

American Committee on Africa
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To: A Few ACOA Friends

From: George Houser, Paul Irish & Jennifer Davis

Re: Notes on Visit to Washington - March 22, 1976

We spent approximately 45 minutes with each of the following: Congressman Charles Diggs, (and Hershelle Challenor, his major Africa advisor); Assistant Secretary of State, William Schaufele; Senator Dick Clark; Mark Moran (of Senator John Tunney's office) who was in Angola in January.

We raised a number of similar questions with each of these people. This report will deal in summary with the most important responses under each topic.

Angola

Recognition of the government; possible visit to U.S. by an Angola delegation; reconstruction aid. - Congressman Diggs had sent a "Dear Colleague" letter (asking for co-signers to a communication to the President urging recognition of the Peoples Republic of Angola) around the house - this had had a poor response with only 22 signers. Caution by potential supporters might be due to reluctance to be associated in any way with sympathy for continued Cuban presence in Africa - particularly in the light of the upcoming elections and Kissinger's constant volubility on this subject. Diggs was pleased with the ACOA initiative on this question. Dr. Challenor suggested trying to approach a Jewish constituency (to see where they stand) as well as our more traditional Church/Labor/Academic nexus. He thought early recognition doubtful. Felt it would be useful to have an Angolan delegation visit DC.; would be glad to help set up something. On future aid, he had already proposed a \$10 million amount be written into the Bill as Disaster Assistance for 1977.

Schaufele said the U.S. was "waiting for Zambia and Zaire" on recognition. He did not directly mention the Cuban presence as an impeding factor. When asked why the U.S. placed such importance on Zambia and Zaire's opinions as against the rest of the OAU, he said they were the countries most directly involved. Denied that the U.S. could or would advise them on their positions. Said he had no view on whether the U.S. would grant visas to allow a delegation to travel away from the UN in the U.S. - would get back to us on the question. Would not discuss the question of assistance. Said that the U.S. would not interfere with trade - cited delivery of Boeings, resumption of Gulf link as examples.

Clark felt that recognition would not come soon (probably not this year), that Kissinger would hang on to his hostile position, using the "Cuban threat" as a useful propaganda lever. Felt that an Angola/MPLA visit would be good; outlined the difficulties of arranging a formal meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee (only Americans can be heard in the Senate - which differs from House rules), but was very willing to make arrangements for them to see Senators and others, to arrange a lunch, etc. Would help if he could on the visa question.

Moran spent considerable time reviewing his view of the MPLA. Was obviously disappointed by Administration's reluctance to deal directly with the MPLA. Said that the release of the Boeings and removal of Gulf ban could have been much more "played up" as a signal to MPLA. Was enthusiastic about a possible visit by a delegation, particularly if that happened soon i.e. for the Security Council meeting. Suggested that it might be possible to set up meetings not only with Senate, etc. people, but also State Dept.

Rhodesia

Everyone agreed that there would be some aid to Mozambique following on the border closure. Kissinger had made a commitment to this effect - not clear yet what that would be. Schaufele had specifically testified to this in Senate Sub-committee hearings.

Hershelle Challenor expressed concern that there was some evidence of a growing mood even within State of the possible ultimate necessity of some pro-white intervention. No one thought that Kissinger would retreat rapidly from his bellicose position on the Cubans though no one really seemed to think that the Cubans would really move into Rhodesia immediately. Even Schaufele admitted that this was very unlikely. Clark expressed some discomfort at being pushed by press questions (Meet the Press) into a position where he appeared to be defending Cuban and Soviet action.

We raised the question of the repeal of the Byrd Amendment with everyone. Diggs, Clark, all felt it would be a useful signal - but also felt that there was considerable reluctance to begin again - because no one wanted to lose again. General feeling that the Administration ought to pick up the issue strongly - not much hope that they would.

Schaufele's attitude was that if Congresspeople and the Administration pushed hard on the repeal that would have to "use up political capital" and might have to make concessions on other things. We asked about the nature of these other things, as he was vague - though he did say at one point that there had been a great deal of pressure over the FLUOR/Ex-Im issue "and you might not want to have to pay the price we would have to pay - i.e. indicating some sort of trade-off with a softening position on the loans to S.A.) Clark later challenged that view - said he did not think that the issue would involve that kind of 'horse-trading' - but that it would be a problem to get anyone to commit themselves to the major task of taking an initial head-count and getting the issue going. In general everyone seemed to think repeal was a good idea if someone else did the work.

