such as continuing long debates until consensus was achieved. The U.S. is trying to impose its own competitive model of "democracy" which will result in increasing the inequities among the people, exacerbating economic and ethnic rivalries.

The strength of Southern Africans is that they will continue to fashion their own version of democracy that will be different according to different needs, for example, in Tanzania or Zambia.

Southern Africa is one of the richest regions in the world, and without Western interference, one of the most hopeful. They have already offered political lessons for the 21st century. **My only hope is that in the not-too-distant future they will offer the U.S. aid to help us overcome racism, and to teach the U.S. to cooperate with, not dominate, its neighbors.**

FRONTLINE **FOCUS**

(CONTINUED)

ANGOLA: A TOUGH SOLUTION

Dateline: 6/91 On May 30 an historic accord was signed that has paved the way for a cease-fire between the Angolan government and the UNITA movement and for the holding of multiparty elections by November 1992 at the latest. The agreement will effect a full cease-fire, bringing an end to 16 years of civil war and foreign military intervention in which at least 300,000 Angolans have been killed and over 500,000 driven from their homes. But fighting is likely to continue and possibly even escalate as government and UNITA forces seek to occupy or recapture towns and areas of the countryside in order to entrench their positions in advance of the politicking and electioneering that will



take place in the transition period between the cease-fire and the eventual elections.

The accord consists of the following basic points:

1. A cease-fire: effective from the signing of the peace agreement on May 30. This will be supervised by a joint verification committee and by a joint political-military committee to consist of representatives of the MPLA, UNITA and the three mediators (Portugal, USA and USSR).

2. Multiparty elections: to be held between September and November 1992.

3. The integration of the armed forces: units of the Angolan army and of UNITA will be merged to form a 40,000 strong national army. The integration will be overseen by the joint political-military commission.

4. Transitional government: the existing MPLA Worker's Party government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos will remain in power during the transition, but will work closely with the joint political-military commission. The post of Prime Minister will be restored.

5. UNITA's political role: under the multiparty constitution UNITA will have full legal status as a political party as soon as the cease-fire is signed. It will join the MPLA and the four or five small, urban-based parties and political associations now in existence. Dr. Savimbi intends to return to Angola in June or July to start the process of turning UNITA into a national political party.

The whole peace process will get off the ground after the cease-fire and with the establishment of the joint political-military committee. At least 600 UN personnel will eventually be sent in to help prepare the way for the elections and to monitor them when they take place. Given the sad failure of the Alvor and Nakuru accords in 1975 to prevent a civil war it can hardly be expected that the transition will be smooth. Outbreaks of fighting, mutual accusations of breaches of the agreement are likely, but with the Soviet Union strongly pushing the Angolan government towards peace, the USA doing the same now for UNITA and both sides sick of war and ready to get on with national reconstruction, it is to be hoped that common sense will finally overcome narrow interests and years of distrust.

MONETARY PROBLEMS

After a decade of rapid economic growth, diamond-rich Botswana expects a slowdown in the 1990s

Dateline: 6/91 The Botswana government has begun exploring for alternative revenue sources from exports of gems, which account for over 90% of total earnings. The government, in its 1991/2 budget, admits it will not be able to achieve the economic growth rate of 10% on average which it achieved throughout the 1980s propelled by a rapid boom in international diamond demand.

A forecast world diamond market contraction in the 1990s, coupled with the recessionary effects of the Gulf War, threaten to sharply curtail Botswana's gem exports, leading to slower growth. Making matters worse, imports of goods - particularly capital equipment and food - increased by 15% between the two fiscal periods from P2.6 billion (the Pula is the Botswanan unit of currency) to P2.9 billion in 1990. As a result Botswana, for the first time, recorded a budget deficit of P135 million last year.

The country's mounting economic woes were also sharply worsened by a rise in inflation - mainly due to the Gulf War - and increasing government expenditure on the social sectors of the economy - especially health and education. This forced the government to begin drawing down on its hitherto healthy foreign reserve of P6.3 billion.

The Botswana government has begun anxious efforts to broaden the country's export revenue base by shifting the current, almost total, dependence on diamonds to other potential areas such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. But Botswana, much of which is desert and wasteland, has a limited range of options for economic diversification to escape dependence on diamonds, economists say.

Last year, the government announced a tourism development master plan, Botswana's first in history, as the basis for attracting both domestic and foreign investment in the sector. The plan calls for a new constitutionally-governed infrastructural development of holiday resorts, hotels, safaris and all related facilities, most of which are not available in the country at the moment.

