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MEMORANDUM ON RECENT STATE DEPARTMENT APPOINTMENTS AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Secretary of State Kissinger has recently made a series of diplomatic shifts which raise disturbing questions about the future direction of U.S. policy toward Africa.

On January 9, 1975, President Ford nominated Nathaniel Davis, former Ambassador to Guatemala and Chile, to replace Donald Easum, who had served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs for only nine months.

At the same time, the State Department confirmed a report by Ken Owen, an investigative reporter for South Africa's Argus newspapers, that William G. Bowdler is being considered to replace John Hurd as U.S. Ambassador to South Africa. Bowdler's previous foreign service experience has been entirely in Latin America: Cuba, U.S. Representative to the Organization of America States, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

Earlier, in June, 1974, Kissinger chose Deane Hinton to be Ambassador to Zaire. Hinton is a specialist in intelligence research and international economic trade. He was AID chief in Guatemala and Chile where Davis also served.

What do these appointments portend?

We do not know the exact thinking of the Secretary of State, but we note that all of these appointments are to key posts in relation to southern Africa. We therefore believe that we must consider what these new appointments might indicate about the new policy to be implemented in response to the significant changes in that region in the last year.

Most significant among these events was the end of Portuguese colonialism, and the transition to independence in Mozambique and Angola. After a decade of struggle, both Angola and Mozambique will be fully independent by the end of 1975. The white minority government in Rhodesia is facing the strongest opposition since it unilaterally declared independence in 1965. Guerilla warfare in the northeast was recently proving more costly to the white regime than ever before. An independent Mozambique poses a threat to sanctions-breaking exports. South Africa is clearly pressing the Smith regime for an early settlement. Smith has been forced to free the leaders of the major African nationalist movements. It therefore seems reasonably certain that the day of majority rule in Rhodesia is both inevitable and not far off.

In light of these events, the Administration can hardly continue to base its southern Africa policy on the now well-known premise stated in Option Two of the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39: "The whites are here/in southern Africa/ to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."

According to State Department sources, Kissinger directed that a new National Security Study Memorandum be prepared in late spring on the unexpected unraveling of Portuguese rule. We believe that a new secret policy decision was reached to meet the ensuing crisis. It appears that Kissinger sought to find persons who could be trusted to be hard-headed, and realistic, in order to give him the sort of reports and policy implementation the new policy required.

In this context, the removal of Nathaniel Davis' predecessor, Donald Easum, suggests that important changes in United States policy toward southern Africa may be in the offing.

In the fall of last year, Easum made a ten-nation tour to important southern African countries. While on the tour, he made a number of public statements expressing somewhat stronger concern about Apartheid that we have come to expect from U.S. policy-makers.

On his arrival in Lusaka, Zambia, on November 2, Easum said in response to questions about the U.S. veto with Britain and France of South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations:

"We believe /South Africa's/ action must now reflect the rhetoric emitted. The question of expulsion will certainly arise at some time again in the future and I would imagine that the degree to which South Africa has made meaningful changes will determine the stances that various countries will take on the expulsion issue at that time. I should also think that it is just not the issue of discrimination, but it is also the degree to which South Africa fulfills its pledges to the U.N. Secretary General with regard to bringing Namibia to self-determination and the nature of South Africa's relationship with Rhodesia in the coming months."

In a prime-time Zambian TV appearance, Easum discussed the veto again, saying, "Our objective is to rid South Africa or see South Africa rid itself of Apartheid..." The U.S., he noted, feels that the time for expulsion "might well come but it is not right now for this kind of pressure. U.S. policy in regard to "continued South African participation in the U.N. is continuously under review. It is not concrete and forever."

Why do these statements appear somewhat unusual? Easum stated that the U.S. policy was to "get rid of Apartheid", which goes beyond the classic U.S. expressions of "abhorrence" of Apartheid. He then said that the question of U.S. veto of South African expulsion was an open one, although the 1969 NSSM made it clear that the U.S. would not go as far as supporting South African expulsion.

