

STATEMENT OF EDGAR LOCKWOOD, DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA,
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE
REGARDING THE NOMINATION OF MR. NATHANIEL DAVIS AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT A HEARING ON FEBRUARY 11, 1975.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity to present our perspective on this important nomination.

The Washington Office on Africa is sponsored by six Protestant denominations and the American Committee on Africa in order to provide timely information to a growing network of citizens and citizen groups who wish to express their concerns about U.S. - Africa policy to government decision-makers. Established in 1972, our office has largely focussed on issues such as Rhodesian sanctions where our country's position on majority rule, self-determination and colonialism is at stake.

The churches which sponsor us have a history of mission work in Africa which makes them acutely sensitive to these issues. Increasingly the leadership of the churches in Africa has shifted from expatriates to native clergy and laity and from collaboration with imperial and colonial designs to active resistance to European and U.S. domination.

Given this context, we are inevitably alarmed by the nomination of Mr. Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on three grounds.

First, Mr. Davis has no professional diplomatic experience in Africa and no other political experience to enable him to appreciate sympathetically the problems and concerns of African states.

Governor G. Mennen Williams, first chief of the Africa Bureau, was prominent in politics and brought fresh enthusiasm and sympathy to U.S. policy toward Africa. His successors, Joseph Palmer, David Newsom, and Donald Easum had each served as Ambassadors in the region and in the administration of African affairs within the Department.

This is not to say that lack of African experience or expertise is always per se a disqualification for the post of Assistant Secretary. Other strong qualifications might indeed be substituted if we could be assured that a new policy of respect for African aspirations, self-determination and political independence were in prospect. What we find disturbing about Mr. Davis' other qualifications are precisely that they portend an opposite trend.

Second, the nomination of Mr. Davis has been greeted by surprise, dismay and apprehension in Africa, even among those independent black states which are politically moderate and relatively well-disposed toward the United States.

President Mobutu of Zaire opened the recent African-American conference in Kinshasa on U.S. policy in Africa by attacking U.S. policy of passive support for the status quo, its failure to work for African liberation, its working against African interests and its silence in the face of South Africa's drive to "Balkanize" southern Africa. In the course of his speech he had this to say about Mr. Davis' appointment:

All African leaders had hailed the appointment of Ambassador Easum as Under Secretary of State for African Affairs. This great diplomat is very experienced in African affairs. He has an accurate knowledge of decolonization and apartheid problems. He has one great quality in particular - that of listening to his interlocutors. This means that he believes in learning and being informed, and not dictating orders. We were very surprised to learn not only that he was fired, but also that his successor is the former U.S. ambassador to Chile at the time President Allende died.

Zaire is not the only moderate African country which appears to be dismayed. We understand that in the State Department stories are circulating that Secretary Kissinger had suggested Ambassador Davis' name to Nigeria as the new Ambassador to that country but that Nigeria did not wish to accept some one tainted by culpability in the downfall of Allende. Perhaps your questioning will uncover the truth about these rumors.

In any case, Mr. Davis will commence his tenure in the shadow of African distrust. We are therefore compelled to ask why this is necessary.

Is Mr. Davis' replacement of Mr. Easum merely a routine shuffle? Mr. Easum was dismissed after only nine months in office, right after a tour of ten African countries which did much to restore U.S. credibility in the eyes of black Africa. We therefore believe his replacement by Mr. Davis was far from routine.

Mr. Davis is a skillful and intelligent diplomat who has well served a misguided and dangerous policy in Latin America. His appointment is part of a pattern we perceive which points to an ominous new turn in U.S. policy toward Africa. This brings me to my third point.

Mr. Davis' nomination should not be confirmed unless and until the Senate has examined the basis of U.S.- Africa policy to eliminate the possibility that the United States will "destabilize" i.e. subvert, popular governments through open economic and political methods and covert activities using the C.I.A., and

will support white racist minorities in southern Africa in their domination of neighboring states and retention of minority rule on the model of our support for dictatorships in Latin America.

Mr. Davis was Ambassador to Chile from 1971-73. During this period \$5 million of C.I.A. money funded anti-Allende candidates and many other covert activities designed to destabilize the popularly elected government. William Colby, C.I.A. Director, has testified that U.S. diplomatic personnel were kept informed of all C.I.A. activities. During these years, the facilities of the Export-Import Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank were denied in order to weaken the economy and create "economic chaos. On September 8th, 1973, three days before the coup in which President Allende and thousands of his supporters died, Mr. Davis flew to Washington for a meeting with Secretary Kissinger. It is a fair presumption that Mr. Davis had inside knowledge of the forthcoming coup and briefed Secretary Kissinger on it.