The government has also set eyes on the agriculture and manufacturing sectors as possible export revenue sources. Although development efforts in these areas may be limited in scope due to Botswana's relatively low population and a climate not conducive to intensive agricultural development, they can contribute further to the country's economic diversification.



Kaunda:

ZAMBIA HOLDS MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS

With the first multiparty elections in 18 years which were held on October 31, 1991, new President Frederick Chiluba and his Movement for MultiParty Democracy (MMD) will face many issues concerning how the country has been run and how it should be run in the future.

Among the issues are the following:

— Determination of what property belongs to the government and what property belongs to Former President Kaunda's UNIP Party..

— The impact of any post-election military reform as proposed by the MMD on UNIP loyalists and whether or not any resulting conflicts could result in destabilization of the new government..

— Criticism from the opposition that the proposed constitution drafted by Former President Kaunda is not representative of the concerns of the general citizenry and could be used to concentrate power in the hands of the presidency..

— The role of the government and the private sectors. Under Kaunda, the government was in primary control of key sectors of the economy. The government-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) had monopoly interests in copper, farming, tourism, etc...

— The formation of new diplomatic and financial ties with countries hostile to former President Kaunda and the UNIP .

The elections were monitored by international observers, including former US President Jimmy Carter. Election monitors were also invited from the 51-nation Organization of African Unity, the 102-member Non Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

IVORY BAN INCREASES ZIMBABWE POACHING

Dateline: 6/91 Instead of reducing poaching of elephants in Zimbabwe, the 1989 ivory trade ban increased poaching in this southern African country. According to the deputy director of the Department of Wildlife in Harare, the number of elephants killed by poachers since the ban came into force has gone up 300% over previous years.

Because of the ban, prices on the black market have shot up, making the trade even more lucrative than before the embargo, he says. Poachers captured recently revealed that middlemen and speculators are giving poachers more financial inducements to step up the illegal killing of elephants.

Zimbabwe, like Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, opposes the international embargo in ivory products passed in Lausanne in 1989. The country has an elephant herd of over 60,000 while wildlife experts claim it has land enough to support only half of the elephant population. The "surplus" elephants, thus, compete with local farmers for scarce land. This has led to the destruction of crops, houses and fences. Last year four farmers in the Nyaminyami region in northern Zimbabwe were killed by elephants.

In the past, regulated culling of elephants by the government brought financial rewards to local communities. Several community projects were supported with cash from the ivory trade. Now, with hundreds of elephant tusks lying unsold in warehouses throughout the country, the government is pressing for an exemption from the ban. It says the ban is inimical to the interests of Zimbabwean elephants as it is disrupting conservation programs.

One local newspaper commented recently: "To conservationists living far away from the frontline in the war to save what remains of Africa's elephants, an all-out ban seems a simple solution. But for those who are in the frontline, there is nothing simple about the negative consequences of a strategy dreamed up by decision makers whose only experience of an elephant is through the bars of a zoo or a television wildlife series.

Meanwhile in Zambia, it is estimated that elephant poaching costs the country \$100m each year. A similar amount is thought to be lost through the slaughter of other species. Dr. Richard Bell, coordinator of the Integrated Resource Development Project, says Zambia could have earned \$1 billion to help pay for its \$8 billion foreign debt from elephant culling alone. Instead, the money has gone to poachers. In the 10 years to 1985, Bell estimates an astounding 100,000 elephants were slaughtered.

The killing continues despite the 1989 ban.

Zambia has now joined Zimbabwe, Malawi, Namibia and Botswana to form a marketing authority for elephant products. The marketing authority will be based on Botswana and will monitor and control elephant products for member states. Marketing will be conducted through a twice-annual public auction.

An immediate effect of the authority will be a lessening of border tensions between Zimbabwe and Zambia. In the past few years, 30 Zambians have been killed as poachers by game rangers in Zimbabwe, particularly in the Zambezi Valley.

LOCAL SCENE

WEST COAST LINK REPORT

On May 11, 1991 several grass-roots groups which support the Friends of the ANC and Frontline States met with U.S. Representative Mervyn Dymally at the Friends of the ANC office. We presented Representative Dymally with a proposal to set up a West Coast Link with the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, of which Dymally is Chair. The purpose of the Link is to be an informational link from the Subcommittee to several groups on the West Coast to inform them about what is happening in Washington, D.C. with regards to Africa. It will also be an informational link from the groups to the Subcommittee to let it know thoughts and views of the various groups on the West Coast. Representative Dymally was in favor of such a link and is cooperating with us in setting it up.