Easum further stated to the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee when he returned from his trip that the black states in the area were as concerned about the liberation of southern Africa as about their own internal economic development. This perception suggests the insensitivity and unrealism of the basic direction of the 1970 policy, in which the U.S. sought to maintain its economic and strategic interests in the white-ruled states merely by giving white-ruled states to the black states.

If Easum was removed because these public statement in southern Africa were out of line with policy, which we believe is possible, we need to ask the following questions:

- Are we to assume that South Africa can count on an automatic veto of its expulsion from the United Nations no matter how it flouts U.N. resolutions and decisions on Rhodesia and Namibia?
- Are we to take it that Apartheid is a matter to be deplored but not gotten rid of
- Does this mean that Apartheid is viewed as a domestic affair of South Africa about which the U.S. will in actuality do nothing whatever, other than to utter pious noises?

We also note that Kissinger's removal of Easum came right after a public attack on the Africa Bureau by South Africa's Secretary of Information, Dr. Eschel Rhoodie. In a press interview with the Johannesburg Star the week of December 7, he said that certain officials in the Africa Bureau were "out to discredit us and make things difficult for us." Was Easum replaced to assure the South Africans that the Africa Bureau would not continue to "make things difficult" for them? The implication exists, and the State Department has not responded to it.

Looking now at the new appointments, why are these three Latin American specialists being assigned to key African posts?

None of the appointees have any significant experience in Africa. While this is not a disqualification, it does raise the question of whether it is appropriate to appoint professional foreign service officers to major posts who have no experience or familiarity with the problems and issues of the area in question. This is particularly critical in the case of Davis, who doesn't even speak French, a major prerequisite for direct communication with Franco-phone Africa. All present Assistant Secretaries for continental regions have served in significant posts in the region. Furthermore, State Department sources indicate that before being named as Assistant Secretary, Davis was nominated as Ambassador to Nigeria, a that he was rejected by the Nigerians because of his apparent role in Chile. His oversight of the Africa Bureau may therefore start in the shadow of African suspicion.

Beyond these questions involving the entire continent, we are concerned about all three Latin America experts being moved to southern Africa particularly. In this regard, what do these appointments, Davis, Hinton and Bowdler, have in common?

- 1.) They have all served in tough Latin American posts in difficult times, where the U.S. fought to overthrow or "destablize" socialist governments or to prevent insurgent movements from reaching power.
 - A. Davis was Ambassador to Chile during the period when, according to the testimony of CIA Director William Colby before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence in April, 1973, CIA money was used to fund anti-Allende candidates and for "political destabilization."

Before that Davis had been Ambassador to Guatemala, at a time when 20,000 persons were wiped out in a U.S.-supported "pacification" program. The primary objective of U.S. policy at that time, according to the State Department "Background Notes", was "to support the constitutional government in its efforts to eliminate insurgency and to provide a better life for its people."

B. Hinton serves as AID chief and counselor on economic development in Guatemala from 1967-69. (Davis' tenure there was 1968-71.) Thereafter, he served in Chile as AID chief from 1969-71.

C. Bowdler served as political officer in charge of "special political problems" in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and a member of the U.S. delegation to OAS from 1961-63. He is a veteran of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis era. He followed Davis as Ambassador to Guatemala in 1971.

2.) Nothing in their background suggests that any of these men protested or stood apart from any of the covert operations which were going on around them. In fact, there are suggestions that they were part of an anti-Communist cold-war effort to maintain "stability" by the use of any means necessary.

Kissinger declared at a National Security Council meeting on June 27, 1970 in regard to Chile, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

Is Kissinger prepared to apply this same principle to southern Africa?

In Mozambique, Frelimo has been peacefully brought to power, through negotiations with Portugal, their former colonial ruler. If Mozambique moves in the direction of a socialist economy or develops ties with socialist countries, will Kissinger attempt to "destablize" the regime by promoting capitalist-oriented splinter parties to challenge it? Will the United States promote middle-class strikes and disruptions in the Chilean model?