Prior to his service in Chile, Mr. Davis served as Ambassador to Guatemala, from 1968-71. A primary objective of U.S. policy at that time was to support the Guatemalan government in "its efforts to eliminate insurgency." Twenty thousand people were killed in this "pacification" program modelled on the U.S. "search and destroy" methods used in Vietnam.

Mr. Davis' appointment is part of an emerging pattern of appointing diplomats with counter-insurgency backgrounds to key African posts. Mr. Davis' appointment follows that of Deane Hinton as Ambassador to Zaire in June, 1974. Mr. Hinton served as AID chief in Guatemala from 1967-69, during a part of Mr. Davis' tenure there and thereafter as AID chief in Chile. He is widely believed to have been a CIA agent using AID as a cover.

The Johannesburg Star announced in mid-January that William G. Bowdler, another Latin American expert in combatting left-wing governments, would soon replace John Hurd as Ambassador to South Africa. Bowdler served in Cuba from 1956-61 when Castro came to power, thereafter as officer in charge of "special political problems" in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, member of the delegation to OAS, deputy co-ordinator of Cuban affairs from 1964-65 when he went to the White House to serve as senior staff officer of the National Security Council on Latin America. He followed Mr. Davis as Ambassador to Guatemala in 1971.

Another veteran of the Davis years in Guatemala and Chile has already been moved to South Africa. Mr. Jeffrey Davidow is now first political officer in Pretoria.

None of the foreign service officers in question have any significant African experience. They have all served faithfully a hard-line anti-Communist policy in Latin America which was prepared to pacify insurgencies by military means in Guatemala and to overturn a popularly elected government in Chile by covert intervention in the domestic affairs of another country.

In cabling Congressman Diggs in response to his protest of the Davis nomination, Secretary Kissinger defended Ambassador Davis' Chilean and Guatemalan record by this rationale:

Ambassadors are not the creators of policy. Their role is to carry out instructions faithfully. An Ambassador is often confronted by difficult political problems. His advice is sought but decisions are made in Washington by the responsible political leaders. These decisions may later become unpopular; we cannot, however, stigmatize the Ambassador or Foreign Service Officer who did what he was told to do.

The post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs would appear

to carry with it a greater share in the creation of policy. The question now arises therefore as to whether Secretary Kissinger has replaced Mr. Easum because his views were too independent. We fear that Mr. Davis may have been appointed in order to provide advice and reports which will confirm Mr. Kissinger's hardline assumptions rather than to provide a balanced, creative and thoughtful contribution to the formation of African policy.

What is to be U. S. policy in the situation which has emerged in Southern Africa following the Portugugese coup?

In Mozambique, Frelimo has emerged from more than ten years of armed struggle with enormous political support among the African population and some elements of the small European community. Mozambique will shortly be independent. Frelimo has built a movement based on popular control of Mozambique's economy and resources. Yet, Mozambiue's economy, a legacy of centuries of colonialism, is perilously weak and dangerously dependent on the economy of South Africa and Rhodesia. The Cabora Bassa dam project was built ^{to sell} almost all of its electricity to South Africa. Mozambican ports draw substantial revenues from South African and Rhodesian exports, the latter a violation of U. N. sanctions. Some 100,000 Mozambicans earn important foreign exchange in gold from their work in South Africa's mines under inhuman conditions. Mozambique will be looking for ways to break out of this economic vassalage. Will we assist them or make it worse?

During the Allende years, the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank and Ex-Im Bank loans to Chile were drastically reduced.

After the coup, a loan of \$26 million was granted for the purchase of wheat.

Are we to see in Mozambique a similar flagrant political use of economic aid so as to insure Mozambique's continued dependence on South Africa's economy, and to insure that Mozambique will not assist in bringing about majority rule in South Africa through armed struggle? Is Mr. Davis preparing to assist in the cultivation of the tiny splinter parties, which are the almost non-existent political opposition to Frelimo?

On November 11th, Angola will become independent. Unlike Mozambique, the situation in Angola is extremely complex politically. Three rival nationalist movements, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA whose political orientation and ideology are diverse and to some degree in conflict, have entered into an uneasy and fragile alliance in order to negotiate the transition to majority rule and independence. Until the election of a Constituent Assembly, there will be a difficult jockeying for power in a fluid political situation.

U. S. corporate interests exist in Angola, as they did and do in Chile, which will press for the United States to fish in troubled waters as it did in Chile. The Gulf Oil Corporation has developed oil wells in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda which now produce over 4 million barrels of oil a month. Gulf plans to double present production.