On June 15, 1991 we met again with Representative Dymally to further discuss the West Coast Link and other concerns of our various groups.

Since then, a general letter went out in a mass mailing with other Friends of the ANC reports, asking that people contact their U.S. Senators and/or Representatives, encouraging them to support House Concurrent Resolution 126, which would reinstate the federal sanctions against South Africa, which were lifted in July, 1991. However, numerous state, county and city sanctions remain in place throughout the U.S.

In the wake of President Bush lifting the sanctions at the federal level, we found that at least three cities (Pasadena, Los Angeles and West Hollywood) in the Southland plan to maintain their own sanctions

against South Africa. The West Coast Link is in the process of sending the Mayors of these cities letters affirming our support of their decisions, even though the Daily News reports that "the U.S. Secretary of State's Office has been considering a test case against a municipality for continuing to refuse to do business with firms involved in South Africa.

SOUTHERN AFRICA MARKET DAY

On Saturday, August 3, 1991, the Friends of the ANC and Frontline States hosted a Southern Africa Market Day to bring cultural and political awareness

from the Southern African region to Los Angeles. The day was spent with several vendors selling their wares, while members of the Friends prepared and sold cultural foods throughout the day to a hungry crowd.



Several members from solidarity organizations including the Mozambique Support Network, the Namibia Support Organization, the African National Congress and the South African Student Congress were in attendance.

PEOPLE SEEK ELECTED POLICE REVIEW BOARD

Los Angeles, CA While the Los Angeles City Hall juggles for power and faces changes on the Police Commission, the people are mobilizing for community control of the police.

At a kick-off rally earlier this year, the Committee for Justice and a Civilian Police Review Board launched its signature-gathering ballot campaign for an elected civilian police review board in the city.

Participants came from every corner of the city to organize and to raise money for this campaign.

The Christopher Commission exposed appalling abuses, but these were not news to the legions of police-abuse victims in this city. Our review board ballot proposal, the strongest in the nation, comes from the community. It requires much more than the Christopher Commission was willing merely to recommend.

This Review Board will be elected, not appointed. It will have an elected special prosecutor and hired staff, independent of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), City Attorney, and City Council, with full subpoena powers and access to shooting sites.

The Review Board will have the power to examine complaints of police abuse and impose penalties that include suspension and firing, as well as the power to review and change LAPD policies and procedures.

The Friends of the ANC know that lifting our struggle in the U.S. is the most important task for U.S. activists, and that our struggle is in solidarity with African freedom fighters. People interested in helping in our campaign to gather signatures to get the Civilian

Police Review Board on the June Ballot can contact us at (213) 733-2107.

ZAPU: Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZIMFEP: Zimbabwe Federation for Education with Production

ZIMOFA: Zimbabwe Mozambique Friendship Association

Glossary

ANC: African National Congress

FANC: Friends of the African National Congress and Frontline States

FRELIIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party

MMD: Movement for MultiParty Democracy

MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

PAC: Pan Africanist Congress

RENAMO: Mozambique National Resistance

SADCC: Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SWAPO: South West African People's Organization

TAMOFA: Tanzania Mozambique Friendship Association

UNIP: United Independence Party

UNITA: Union for the Total Liberation of Angola

ZANU: Zimbabwe African National Union

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TO OUR READERS:

Many of you have been reading the Southern African Support Committee Newsletter for a number of years. About three years ago a number of local anti-apartheid organizations came together with members of the African National Congress and the South Africa International Student Congress to develop a closer relationship between the struggles for liberation "from South Africa to South-Central Los Angeles." Out of this came the Friends of the ANC and Frontline States. We have worked hard to monitor and analyze news and events in Southern Africa, and we hope you enjoy our first newsletter under this name. The Friends of the ANC and Frontline States meet every second and fourth Thursday of each month at 2824 S. Western Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90018. We'd love your comments, or better yet, your participation in our work.

FRIENDS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND FRONTLINE STATES

The situation for the African people in South Africa is still at a critical stage. While negotiations toward majority rule have yet to begin, Africans still do not have the right to vote, and little has been done to ease the suffering of those forced to live in the most primitive conditions in the townships and bantustans. Write your representatives and urge them to keep the pressure on South Africa's apartheid regime until one-person, one-vote is a reality for everyone in South Africa.

I will write my Representative.

I have enclosed a donation of \$_____.

Name: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

Phone: _____

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