Clark felt it might be very useful to have someone like Bishop Muzorewa visit DC - felt that considerable publicity and interest could be generated around him.

Any action on the Cuban presence was not likely to take place in Africa, but directly against Cuba.

South Africa

We asked Diggs why he had encouraged Kissinger to visit South Africa. He was a little defensive, but reiterated his position that it was a good idea for serious people (i.e. not tourists or entertainers) to go to S.A. and observe conditions; that that must inevitably toughen up their stance against Apartheid - he also clearly hoped that Kissinger would be able to "confront" the South Africans. We expressed our doubt that Kissinger would in fact do such a thing. Clark told us that he had responded to Kissinger's inquiry about whether he should go by saying "only if you do a Bobby Kennedy"! Schaufele asked our view (we indicating we strongly opposed). He clearly was not very keen on the visit himself, said that Kissinger had only begun to consider it after Diggs's suggestion. Diggs said he was going to communicate with Kissinger indicating conditions which must be met if he was to visit S.A.

We raised the question of the proposed Seagram's investment in Kwazulu, the Kenneth Clark report and the whole issue of Bantustan recognition. Diggs said he felt concerned over the probable conclusions of the report - indicated that he did not feel comfortable with any argument for investment in the Bantustans. Every one had heard of the Buthelezi-Naude statement - I think few had read it carefully - it was generally being

interpreted as a broad-universal-anti-investment statement. We pointed out that it in fact distinguished between the central (that is, direct investment in South Africa) and some other (unspecified, but by implication Bantustan) economies. Schaufele said the U.S. could not commit itself on whether it would recognize the independence of the Bantustans - waiting for Africa, although he believed Africa would be hostile. Said, in response to a question from us about why the U.S., as it said it was opposed to the Bantustans, could not take a clear position on its own "But you always want us to be sensitive to Africa!". Also then said U.S. could not take a separate stand on investment in the Bantustans (apart from the general "we neither encourage or discourage" position) because if they did not recognize the independence of the Bantustans, investment in the Bantustans was just investment in South Africa! At which point George made a gently irrate comment about playing games! Clark said he had not made up his mind on the whole investment issue. He was thinking of holding hearings on South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Mentioned one interesting thing while we were talking about question of the role of U.S. investment. He had discussion with Helen Suzman who told him that if the U.S. wanted "to do the ethical thing" it should cut off all investment. This seems to indicate an increasing feeling on her part that the argument that investment will bring change has, in fact, no validity. Diggs was concerned about rapid growth of investment in South Africa.

Namibia

The most interesting discussion on Namibia was with Schaufele. On the Constitutional Conference he said the U.S. had urged the South Africans to include SWAPO and others. We asked whether he thought that SWAPO would agree. He indicated that there were differences between SWAPO internal and external organization, and that he felt if SWAPO internal were willing to agree, that would be a useful "first step". Indicated that the U.S. would continue to press the South Africans on including SWAPO and possibly at some stage the UN (rather vague on that.)

He denied absolutely that Namibia was any "threat to the peace" although we referred to the SWAPO reports that UNITA now had several hundred men in Northern Namibia who knew the terrain and could be used by the South Africans as well as posing a threat to the Government of the PRA. Denied any knowledge of such a UNITA presence.

On the Decree said in response to our question as to whether there was a U.S. position on enforcing the Decree that there were legal problems involved. Was quick to mention the "affirmative action" on seal-skins --- but indicated that the U.S. could only act where U.S. law already provided for the prevention of imports - i.e. in reality the U.S. would not act to enforce the Decree. (Seemed surprisingly ignorant about 'details' such as the fact that a major Namibian export was Tsumeb-produced copper.)

Diggs said he was holding hearings on Namibia soon.

In general no one felt very optimistic about the direction of U.S. policy on any issue; people like Hershelle Challenor obviously felt there was a constant pressure to move the wrong way.