

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1959

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1451
TO AMEND FURTHER THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 2

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The American Committee on Africa, a nonpartisan organization composed of American citizens in all walks of life and counting among its national committee many distinguished public figures, welcomes this opportunity to comment briefly on the mutual security program as it affects this country's relations with Africa.

The remarks below are based on the friendly contacts which officers and members of the committee have maintained with African leaders during the past 6 years and on firsthand knowledge and observation of the problems of the African continent. The point of departure of the committee's approach to this problem is that the welfare and security of America demand that aid to Africa be conducted over the next several years on a rising scale. The committee, however, believes that the economic, political, and social problems of Africa are essentially no different from those of other underdeveloped areas in Asia and Latin America, and that the healthy growth of Africa is inseparable from a worldwide effort to enable two-thirds of the earth's people to break out of the vicious circle of poverty and join the lucky and privileged few, to whom we Americans belong, in achieving a standard of life commensurate with their dignity as human beings. In holding this belief, the committee states—without comment, because comment has been furnished by others more qualified—its adherence to the following propositions:

1. The gap between haves and have-nots, rich lands and poor lands, or, in the neutral jargon of the economists, developed and underdeveloped countries, is growing wider rather than narrower.

2. The infusion of outside capital into the economies of the underdeveloped countries is a sine qua non of development. The present rate of such infusion is inadequate to enable the economies of the underdeveloped countries to do more than keep up with their population rise.

3. Although private capital has an enormously useful role to play, it is not now meeting the needs of the underdeveloped countries nor will it do so in the foreseeable future, no matter how attractive an investment climate is created.

4. If public capital from the United States and its allies does not fill the gap, the underdeveloped countries will be impelled either to turn for help elsewhere, or to force the pace of domestic saving at the expense of democracy or both.

5. Although Europe will be able to bear an increasing share of the public capital contribution to underdeveloped countries, the United States will have to continue to bear the lion's share, because it can best afford to do so.

Having said this much, and having, up to this point, duplicated some of the testimony already given at these hearings, the committee would now like to make a number of points, which, because of their special relevance to Africa, it feels particularly qualified to make. They have to do with (1) the relationship between political and economic developments in Africa, (2) the role of the metropolitan powers, (3) Africa's capacity to absorb economic assistance, (4) the undesirability of aiding certain areas in Africa, and (5) our special responsibility for aiding certain other areas.

(1) On the first point, it must be borne in mind that Africa is the last great area of colonial liberation. Since 1950, six countries with a total population of 30 million have become independent; next year four more countries with a population of 40 million, almost one-fifth of Africa's total, are slated for independence. Whenever the ties of colonial bondage are cut, so, invariably, are some of the economic lifelines. While aid from the colonial power to the colony does not usually cease completely with the coming of independence, there is always a marked decrease in its volume. This is due sometimes to the hurt feelings of the former "mother country," but, more frequently, to its natural desire to divert its resources into those colonial areas over which it retains control. As Dr. Arnold Rivkin, director of the African economic and political development project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has pointed out: "At the very time independence is achieved and economic development becomes a primary concern of the indigenous authorities, the important capital, technical assistance, and personnel flows from the metropole are placed in jeopardy."¹

Great political harm can come from our failure to be prepared for these contingencies. For example, when Guinea chose independence from France last September, our country was the first to which it turned for assistance in filling the void left by the sudden withdrawal of French arms, personnel, and equipment. We failed to respond, and other countries, more flexible in their foreign operations, notably Czechoslovakia, heeded an appeal not even addressed to them. As a result, we lost, at least temporarily, an opportunity to cement ties of friendship with an important new country and the world was left with the erroneous impression that Guinea was turning away from the West. Will the same thing happen next year when Nigeria, Togoland, the Cameroons, and Somalia become independent?

(2) It may be argued that the United States should not be required to pick up the tab for independence. There are two answers to this: One is that the amount of capital invested by certain European powers in their dependent territories is probably larger than is generally realized in this country. Thus, according to the United Nations Statistical Yearbook for 1958, France's aid to underdeveloped countries during the period 1954 to 1957 came to 2.6 billion dollars, or approximately 1.7 percent of its average national income, as compared with 0.38 percent for the United States, and her total contribution to underdeveloped areas during the last decade is estimated at 6 billion dollars. Similar, although not quite such impressive figures, could be cited for Great Britain and Belgium.