But oil is not the only mineral wealth in Angola. One economist estimates that Angola's riches per head, largely unexploited, exceed those of any other African country except South Africa.

Now both Mozambique and Angola will be independent by the end of 1975.

The startling misjudgement of the 1970 National Security Study Memorandum on southern Africa that "whites are here to stay" has now been proven false, and one senses an upsurge of desperate U.S. interest in Portuguese politics and in Angola's and Mozambique's future. According to an October 20th, 1974 report in the London Times, "nattily dressed C.I.A. men" checked into Lisbon's Sheraton Hotel following the April coup, intent upon seeing to it that "the right guys" emerge as leaders of Angolan liberation. Lisbon negotiators spoke privately of "the American solution" to Angolan independence.

According to a report by Miguel Accoa in the International Herald Tribune on October 28th, 1974, C.I.A. deputy chief Vernon Walters was in Lisbon in August for a personal assessment at the request of Secretary Kissinger, because of his concern about possible Communist Party strength in the coming elections. Reports also indicate that Secretary Kissinger replaced Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott, an able and conservative Wall Street lawyer, with Frank Carlucci because Scott's interpretation of events was insufficiently aware of Communist dangers.

Meanwhile the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (FLEC) denounced the major Angolan liberation movements for claiming that Cabinda is part of Angola. Reports continue to be received that FLEC is a creation of the C.I.A. and of Gulf Oil Corporation.

In these circumstances it seems appropriate to ask Mr. Davis some searching questions in regard to the future of Angola.

Is the United States prepared to undergird and strengthen the coalition of the three liberation groups so that all important political movements are left to work out their own arrangements in ways which they perceive to be

beneficial to the Angolan population? Or will we use the pretext of Soviet or Chinese aid to continue to underwrite financially and militarily one of the movements and to foment and exacerbate divisions and partitions among the movements?

In Rhodesia and Namibia the crumbling of Portuguese rule has brought majority rule so close that even the South African government has recognized that it is inevitable.

The pressing question therefore for U.S. policy is: Will Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Davis and the Embassy in Pretoria be using its leverage on South Africa to ensure that South Africa withdraws its military, para-military and police forces from these countries? Or does Mr. Kissinger disapprove of Mr. Easum's rather mild statement in Lusaka on November 2nd that the question of expulsion of South Africa from the U.N. in the future may depend on South Africa's actions in regard to Namibia and Rhodesia and its elimination of discrimination in fact as well as in rhetoric? Firing Mr. Easum was hailed in South Africa as a sign that he was too hardline. Is this correct? Will Mr. Davis relinquish such small weapons as remain to the U.S. after a veto and count on gratitude alone to sway the heart of the racist rulers in South Africa?

What seems to be emerging is a U.S. recognition of South Africa's view of reality as reality, an acceptance of cosmetic changes as progress toward majority rule. Are we prepared to accept the Balkanization of South Africa? What meaningful independence can there be for the Transkei, for Zululand or for any other of the so-called homelands so long as the majority of South Africa's Africans live outside the homelands and so long as most of the land

and most of the resources are in the white areas? Eight out of nine homeland leaders reject such spurious independence, but the Transkei is moving toward it.

South Africa's delegate to the United Nations now says that South Africa is against "discrimination". His rhetoric thus becomes more akin to ours. But what does it mean? Does it mean, as seems likely, fewer benches in the park with Whites Only or does it mean that Africans will vote? Prime Minister John Vorster is authority for the statement that South Africa does not intend any basic change in its political and economic power relationships.

In these circumstances, are we to understand from the Davis appointment that there will be a further relaxation of U.S. pressure on South Africa for change? Will we move closer and closer to accepting South Africa as our surrogate and unacknowledged managing partner in a racist Alliance For Progress in southern Africa? The recent revelation of National Security Study Memorandum 39 gives us no assurance on this score. Indeed it indicates that as early as 1969 U.S. strategists had retreated from resistance to South Africa's dominance to acceptance of its desirability. Africa is seen in that study purely in terms of cold-war realities and great power interests.

The struggle for human dignity, for equality and for a just share of the world's resources is more important than the greed for power, for gain and for prestige among nations. That struggle involves the struggle of the people of Africa to decide their own future, to shape of it in ways that benefit them and in ways determined by them. U.S. policy toward Africa now seems to be taking a turn which will impede that struggle and make it more difficult, but that struggle will succeed, and our policy, if it continues,

will be seen as a tragic mistake.

The people of the United States want no more Vietnams and no more Chiles.

These are the issues which we call upon the Senate to deliberate upon before acting in haste to confirm Mr. Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.