In Angola, will Kissinger direct these diplomats, who have experience in destabilization, to break the delicate coalition among the three liberation movements which will now join in the transitional government? The U.S. has in the past supported FNLA, one of these groups, with money and advisors. Will it support an independent Cabinda by covertly underwriting FLEC and thus securing Gulf Oil from nationalization?

MPLA in Angola, Frelimo in Mozambique, and PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau all share left-wing perspectives. They have all been recipients of aid from socialist countries in their struggle against colonial rule. To what extent can we expect Davis to supervise a process of weaning these movements from Moscow and Peking and making them dependent on the West?

3.) Kissinger has chosen men for these key posts who understand the tangible interests and the game of global politics which he is agent of. These are not soft-headed humanitarian idealists. They are men of maturity or human rights echelons of the Africa Bureau.

All three people have White House experience:

- A. Davis was senior staff member of the National Security Council from 1966-68.
- B. Hinton served on the senior staff of the White House from 1971-74, ultimately becoming deputy chief of staff of the office of International Economic Policy.
- C. Bowdler was the senior staff officer for Latin America for the National Security Council from 1965-68.

One therefore has to ask whether Kissinger is moving now from Option Two to Option One of NSSM 39. That Option in effect says, "Let's promote our tangible interests wherever they may be found: profits wherever they may be found (especially in the white states), strategic interests in South Africa's ports and airfields, and scientific interests in nuclear and space fields." Has he in effect decided to let the black states roar all they want about Apartheid but to dis-miss their views as impotent and unnecessary distractions?

4.) U.S. policy toward leftist governments in Latin America has been to use stringent measures amounting to economic warfare together with CIA penetration of domestic politics to protect the private investment of American corporations. The Nixon Administration used Eximbank direct loans, guarantees and insurance as a weapon against Chile's Allende regime in order to create economic chaos. It used its clout with the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank to carry out a credit boycott aimed at strangulation of the Chilean economy.

Given this background, we need to ask what measures the United States is prepared to take to protect American investment, present and potential, in the states of southern Africa.

Is the United States prepared to enter into closer and closer alliance with states of the region which possess important mineral resources in order to preserve our own wasteful economy, without regard to the issue of universal human rights?

South Africa has chrome, coal, iron, uranium, manganese, gold and diamonds. But its political economy is designed to exploit cheap African labor and to prevent Africans and other non-Europeans from gaining political power. What will be the posture of the United States when the inevitable struggle for power in South Africa reaches its climax?

Zaire produces 55% of the world's cobalt. The U.S. imports 22% of its requirements, mostly from Zaire. It has resources of copper and oil, diamonds and manganese in abundance. The U.S. has assisted in the training of Zaire's 23,000-man police force. equipped its patrol boats on Lake Tanganyika and supported Mobutu's economic plans. To what extent are we prepared to assist in the suppression of popular discontent in Zaire?

Not only are South Africa and Zaire important in themselves because of their economic resources, their pro-U.S. regimes can be used to exert leverage on the transitional situation in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia, where U.S. economic interests are significant although smaller.

South Africa is announcing that it has achieved "detente", thus assuring itself that its internal political structure, built on white supremacy, will remain free of significant outside pressure. Zaire, to the north, has proven during Mobutu's presidency to be friendly to American economic interests. South Africa and Zaire therefore could act as two arms of a nutcracker around the economically and politically weaker states to the south, east and west: Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

We believe that the Senate now has an opportunity to ask some important and searching questions of the two nominees who will soon come before it for confirmation. These should go beyond the question of qualification of these men for the posts in question to inquire what the Kissinger doctrine is for Africa.

Are the monies of U.S. taxpayers going to be used to defend the special interests of multi-national corporations as they were in Latin America? Are we prepared to destabilize emerging independent countries which are moving toward a socialist economy? Are we going to foster and abet the South African domination of its neighbors to the north in order to protect our tangible interests without demanding any change in the Apartheid system we profess to abhor?

Are we in effect committing ourselves to an Alliance for Progress in southern Africa in which South Africa emerges as the managing partner on our behalf?