¹ "A Proposal for Africa," Africa special report, September 1958.

The second answer is that it is quite true that the United States should not be expected by itself to bear the cost of the liberation of Africa's colonies and should see to it that any contribution it makes to the development of these areas is matched by Europe in proportion to Europe's financial capability. It may well be that channeling more of this aid through the United Nations and other multilateral agencies would result in larger participation by other countries. In this connection, the relationship between the European Common Market Organization and the African dependencies and ex-dependencies of its members will bear watching.

(3) It is sometimes said that Africa's ability to absorb outside capital and technical assistance is severely limited by its present level of development. There is some truth in this, for the last decade or 15 years of relatively enlightened colonial rule have not offset the effect of the preceding centuries of enforced ignorance and compulsory orientation of the colonial economies toward export crops at the expense of local industry. Nevertheless, Africa can and must find ways to utilize productively much larger quantities of foreign assistance than it is now receiving. It is an economic necessity if Africa's excessive dependence on the production of raw materials, with their wildly fluctuating world prices, is to be broken.

It is also a political necessity. In the words of Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana: "The leaders of the new Africa have no alternative but to look for outside assistance. The hopes and ambitions of their peoples have been planted and brought to maturity by the impact of Western civilization. The West has set the pattern of our hopes, and by entering Africa in strength it has forced the pattern upon us. Now comes our response. We cannot tell our peoples that material benefits and growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do, they will throw us out and seek other leaders. And they will abandon us, too, if we do not in reasonable measure respond to their hopes. Therefore we have no choice. Africa has no choice."²

A measure of the extent to which economic growth is possible in Africa is that, as a result of energetic national leadership and an effective program of governmental assistance, mostly from the United States, coupled with a policy of encouragement to private investment, the national income of Liberia has risen from \$1 million in 1944 to \$20 million last year and is expected to double again in the next 5 or 6 years.

(4) There are areas of Africa where the expenditure of American aid raises political problems unlike those facing the mutual security program in Asia, but not unlike those presented by the operation of the program in certain Latin American countries. These problems arise from the giving of American aid to governments which are representative of a small fraction and oppressive of the large majority of the people in their countries.

In the opinion of the American Committee on Africa, the Union of South Africa, the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and, to a lesser extent, the Central African Federation, fall into this category, and the extension of American aid to such areas, through the Export-Import Bank and various programs of raw materials purchasing and stockpiling, raises grave questions of political wisdom and moral rightness. Any amounts appropriated to, spent in, or loaned to countries which pursue an open policy of racial discrimination are bound to create ill feeling toward the United States among their disenfranchised nonwhite populations, as well as in other African countries. It may not be inappropriate to establish legislative safeguards against the expenditure of mutual security funds in such areas.

(5) If there are areas in Africa to which American aid should not go at all, there are others which have a special claim on such aid. These are Liberia, which, having been created by America in 1847, was neglected by it for almost a century thereafter; Libya, which was guided to independence after World War II by the United Nations, in which our country plays such an important role; and the United Nations trust territories of Togoland, the Cameroons, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, and Somalia in which, again, the United States should have a special interest because of their special relationship to the United Nations. The faith which the people of these trust territories have in the United Nations is self-evident to anyone who has ever heard a petitioner from a trust area present his case to the U.N.'s Fourth Committee. As the most powerful single member of the United Nations, the United States is expected

² "African Prospect," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1958.

to live up to that faith and should add to the political responsibility which it has already assumed for these areas, a responsibility on the economic plane, both before and after their independence.

In conclusion, a word about the readiness of the American people to pay for an increased amount of foreign aid. The American Committee on Africa has, in the last 2 years, received voluntary contributions totaling approximately \$150,000, mostly in small amounts, from nearly 10,000 individuals, and has just had an opportunity to observe the warmth and enthusiasm with which one of Africa's outstanding political leaders, Tom Mboya, of Kenya, was received throughout the length and breadth of this country during a 5-week lecture tour sponsored by the Committee. Judging from its own experience, therefore, the Committee believes that the American people, with their usual good sense, will put up the money for any program that is right and useful and necessary, provided they are satisfied that it is all of these things.
